

Confidential

Canning to Earl Moira (Hastings)
Board of Control Correspondence
August 30th 1816

My dear Lord,

BTM.1

In addressing your Lordship for the first time, it is a great satisfaction to me to begin our correspondence with my cordial congratulations on the termination of the Gorkha War; and to have ^{to} ~~assess~~ ^{me} your Lordship that the Prince Regent and His Ministers do full justice to the gallantry and skill with which the operations of the British Army have been conducted, and to the firmness and prudence with which your Lordship has secured and improved the results of those operations.

Until the intelligence of this event had been received here, it was not possible to take a clear and steady view of Indian politicks; liable as they necessarily were to be affected (p) either by the protraction of your negotiations, or by any interruption in the progress of your military success, in Nepaul.

Any instructions that could have been sent to your Lordship under such uncertainty, ~~and~~ must have been, in a great degree contingent and conditional. I confess also that I should have felt some difficulty in writing quite freely to your Lordship on the general subject of our Indian policy, while there was any danger that you might receive my Letter at a moment of embarrass^{ment}, - or that

Leeds Public Libraries Archives: Canning 99A: ^{George} Canning
to ~~Earl~~ Earl Moira: 30-8-1816.

the language of caution could be misinterpreted into that of dissatisfaction or distrust.

The happy issue of the Gorkha War removes all difficulty of this sort; and the ample exposition of your Lordship's opinions in the several able minutes which have been transmitted by you within the last eighteen months, entitles your Lordship to a distinct expression of concurrence or dissent on the plans and suggestions referred ~~home~~^{home} for consideration. (p) Instead of commenting upon particulars passages of your Lordship's minutes, it will be a shorter course, and perhaps more satisfactory to your Lordship, that I should state at once the objects of the Prince Regent's Government with respect to India.

The first of these objects in one word is Peace:- the next, if peace cannot be preserved altogether, is to have as little War as possible; - and that War to arise only from causes demonstrably unavoidable, and to be terminated as soon as those causes can be removed.

To this system, if we were not led by choice, we should find ourselves compelled by necessity.

We are not unaware that a large and comprehensive forecast has often laid the foundations of permanent tranquillity and security in War, - or in measures by which War was purposely and justifiably hazarded.

We do not deny that in many cases it may be prudent economy to draw upon existing resources, even at the certainty of (p) immediate inconvenience, for the sake of avoiding a distant, but more extended and more exhausting expenditure.

And we are not insensible to the degree of truth which is to be found in the general maxims so often applied to our Indian Empire, - that a Government created and fostered in it's growth, by a concurrence of circumstances so extraordinary and anomalous, and holding its station in defiance of so many hostile prejudices and interests, - reigning over millions to whom it bears no natural affinity, and surrounded by states which must deem its existence dangerous to their own, - cannot afford to stand still at any point of its elevation, however exalted; - that it must totter when it ceases to advance, and can maintain even its integrity only by perpetual progression.

But these general maxims, we think are not only susceptible of modification from time and circumstances, but are encountered by other maxims which must be allowed to qualify and control them. (p) If it be true that there is in a new power, established by conquest and maintained by opinion in a strange land, an irrepressible tendency to enlarge itself by swallowing up it's neighbours; - it is equally true that there is in an overgrown Empire a no less prone disposition to fall in pieces. To mark before hand the precise boundary at which aggrandizement might stop and settle into firmness and consistency, is

evidently a hopeless undertaking; nor could the attempt be made without adopting, or being accused of adopting those doctrines of "natural limits" - and "irresistible destinies" - which have cost Europe so dear within the last quarter of a century; - It is equally impossible to assign the period at which the maturity of states begins to turn to decay and dissolution.

But between conflicting generalities, it may perhaps be assumed without ~~tashness~~, that the progress of acquisition and incorporation even if necessarily intermiⁿable, need not be absolutely incessant that a pause may occasionally be (p) made without danger of retrogradation. - ~~It~~ⁱⁿ like manner it can hardly ^{be} denied that though to lay out a little now, in order to save a great expense hereafter be generally the best economy these may be special circumstances under which the prospect of a greater pecuniary demand at a distant period, should justify the endeavour to prevent it by overstraining our immediate resources.

And whatever may be the attacks which we apprehend to be meditated against our safety or our peace, there may be cases in which it is advisable to trust in some degree, to time and chance for dissipating the danger rather than to meet it by anticipation.

If there be any truth in the~~se~~ propositions, surely the precise occasion at which such a pecuniary sacrifices, and such a relaxation of political and military efforts might be

most excusably and most safely indulged, would be immediately after some great exertion of strength, and some signal display of resources, in a War unquestionably just and for the punishment of a presumptuous aggression. (p)

The strong persuasion which we feel that pacifick counsels are likely to be most conducive to the well-being of our Indian Empire, is founded on a consideration of the actual state both of India itself, and Europe.

We doubt the desirableness, even if we were convinced of the practicability, of establishing the British Government as the recognized Empire of all Indian quarrels and assuming to it with the authority and influence, the onerous duties of such a superintendence. - We doubt the expediency of expanding our control so widely over the whole surface of the Indian Continent, as to present to European observation, one connected and universal system of British power, stretching towards China on the one hand and towards Russia on the other.

France was heretofore the single source of external danger to our Indian Establishment. That danger is for the present gone by: - but the peculiar position of Russia, - her half Asiatick character, - her influence and authority in persia, and the measures which she is understood (p) to be taking for strengthening and improving that connection, - the diffusion of military skill and military habits among her people, - the example of Buonaparte, both in what he achieved and what he is known to have designed, - all conspire to give a colour of probability to the supposition, that Russia may

be looking towards India, if not with any matured purpose, at least with a vague and undefined expectation, that the time may come when her ambition or her Interest may direct her arms that way.

An enterprize so gigantic and so hazardous will no doubt require both a favourable opportunity and a plausible, pretext; - but mankind are in a great measure familiarized to projects of wild extent and extravagant daring. The jealousy of our wealth (of which India is generally considered on the Continent of Europe as the main source and spring) may soon efface the remembrance of all that Europe owes to us for the employment of it.

Is it not possible that any indications (p) of a new and stirring spirit of ambition on the part of the British Government in India, might furnish at once that stimulus which may alone be wanting to give life and motion to the half formed intents of Russia; - and might conciliate that favour to them from the rest of Europe, without which Russia might think her European Interests left in hazard by so distant an Expedition?

May it not further be well worth considering whether, in the event of such a danger coming upon us, it would be fortunate that we should have bound ourselves, by bringing all the States of Hindustan within the pale of our protection, to meet the attack on the borders of the Desert, or on the banks of the Indus?

As to any advantage to be derived from extending the scale of our present system of alliances, with a view to general control, - We have doubts of another kind. - We are inclined to think that the subsidiary system has gone for enough. - Each new State (p) that we adopt into this system appears to lose by degrees its native strength and vitality, and a burdensome ally may frequently be a bad exchange for a troublesome perhaps, but not very dangerous neighbour.

By widening more and more the circle of our adoption, we also take upon ourselves in the same proportion, a more extended responsibility for the suppression of those elements of disorder and disturbance which always have existed, perhaps (humanly speaking) always must exist in India, - which cannot for a long series of years at least, be expected to settle into habits of industry and peace. If we cannot hope entirely to extinguish the predatory Hordes (and ~~have~~ even a complicated and costly scheme of new alliances and warlike operations could hardly be expected to have that effect, either promptly or permanently) an indefinite extension of territory and influence on our part would only bring them so such more immediately and constantly in contact with ourselves or our allies.

I have said that necessity would dictate (p) a pacifick policy in India, even if we were not inclined to it from choice.

To speak quite plainly to your Lordship upon this point we have not the means of War.

If, indeed, a War ^{were} ~~were~~ to be forced upon us in Europe by any direct injury or insult the occasion itself would create the means out of the spirit and indignation of the people. But a war not absolutely unavoidable, and undertaken for ^{purposes of} ~~the~~ present state and temper of this country. ^{would not} ?

If such be the feeling in England, with respect to European objects and interests, how much more with respect to India; where, in addition to all other considerations, distance of place operates like distance of time, to remove still further the objects of pursuit, and proportionably to weaken their impression?

