

U
Cornwallis's concep., cont.

No 25

Wimbleton
7th April 1788

My Dear Lord

B.I. 1

The accompanying paper has been transmitted to me by one of the professors of philosophy in the university of Edinburgh. I have no scruple in transmitting it to your lordship, because the suggestions it contains are of a nature to draw your attention, if by any fair encouragement the cause of literature and science can be promoted in the manner set forth in the paper,

Yours very sincerely

Earl Cornwallis

Henry Dundas

No 11

Wimbleton
27th July 1787

My Dear Lord

I make it a rule to receive information from everybody that offers it to me upon the subject of India. I get a great deal of information that way, which repays the time it consumes, although sometimes it consumes a great deal. I send you two that have come to mein the course of these communications. The No 1 is very long, and you will judge if it contains anything worthy of your extracting from it. No 2 was the heads of a conversation I had with Mr Cumming himself on the subject of it, and which I desired him to put in writing. He was introduced to my acquaintance by our secretary Mr Rouse. He is now at Bengal, where you can have opportunities of conversing with him yourself.

Yours most sincerely

Earl Cornwallis

Henry Dundas

No 60

17th March 1791

My Dear Lord

Upon looking over the copy of the letter I wrote to you on the 4th of this month, it strikes me that there is a part of it liable to misapprehension, I mean that part of it where I speak of the Nabob of Arcot having any troops in his service, in the event of an arrangement to fix him at Arcot, and leave him in possession of the middle provinces of the Carnatick. I am clear in the opinion, we have so long entertained, that the sword must be exclusively in our hands, and therefore whatever arrangement takes place with the Nabob, it would be unwise and unsafe to entrust any part of the defence of the Carnatick in his hands. Be his possessions larger or smaller, they must be all defended by us, in the same manner as our own. I thought it right to trouble you with these lines of explanation in case your lordship should be induced from what I formerly wrote, to think there was any fluctuation in my opinions on this important subject.

I am, my dear lord, yours most sincerely, Henry Dundas
Earl Cornwallis

Dundas to Cornwallis: Some Extracts on Zemindari Settlement and Criminal Justice.

8th August 1789 (No 44) I am truly concerned on account of Mr Shore's health. I long much for his revenue settlement, and I have postponed giving a serious consideration to Mr Grant's or any other individual speculation upon Revenue, till by the conclusion of Mr Shore's arrangement, I can have the whole before me.

Your wishes for the improvement of the criminal justice of the country are worthy of yourself, and of infinite moment. In every system you recommend for that purpose, you of course will never lose sight of the religion, manners, and even prejudices of the natives. Under that reserve, I do not think it is possible you can suggest anything which I shall not be disposed to subscribe.

My chief consolation consists in the hopes that your Regulations will prevent any future governors from doing mischief, which we have not means of discovering and checking.

16th May 1790 (No 47) I have not yet had much communication with Mr Shore, and shall certainly take care not to be overwhelmed by his authority in considering the subjects on which your lordship and he entertains any difference of opinion respecting the permanent settlement of Revenues. I propose in the course of this summer to consider the whole subject with the most minute attention, and as both Mr Shore and Mr Grant are on the spot, there can be no doubt of able discussion on the points where they differ. you need entertain no doubt that Mr Shore, as well from regards to your wishes, as from his own merits, will meet with every attention from all of us.

14th September 1790 (No 52) You may rest assured, I will not fail to pay every attention, to everything you state relative to the Bengal Settlement. It shall occupy my most serious attention the moment I return to town. I could perceive before I left town, that the friends of Sir John Macpherson and Mr Grant were very busy in endeavouring to create jealousies on that subject, and of course it will be necessary to give it the most minute consideration.

13th November 1790 (No 54) You have no occasion to caution me against a hasty judgement on the subject of the Bengal Settlement, for when so great authorities differ, you may conceive I shall be exceedingly cautious. If I was to follow the bent of my own inclination, it would be not to decide on the question in which your lordship and Mr Shore differs, till you return to the country, when I could have had the advantage of private and confidential conversations with both of you, and if there had been no interruption to your return at the time you proposed, I should certainly have been induced to have the advantage of that circumstance. Although it had been attended with some small delay, but if you are detained for any length of time, we must do the best we can. I have ordered every paper on the subject to be collected together, and I think we shall have so long a recess at the Christmas holidays, that I may be able to

get through them. When I do, you may depend on hearing from me, with an account of my genuine opinions either officially, or by private correspondence.

2nd May 1791 (No 61) Your letter No 49 brings me your propositions respecting the criminal justice of India, which having but just received, I have not yet had time to give it any consideration.

There is a disposition in the Court of Directors to postpone the consideration of the great question of the land revenues, not from any other cause, but apprehensions for the difficulty of it, but I do not mean to indulge them in that disposition. I send you No 1, a copy of the paragraphs proposed by them; No 2, a copy of the one substituted by me; and No 3, a copy of the reasons assigned for the alterations.

Malabar and Tippee

21st September 1791 (No 66) The situation of the Rajahs along the Malabar coast, from Travancore northward, claim your lordship's particular attention; and the exercise of every power in your hands, which can add to their happiness, and future security. Let them, after the example of the Cochin Rajah, become our tributaries, in place of the tributaries of Tippee Sultan, under such stipulations as may secure them from all apprehensions either from us or each other. From all I have heard respecting them, that sentiment duly attended to, will ensure to us their perfect fidelity, and procure for us, consequentially, the great political and commercial benefits to be derived from a free, secure, and uninterrupted intercourse with the Malabar coast, that we have never enjoyed since the last peace with him in 1764.

These objects being secured, it will be for your lordship, under all circumstances, to determine whether Tippee is to be left in possession of the proper Mysore country; or if that country is to be restored to the ancient Rajahs of Mysore and Bednore. My mind leans strongly to this last arrangement, because I do not conceive that India, under almost any precautions, can remain at peace, while the restless, turbulent, and proud spirit of Tippee is allowed to remain in possession of any authority. He is, at any rate, an usurper, and a due attention to the just claim of these ancient Hindoo princes, whose rights he has usurped, will add to our security, by adding to the celebrity of our national character. Besides, these princes will always look up to us as the restorers of their rights, whereas Tippee will consider us the destroyers of the fair prospects of his ambition; and he will be at all times the ready instrument for the intrigues of the French, or any other power, who may envy and wish to destroy our power and consequence in India.

Henry Dundas to Wellesley (extract): 21.3.1799 (No 10)

BT II.2

The Northern Circars have certainly never produced to us these advantages which the extent of the country, and the fertility of the soil in many parts, entitle us to expect. I know not to what cause to attribute it, but the inhabitants of some of its higher parts seem to be in a state of very uncivilized society, and this can only be gradually removed by a steady, just and vigorous government. We must not too rapidly apply to that part of our possessions the same principles of government, which have been wisely applied to the more civilized provinces of Bengal. I believe the same observations may to a considerable degree be made, with regard to some parts of the Circars, that I shall immediately bring under your view, with regard to the Malabar provinces.

From the situation of the countries in our possession, on the coast of Malabar, they are calculated to be either a great security, or a great annoyance to our power in India; and whether they shall be one or the other, depends much on the manner in which they are managed. I was much struck with a letter I received from General Stuart on this subject. He is an intelligent man, and being the result of his own observation on the spot, I am the more disposed to rely on the solidity of his observations, and I recommend them to your serious attention. I send you an extract of the letter to which I refer and your lordship will observe that I have made considerable use of it in the public despatches which go by this conveyance to the Bombay Government.

Among the particulars in this letter the concluding part attracted my attention, and as coming from so excellent a military authority, they tended to confirm an opinion I have long been inclined to entertain; I mean the impropriety of too much dividing and distracting our force on the Malabar coast. We ought undoubtedly at all times to maintain an efficient government at Bombay for the safety of the island and the many valuable interests established there, but having done this, the great body of our army under that Presidency ought, in my opinion, to be concentrated in some position on the Malabar coast, best calculated to make an impression on Tippee's country, if, at any time, we are compelled to engage in hostilities with him. I wish this part of the subject to be duly examined, and if the idea is a right one, it ought certainly to be acted upon systematically. It is impossible we can allow our troops to be expended in hunting through the jungles in the Malabar country after every refractory Rajah, who may be disposed to be troublesome. The late transactions with the Coticote Rajah ought to afford us a salutary admonition.

I remain
my dear lord
yours most faithfully

Henry Dundas

From Add MSS No 37274, pages 145-6, of Wellesley

Papers in the British Museum. The letter, except the last two paras reproduced above and the accompanying enclosure of the extract from General Stuart's letter, is printed in vol II, pages 107-10, of "Wellesley Despatches, Memoranda, Correspondence &c".

Cornwallis Correspondence

Dear Sir,

31.3

The conversation which passed between us this morning has given me the greatest uneasiness; whilst I conceived that your resolution of going home was formed from the consideration of your health alone, although I felt the misfortune to the public and to myself, I could only lament the unhappy cause and submit. But to be told that I have sacrificed your services to such a man as Mr. Mackenzie*, touches me too sensibly. As there was no part of our former connection that gave me reason to apprehend that this would be the consequence of my opinion on the late altercations at the Board of Revenue, you will easily conceive that your declaration came very unexpectedly upon me. It will be a great ease to my mind to have another conversation with you on the subject, and I shall be glad to call on you for half an hour either this evening or tomorrow morning, whichever will be most convenient or agreeable to you.

(Cornwallis)

To

John Shore Esq.

Public Record Office: PRO/30/11/165:
Letter from Cornwallis to John Shore:
Sheet 90 (seems to be manuscript in own
hand: Seems to refer to 88: April 25, 1789).

*Crossed out in original "whom I both hate
and despise".

Cornwallis to Dundas: 26.8.1787

Letter dated 26th August 1787
(pp.273r) omitted portion)

.... There will be an end of
my reformation.

omitted
portion

Then Benaras well managed is able
to pay 40 lakhs with ease, I am well assured.
I this day received an account from the
Commanding Officer of the Sepoys Brigade
that the greatest part of the Battalion
stationed at Joanpoor is now dispersed over
the country to prevent the Ryots from running
away with their wives and families, to some
place where they will suffer less oppression
If Mr. Duncan can prevent this, will his
additional 4,000 rupees per month be thrown
away....

omitted
portion

I still hardly can think that Tippoo
will attack the Carnatic without a ~~maxx~~ ^{max} as
much more outside support from the French,
than the present situation of the affairs
in Europe makes it probable that he will
receive.

Public Record Office: Cornwallis Papers: Extracts
from letters of Cornwallis to Dundas.

Cornwallis A. Read

Camp near Ootradroog

14th January 1792

Sir,

I am exceedingly sensible of the great advantages that the public service has derived from your zeal and ability in conciliating the good will of the inhabitants and in arranging the settlements of the districts that have been placed under your management and as some compensation for the trouble and responsibility of your station, you are authorised to charge in your accounts six per cent, on your nett collections. I mean upon the amount that may be realised for the benefit of the Company after deducting all the expenses with which those collections may be actually attended. Being persuaded that Lieutenant Munro's services will prove of great utility in the capacity of your assistance, you are likewise authorised to pay him from your receipts an allowance of two hundred pagodas ~~per~~ month from the day ^{per} on which he was relieved from the command of the two Companies of sepys that are employed under the Prize agents of the army.

The above allowances are to be considered as the whole compensation that you and Lieutenant Munro are to expect for discharging your respective duties in superintending the Districts that have been reduced from the enemy; and I have so entire confidence in your honour and integrity as to be persuaded that neither of you are capable of attempting to obtain the smallest emolument beyond that which is open and allowed.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient and
most humble servant

(Signed) Cornwallis

Captain Alexander Read,

India Office Records: MSS Eur E 184 & E225

Extract of a letter from Captain Read to Lord Cornwallis dated Bangalore February 1792

Having now settled all the conquered countries, to the Eastward of Seringapatam, excepting that tract, bounded by the Maggerly Hills, and the Cauvery, which is so much laid waste as to be incapable of producing any revenue; the present Gentoo year terminating the 21st June, to which all my settlements are limited, and meeting with unavoidable delays in acquiring the requisite information to complete, as I propose, my Reports of each District, I do myself the honour to transmit your Lordship in the meantime memorandums of my several stipulations. The first (No. 1) contains the several payments made, or due from every district, to the end of June. In the Second (No. 2), their several instalments are classed into months, to show the monthly surplus, after defraying the expense of all the troops under my command, which does not exceed Pags. 10,000 as it may be assisting in the distribution of public money and the third (No. 3) shows the quantities of grain that, if required, may be collected into the forts of Colar, Hiskotta, Hissoor, Bangalore, Nundy Droog, and Outray Droog, in the month of February and March, June and July.

By including grain in my settlements, I rather provided for exigencies than supposed it would be advisable to collect such large quantities into those different places, knowing that would straiten the Banjarries, who must be chiefly depended upon for carrying it to Camp, and on that occasion account care was taken to leave the receiving it, or an equivalent in money optional.

No. 1 Memorandum of the instalments of Revenue arising from the district in Ballaghat the current year ending the 21st June 1792.

No. 2 Memorandum of the instalments of Revenue from the district under the Company's protection in Ballaghat in the order they become due.

India Office Records: MSS Eur E 184 & E 225

No. 3 Memorandum of the stipulated quantities of grain to be collected for Government, if required from the Districts in Ballagaut the current revenue year ending the 21st June 1792.

Letter No. 66 dated 18th June 1792
(pp. 125-127 from Madras Vol. 151)

(126)....A man of upright intentions with ability in application that and undertake this Government for six or seven years might do great things for the public, and save a considerable fortune for himself....

Governor General.....which I hope never again to see in the hands of Company's servants.

B 11, 4

Public Record Office: Cornwallis Papers: Extracts from letters of Cornwallis to Dundas.

Cornwallis:
Only someone from British
nobility should be
Governor General in India

B-II.5

(88)....Lord Cornwallis and you have gone to India not like former Governmers for the purpose of enriching yourself or providing for needy connexions, but you have undertaken the much nobler task of redeeming a lost empire; and upon that foundation establishing a monument to your own fame in the gratitude and affection of your own country.....

(89)....It is a fault of all the Dispatches of fomer Governors of India, to be mixt with an unsufferable quantity of egotism. The fact is, I have never failed the distinction to give Sir John Macpherson all the credit, he on so many occgsions, deserves because he said so much of himself.

Public Record Office: Cornwallis Papers:
Letter dated Winbeldon, 26th July 1787 from Henry Dundas to Sir Archibald Campbell, Governor of Madras (Vo.112)

B-II.6

(286)....But the truth appears to me that the little now remains to be accomplished beyond the settlement of the state of that disorder, which must always be the immediate consequence of transfer of power, effected by the operation of war.....

(287)....Barlow as the original Legislator of India.....

Public Record Office: Chatham Papers:
Letter dated 18th May 1805 from Wellesley to Pitt (pp.285-290): PRO 30/8/362/II

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Ellenborough papers

VII

BII.7

Calcutta
December 2, 1829

My Dear Lord

I have the pleasure of sending enclosed a copy of a minute, which will give you a complete view of the proposed modification of our relation with the state of Nagpore, the general outline of which I communicated to you per Vectian (?). I trust the arrangement will meet your approbation.

Yours sincerely

William Bentinck

To

Lord Ellenborough

Public Record Office: PRO/30/9/4/II/2:
Ellenborough Papers: Letters from Lord
William Bentinck to Ellenborough:
Letter dated December 2, 1829 enclosing
a Minute dated November 15, 1829.

VII
Lord Ellenborough to Duke of Wellington: 20.5.1830

India Board
May 20, 1830

My Dear Duke of Wellington

(See Des 9. 6. 1830) 3

I send you the papers relative to the new treaty with Nagpore and the treaty of 1826 for reference. I enclose likewise the letter which it seems to me expedient to send out without delay.

The view I from the first took of the impolicy of the new treaty has been confirmed by my conversation with Mr Jenkins.

Believe me,
My dear Duke of Wellington
Very faithfully yours

His Grace the Duke of Wellington Ellenborough

Memorandum by the Duke of Wellington on treaty of Nagpore

Memorandum

June 5th 1830

The transfer of the territory is one thing; that of the army and particularly the departure from the obligations of the 15th article of the treaty are quite different.

The former might be expedient, and might, if besides attended by a reduction of the strength of the Rajah's army, have increased his pecuniary resources.

But this was not the object of the measure. That object was to get from the Rajah a subsidy of eight lacks; and for this everything else is sacrificed without consideration.

I don't see upon what ground these eight lacks are claimed. Sure I am that the former arrangement was worth double the money.

In my opinion the Governor General ought to be ordered not to alter the treaties with the native powers without previous explanation to the Court; and orders from home.

Public Record Office, London: PRO 30/9/4 Part 1.1
(Colchester Papers). The Memorandum, though probably in the Duke's own hand, is unsigned as are several other papers from the Duke to Lord Ellenborough in this collection.