I am much mistaken if one effect of the astonishing changes of the last two years, produced as they were by causes obviously unforeseen, (p) and too extraordinary to have been taken into contemplation, has not been to discredit in the ordinary judgement of the world, those calculations of policy which were heretofore considered as constituting the science of a statesman. I doubt whether the most sagacious plan that could be devised for securing by a new scheme of alliances at the risk of new Wars, the ascendancy of the British power in India, would be now received in Parliament with any other comment than an inquiry, whether, half a dozen years ago, the frontier of Nepal would have been noted as the quarter from which the first attack upon our power was to be apprehended.

Insuperable, therefore, would be the difficulties which the Government would have to encounter in recommending to the

approbation and support of parliament, a War in India, growing out of any other causes than absolute, immediate self-defence. Public opinion is pronounced upon these subjects in a way too clear to be misunderstood. The same feelings in deference to which the House of Commons (p) was induced last year to abandon the most certain and productive source of publick revenue, would unquestionably obstruct the raising of a single shilling, for the support of a War of conquest or aggrandizement.

Something indeed is stated in one of your Lordships discussions with your Council, of the possibility of maintaining a War by the resources of India itself, but even in the course of the same argument you refer to the eventual aid of parliament as available in case of a disappointment in the calculated amount of those resources.

We certainly are not very sanguine here in the expectation of an Indian surplus, applicable to purposes of War, or to any other purposes: and your Lordship will have learned enough (long before this letter reaches you) of the disposition and temper of parliament on all subjects of expenditure, to be satisfied that you cannot render a greater service to the East India Company, than by keeping them out of the House of Commons. (p)

In thus declaring to your Lordship our general principles of policy, I do not mean to overlook the special cases which may create, or may already have created, a necessity for your

partial deviation from them. These cases are, so far as we are informed, three; - 1st The Pindarries, - 2nd Berar, - 3rd Jaypore.

1. We venture to flatter ourselves that the vexation of the Pindarries, the serious nature of which we are unable to dispute, may yet not prove of such magnitude as materially to endanger the tranquillity of India, - however it may, for a time, interfere with the course of your reductions and retrenchments. To protect ourselves and our allies against this vexation is obviously the full extent of our duty. That duty it is not intended that your Lordship should decline. Towards the performance of it you have a right to claim the assistance of each of our allies, according to the measure of their respective stipulations by Treaty.

The aggregate amount of Cavalry stipulated to be maintained by our several allies, is I think, about 14,000. - We have (according to your Lordship's last report) about 17,000 of our own. (p.)

The aggregate amount of the Pindarry Horse is stated by those who rate it highest, at about 30,000.

^{Their}
~~This~~ desultory modes of attack, their swiftness of movement, the singular facility with which they dissolve and reunite their bodies of plunderers undoubtedly occasion considerable difficulties in any plan for their complete extirpation; but what we hope, and (so far as we can form

a judgement upon the matter) are led to believe, is, that those difficulties however harrassing, cannot be of a size, or of a sort, to require an universal confederation to be enforced at the risk of a general War. And it is my duty to say, without reserve to your Lordship, that if the complete extirpation of the evil can be fought only at the risk, we should prefer to that experiment, the endurance (at least for the present) of so much of the evil as cannot be repelled by our own exertions, and by those of the Allies whom we are authorised by ~~the~~ subsisting Treaties to call into action against it.

If Scindia and Holkar, or (in this view same as Holkar) Ameer Khan, have an interest in favouring the existence of the Pindaries, that must be a hollow league in which Scindia and (p) Holkar would concur for the extirpation of them. The refusal of these Chieftains to become parties to such a league would not be substantially a just cause of War. Their violation of such a league, after having become parties to it, would.

It appears to us that it is our interest to encourage what remain of the substantive States of India in maintaining their independence; without inquiring too narrowly (where the obligations of Treaty, the just claims of an ally, or the security of our own professions do not compel us to such inquiry) either into the means by which they obtained their power, or the tenure by which they hold it.

← Para
(end p. 14)

It appears that it would atleast be worth the trial, whether alliances with independent (p) States (when there is an immediate urgency for contracting alliances at all) would not answer and better answer our purposes, than either an extension of the subsidiary system, or a new system of universal confederation and control.

2. In saying this, I have in great measure anticipated the few observations with which it is necessary for me to trouble your Lordship on the subject of Berar and ^eJypore. Your Lordship may (in the one case, in strict conformity to opinions sanctioned from home, and in the other in the execution of positive Instructions) have contracted new engagements with each of these ^{use} powers, or may be in the course of contracting them, when this letter comes to your hands.

As ^{to} Berar, while your Lordship may be assured that you will receive the fullest approbation and support, you shall have succeeded in carrying into effect the original ~~instructions~~ ^{intention} of Lord Minto. - I must avow to you at the same time, that we shall not be sorry if the persevering ^urepugnance of the Rajah shall have prevented the conclusion of a Treaty on the subsidiary plan: or if the new Rajah (whom (p) we understand to have succeeded to ~~Ragojee~~ Bhoosla) shall have inherited in this respect, the intractability of his predecessor. We should think the opportunity not unfavourable for making the experiment (on the principles just stated) of an alliance grounded on a system differing from the subsidiary one in these respects,

that we should not be bound to station a force in the Rajah's Dominion nor should require any regular annual payment; but that whatever degree of assistance we engage to afford, should be afforded on each exigency that may arise; and that the payment should be made only in proportion to the extraordinary expense incurred by us on such occasions. The counter stipulation on the part of the Rajah of Berar being, for the maintenance of a body of horse applicable, at our demand, and under our direction, specifically to employment against the Pindarries.

3. With respect to Jeypore the Instructions sent to your Lordship in Council, in the secret despatch of 23 December 1813, are so full ~~of~~ ^{and} precise that there is no room for observation upon them. It will indeed ~~be~~ matter of regret should a war have been incurred with Scindia and Holkar, or (p) with either, in the execution of those Instructions. But if that misfortune has happily not ensued, it is then only necessary to be borne in mind, that the case of the Rajah of Jeypore, standing on its own grounds of peculiar hardship and special justice; and being in fact nothing more than a renewal of formerly subsisting relations, does not afford a model upon which a new system of alliances is to be framed.

Upon the whole Your Lordship will collect from what I have taken the liberty of stating to you, that the situation of British India, after the close of the nepaulesse ^{war} ~~that~~, appears to the Prince Regent's Government sufficiently satisfactory to make it our business rather to maintain and improve its present

condition, than to attempt my extensive enlargements ~~may~~ or any hazardous alterations.

You will perceive that in our opinion no accession of territory or influence ~~might~~ ought to be sought through War; nor any war incurred that can with honour and safety be avoided.

If your Lordship, after having given to the powers of India, in the prompt and effectual punishment of the aggression from Nepaul, a signal example of the danger of drawing down British vengeance by unjust and unprovoked attacks, shall be (p.) enabled to ^{turn} ~~use~~ to account the internal tranquillity and security which your military successes must have ensured, atleast for a time, - by cultivating your existing alliances with a view to the continuance of peace, - and by the ~~diminution~~ ^{diminution} ~~reduction~~ of your warlike establishment, you will have entitled yourself, by every claim, to the applause of your Employers and of your country.

(End)

(to go on page 11; missing para from page 16 of Ms)

But it does not appear to us that any solid advantage would be gained by successes against Scindia and Holkar, which should have the effect of reducing them from their present comparatively regular power, to the state of mere leaders of Banditti. This we cannot but think would be rather an augmentation of the evil which goads us to exertion, and with which we find it so difficult to cope, precisely because it presents itself in a shape so little tangible.

II

Confidential

Bill. 1

Board of Control

August 30th 1816


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Unhappily the intelligence of this event had been received here, it was not possible to take a clear and steady view of Indian Politics; liable as they necessarily were, to be affected

His Excellency

The Earl of Moira, K. G.



Canning to Earl Moira

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Instead of commenting upon particular passages of your Lordship's Minutes, it will be a shorter course, and perhaps more satisfactory to your Lordship, that I should state at once the objects of the Prince Regent's Government with respect to India.

The first of these objects in one word is Peace: — the next, if peace cannot be preserved altogether, is to have as little War as possible; — and that War to arise only from causes demonstrably unavoidable, & to be terminated as soon as those causes can be removed.

To this system, if we were not led by choice, we should find ourselves compelled by necessity.

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But between conflicting generalities, it may perhaps be assumed, without rashness, that the progress of acquisition & incorporation, even if necessarily interminable, need not be absolutely incessant; that a pause may occasionally be

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solid advantage would be gained by successes
against Scindia & Holkar, which should have the
effect of reducing them from their present comparatively
regular power, to the state of mere Leaders of
Banditti. This we cannot but think would be
rather an augmentation of the evil which goods
us to exertion, — and with which we find it so
difficult to cope, precisely because it presents
itself in a shape so little tangible.

It appears to us that it is our interest
to encourage what remain of the substantive States
of India in maintaining their independence; without
inquiring too narrowly (where the obligations of Treaty,
the just claims of an ally, or the security of our
own possessions do not compel us to such inquiry)
them into the means by which they obtained their
power, or the tenure by which they hold it.

It appears that it would at least be
worth the trial, whether Alliances with independent
States

Thomas
Munro

States (when there is any immediate urgency for contracting Alliances at all) would not answer, and better answer, our purposes, than either an extension of the Subsidiary system, or a new system of universal confederation & control.

2. In saying this, I have in a great measure anticipated the few observations with which it is necessary for me to trouble your Lordship on the subject of Berar and Scypos. Your Lordship may (in the one case, in strict conformity to opinions sanctioned from home, and in the other in the execution of positive Instructions) have contracted new Engagements with each of these powers, or may be in the course of contracting them, when this letter comes to your hands.

As to Berar, - while your Lordship may be assured that you will receive the fullest approbation & support, if you shall have succeeded in carrying into effect the original intentions of Lord Minto, - I must avow to you at the same time, that we shall not be sorry if the persevering repugnance of the Rajah shall have prevented the conclusion of a Treaty on the Subsidiary plan: or if the new Rajah (whom

we

8.
I understand to have succeeded to Ragoju (Boosta)
shall have inherited, in this respect, the intractability
of his predecessor. We should think the opportunity
not unfavourable for making the experiment (on the
principles just stated) of an alliance grounded
on a system differing from the Subsidiary one
in these respects; - that we should not be bound
to station a force in the Rajah's Dominions,
nor should require any regular annual payment;
but that whatever degree of assistance we engage
to afford, should be afforded on each exigency
that may arise; and that the payments should
be made only in proportion to the extraordinary
expense incurred by us on such occasions. - The
counter stipulation on the part of the Rajah
& Berar being, for the maintenance of a body
of Horse applicable, at our demand, and under
our direction, specifically to employment against
the Pindarries.

3. - With respect to Mysore, the Instructions
sent to your Lordship in Council, in the Secret
Despatch of 23 December 1813, are so full & precise
that there is no room for observation upon them.
It will indeed be matter of regret should a war
have been incurred with Scindia and Holkar, or
with

19.

with either, in the execution of those Instructions. But if that misfortune has happily not ensued, it is then only necessary to be borne in mind, that the case of the Rajah of Seypore, standing on its own grounds of peculiar hardship & special justice; and being in fact nothing more than a renewal of formerly subsisting relations, does not afford a model upon which a new system of alliances is to be framed.

Upon the whole your Lordship will collect from what I have taken the liberty of stating to you, that the situation of British India, after the close of the Nepaulesse War, appears to the Prince Regent's Government sufficiently satisfactory to make it our business rather to maintain & improve its present condition, than to attempt any extensive enlargements or any hazardous alterations.

You will perceive that in our opinion no accession of Territory or influence ought to be sought through War; nor any War incurred that can with honour and safety be avoided.

If your Lordship, after having given to the powers of India, in the prompt & effectual punishment of the aggression from Nepaul, a signal example of the danger of drawing down British vengeance by unjust & unprovoked attacks, shall

be

be enabled to turn to account the internal tranquility and security which your military successes must have ensured, at least for a time, - by cultivating your existing alliances with a view to the continuance of peace, - and by the diminution of your warlike establishments, you will have entitled yourself, by every claim, to the applause of your Employers & of your Country. -

Mem.

95

Private

Calcutta 2nd February 1821

B III. 2

My dear Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge your letters No. 40 and 50 of the 5th August 1820. In the letter, you remind me appositely, though superfluous^{ous}ly, that the Letters which bear the signatures of the Secret Committee in reality emanate from the Board of Control. It is impossible that I should not apply this intimation to the Secret Committee's Letter of the 22nd June last. You say that I shall have found some doubt ^{was} exposed as to the fitness of receiving a contribution from the Nizam. The phrase is rather inaccurate. So far from there being a tincture of Doubt in the Language used to me, the condemnation is as unqualified as Words could well impart: and throughout the Letter every collateral point on which blame could be insinuated appears to have been studiously seized. In former letters I have hinted at this disposition. I should now be guilty of a duplicity which would lower me in my own esteem did I let you believe that I am not aware how I stand. Indeed, I trust that I have not given you cause for deeming me so ^{inept} unfit as not to comprehend the game played at me (p) nor do I think you ought to imagine me incapable of knowing how to conduct myself under such circumstances. Into occasional error I must be as likely to fall as any other ^{man} ~~than~~; but I should have an odd Head if every step I take be deserving of rebuke. When I observe

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that latterly there has not been a single measure of mine which had not been captiously misconstrued, I necessarily cast about for the object of such uniform censure significantly, while the Company's Concerns are experiencing a striking steady course of increasing Prosperity under my Management. One solution alone presents itself; that you are anxious to get rid of me. When the result of every procedure of mine hitherto has been decidedly advantageous for my Employers, for my Country and for the natives of India (subjects or allies) it might be invidious to dislodge me cavalierly; even if the Court which I do not suspect, would concur in such a purpose. A hope has thence probably been indulged that I might be harrassed into insisting intemperately on my recal, so as that my removal from the Government might be ascribed to my own forwardness, and the imputation of meeting my zeal with an unworthy Return might be escaped. Now, I cannot suppose you, my Dear Sir, to act from any personal Ill-Will towards me. I take it for granted you are influenced by some consideration (p) of Policy, thoroughly satisfactory to your mind, in wishing that I should make way for another. Had this been frankly explained to me, you would not have found any difficulty on my part. As it is, I am thrown on my Defence; and I am prepared to vindicate to the Company, to my Sovereign, and to Parliament, the ~~town~~ ^{tenor} and success of my Administrations. Of my situation, I am completely tired; so far you have succeeded: But I cannot

be so complainant as to put myself willingly in the wrong and my retreat will not be exactly in the way calculated.

My observations on the general tone of the Letter of the 22nd June being thus despatched, let me ~~an~~ ^d advert to some of it's particulars. The official answer to it will explain a misapprehension into which you had fallen respecting the source whence the £200,000/- a sum to which the clearest Equity gave the Company pretension] was to come. Two of the appropriations speculated upon for a portion of the Expected money are noticed by you with oblique disapprobation yet both of them will speedily be exacted from the company by Parliament. The rapidly augmenting concourse of Europeans to Calcutta will require the Erection of another Church: and that it must be made a Cathedral is beyond doubt, since the Church which at present bears that title is Private Property over which the Bishop has not the ordinary (p) control. If a new Church is to be essentially the Cathedral, its external appearance should correspond with that character, and ~~neg~~ ^ggardlessness in ~~x~~ such an Edifice would be discreditable to the British name. With regard to a Bishop's Palace, be assured the House of Commons will soon irresistibly demand an Episcopal Residence to be provided by the Company. The ~~Sudde~~ Devanny adaulut has strongly represented the inconvenience and inadequacy of the building in which the Court, and all it's offices are now hold. It

was proposed that the Fund in question should furnish the amount for the purchase of ground, and the erecting upon it a structure more suitable to the Court whose important and incessant, Duties require every accommodation. And then ~~these~~ we meant to solicit the Court of Directors that the building vacated by the Sudder Devanny adaulut (which is the property of the Company) might, after some moderate improvement defrayed by that Fund, be assigned to the Bishop. The motive for that application would have been the same which will bring forward the question at home in a less convenient shape, namely, that the Bishop cannot, on no higher salary than what is allotted to a Puis^{ne} Judge in a Provincial Appeal Court, support the decent Dignity of his station if he be obliged to pay out of his income (p) the charge of a residence in Calcutta where house rent is exorbitant. These objects and some that are ^{imperiously} ~~impressively~~ required for the Health of the City, will now fall upon the Company's purse. You may possibly say you could not be aware of such circumstances: To which the reply would be why then did you determine on the point without explanation? In the absence of information on the subject, it might have been natural to rely on an individual on the subject, it might have been ~~spirit~~ ^{spot} whose common sense and attention to the Company's interest might rationally be trusted to such an extent unless they were most improvidently reposed upon in infinitely higher concerns.