VII
Ellenborough to Chairman, Court of Directors: 16.6.1830

Private

India Board
June 16, 1830.

My Dear Sir

I am sorry it will not be in my powers to receive you and the Deputy on Saturday as the further moving of the prize clause is fixed for that day before the Privy Council. I hope you sent off the Nagpore letter. Rajpootana is coming; but in any case there should be no delay in sending off the Nagpore letter.

I am really nervous until the Government had instructions as to their future policy and I much regret that accidental circumstances have delayed this letter three weeks after it was written by me.

I remain, My Dear Sir
Yours very faithfully

W. Astell Esq

(signed) Ellenborough

Ellenborough to Chairman, Court of Directors: 18.6.1830

Private

India Board
June 18, 1830

My dear Sir

The receipt of the information from Bengal that the treaty with Nagpore has been modified in the manner we before knew that the Bengal Government intended to modify it, will not induce the necessity of altering the words of the letter the Board have already directed the Secret Committee to transmit to the Supreme Government upon that subject. I send herewith a short letter acknowledging the receipt of the treaty which is all that is required.

I have already intimated to you my great regret that so much unavoidable delay took place in transmitting the letter to you after it was written and my anxiety that it should be sent with all speed, for I am really fearful of what may be the next measure of foreign policy adopted by the Indian Government.

You and the Deputy have already privately stated to me your impression upon the subject of the treaty and of the letter. The act of Parliament does not make provision for an official representation on the part of the Secret Committee where they may happen to take a different view from that adopted by the Board, and I could not officially receive any such representation.

I do hope that you will forthwith forward the letter in question.

The least delay in its transmission to India is in my opinion injurious to the public service.

Believe me, My Dear Sir
very faithfully yours
(signed) Ellenborough

W. Astell Esq

PRO/30/9/4-III-4 in Public Record Office, London.

From Secret Committee to Commissioners: 24th June 1830

Secret

East India House
24th June 1830

Sir,

I am directed by the Secret Committee to request that you will be pleased to move the Right Hon'ble the Commissioners for the affairs of India to authorise the Committee to communicate to the Court of Directors the Despatches addressed by the Committee to the Governor General in Council of Bengal on the 9th and 18th instant relative to the affairs of the state of Nagpore.

To
The Hon'ble J. Stuart Wortley

I have & c
W. McCulloch

From Commissioners to Secret Committee: June 26th, 1830

Secret

India Board
June 26, 1830

Sir,

I am directed by the Commissioners for the affairs of India to acknowledge the receipt of your letters dated the 23rd and 24th instant and to acquaint you that the Secret Committee have the Board's authority to communicate to the Court of Directors the secret documents therein referred to, viz:

The Despatches addressed to the Governor General in Council on the 9th and 18th instant, relating to the affairs of Nagpore

and

The Secret Letter from the Governor in Council at Fort St George dated 16th February 1830, together with its enclosures relating to the affairs of Travancore.

To
W. McCulloch Esq

I am & c
(Signed) J. Stuart Wortley

From Chairman and Deputy-Chairman to Commissioners: 21.6.1830

Secret
No 749

East India House
21st June 1830

My Lord,

Though we are aware that the legislature has not formally vested the Secret Committee with the right of remonstrating against instructions to the Indian Governments prepared by the Commissioners for the affairs of India, and are aware of your lordship's objection, as expressed in conversation and by letter, against receiving officially the representation of what appears to us exceptionable in the Draft of the Secret Letter transmitted from the Board on the 9th of June, we think it due to the freedom which we wish should characterise our communications with, and to our respect for, your lordship, to make you acquainted beforehand with the reasons which will probably induce us to leave it upon record, that we only sign the letter ministerially, and we are no parties to some of the sentiments which it conveys. Though this has produced some delay, it is the less to be regretted, as no opportunity for transmitting this and the

from Secret Committee Drafts and Correspondence 1824-30, vol 2, pages 243-6, in the Political and Secret Department Records, India Office Library.

subsequent letter of the 19th June, to India, has occurred since the transmission of the latter to the India House.

The act of the Bengal Government to which the Draft above alluded to, refer, consists of two parts, 1. relieving the Rajah of Nagpore from the controul which the British Government has exercised over a part of his domaniens; and 2nd taking from him, in return, an annual payment of 8 lakhs of rupees.

The last mentioned part of this transaction, is no doubt liable to a diversity of opinion; and we do not think it necessary, at present, to enter upon the question, whether, if we we had been previously apprized of the measure, we should have approved of this part of it, or not.

With respect however to to the part first mentioned, namely, receding from controul over a native government, as far as is consistent with the security of our own government, this has been long recognised by the authorities at home, as our true policy in respect of every native government still existing in India, and has been enjoined upon the Indian Governments by unvarying instruction, both public and secret for a series of years. We confess that we are so far from concurring in a condemnation of this course of policy that we concur with your predecessors and ours, in approving it, and think it our duty to do all that lies in our power to prevent it from being altered.

We also think it incumbent upon us to state, that so far as the language of the Drafts conveys a censure of the Bengal Government for withdrawing its controul from the Government of the Rajah, we are unable to adopt it; because we think that our Governments in India are bound, in pursuance of the instructions which they have received, to omit no opportunity of adopting measures of this nature whenever they think it can be done with safety.

There is still another consideration which we beg leave to submit to your lordship, and which presses upon our minds as a matter of great weight; that when our important course of policy, deliberately adopted, and long pursued, is to be changed, it ought to be done with great deliberation, and with a full communication of the grounds upon which the change is adopted; and that, in the deliberation, upon such a change in the policy of the Indian Governments, the Court of Directors ought to be parties. It appears to us that this is clearly the intention of the legislature; and that they are divested of their legitimate share in the government of India, if this is denied them.

This is a very summary indication of the reasons which render us averse to the signing of such a letter as that, the Draft of which you have forwarded to us. It appears to us to be sufficient in the meantime to apprise your lordship, generally with the state of our sentiments; and a more detailed exposition can be made, if it should hereafter appear to be necessary.

The Right Hon'ble
Lord Ellenborough

We have the honour &c &c
(signed) W. Astell
Robert Campbell

Letter from President, Board of Commissioners to Chairman:

Private & Confidential
No 750

India Board
2nd July 1830

My Dear Sir,

I have read again the letter of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors in which they desire the authority of this Board to lay before the Court the letter addressed by the Committee to the Government of Bengal on the affairs of Nagpore, and I find it as you stated.

I had certainly imagined that the letter the Secret Committee wished to lay before the Court was one addressed to them by the Bengal Government and in this error acquiesced in the desire expressed.

I very much regret this error which was common to Mr Wortley and me. However as you made the Court secret I do hope the substance of the Secret Letter will not transpire, as the giving publicity to the principles laid down in that letter for our future conduct with regard to the remaining native states of India might be very prejudicial. I refer particularly to the use which might be made by Russia of the knowledge of our policy &c. I again request you will have the goodness to explain to the Court the inadvertance by which the letter has been communicated to them, and to impress upon them the necessity of preserving secrecy upon the subject.

W. Astell Esq

Believe me &c &c
(signed) Ellenborough

VII

B 11.8

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter dated the 22nd March, and the accompanying Minute, which gives a most interesting account of the chiefs of the Southern Marhatta country. I have sent it to the Duke of Windsor, who will, I know, ^{at Wellington} peruse it with great pleasure. He looks back to India with the warm feelings of youth.

I have am much disposed to concur in all the observations you have made, and in all the opinions you have intimated in your minute. When I was appointed to my present office, I had no preconceived opinions, and I have kept out of the way of prejudiced men. I have allowed opinions to grow up gradually in my own mind, as I acquired more knowledge from more sources, and the result of my consideration has been that the fiscal and judicial functions must be entrusted, as much as possible, to the natives of India, and that the Village system must be the foundation of any good government.

I do not see my way to that which should be the first object of all governments,

Public Record Office: PRO/30/9/4/Par^a V/2:
Letter from Ellenborough to Sir John Malcolm
Governor of Bombay: Dated 7th August, 1829
on Malcolm's Minute on the Southern Marhatta
country.

VII
Lord Ellenborough to Arthur, Duke of Wellington: 4.10.1842.

Extract

Simlah,
October 4, 1842.