As to the transaction of the House of William Palmer & Co. with the Nizam's Government respecting which you Counsel me as a friend to be prompt in my compliance with the Court's Directions, you will find that I carried the spirit of their commands into immediate execution as far as I conceived to be within my competence. I am disposed to suspect that those orders were somewhat hastily issued. The assumption by the Court of a right to annul^u the provisions of ~~an~~^{an} act of Parliament appears to me hardly maintainable. I have nevertheless endeavored to give full force to the pleasure of the Court, only keeping myself clear from the charge of voluntary participation in a procedure the legality of which [although sanctioned by you] I cannot bring (p) myself to think free from considerable doubt. By turning to the 28th clause of the 37th Geo: 3rd C.142, which gives to any Governor in Council a power, independently of the Court, to authorise Pecuniary Transactions between British subjects and native Princes, you will see the ground whereon I question the correctness of your step.

Adieu, my Dear Sir, our public relations will probably soon terminate. It will be my unfeigned inclination to part on pleasant terms. My Labor, heavy enough with the best advantages, has been latterly made ~~with~~^{with} some through evident purpose; yet you would err widely if you supposed me to speak of my toil as thankless. To the liberal recompense which my services have received from the Company, I am deeply sensible; and I have a still ampler reward in the reflection

- 6 -

that it has been the ^{lot of} ~~belief~~ few to have benefited an immense portion of their fellow creatures in an equal degree with what my situation in India enabled me to effect.

I have the honor, my Dear Sir, to be with great Esteem,

Your very obedient
Humble Servant,

The Rt Honble George Canning. ~~Esq~~ HASTINGS.

B IV, 2

(Duplicate)

CANNING 94 A

Private

Calcutta 2nd February 1821-

My Dear Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge
your Letters N^o: 49 and 50 of the 5th of August 1820. In
the latter you remind me appositely, though superfluously,
of the Letters which bear the Signatures of the Secret
Committee in reality emanate from the Board of Control.
It is impossible that I should not apply this intimation
to the Secret Committee's Letter of the 22nd June last. You
say that I shall have found some doubt expressed as
to the fitness of receiving a Contribution from the Nizam.
The phrase is rather inaccurate. So far from there being
a tincture of Doubt in the Language used to me, the
condemnation is as unqualified as Words could well
express: And throughout the Letter every collateral Point
in which Blame could be insinuated appears to have
been studiously seized. In former Letters I have hinted
at this disposition. I should now be guilty of a duplicity
which would lower me in my own Esteem did I let you
believe that I am not aware how I stand. Indeed, I
trust that I have not given you cause for deeming me
so inept as not to comprehend the Game played at me;

Earl Mordaunt to G. Canning

do I think you ought to imagine me incapable of
knowing how to conduct myself under such circumstances.
to occasional error I must be as likely to fall as any
other Man; but I should have an odd Head if every
step I take be deserving of rebuke. When I observe that
scarcely there has not been a single Measure of mine
which has not been captiously misconstrued, I necessarily
doubt about the object of such uniform censure significant
while the Company's Concerns are experiencing a striking
steady course of increasing Prosperity under my Management.
The Solution alone presents itself; that you are anxious to
get rid of me. When the result of every procedure of mine
there has been decidedly advantageous for my Employers;
for my Country, and for the Natives of India / Subjects or
allies; it might be invidious to dislodge me cavalierly; even
the Court, which I do not suspect, would concur in
such a purpose. A hope has thence probably been indulged
that I might be harassed into insisting intemperately on
my recall, so as that my removal from the Government
might be ascribed to my own forwardness, and the imputa-
tion of meeting my Zeal with an unworthy Return
might be escaped. Now, I cannot suppose you, My Dear
Sir, to act from any personal Ill-Will towards me. I take
it for granted you are influenced by some Consideration
of

of Policy, thoroughly satisfactory to your mind, in wishing that I should make way for another. Had this been frankly explained to me, you would not have found any difficulty on my part. As it is, I am thrown on my Defence; and I am prepared to vindicate to the Company, to my Sovereign, and to Parliament, the tenor and success of my Administration of my Situation. I am completely tired; so far you have succeeded: But I cannot be so complaisant as to put myself willingly in the Wrong, and my Retreat will not be exactly in the way calculated.

My observations on the general tone of the Letter of the 22^o June being thus despatched, let me advert to some of its particulars. The official answer to it will explain a misapprehension into which you had fallen respecting the source whence the £200,000 a Sum to which the clearest Equity gave the Company pretension was to come. Two of the appropriations speculated upon for a portion of the Expected Money are noticed by you with oblique disapprobation yet both of them will speedily be exacted from the Company by Parliament. The rapidly augmenting concourse of Europeans to Calcutta will require the Creation of another Church: And that it must be made a Cathedral is beyond Doubt, since the Church which at present bears that Title is Private Property over which the Bishop has not the ordinary Control

control. If a New Church is to be essentially the Cathedral,
its External appearance should correspond with that Char-
acter, and Niggardiness in such an Edifice would be dis-
creditable to the British Name. With regard to a Bishop's
Palace, be assured the House of Commons will soon irresist-
ibly demand an Episcopal Residence to be provided by the
Company. The Sudder Dewanny Adawlat has strongly re-
presented the inconvenience and inadequacy of the Building
in which the Court, and all its offices are now held. It
was proposed that the Fund in question should furnish
the amount for the purchase of Ground, and the erecting
upon it a Structure more suitable to the Court whose im-
portant and incessant Duties require every accommodation.
And then we meant to solicit the Court of Directors that
the Building vacated by the Sudder Dewanny Adawlat
which is the Property of the Company might, after some mo-
derate improvement defrayed by that Fund, be assigned to
the Bishop. The motive for that application would have
been the same which will bring forward the question at
home in a less convenient Shape; namely, that the Bishop
cannot, on no higher Salary than what is allotted to a Justice
Judge in a Provincial Appeal Court, support the decent
Dignity of his Station if he be obliged to pay out of his
Income

become the Charge of a Residence in Calcutta where House
rent is exorbitant. These Objects, and some that are imperiously
required for the Health of the City, will now fall upon the
Company's Purse. You may possibly say you could not be
aware of such Circumstances: To which the Reply would be
why then did you determine on the spot without explana-
tion? In the absence of information on the Subject, it might
have been natural to rely on an Individual on the Spot,
whose common Sense and Attention to the Company's Interest
might rationally be trusted to such an extent unless they
were most improvidently reposed upon in infinitely higher
concerns.

As to the transaction of the House of William
Palmer & Co: with the Nizam's Government respecting which you
counsel me as a Friend to be prompt in my Compliance with
the Courts Directions, you will find that I carried the spirit
of their Commands into immediate Execution as far as I
conceived to be within my Competence. I am disposed to dis-
spect that those Orders were somewhat hastily issued. The as-
sumption by the Court of a Right to annul the Provisions
of an Act of Parliament appears to me hardly maintainable.
I have nevertheless endeavoured to give full Force to the Plea
sure of the Court, only keeping myself clear from the Charge
of voluntary participation in a Procedure the Legality of
which / although sanctioned by you / I cannot bring
myself

myself to think free from considerable Doubt. By turning
to the 20th Clause of the 37th Geo. 3rd C. 142, which gives to any
Governor in Council a Power, independantly of the Court,
to authorize Pecuniary Transactions between British Subjects
and Native Princes, you will see the Ground whereon I
question the correctness of your Step.

Adieu, My Dear Sir, Our Public Rela-
tions will probably soon terminate. It will be my unfeign-
ed inclination to part on pleasant terms. My Labors, heavy
enough with the best Advantages, have been latterly made
irksome through evident purpose; yet you would err widely
if you supposed me to speak of my Toil as thankless. To
the liberal recompense which my Services have received
from the Company, I am deeply sensible; and I have a
still ampler Reward in the reflection that it has been the
lot of few to have benefited an immense portion of their
Fellow Creatures in an equal degree with what my Situ-
ation in India enabled me to effect;

I have the Honor, My Dear Sir, to be with
great Esteem,

Your very obedient
Humble Servant

The Right Honorable
George Canning
&c. &c. &c.

W. Pitt Rivers

Canning Bundle 99A

Dupl.

W. C.

Marquis of Hastings
Calcutta Febr. 2. 1821.

origl. A. Aug. 7.
Dupl. - Aug. 10.

and J. Aug 20th ^{to J. P. Ganges &}
Sept. 1. ^{General Order} ^{sent to Secy 27/10}

Acknowledging Mr. Canning's
Letter No. 49 & 50. of Aug. 5.
1820; - I am in agreement to the
Disposition of the Secret Com^{tee}
of June 22. 1820. which is
attributed to a design to bring
him, through disgust, to the
resignation of his office.

J. W. Canning

Seaford, August 20, 1821

B IV. 3

My Dear Lord,

I know not when I have been more astonished than at the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 2nd of February.

Conscious of having adopted, in my correspondence with your Lordship, a frankness and fullness of communication not usual between persons connected by no other than an official relation; - conscious of having, on more occasions than I ever troubled your Lordship with specifying, softened and conciliated growing misunderstandings between your Lordship and your Employers, - which, with such a disposition as you are now pleased to attribute to me - I needed only to have suffered, at the several periods when they occurred, to take their natural course; - the imputation of a design to drive your Lordship through disgust to resignation, has come upon me as unexpectedly as undeservedly.

A charge so void of foundation might (p) not perhaps have appeared to me to call for any justification on my part; if it were not that the personal charge involves also one of official misconduct. Upon this publick charge^r your Lordship is pleased to intimate that I may have

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opportunity hereafter incidentally to vindicate myself in Parliament. It may therefore be not ^{im}proper to apprise your Lordship before hand on what grounds I am prepared to test my vindication.

The Despatch from the Secret Committee of the 22nd of June 1820 (which forms the groundwork of your Lordships complaint) prohibited the solicitation or acceptance of a sum of money as a "boon" from the Nizam; and it sanctioned the Order already sent out by the Court of Directors, which enjoined the revocation of the Licence granted by the Bengal Government for certain pecuniary transactions between that Prince and a British House of Agency previously established, under the permission of the Governor General in Council, at Hyderabad.

The state of our relations towards the Nizam's Government, at the time when that Despatch was written, as collected from the various documents brought before me - was as follows:- (p)

1st The British Resident at Hyderabad, anticipated the approach of a crisis, when your Lordship in Council must expect to be obliged to interfere in the affairs of the Nizam, in the manner for which there have been

unhappily so many precedents in India, and to the extent of assuming the administration of his Highness's Dominions.

2ndly The House of Palmer & Co. - the British House of Agency established at Hyderabad in 1814 - had, in the year 1816 obtained from the Governor General in Council, Licence for pecuniary dealings with the Nizam's Government; and, in pursuance of that Licence, and under the immediate supervision of the Resident, had (at least since the year 1816) been in the practice of advancing sums of money for the relief of the Nizam's financial difficulties; taking assignments of Revenue in return.

3rdly In these circumstances it was proposed to suggest to the Nizam to offer to the Bengal Government a "boon" ~~offer~~ about £200,000.

These three propositions comprehend the grounds both of what I originated, and what I sanctioned in the Orders sent out to the Bengal Government.

It was announced by your Lordship (p) that the money to be then obtained from the Nizam, was to be applied to the building of a Cathedral and an Episcopal Palace at Calcutta and I now learn from your Lordship that other publick objects were to be embraced in the same scheme.

They make no difference in my view of the matter. The objects of expence may be all ^{Very} proper objects. - The Secret Committee would have had nothing to do with the question - "Is it not desirable to build a Cathedral and an Episcopal Palace at Calcutta?" - But to the question - "is it right to take money from the Nizam provided we lay it out in a Cathedral and a Palace?" - It was the duty of the Secret Committee to give an answer: and I can only say that the answer given was a conscientious one; and that I stand to it.

Your Lordship now holds out to me and to the Court of Directors, a coercive interference, on the part of the House of Commons, to enforce the construction of the projected metropolitan Palace and Church, at the expence of the East India Company. - With all my heart - I may perhaps be a little less sanguine than your Lordship appears to be, ~~so~~ as to the disposition of the House of Commons to prescribe or encourage the expenditure of ^(P) public money, the erection of magnificent publick works, or the augmentation, direct or collateral, of publick allowances, in any department of the Government, ~~or~~ in any part of the British Dominions. But, if the objects in question are to be accomplished at the Company's

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expe^{nce}, and with the Company's consent I ~~can~~^{can} only repeat - with all my heart!

I must be pardoned however for adding that, if in the suggestion intended to be offered to the House of Commons for this imperative disposal of the Company's funds, shall be implied (as I rather understand to be in contemplation) some inculpation of me, as having heretofore thwarted the accomplishment of the desired objects; I shall feel myself compelled, in my own defence,

1st To show that the accomplishment of them was propounded to me, only as connected with the proposition for raising a sum of money for the purpose, in a way which appeared to me liable to objection; - and

2ndly To move that these shall be laid before the House of Commons those Reports from the President at Hyderabad, and all information respecting those transactions of the British House of Agency established there, which, taken together, constituted in my judgement, the impropriety of any pecuniary call upon the Nizam. (p)

Abstractedly from these considerations I deny having obstructed the project for the Cathedral and the Palace. But I admit that the contemplation of those purposes did not remove my objection to the mode in which the money was to be provided.

Perhaps (to speak the whole truth) the ^{juxta-}~~picture~~ position of the end ^{and} ~~of~~ the means, led me to look with some little jealousy at the whole project. It appeared to me that if our right to the money from the Nizam was clear, the Nizam could have nothing to say to our subsequent appropriation of it. It appeared to me ~~that~~ further, that the expediency (as distinct from the right) of requiring such a payment, was to be measured rather by the ability of the Nizam to furnish it, than by the opportunity which might be found of laying it out to advantage.

I am far from contending that - if our right to some pecuniary compensation from the Nizam had been the whole and single question - that right might not have been substantiated. The relief from Chout due to the Peishwa, is unquestionably a great pecuniary benefit to the Nizam; for which I do not say that it might not be just to exact - or at least blameless to receive, some equivalent, and the transfer to (p) that Prince, of territory, which it was on our good pleasure to give or to withhold, might undoubtedly if we thought fit, be matter of bargain and sale, instead of gratuitous bounty. But the question to be decided was not so simple.

XX
No fault was found with the transaction by which your Lordship obtained from the Nabob of Oude a large pecuniary

benefit to the Nizam; for which I do not say that it might not be just to exact - or atleast blameless to receive, some equivalent, and the transfer to (p) that Prince, of territory, which it was on our good pleasure to give or to withhold, might undoubtedly, if we thought fit, be matter of bargain and sale, instead of gratuitous bounty. But the question to be decided was not so simple.

No fault was found with the transaction by which your Lordship obtained from the Nabob of Oude a large pecuniary compensation for the transfer to him of land ceded by the Goorkahs: none at least with the principle of the transaction; though upon the details, I believe, some question was raised not by the Secret Committee but by the Court.

With the Nabob of Oude, however, we did not stand in the same relation as with the Nizam. He had not at that moment, at Lucknow, a British House of Agency authorized by the Governor General in Council to lend money to the Government of Oude, under the superintendence of the British Resident, and to take assignments on the Nabob's territory for the interest and principal of their advances.

But, contemplating with the same reluctance as your Lordship, the catastrophe impending over the Nizam's Government, and anxious, with your Lordship, to avoid even

the appearance of anything which could be though likely to precipitate it, I doubted (p) whether to deduct from the Nizam's pecuniary means, even by claim of right would be expedient; and these seemed to me something peculiarly exceptionable in receiving a "boon" from the Nizam on the one hand, while, on the other hand a British House of Agency was obtaining assignments of Revenue for loans advanced to his Government.

It may be true that I did not advert sufficiently to the distinction pointed out by your Lordship - that the Nizam and his Govern^{ment} are to be considered as entirely separate existences; that the Government is ruined, but the monarch individually ~~wealthy~~ ^{affluent}; - that the ~~assessment~~ ^{of the} sovereign cannot be induced to succor ^{the} distresses of his bankrupt state; - that Messrs. Palmer & Co. were lending to the poor, but that we were taking from the rich; - and that there was therefore no just connection between the "boon" and the Loans.