My Dear Duke of Wellington

I could not have credited the extent to which the Mahomedans desired our failure in Afganistan, unless I had heard here circumstances which prove that the feeling pervaded even these entirely dependent upon there

Here ~~time~~ is a great preponderance of Mahometans. I am told that the guns produced absolute consternation, visible in their countenances. One ayah threw herself upon the ground in an agony of despair. The commander in chief observed it amongst his own servants. I fired fortytwo guns for Ghuzni and Cabul; the 22nd -- which announced that all was finished-- was what overcame the Mahometans. The Hindoes, on the other hand, are delighted. It seems to me most unwise, when we are sure of the hostility of one-tenth, not to secure the enthusiastic support of the nine-tenths which a-re faithful, and, avoiding everything which could be justly offensive to the Mahometans. I would make the most of our successes and the recovery of the gates of the temple, treating it ostensibly as a great military triumph, but knowing very well that the Hindoes will value it as the guarantee of the future security of themselves and their religion against Mussulmans. ~~All these effects will be~~ ~~very~~ All these who best know India tell me that the effect will be very great indeed, and I think it will.

On the morning of the first I wrote to the principal sovereigns of India, to announce ~~an~~ our success, in terms adapted to the nature of our different relations with them. I believe I shall now keep all quiet very easily.

Our revenue is improving very rapidly. In the year ending in August the receipt is about £ 900,000 more than in the preceding year. Of this, £ 500,000 from opium. Amidst all the favourable circumstances which now surround me, I assure you my highest pleasure would be to know that you think I have done right.

Believe me & c

(signed) Ellenborough

From "History of the Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough in his Correspondence with the Duke of Wellington" 1874, pages 293-6, published 1874

VII
Letter from Duke of Wellington to Lord Ellenborough: 4.2.1843

Extract

London
February 4, 1843.

My Dear Lord Ellenborough

...

A perusal of the debates in both Houses on the address to the Queen will show you what will be the topics in the discussion on the motions for thanks. In respect to yourself, they will be to your order of the 1st October 1842, in relation to the policy of the Afghanistan war, and your letter to the Rajwary of India in relation to the gates of the pagoda at Somnauth; the former will be made a bitter party complaint, the latter will be used as a means to excite against you the feelings of the religious parties in this country.

I am much more uneasy about the thanks to General Pellock than I am about those to yourself....

Letter from Duke of Wellington to Lord Ellenborough: 14.3.1843

London
March 14, 1843.

My Dear Lord Ellenborough,

You will see that we had in both Houses of Parliament, on Thursday the 9th, debates on your proclamation, or general order, from India of the 1st October 1842, and upon your letter to the Rajwary upon the gates of Somnauth.

Nothing could have been more satisfactory than the debate in the House of Lords, and I am told it was equally so in the House of Commons. The resolution was rejected in the latter House by a very successful majority, and everybody has since appeared satisfied.

There is an end of the question.

Believe me
Ever yours most
sincerely
(signed) Wellington

H.E. the Lord Ellenborough

From pages 293-6 and 365-6 of "Ellenborough Correspondence with the Duke of Wellington &c "

Wellesley to Dundas 12.11.1798.

SRD: GD 51/3/2/13-31: Wellesley to
H. Dundas, 12.11.1798

WELLESLEY ESTIMATE OF LORD CLIVE

III
BTI.9

...It is with the utmost real concern that after a (162b) full and impartial enquiry, I am compelled to declare to you, that I believe Lord Clive is not equal to his situation either in point of talents or of knowledge. His intentions are however so indisputably pure and honorable, and he has shown so much desire to act cordially with me, that I should be quite certain of his becoming an useful support, if he were not so much in the hands of Mr Webb. With a full knowledge of my opinion of that gentleman, Lord Clive has been so deceived as to request from me a discretionary power of (163a) imparting to Mr Webb my private and confidential communications to his Lordship, If Mr Petrie were in the council I entertain a hope that Mr Webb would lose his ascendancy in some degree; but as the matter now stands, I am seriously apprehensive for the safety of our possessions in the Carnatic, the care of which requires a considerable degree both of ability and vigour.

Nov 13th

However my accounts of this day from Madras give me more hopes; they had just received the news of my bloodless victory at Hyderabad; which has considerably raised the spirits of Lord (163b) Clive and General Harris, and I hope depressed those of the faction in an equal proportion. I have endeavoured on this occasion to apply ~~excuses~~/to Lord Clive's constitution; I enclose a tonic a copy of it, and I entertain a sanguine hope that it may prove useful.

My earnest request to you is that you will, by the earliest possible opportunity, overland and by sea convey to India through the Secret Committee a most pointed censure of the letters of the 10th of July, and of the 3rd of August from Fort St George.

(164a) From the censure you will exempt General Harris, and direct your thunder against the subordinate officers of government. That you will also censure the Political and Secret letters of the 15th of October, and remark the gross misrepresentation of my measures, as well as the inconsistencies which these letters contain.

From this censure you will except Lord Clive, and refer to my Secret letter in council, and to my separate letter to the Court of Directors to show the cordial union which subsists between us; expressing a confidence, that Lord Clive will not suffer the arts of any (164b) faction to interrupt our mutual harmony.

If you will immediately send out censures to this effect, I trust my authority will stand on a firm basis, but if any disposition to balance or compromise between me and the authors of the letters in question should appear in your despatches, it will become quite impossible

Scottish Record Office: GD 51/3/2/13-31: Secret and Confidential No 3, Fort William Nov 12, 1798; Wellesley to Dundas: ff 157-168.

for me to hold the charge of the Government General with any hope of enforcing due respect or prompt obedience to my orders in any part of India. I think you ought also to direct me (through the Government of Fort St George) to remove from (165a) their offices any persons whom I believe to have been concerned in the late factious proceedings at Madras. No Government can proceed with safety against such a new and dangerous species of secret influence; by which these who ought to obey now govern without responsibility and without the possibility of control. If Mr Webbe's libels of the 15th of October, or any other from the same manufactory should make any unfavourable impression of my conduct, I trust to my friends for my defence in the publication of my several minutes and letters. You will decide upon the reports which you (165b) will receive from this country, and upon your own judgement and knowledge of the interests of India, whether my conduct has corresponded with the exigencies of my duty. That the crisis has been most arduous and difficult cannot be denied, and it is equally unquestionable that the part which I have acted has been strong and decided. It is therefore evident that my measures have been either very proper or very much otherwise. ...

Wellesley to Lord Clive: 14.11.1798 (ff 186-8)

(ff 187a) ... I am most happy to learn that your batting train is in such forwardness, and if the same spirit of alacrity and dispatch can (through your Lordship's means) be infused into all the departments of your Government, you will hereafter have the satisfaction to reflect that you have contributed most effectually to the preservation of that empire, which was acquired by the tenor of our arms, and must be maintained by the same means.... (ff 187b) Nor can I conceive a more firm foundation or a more honorable of friendship, than a common share in the labours, difficulties, and honour of defending and saving so valuable a part of the British Empire. This is the nature of the connection which I seek with your Lordship; and these are the sentiments which render me so averse to those men appear so negligent, or reluctant, or irresolute in a conjuncture, which ought to extinguish all partialities, all private resentments and affections, and unite all talents and exertions in one common cause. ...

The above volume also gives Wellesley's letters to Dundas of May 16, 1799 (ff 215-9) and January 25, 1800 (ff 225-31) the first on 'Clive' and the second on 'Webbe'.

In the John Rylands Library there is another letter from Wellesley to Dundas dated Fort St George July 31, 1799 on the same subject (Pitt Papers: E 907: no 22). It gives sketches of the 'leading characters of this place', mentions that 'Petrie is a black sheep' and states: 'with respect to Fallefield, he is a true Indian councillor whom you may dismiss or retain according to your caprice. He does nothing, says nothing, and writes nothing. You may dispose of him as you will.' The letter is marked 'Duplicate'.