I will not say more of this distinction than that I really do not think it such as I could have undertaken to explain to the satisfaction of the House of Commons. - and I ~~am not~~ ^{must} beg leave to conclude what I have to urge in vindication of the Despatch of the Secret Committee by recommending your Lordship that it was my duty to be prepared to explain and defend, if (p) questioned, in

Parliament, ^{whatever} ~~whether~~ part of the conduct of the Government in India, I had not corrected or disapproved; and that I was consequently bound in honour to your Lordship no less than ~~at~~ a reasonable protection for my-self, to ^{avow} ~~avow~~ and record my disapprobation of whatever I was not prepared to defend.

To come next to the Court's instructions of the 24th of May, sanctioned (as I admit) by the Secret Despatch of the 22nd of June.

Your Lordship doubts - 1st, whether Mr. Palmer being, though a British subject, not an European, the general tenour of section 28 of the 37th ^{Geo} ~~Geo~~ III cap. 142, could bind his House? - 2ndly, whether the Court of Directors have power to recall a license granted, under the exception in that clause, by the Governor General in Council.

If these two questions were to be answered in the negative, it would follow that the enactments of the section above cited, are utterly nugatory. One native partner in a British House of Agency would take that House out of their operation and, a Licence once granted, the governing authorities at ^{home} ~~house~~ would be, henceforth, excluded from any contr^{oul} ~~ol~~ ^{over} ~~one~~ measures which might be, in their view (p) dangerous to the character as well as to the interests of their Empire in India.

Such cannot have been the intention of the Legislature in passing an act which introduced to signal a reformation into the administration of British India. The object of the particular enactment on which this discussion turns, was to restrain, by criminal penalties, the practice of lending money to native Princes of India; a practice which had notoriously led to fragrant and scandalous abuse, ^{and} ~~only~~ brought disgrace upon the British name. - An exception, indeed, to the uniform and universal operation of this enactment was introduced; exempting from penalty such Loans as the Court of Directors, ^{their} ~~this~~ local Governments may specifically sanction. But comparing the general scope and tenour of the Enactment with this special exception, is it possible to imagine that the Legislature had it in contemplation to allow such License to be granted except in cases of unforeseen exigency? or that the power to the Local Governments was made co-ordinate with that of the Court of Directors in this respect, on any other ground than the possible occurrence of such an exigency as might not admit of a reference home? - A hundred statutes allow acts to be done by (p) a principal, or his Deputy. But was it ever contended that such an alternative took the Deputy out of all dependence upon his Principal, and placed the acts of the Deputy, even though in ^{their nature} ~~this native~~ susceptible of revocation on revival, altogether beyond the Principal's contract?

So far then from ~~concerning~~^{div} the revocation of the License granted to Messrs. Palmer & Co. to have been against the Law, I own it rather appears to me doubtful whether the License, in the shape and extent in which it was granted, were not itself illegal.

Much more consonant, in my judgement, to the true construction of the Statute and to the purposes which it was intended to secure, would have been a License, publickly issued on any sufficient and proved exigency of the Nizam's affairs, to authorize the raising a loan for his Highness, of a specific amount, by open competition in the money market of Calcutta; than a license to a single House of Agency, for an indefinite series of money negotiations with a native Prince, of which neither the amount, nor the terms, nor the duration, were either prescribed or accurately ascertained.

With these opinions - which I have seen nothing to alter, - I was, at the time when the Court's Despatch of May 24, 1820 passed ~~to~~^{the} Board (p) and I still continue to be convinced, that, in recalling such a Licence, the Court of Directors were equally warranted by reason and by Law.

I have thus gone through the whole of the complaints, expressed or implied in your Lordship's letter of the 2nd of February, so far as they rest on publick grounds. A few words, now, on what is more personal to myself.

If it be any satisfaction to your Lordship to know that my attention was perhaps more anxiously fixed upon the whole of this business by rumours which I understood to be ^{current} ~~correct~~ in Indian Circles in London, I will fairly avow that it was so. No such rumours came, or could come, directly to me from India, for, in India, except your Lordship, I have not nor ever had (while President of the Board of Control) a single personal Correspondent. But I avow that the existence of such rumours, did furnish a motive not for forming the opinions which it was my duty to form on publick grounds, (and having so formed to record them) - but for giving to the instructions of the Secret Committee sanctioning in those of the Court of Directors, a tone of more perhaps than usual decision. I had seen numerous instances of positive orders from England, referred back to England for reconsideration, and every man knows how (p) often, in publick office, the absence of all discretion is a most desirable defence against the importunity of individual solicitation. I can truly say, therefore, that in adopting this course, I was, if not guided, fortified by considerations anything but unfriendly to your Lordship.

The like sentiment dictated the few words of Counsel which (after much deliberation) I took the liberty of offering to your Lordship in my private Letter of the 5th of August 1820.

Had it not been for such considerations operating conjointly with a sense of public duty, it would have been much more agreeable to me to leave to whoever might be my successor the unsatisfactory task of pronouncing upon the whole of these transactions. Your Lordship has not now to learn that from a period sometime antecedent to the date of my Letter of August, antecedent to the Despatch of June - I held my office by attenure very precautions. - I had actually tendered my resignation to the King, early in June; and it was a moot point whether I should leave England (at the beginning of the Queen's trial) still a Minister or not - In any case, I should have thought that sentence in my private Letter of August, which has evidently given your Lordship offence, the best testimonial of goodwill that I could bequeath to you. (p) Our ~~firm~~ official relation has now ended. It is no fault of mine if it has not ended (as your Lordship is obliging enough to say you wish it should) "on pleasant terms". For, I cannot hesitate to declare that, so far as my own judgement and feelings may be trusted, I have on no occasion better deserved the acknowledgements which your Lordship has at different times had the goodness profusely to offer to me, than on this last - on which I have been so unfortunate as to cancel in your Lordship eyes, all foregoing merits obligations.

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I should ^{have} ~~have~~ close this long letter, did I not think it due to others as well as to myself, to advert shortly,

to the crooked and covert purpose, which your Lordship has imputed to so many of the despatches sent out to Bengal by the Court of Directors, and in which you now, for the first time, implicate me, as the author of the Despatch of the 22nd of June.

I do not exactly make out whether your Lordship intends to accuse me of having been prepared to sacrifice you - 1st to the so long apprehended dissatisfaction of the court of Directors; or 2ndly to some supposed political convenience of the Ministry, - or 3rdly to some suspected individual ambition of my own.

My answer shall meet each of these constructions. (p)

To begin with myself - I know not why I should make any mystery to your Lordship of the fact, that, since I have been out of office, I have had reason to believe that, in the event of a new Governor General being ^{to be} appointed my name would be not unacceptable to the Court of Directors. The letter unanimously addressed to me by that Body, on my retirement from Office (a copy of which I took the liberty of transmitting to your Lordship at the time); ^{and} ~~of~~ the subsequent proceedings in the Court of Proprietors; were calculated to count^{enance} ~~less~~ness that belief; and communications which I have naturally had on the subject since my ^{return} ~~action~~ to England, have certainly rather tended to confirm it.

But I owe it to every person with whom I have thought it right to have such communications to de^{late}~~cease~~ - that never for a moment, has the notion of such an appointment been entertained by any one of them, Director or Minister, any more than by myself, except on the contingency (whether more or less near) of your Lordships spontaneous, unsuggested retirement.

I may add that never, to the best of my knowledge and belief, during the whole time that I was in Office, was there any question of (p) your Lordship's recall, or even of the eventual appointment of a successor to your Lordship, on the part either of the Ministry or of the Court of Directors, certainly none on mine.

In thus repelling your Lordship's suspicions, to whatever quarter directed, I beg your Lordship to understand me as merely stating facts; - not as offering professions or apologies; for which I feel that I have no occasion; ~~but~~ and to which I cannot admit that your Lordship (whatever respect I may bear to you) has any claim at my hand.

For myself, I reject alike the imputations, that I could seek to procure your Lordships return indirectly for any unavowed or private object; - or that, if, at any time convinced of the expediency of your recall, for the publick service, I should have shrunk from the responsibility

of recommending it directly, and without disguise.

I have the honour to be, with great esteem,
My Dear Lord,
Your Lordships,
Obedient Humble Servant
(Signed) Geo. Canning. (p.)

P.S. Since this letter was ~~begun~~^{begun}, I have, upon ^{lica} appreciation to the President of the Board of Control, been favoured with the perusal of the Official answer from your Lordship in Council to the two Despatches of May and June 1820; and of some previous "consultations" of the Bengal Government, which (whenever they may have been transmitted to England) I had not seen before; particularly those of the 1st January 1820, including Mr. Stuar's most clear and able ^{minute} Minister of Nov. 10th 1819, and your Lordships reply there-to of the same date.

Having no longer any official responsibility I am not called upon to pronounce on the matter, as it stands after these additional illustrations.

But as it would have been unhandsome to your Lordship not to have avowed a change of the opinions which I have already expressed, had any such change been effected by what has subsequently come to my knowledge; so would it be unjust to myself not to declare, with equal frankness, that those opinions, so far from being shaken or qualified, are ~~are~~ on the contrary in every material point, confirmed.

It is a great relief ^{to} my mind ^(p.), however, that (as ~~the~~ ^{one} result of the ^{late} ~~late~~ Communications) I am now ~~able~~ to

specify without indelicacy, the nature of the rumours to which I could only before refer indistinctly.

They related to that circumstance which your Lordship has recorded with so much feeling and propriety in your minutes of June 17th 1820, - the connection of Sir M. Rambold with the House of Agency at Hyderabad.

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Seaforth, August 20. 1821.

My Dear Lord,

I know not when I have been more astonished, than at the receipt of your Lordship's Letter of the 2^d of February.

Conscious of having adopted, in my Correspondence with your Lordship, a frankness & fullness of communication not usual between persons connected by no other than an official relation; - Conscious of having, on more occasions than I ever troubled your Lordship with specifying, softened & conciliated growing Misunderstandings between your Lordship & your Employers, - which, with such a disposition as you are now pleased to attribute to me, - I needed only to have suffered, at the several periods when they occurred, to take their natural course; - the imputation of a design to drive your Lordship through disgust to resignation, has come upon me as unexpectedly as undeservedly.

A charge so void of foundation might not

His Excellency

The Marquis of Hastings, R.G.

not perhaps have appeared to me to call for any justification on my part; if it were not that the personal charge involves also one of official misconduct. Upon this public charge your Lordship is pleased to intimate that I may have opportunity hereafter incidentally to vindicate myself in Parliament. It may therefore be not improper to apprise your Lordship beforehand, on what grounds I am prepared to rest my vindication.

The Despatch from the Secret Committee of the 22^d. of June 1820 (which forms the groundwork of your Lordship's complaint) prohibited the solicitation or acceptance of a sum of money as a "boon" from the Nizam; and it sanctioned the Order already sent out by the Court of Directors, which enjoined the revocation of the Licence granted by the Nizam's Government for certain pecuniary transactions between that Prince & a British House of Agency previously established, under the permission of the Governor General in Council, at Hyderabad.

The state of our relations towards the Nizam's Government, at the time when that Despatch was written, as collected from the various documents brought before me - was as follows; - (Y.)
1st

1st The British Resident at Hyderabad, anticipated the approach of a Crisis, when your Lordship in Council must expect to be obliged to interfere in the Affairs of the Nizam, in the manner for which there have been unhappily so many precedents in India, & to the extent of assuming the administration of his Highness's Dominions.

2^{dly} The House of Palmer & Co. - the British House of Agency established at Hyderabad in 1814 - had, in the year 1816 obtained from the Governor General in Council, a License for pecuniary dealings with the Nizam's Government, and, in pursuance of that License, & under the immediate supervision of the Resident, had (at least since the year 1816) been in the practice of advancing sums of money for the relief of the Nizam's financial difficulties; taking assignments of Revenue in return.

3^{dly} In these circumstances it was proposed to suggest to the Nizam to offer to the Bengal Government, a "loan" of about £200,000.

These three propositions comprehend the grounds both of what I originated, & what I sanctioned, in the Orders sent out to the Bengal Government.

It was announced by your Lordship that

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that the money to be thus obtained from the Nizam, was to be applied to the building of a Cathedral & an Episcopal Palace at Calcutta. - And I now learn from your Lordship that other publick objects were to be embraced in the same scheme. They make no difference in my view of the matter. The objects of expence may be all very proper objects. - The Secret Committee would have had nothing to do with the Question - "Is it not desirable to build a Cathedral & an Episcopal Palace at Calcutta?" - But to the Question - "Is it right to take money from the Nizam, provided we lay it out in a Cathedral & a Palace?" - it was the duty of the Secret Committee to give an answer: and I can only say that the answer given was a conscientious one; and that I stand to it.

Your Lordship now holds out to me & to the Court of Directors, a coercive interference, on the part of the House of Commons, to enforce the construction of the projected Metropolitan Palace & Church, at the expence of the East India Company. - With all my heart. - I may perhaps be a little less sanguine than your Lordship appears to be, as to the disposition of the House of Commons to prescribe or encourage the expenditure of

of public money, the erection of magnificent public works, or the augmentation, direct or collateral, of public allowances, in any department of the Government, or in any part of the British Dominions. But, if the Objects in question are to be accomplished at the Company's expence, & with the Company's consent, I can only repeat - With all my heart!

I must be pardoned however, for adding that, if in the suggestion intended to be offered to the House of Commons for this imperious disposal of the Company's Funds, shall be implied (as I rather understand to be in contemplation) some inculpation of me, as having heretofore thwarted the accomplishment of the desired Objects; I shall feel myself compelled, in my own defence,

1^o To shew that the accomplishment of them was proposed to me, only as connected with a proposition for raising a sum of money for the purpose, in a way which appeared to me liable to objection; - and

2^o To show that there shall be laid before the House of Commons those Reports from the Resident at Hyderabad, & all information respecting those Transactions of the British House of Agency established there, which, taken together, constituted in my judgement, the impropriety of any pecuniary call upon the Nizam.

Abstractedly

6.
Abstractedly from these considerations,
I deny having obstructed the project for the
Cathedral & the Palace. But I admit that the
contemplation of those purposes did not remove
my objection to the mode in which the money
was to be provided.

Perhaps (to speak the whole truth) the
mixt-position of the End & the Means, led me
to look with some little jealousy at the whole
project. It appeared to me that if our right
to the money from the Nizam was clear, the
Nizam could have nothing to say to our
subsequent appropriation of it. It appeared to
me further, that the expediency (as distinct from
the right) of requiring such a payment, was
to be measured rather by the ability of the Nizam
to furnish it, than by the opportunity which
might be found of laying it out to advantage.

I am far from contending that - if
our right to some pecuniary compensation from
the Nizam had been the whole & single question,
- that right might not have been substantiated.
The relief from Chout due to the Peshwa, is
unquestionably a great pecuniary benefit to
the Nizam; for which I do not say that it
might not be just to exact - or at least blameless
to receive, some equivalent. And the transfer
to

7.
to that Prince, of Territory, which it was in our
good pleasure to give or to withhold, might
undoubtedly, if we thought fit, be matter of
bargain & sale, instead of gratuitous bounty.
But the Question to be decided was not so simple.

No fault was found with the transaction
by which your Lordship obtained from the Nabob
of Oude a large pecuniary compensation for
the transfer to him of land ceded by the Goorkals:
none at least with the principle of the transaction;
though upon the details, I believe, some question was
raised; not by the Secret Committee but by the Court.

With the Nabob of Oude, however, we
did not stand in the same relation as with
the Nizam. He had not at that moment, at
Lucknow, a British House of Agency authorized
by the Governor General in Council to lend
money to the Government of Oude, under the
superintendance of the British Resident, & to
take Assignments on the Nabob's territory for the
interest & principal of their Advances.

But, contemplating with the same
reluctance as your Lordship, the catastrophe
impending over the Nizam's Government, &
anxious, with your Lordship, to avoid even
the appearance of anything which could be
thought likely to precipitate it, I doubted
whether

whether to deduct from the Nizam's pecuniary means, even by claim of right, would be expedient. It then seemed to me something peculiarly exceptionable in receiving a "boon" from the Nizam on the one hand, while, on the other hand a British House of Agency was obtaining assignments of Revenue for Loans advanced to his Government.