BM: Add MS 37274: Henry Dundas
to Lord Mornington (Wellesley): 9.10.
1799

Letter from Henry Dundas to Lord Mornington (later Earl
Wellesley) Governor General of India: 9.10.1799

No 17

Wimbledon
9th October 1799

My Dear Lord

By the overland conveyance of date 27th September, I wrote to your lordship a few lines giving a very general outline of my sentiments respecting the final arrangements of the late conquest made of the kingdom of Mysore. I resume the subject under considerable difficulties as in all probability your lordship may have made an arrangement which it would be inexpedient to disturb. But my uneasiness arises from the immense importance I attach to the settlement of India at the present crisis. In the confidential letter I received from your lordship dated _____ after the war commenced you stated your intention with regard to the objects of negotiation to be pursued under every contingency except the one which actually happened, viz, the complete overthrow of Tippee's power by the capture of Seringapatam. I confess I see no permanent peace in India if any of the descendants of Tippee are placed upon the throne of Mysore; let them be curtailed in power and influence as much as you please still there will remain the seeds of new hostility, perfidy and revenge, which experience has proved to be inseparable from the continuance of power in that family. One would have thought that the severe lesson Tippee was taught by the event of the war terminated by Lord Cornwallis, would have ensured the quiet of India for some time by teaching him how incompetent he was to struggle with the power of Great Britain in India. But from the documents lately transmitted by you he appears as early as 1797 to have resumed with redoubled animosity all his hostile intentions to the interests of this country in India. It may be true that if the temptations of aid from France had not been held up to his view he might have remained quiet, but he would only have done so till some fresh temptation was presented to him. Our situation in India never can be sustained if its peace and security is to rest on such a precarious tenure. I need not enlarge on this topic as I am persuaded your lordship will feel the principle I am stating as strongly as I do, and if you do not apply it on the present occasion to the purpose of totally excluding the family of Tippee Sultan from either the reality or resemblance of power in Mysore your not doing so must arise from your lordship not feeling as forcibly as I do the necessity of adopting that line of conduct as essential for the security of the British interests in India.

I have often heard an idea circulated that it would be an act of munificent generosity on the part of this country, if they would restore the old Mysore family, dethroned by the usurpations of Hyder Ally and his son. This is a refinement to which I confess I am not disposed to subscribe. I know not with any certainty that there is any such family. If there is let them feel the generosity of the British nation in the exercise of its power, but do not let this be done by sacrificing or exposing to risk our own permanent interests. Such a measure could not be adopted without

fettering and controuling him in such a manner as to render all his operations and transactions subservient to our interest and safety. He must of necessity be a cypher on his throne, and I can only appeal to your lordship's experience in the cases of Arcot, Oude and Tanjere if we have much inducement to resort to that species of mixt and double government which has hitherto proved as unpropitious to the happiness and prosperity of the governed as it has to the safety, interests and character of the governors.

I distinctly state it as my wish that your lordship may have seen cause to annex the kingdom of Mysore to the crown of Great Britain to be administered in the same mode and by the same rules as these which are applied to the other British possessions in India.] I know from the communication that you have made to me, that under no circumstances your lordship would agree to allow the maritime parts of the Mysore country on the Malabar coast to remain in any hands but our own, and likewise take it for granted, that you would not allow any part of the country below the passes which enter into the Mysore country from the Carnatic to remain under any government but ours. Holding these points as certain I am at a loss to form any solid grounds for thinking that any reason can be assigned why that part of the peninsula, in place of forming an extensive disjointed and irregular boundary to our interests in the Carnatic should not be concentrated into one valuable and efficient possession connecting together our territories on both coasts, of which Seringapatam itself would be the centre and capital. By such an arrangement we would be impregnable from any quarter, we would have a productive revenue adequate to all our objects both political and commercial, and thereby relieve ourselves from the necessity of draining the revenues of our dominions on the Ganges for the support of our other settlements; we would be placed in a situation with facility and promptitude, either to check the first appearance of hostility on the part of the Mahrattah and the Nizam or to afford them our protection so long as they remained faithful to their engagements with us; in short we would be enabled to preserve the peace and be the arbiters of India, and if we took care that in every act of our administration our justice should be as conspicuous and acknowledged as our power, I can see no reason why our Indian interests may not for ages rest upon a basis of impregnable security.

Under such an arrangement I should doubt the necessity of having so many separate settlements. Bombay ought to remain a powerful military station with a competent marine establishment and all our other settlements on both coasts (including Madras and Ceylon) ought to be stations dependant on the government established at Seringapatam where the great central army ought to be. These different stations on the coast would continue to be great commercial establishments with as much military force as was necessary for their security; but my reason for saying that the great army of that part of India ought to be in the Mysore country is, that from its elevated situation it could watch over not only our territories but those of our neighbours from whom alone any danger could threaten us. An army situated there could at any moment march either into the Mahratta dominions, or the Nizam's country, or our own possessions on the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel as circumstances

might require.

In all this reasoning I do not overlook the objection which naturally suggests itself for consideration, I mean the claims which our allies may be supposed to have to a share in the conquests we have made. Those allies can only be the Mahrattas or the Nizam. The first do not appear to have any claims at all, for they have not in any respect borne a share either in our dangers or in our exertions, and in place of thinking of new acquisitions they can only consult their interest by bestowing their attention on the management of those vast territories they already possess. The Nizam certainly has a claim to attention; and after the situation in which we are now placed respecting him by your lordship's masterly stroke in banishing French intrigue from his Durbar, there can be no doubt of its being our interest to cultivate by our means the most cordial connexion with him. Whatever difficulties there might have been in managing that connexion when we had to consult the jealousies both of the Mahrattas and Tippee I do not think any such difficulty now remains. The Mahrattas must, from past experience, be sensible of our sacred attention to the faith of treaties and therefore will feel it their interest and their inclination to connect themselves with us in the preservation of our common engagements with the Nizam the bases of which are purely defensive, and to which our guarantee must inviolably attach. If your lordship feels that you have the option in your hands I would rather prefer remunerating the services of the Nizam by pecuniary compensation than by additional territory; but if you find that to be inexpedient I have no hesitation in saying that I would much rather gratify the Nizam in his favorite wish of recovering the Circars than I would break in upon that unity and connexion of power and dominion which it is now in our hands to obtain by annexing the Mysore country to our territories. From the anxiety the Nizam has never failed to feel and express on the subject of the Northern Circars, there can be no doubt he would feel such a concession on our part as an ample compensation for any proposition we may have occasion to make to him. If in the course of such an arrangement the Circars should return to the Nizam it will not escape your lordship's attention to guard with the utmost precision against any chance of those territories being alienated to any other power whatever without our special consent previously obtained; and under the circumstances by which we are now related to him, you will be under no difficulty in excluding all other powers from the ports in his maritime dominions except with our consent and concurrence.

I refer your lordship to the map of India for the boundary which this agreement would establish between the Nizam and us. It would run from Innaconda to where the Tungabadra river touches the Mahratta territories; and would bring the districts about Adoni and Cuddapah within our boundary; but I understand that is not a valuable part of the Nizam's country and the cessions of the Circars would be felt by him as a full remuneration for these districts and the services he has performed to us in the course of the war.

If your lordship has made or shall make such an arrangement as I have detailed there arises an easy answer to the question your lordship puts to me how

far it is eligible that the Nabob should take up his residence at Arcot. I answer without hesitation in the affirmative. The only plausible reason why it has ever been stated that he ought to reside at Madras is, that we have thereby the means of watching over him and preventing his intrigues with the French, with Tippee or any other power in his neighbourhood. That reason, I trust, is at an end. The commanding situation we would possess gives the full means of every such precautionary attention, and to your lordship, who by this time have probed it to the bottom, and felt the pernicious effects of it, to your Government, I need not detail the incalculable advantages which would accrue to the interests, the morals, and the material character if we could by removing his Durbar at a distance from our Government and servants; annihilate that source of wickedness, intrigue, profligacy and corruption.

In my letter of the March, I entered so fully into a detail of my sentiments on the situation and importance of the native powers in India, and of our relative connexion with them respectively, it is not my intention at present to enlarge again on those topics. But the new situation in which India is now placed by the fall of Tippee, tempts me to look forward to a state of affairs beyond the present moment. The different modes of disturbing our power in India have been supposed to be either by a direct attack on our territories on the Ganges, or by overwhelming us by expensive contests in the Carnatic by the union of European and native enemies.

As to the first of these modes, it ~~is~~ can scarcely be looked upon as a probable, or indeed a possible event, unless the French were to be in possession either of Ceylon or the Mauritius joined to a superiority at sea. This last is an essential ingredient; for although the French were to be able to collect a great military force at Ceylon or the Mauritius, and land it in the Bengal provinces, the army could not long maintain itself there unless reinforced and otherwise supported by the protection of a superior naval force.

The Carnatic therefore has hitherto been the chosen spot for annoying us; and this has been done in cooperation with a powerful native force chiefly in the person of Hyder Ally or his son Tippee. If we improve the present as I trust we will, this mode of attack will be rendered so unpromising as almost to remove the apprehension of it. The Mahrattas or the Nizam are the only native powers in that quarter to whom the French could apply for cooperation, but if the measures are adopted which I have detailed in the course of this letter, I think their own manifest interests to keep with us, and the example before their eyes of the fall of Tippee, give us just ground to hope that our interests in the Carnatic rest on so sure a foundation as to exclude any alarm of danger in that quarter.

But contemplating the local situation of Hindostan and the nature of its inhabitants in the northern parts of it, we should act a very unwise part if we did not keep a watchful eye on what was passing there. There seems no reason to doubt that Zemaun Shah was implicated in the late combinations against us, and as his object is well-known to be the recovery of the throne

of Delhi, if he persevere in that pursuit it is impossible for the British power in India to be an indifferent spectator or inattentive to the consequences of so powerful and restless a chief coming on the back of our frontiers. He would not long remain quiet, but the country of Oude would be the immediate object of his ambition, and I need not detail to your lordship the fatal consequences to our Bengal provinces, if ever he would be successful in such an enterprize. Such an attempt must be met and resisted in the first and in every stage, and if we are not remiss in our attention to the subject, I don't feel it to be attended with either difficulty or danger. Our own resources alone in the Bengal provinces would be sufficient for the object, and as the Mahrattas, particularly Scindia, has so manifest an interest in the question, there seems no reason to doubt his cordial concurrence in the resistance of such an invasion. But I do not think even there it ought to be allowed to rest; for by keeping up a connexion with the various tribes on the northwestern part of India, it is not a difficult matter to find him at all times business at home to prevent him from hazarding so dangerous an enterprize at so great a distance from home. With this view allow me to direct your attention to the Indus river and those who inhabit the borders of it. I have always thought that if any great European powers had a view to destroy our interests in India they would have acted a wiser part in directing their attention to that quarter than even to those which have more immediately attracted it. But be that as it may if they are excluded by recent events from annoying us in those former quarters, it is reasonable to suppose they will now turn their eyes to that which seems to present a fair opening for that purpose, if we do not take care to shut the door against the danger of their intrigues. For this purpose the possession of Diu would be a most desirable acquisition. Even alone it would be so as it would be the means of preventing its falling into the hands of France. The Portuguese are totally unable to keep it, nor do I know of what advantage it is to them to possess it. It can not escape observation that the Portuguese possessions on that side of India, formed an essential part in the confederacy lately formed between the French and Tippee Sultaun. Even now that Tippee is destroyed depend upon it they will still remain objects of great importance to them to obtain. Goa and Diu would be valuable possessions to the French, if they direct their attention to intrigue with powers in the North west. The Indus is navigable with vessels of considerable size the length of Moultan, and therefore in respect both of its valuable commerce, and in respect of the means it affords of forming connexions with the various chiefs and tribes who border upon it, it opens prospects of extensive speculation, to any power who may wish to rival the wealth or overthrow the power of Great Britain in India. The alliance which such a power would naturally cultivate would be that of Zemaun Shah. He annually resorts to Moultan; the tribes who inhabit the border of the Indus from Moultan to the sea are tributary to Zemaun Shah, and he would be well disposed to give them to any power who would aid him in his views on Hindostan; every inducement of interest and hostility must exert in the breasts of the French the desire to concur in these views. By doing so they introduce a powerful invader upon our Bengal territories in like manner as they tempted Tippee to be our inveterate enemy in the Carnatic. Zemaun Shah is the natural enemy of the

Mahrattas and he would cordially concur with the French in the conquest of the Guzerat country, whereby they would be enabled to maintain a very considerable army to act in cooperation with Zemaun Shah in the establishment of their joint wishes of invading Hindostan and exterminating the British power in India.

Your lordship will probably anticipate the conclusions I naturally draw from these observations. It is my wish that you should explain to the Mahrattas the deep interest they have to prevent the accomplishment of the views I have described. Their existence is implicated in the question, and if they are duly sensible of it they will readily concur in the wish of our obtaining possession of Diu and Gea from the Portuguese and of our maintaining a considerable force at their expense in the Guzerat for the protection of it, and to be prepared to thwart and counteract any views which may be formed by a cooperation of France with Zemaun Shah and the tribes bordering on the Indus. If we had a well disciplined force at Diu and in the Guzerat, we could effectually watch over every operation which might take place in the Indus, and if Zemaun Shah should at any time meditate hostilities against Hindostan to the eastwards we could, by moving a force up the Indus, and cooperating with the Seiks or other tribes hostile to him recal him to his own territories by very hasty strides.

This letter has extended to a greater length than I proposed, I shall have occasion to write to you on other subjects, but I wished to confine myself at present to that which I have treated of in this letter, and I flatter myself I have made my ideas so intelligible to your lordship as will enable you to act upon them so far as circumstances will now admit.

I have the honour to be
My dear Lord,
Yours very faithfully

Henry Dundas

From Additional Manuscripts No 37274 (sheets 244-57) amongst the Wellesley Papers in the British Museum. The letter does not appear to be printed in the printed "Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence of Marquis Wellesley during his administration of India 1798-1805" published in 5 vols in 1836-7. Wellesley's reply dated 5.3.1800, however, is included in vol II pages 225-49 and further in letter dated 9.6.1800, pages 267- vol II.

Letter from General Stuart to Henry Dundas: 28.1.1798

B II. 11

(Extract as sent to Wellesley by Dundas with his letter dated 21.3.1799, No 10.)

Having finished a short narrative of these proceedings I would gladly afford you some information respecting the general circumstances of this province which forms so important an appendage of the Bombay Government; but I confess that I find it more easy to point out faults than to propose remedies.

When we first entered upon the possessions of this dominion it appears to me that we committed several errors.

By an abrupt assumption of the native rights and prerogatives we began where we should have ended and suddenly possessed ourselves of the privileges of sovereigns, which we should have sought to acquire by the secret and progressive operation of time. Our conduct was neither politic nor just. It was indiscreet to discover views which were to be accomplished by a prosecution in concealment and it was contrary to equity as was the object was inconsistent with former or existing connections with many of the Rajahs and in violation of stipulations expressed or understood with some of them.

All or the far greater part of the Malabar chieftains and those possessing the northern districts were particularly partners with us in the contest against the Sultan and as in a common cause assisted at the risk of their persons or property towards the liberation of their country. Disclaiming at this time views of contest we treated the Malabar Rajahs as allies and friends engaged together on the part of humanity, and struggling with united efforts to expel an odious tyrant, whose rule we promised and they expected should be succeeded by days of freedom and independence.

Admitting that on balancing this account a large debt of obligations remained due to us, the chiefs could not long remain impressed with sentiments of affection or gratitude, when they saw us acting, on the rights of absolute conquest and passing an edict that reduced the native Rajahs and princes to the level of ryotts. In thus depriving the Rajahs of authority, the intention was, I shall allow benevolent, and it was with similar humane views, which in neither case have been realised, that we altered the ancient system of legislature. These measures sufficiently unpopular were made more obnoxious by the mode of executing them. The design of overthrowing the influence and of a hereditary and sacred race of rulers became an avowed principle of action and was the deprivation of the Rajahs was openly, promulgated. It was deemed an unsuitable policy to derive success by combining with our views a system founded on principles engraved on the heart of men, the benefits of which were only to be the slow and progressive result of time. Few of the natives of Malabar were retained in any office and the administration of justice itself was generally transferred to

from pages 12-17 of Add MSS No 37274 in British Museum.

needy adventurers from other parts of India.® In framing these arrangements I do not doubt but that Government had in prospect an impartial diffusion of equitable laws: but they did not calculate on the difficulty if not impossibility of forcing people even for their advantage to relinquish modest customs in which they have been religiously educated. It was not to be expected that the ancient sovereigns would suffer themselves to be deprived of their authority without a struggle to retain it, and the people in whose behalf the system was professed to operate either secretly or openly combined with the Rajahs to make it abortive.

The province of Malabar exhibits a very different state of manners from the rest of India and perhaps it would not be difficult to find the origin of this originality. When the other parts of Hindostan submitted to the conquerors from the north several of the Hindoo governments towards the extremity of the peninsula, retained their freedom and remaining unmixed with a foreign people do even at this moment display their ancient customs uncorrupted. Their distance and the nature of their country secured their freedom. It appears that at a former period, their cultivation was far more prosperous than it is at present, the population more extensive and that they enjoyed all the blessings of the arts of peace. Although they have never been thoroughly overcome they have been frequently disturbed by the christians as well as the Arabs, and the state of warfare they so long maintained with Tippee, has gradually introduced a warlike disposition among them; but the country has been by these means depopulated and its inhabitants deprived of the chief comforts of civilization. We now behold therefore the people of Malabar in their society less cultivated than the other inhabitants of India, who have fallen an easy prey to their invaders. The changes attempted for the benefit of a people of this description should be continuous and gradual, for they are not yet in that state to admit of the introduction of the best laws. A due execution of such as remain of their own would serve in a great degree all the purposes of good government.

In enacting regulations for Malabar, the character and circumstances of the people were not sufficiently attended to. We drew our system from the practices in other parts of India, without reflecting that the inhabitants are in a different situation from any people of Hindostan. The conquests we have heretofore made in India, have for the most part been from conquerors themselves, or over people long habituated to subjection; but Malabar imperfectly subdued by Hyder and Tippee, had had antecedent to the Mahomedan invasion always enjoyed independency. The period of the Sultans' rule also was of too short duration to eradicate an attachment to the old state of things. A peculiarity of manners, and a tenacious adherence to ancient customs has naturally resulted from this country falling later under a foreign yoke, than the rest of the nations of the peninsula. They were separated from the government

® This is not meant to convey a reflection on Government. The judicial native appointments were made by the local administration in Malabar, who were in some measure obliged to select men accustomed and willing to transact business with Europeans, which the inhabitants, natives of the province, discovered at first a shyness or reluctance to perform under the new government. Thus the execution of these duties devolved on adventurers from

of Tippee by their own exertions, as well as ours, and the circumstances by which they fell under our dominion, diminished the privileges of conquest. Had we sufficiently considered these things we should not, I must suppose, have expected that our authority could be established in Malabar with the same facility as in other parts of India, where the people being long accustomed to the dominion of strangers, a change of government, was submitted to with indifference, or sought after in the natural hope of obtaining a better master.

Under these circumstances I am persuaded that the best line of policy we could have pursued in Malabar, would have been to leave a reasonable share of authority in the hands of the native princes, and reposing on them, or the ancient establishments, the management of judicial and revenue affairs, to maintain ourselves to the general political supervision of the country. In this case, it would have been necessary to have made some exceptions, and of imposing restrictions to prevent the Rajahs abusing the trust reposed on them, which aided by a watchful conduct on our part might have preserved the country in peace, and ensuring to it a tolerable government paved the way to the gradual subversion of the influence of the chiefs.

If this conduct had been adopted, the situation of the Rajahs would have remained sufficiently dependent, and we should have escaped a great deal of expense that has been otherwise incurred. The intricacy and corruption attending our administration of the magistracy and revenue powers have involved truth and debased our character. Had some system like the preceding been pursued, we should have derived a revenue without the expense and odium of collecting it. We should have been the guardians of the laws of the land, and as in some instances the operation might be barbarous or bad, the agreeable task, in such cases, would have devolved on us of meliorating them by degrees, or of pardoning or mitigating the punishment inflicted. The degree of authority vested by this plan in the Rajahs, would have attached them more to our Government by soothing or satisfying their ambition and vanity, and the power thus conferred would not have been so dangerous, or so likely to be exercised against us, as that which they now possess without our concurrence. We should have gained another great advantage by the foregoing arrangement. It would have enabled us to concentrate and keep collected our military force, the efficacy of which is in some measure lost by its dispersion in detachments throughout Malabar.

(contd previous footnote) other parts of India, but in this respect the sentiments of the natives are already much altered and the former system is discouraged or growing into disuse.

Henry Dundas to Wellesley (extract): 21.3.1799 (No 10)

The Northern Circars have certainly never produced to us those advantages which the extent of the country, and the fertility of the soil in many parts, entitle us to expect. I know not to what cause to attribute it, but the inhabitants of some of its higher parts seem to be in a state of very uncivilized society, and this can only be gradually removed by a steady, just and vigorous government. We must not too rapidly apply to that part of our possessions the same principles of government, which have been wisely applied to the more civilized provinces of Bengal. I believe the same observations may to a considerable degree be made, with regard to some parts of the Circars, that I shall immediately bring under your view, with regard to the Malabar provinces.

From the situation of the countries in our possession, on the coast of Malabar, they are calculated to be either a great security, or a great annoyance to our power in India; and whether they shall be one or the other, depends much on the manner in which they are managed. I was much struck with a letter I received from General Stuart on this subject. He is an intelligent man, and being the result of his own observation on the spot, I am the more disposed to rely on the solidity of his observations, and I recommend them to your serious attention. I send you an extract of the letter to which I refer and your lordship will observe that I have made considerable use of it in the public despatches which go by this conveyance to the Bombay Government.

Among the particulars in this letter the concluding part attracted my attention, and as coming from so excellent a military authority, they tended to confirm an opinion I have long been inclined to entertain; I mean the impropriety of too much dividing and distracting our force on the Malabar coast. We ought undoubtedly at all times to maintain an efficient government at Bombay for the safety of the island and the many valuable interests established there, but having done this, the great body of our army under that Presidency ought, in my opinion, to be concentrated in some position on the Malabar coast, best calculated to make an impression on Tippee's country, if, at any time, we are compelled to engage in hostilities with him. I wish this part of the subject to be duly examined, and if the idea is a right one, it ought certainly to be acted upon systematically. It is impossible we can allow our troops to be expended in hunting through the jungles in the Malabar country after every refractory Rajah, who may be disposed to be troublesome. The late transactions with the Cottiote Rajah ought to afford us a salutary admonition.

I remain
my dear lord
yours most faithfully

Henry Dundas

From Add MS No 37274, pages 145-6, of Wellesley

Papers in the British Museum. The letter, except the last two paras reproduced above and the accompanying enclosure of the extract from General Stuart's letter, is printed in vol II, pages 107-10, of "Wellesley Despatches, Memoranda, Correspondence &c".

VI

Dunira

[Sarkis, M. Mohan]

BT. 12

Dunira 16 May 1808

My dear Madam,

I have received your letter with its enclosure. I had ~~been~~ heard, when in London, that your brother had expressed some ideas similar to those contained in your letter from him. I confess to you I did not give credit to the report. Although general, the Commander in ⁱⁿ Chief has been a Member of Council, it has not been uniformly so, and always with the reluctance of the Court of Directors, and a degree of management necessary to effectuate it; and when the authority of the Board of Controul was such as it was while I was there, it was not very difficult to accomplish. But your brother has been long abroad, and does not know that the authority of Government in Leadenhall Street was let very loose for several years, and it will require time and management to restore it to where it was, and when that is the case, the Government will probably have (S14V) influence sufficient to ~~the same~~ procure the re-appointment to the Council of the Commander in Chief, who is generally a King's officer, and on that account the reluctance of the East India Company and their service to the distinction of the Commander in Chief being in Council, is certainly not diminished. But independent of the policy and expediency of the measure, which is a question solely between the Government and the East India Company, there are not rational grounds for the Commander in Chief taking up the question in the light your brother does. If the seat in Council had been in the gift of the Crown or the Commander in Chief, there might be room for his exercising any military feelings and points of honour on the subject, if he was appointed by his sovereign to a situation deprived of any of the distinctions usually belonging to it; but what right has he to resign a command to which the King has appointed him; because the East India Company decline, upon grounds of expediency, no matter whether right or wrong, of which (S15R) by law they are Judges, to appoint him to another civil situation which exclusively belongs to them. It was in ~~this~~ their power to have

Sarkis M. Mohan Office : GD 51/3/454/4

even appointed another person to be Commander of their troops and there would have been something of consistency though not of sense, if he had declined any Military emoluments from them, because they did not at the same time accompany it with a distinction usually going along with it; but if your brother in the smallest degree acts by his reason, in place of surrendering his reason to his passion and a mistaken point of honour, he must feel that there is an absurdity in resigning a command, conferred upon him by the King; because the East India Company have given a civil employment in their gift to a civil servant of their own. Depend upon it, the matter cannot bear a serious argument. The East India Company will thank him for his feelings, because it will immediately open to them the means of contending that an officer of their own should be the Commander in Chief: (L515V) a question which they and their military servants never fail to contend when it is in their power to do so; and they would consider the opening made by your brother and the grounds of it as affording them a strong ground for appointing a military servant of their own, who will not fail to accept of it, without encroaching on the expectation and views of the civil servants of the Company, whose rights to seats in the Supreme Councils of the different Presidencies, is expressly declared by Act of Parliament, with the single exception of the Commander in Chief being second in Council, if the East India Company think it expedient to appoint him to it. I have sent your letter to my son where it ought to be. He will of course, on grounds of public expediency, fight the battle with the Court when a fair opportunity occurs; but the resignation of your brother would not strengthen his hands for the combat. Altho' I can do nothing effectual in the business, unless by using the authority of my name and example (516R) in the dispute, he can fortify himself in the exertions he will make to restore things to their former course. In the mean time I felt it due to you, in a matter where you are of course deeply interested, to explain to you fully the light in which the matter casts up to me; and I shall be truly sorry in all your accounts, if your brother, should persevere in the course he mentions, which as he truly states, would be an end of his military

pursuits, which are fair ones, and in my judgement could not fail to proceed successfully, if by his own intemperance and impatience, he does not frustrate them.

We all here (Lady Melville, Miss Gordon, Miss Wortley and myself) are perfectly well, enjoying most delightful weather, and enchanted by everything around us, which is in great beauty. Remember us kindly to Lord Hermand, and I remain
My dear Mada m,

Yours truly

(Signed) Melville

M^{rs}. Fergusson

(Copy)

No. 7.

Private

B. 11. 13

Wimbledon, 29th August 1796

My dear Lord,

Since I last wrote to you, I have received your Letter of date 20th February with Postscript of 23rd February, and a short Letter of 28th February last.

The public Dispatches, you will receive much about the same time with this, will convey to you our decisions on the important Subjects of your recent Dispatch.

The most difficult and the most important was the Question respecting the Nabob. I called in Mr Pitt's aid on that point, as it would probably not escape Observation in Parliament. We read all the Papers and the decision you will receive is our joint production. It was impossible not to entertain a strong wish to have gone further, but upon the most mature consideration we found it impossible to defend any stronger measure than that which we have taken.

The Charter of Justice is in great forwardness, and I hope will be soon sent out.

Lord Hobart.

My

My chief reason for writing to you at present, is the very unpleasant Letters I have lately received from you respecting yourself. Your expressions are so peremptory with regard to your intention of returning if Sir John Shore is not brought on, that after thinking much upon it, I did not feel myself at liberty to act upon the belief that you would not keep to that Resolution; and therefore, although I did not advise the appointing even a provisional Successor, I have taken care that in the event of your coming away, the Government shall not fall into the hands of whoever may happen to be the next in Council. Having done what I conceive to be my duty in this respect, I shall now proceed, without reserve, to state to you my opinion upon the Resolution itself, that if you should take so ill-advised a step I may have nothing to reproach myself with in having omitted to take every means which private friendship for yourself, and

and attention to the public Interests dictated upon such an occasion. I believe I may venture to assure you, that if you do take such a step, you will stand single in your opinion with regard to the propriety of it, and will not have the satisfaction to feel that those who regard you most will accord with your Judgment in the step you have taken.

In the first place, my dear Lord, I feel it my duty in justice to the Department of Government committed to my charge, to protest against the right of Governours appointed to distant and important situations to relinquish them at pleasure. The opinion of the Government on which they act ought not to be overlooked on such a point. The public interest may often, and in the present case would most certainly suffer from such an abrupt change in its foreign Rulers, and no individual who has accepted of such a situation is entitled to consult his own Judgment

or

or feelings solely in the relinquishment
 of it :- This however is not the
 Topic I mean much to enlarge upon,
 I desire to speak to the substance of
 the Resolution itself. I admit perfectly
 that previous to your sailing you had
 justly a right to confide in the
 assurances of Government that no
 person would be put over you in
 the Government of India. If my
 recollection does not fail me, I think
 I am correct in admitting that from
 the state of Sir John Shore's Health
 & Spirits it was probable that he
 would not stand long in your way
 of going to Bengal, but I am positive
 this was not thought the circumstances
 most to be wished for in your appoint-
 =ment to Madras. I remember well
 that Lord Cornwallis & myself, often
 regretted that you would probably
 be leaving Madras before every
 thing was arranged and put into
 a state of regularity at that
 settlement. Your own account of
 the

the situation in which the Carnatic now is certainly does not tend to diminish that opinion. With that sentiment in my breast, it certainly never could be a wish of mine, nor do I think your Lordship ever states it as a wish of your own, at that moment, that Sir John Shore should, at an early period, leave the Government of Bengal. I cannot state more strongly my feeling on this point, than by distinctly stating to you, that if no such unfortunate differences had occurred as those which too strongly agitate your mind, and if Sir John Shore's day of departure had been fixed, I would have felt it my duty for the sake of India, in general, and of the Carnatic in particular, to have used every means in my power to prevent any change in the respective Governments at the critical period in which we now are both at home and abroad. In so far therefore, as any part of your Letters express a
regret

regret that Sir John Shore has not left Bengal, or that you have not been enabled to leave Madras, it is impossible for me to concur with you in that feeling. The opposite is my decided sentiment on the subject.

I trust you will give me credit when I assure you, that in the consideration of this subject, I have not omitted minutely to examine every circumstance which seems to have given you uneasiness, and I have not trusted to myself only in this examination but have likewise caused the whole to be examined by Mr Pitt and Lord Mornington. I have likewise seen your friend Mr. Sullivan, and to him have submitted every circumstance which has operated on my Judgment. I have likewise recently had a conversation with Lord Cornwallis, to whom, I find you had likewise wrote, and who tells me he has wrote to you. All your letters state a conviction

conviction that Sir John Shore is hostily
disposed towards you, that he does not
wish to maintain your credit, and is
rather disposed to detract from the merit
you have manifested in the critical
situation you are placed. As to the
most of those opinions, you have not
laid before me the grounds of them,
and of course have not furnished me
with the means of examining them.
In so far as you have produced
the foundations on which you entertain
those feelings, I have examined them
attentively, but cannot bring myself
to concur with you in the sentiments
you express. It is my sincere
opinion, my dear Lord, that you are
labouring under an undue prejudice.
I do not say this on light grounds.
I would not rest that opinion solely
on public dispatches, but I have
made it my business through his
most confidential Friends in this
Country, to have access to his most
private Correspondence, and there
is

is not to be discovered in any one of them, the vestige of those sentiments and dispositions which you have been induced to impute to him: the reverse appears from them. He talks of you in high terms of approbation, and good opinion; he expresses his opinion how likely you are to prove in your future situation, an able and upright Governor of India. In one or two letters he adverts to your being intemperate and not feeling exactly as he would wish towards him. But this he mentions more as a subject of regret as depriving him of the pleasure of those confidential communications with you which he would wish, and by which he conceives the public interests would be benefited; but in no part is there to be discovered that spirit which you are induced to suppose him to be actuated by. I cannot dwell on every circumstance, but the result of the whole is a conviction
in

in my own mind, that wherever he differs from you in opinion, or wherever he exercises that right of controul over any of your measures which his situation, and the authority under which you both act entitles him to do, he does not do it from any feeling of caprice or bad humour towards you, but from a conscientious feeling of duty, free from the smallest mixture of personal rancour or animosity. I must therefore conclude with giving you my decided opinion that I think you unfounded in the conceptions you have formed with regard to Sir John Shore, and consequently in urging you to remain some time longer where you are, I am urging you to do nothing incompatible with your honor or that ought to injure your nicest feelings. On the other hand let me entreat you to view with candor the other side of the question. Sir John Shore has, during a long period of public life, acted in such a manner as a servant of the East India Company, as

as to have obtained their opinion, and
the opinion of their best servants,
highly favorable both to his Talents
and Integrity. I mention in a
particular manner the Sentiments
of Lord Cornwallis, who has had
much occasion to act with him, &
to know him, and upon my recently
putting the question to him he
declares that he believes him totally
incapable of any mean or dishonorable
act, and considers him to be a most
able and upright servant of the public.
When they were in Government they
have differed on most essential subjects.
but he never had to impute to him
any thing that was not perfectly
honorable and upright. Upon those
grounds I feel that I could not
recal Sir John Shore without doing
him an essential injury, and lessening
in his person that confidence of
support with which I wish all
foreign

foreign Governors acting under me, to look up to me. Allow me further to state, that I doubt if the Court of Directors would be induced to do it, and if I was to recall him in an offensive way by the King's authority, without their consent, the consequence would be, that you, or any other Successor would have a most uncomfortable situation to act in, and the Government of India would be for years kept in a state of distraction; by jealousy and contention between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control. All that and much more I would undergo, if I was called upon to do it in justice to you, or to protect you from any injury you had either suffered or was likely to suffer; but I have already explained to you, that upon a thorough examination of the whole subject, I cannot find a circumstance or the trace of a circumstance to enable me to view it in that light.

I have troubled you, my dear Lord, with a long letter, but in so doing I have

have discharged my duty to the public and, at the same time, have given the most unequivocal proof of my private friendship for you; and I conclude in the most perfect confidence, that whatever opinion you may now form, or whatever conclusion you may come to upon the whole business, you will one day feel as I wish you to do upon the subject. I have only most earnestly to entreat you, that you will not allow that day to arrive when it is too late to produce the good consequences which it may now do, if you act that part which your best friends wish, and which I am positive your truest honor ought to dictate. -

Believe me, with sincere regard,
My dear Lord,
Yours very sincerely
(signed) Henry Dundas.