It may be true that I did not advert sufficiently to the distinction pointed out by your Lordship - that the Nizam & his Government are to be considered as entirely separate existences; that the Government is ruined, but the Monarch individually wealthy; - that the affluent Sovereign cannot be induced to succour the distresses of his bankrupt State; - that Mess^{rs} Palmer & Co. were lending to the poor, but that we were taking from the rich; - and that there was therefore no just connection between the "boon" & the Loans.

I will not say more of this distinction than that I really do not think it such as I could have undertaken to explain to the satisfaction of the House of Commons. - And I must beg leave to conclude what I have to urge in vindication of the Despatch of the Secret Com^{tee}; by reminding your Lordship that it was my duty to be prepared to explain & defend, if questioned.

9.

questioned, in Parliament, whatever part of
the conduct of the Government in India, had
not corrected or disapproved; that I was
consequently bound in honour to your Lordship,
no less than as a reasonable protection for myself,
to avow & record my disapprobation of whatever
I was not prepared to defend.

To come next to the Court's Instructions
of the 24th of May, sanctioned (as I admit)
by the Secret Despatch of the 22^d of June.

Your Lordship doubts - 1st whether, Mr.
Palmer being, though a British Subject, not an
European, the general tenour of Section 28 of the
37th Geo. III cap. 142, could bind his House? -
2^{dly} whether the Court of Directors have power
to recall a license granted, under the exception in
that Clause, by the Governor General in Council?

If these two questions were to be answered
in the negative, it would follow that the
Enactments of the Section above cited, are utterly
negatory. One native partner in a British
House of Agency would take that House out
of their operation. And, a license once granted,
the governing authorities at home would be,
thenceforth, excluded from any control over
measures which might be, in their view,
dangerous

dangerous to the character as well as to the interests, of their Empire in India.

Such cannot have been the intention of the Legislature in passing an act which introduced so signal a reformation into the Administration of British India. The object of the particular enactment on which this discussion turns, was to restrain, by criminal penalties, the practice of lending money to native Princes of India; a practice which had notoriously led to flagrant & scandalous abuse, & brought disgrace upon the British Name. — An exception, indeed, to the uniform & universal operation of this Enactment was introduced; exempting from penalty such loans as the Court of Directors, or their local Governments may specifically sanction. But comparing the general scope & tenor of the Enactment with this special exception, is it possible to imagine that the Legislature had it in contemplation to allow such license to be granted except in cases of unforeseen exigency? or that the power to the local Governments was made co-ordinate with that of the Court of Directors in this respect, on any other ground than the possible occurrence of such an exigency as might not admit of a reference home? — A hundred Statutes allow acts to be done by a

a Principal, or his Deputy. But was it ever contended that such an alternative took the Deputy out of all dependence upon his Principal, and placed the Acts of the Deputy, even though in their nature susceptible of revocation or revival, altogether beyond the Principal's control?

So far then from conceiving the revocation of the license granted to Messrs. Palmer & Co. to have been against the Law, I own it rather appears to me doubtful whether the license, in the shape & extent in which it was granted, were not itself illegal.

Much more consonant, in my judgement, to the true construction of the Statute, & to the purposes which it was intended to secure, would have been a license, publicly issued, on any sufficient & proved exigency of the Nizam's Affairs, to authorize the raising a loan for his Highness, of a specific amount, by open competition, in the money market of Calcutta; than a license to a single House of Agency, for an indefinite series of money negotiations with a Native Prince, of which neither the amount, nor the terms, nor the duration, were either prescribed, or necessarily ascertained.

With these opinions - which I have seen nothing to alter, - I was, at the time when the Court's Despatch of May 24. 1820 passed the Board,

8. and I still continue to be, convinced, that, in recalling such a licence, the Court of Directors were equally warranted by reason & by law.

I have thus gone through the whole of the complaints, expressed or implied, in your Lordship's letter of the 2^d of February, so far as they rest on public grounds. A few words, now, on what is more personal to myself.

If it be any satisfaction to your Lordship to know that my attention was perhaps more anxiously fixed upon the whole of this business by rumours which I understood to be current in Indian Circles in London, I will fairly avow that it was so. No such rumours came, or could come, directly to me from India; for, in India, except your Lordship, I have not, nor ever had (while President of the Board of Control) a single personal Correspondent. But I avow that the existence of such rumours, did furnish a motive, not for forming the opinions which it was my duty to form on public grounds, (and having so formed to record them), - but for giving to the Instructions of the Secret Committee, sanctioning in those of the Court of Directors, a tone of more perhaps than usual decision. - I had seen numerous instances of private orders from England, referred back to England for reconsideration. And every man knows how often,

often, in publick Office, the absence of all dis-
-cretion is a most desirable defence against the
importance of individual solicitation. I can
truly say, therefore, that in adopting this course,
I was, if not guided, fortified by Considerations
anything but unfriendly to your Lordship.

The like sentiment dictated the few
words of Counsel which (after much deliberation)
I took the liberty of offering to your Lordship in
my private Letter of the 5th of August 1820.

Had it not been for such Considerations
operating conjointly with a sense of publick
duty, it would have been much more agreeable
to me to leave to whoever might be my Successor,
the unsatisfactory task of pronouncing upon the
whole of these Transactions. Your Lordship has
not now to learn that from a period some time
antecedent to the date of my Letter of August,
antecedent to the Despatch of Grace, - I held my
Office by a tenure very precarious. - I had
actually tendered my resignation to the King,
early in June: and it was a moot point whether
I should leave England (at the beginning of the
Queen's Trial) still a Minister or not. - In any
case, I should have thought that sentence in
my private Letter of August, which has evidently
given your Lordship offence, the best testimonial
of goodwill that I could bequeath to you.

Our official relation has now ended. It is no fault of mine if it has not ended (as your Lordship is obliging enough to say you wish it should) "on pleasant terms." For, I cannot hesitate to declare that, so far as my own judgement & feelings may be trusted, I have on no occasion better deserved the acknowledgements which your Lordship has at different times had the goodness profusely to offer to me, than on this last, - on which I have been so unfortunate as to cancel in your Lordship's eyes, all foregoing merits & obligations.

I should here close this long Letter: did I not think it due to others as well as to myself, to advert shortly to the crooked & covert purpose, which your Lordship has imputed to so many of the Despatches sent out to Bengal by the Court of Directors, - and in which you now, for the first time, implicate me, as the author of the Despatch of the 22^d of June.

I do not exactly make out whether your Lordship intends to accuse me of having been prepared to sacrifice you - 1st to the so long apprehended dissatisfaction of the Court of Directors; or 2^{dly} to some supposed political convenience of the Ministry; - or 3^{dly} to some suspected individual ambition of my own.

My answer shall meet each of these constructions.

No.

To begin with myself. - I know not why I should make any mystery to your Lordship of the fact, that, since I have been out of office, I have had reason to believe that, in the event of a new Governor General being to be appointed, my name would be not unacceptable to the Court of Directors. The Letter unanimously addressed to me by that Body, on my retirement from office (a copy of which I took the liberty of transmitting to your Lordship at the time); & the subsequent proceedings in the Court of Proprietors, were calculated to counteract that belief; and communications, which I have naturally had on the subject, since my return to England, have certainly rather tended to confirm it.

But I owe it to every person with whom I have thought it right to have such communications, to declare, - that never for a moment, has the notion of such an appointment been entertained by any one of them, Director or Minister, any more than by myself, except on the contingency (whether more or less near) of your Lordship's spontaneous, unsuggested retirement.

I may add that never, to the best of my knowledge & belief, during the whole time that I was in office, was there any question of
 your

your Lordship's recall, or even of the eventual appointment of a Successor to your Lordship, on the part either of the Ministry or of the Court of Directors: certainly none on mine.

In thus repelling your Lordship's suspicions, to whatever quarter directed, I beg your Lordship to understand me as merely stating facts; - not as offering professions or apologies; for which I feel that I have no occasion; & to which I cannot admit that your Lordship (whatever respect I may bear to you) has any claim at my hands.

For myself, I reject alike the imputations, that I could seek to procure your Lordship's return indirectly, for any unavowed or private object; - or that, if, at any time convinced of the expediency of your recall, for the publick Service, I should have shrunk from the responsibility of recommending it directly, & without disguise.

I have the honour to be, with great Esteem,

My Dear Lord,

Your Lordship's

Obedient Humble Servant

signed / Geo. Canning

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P.S.

September 9. 1821.

Since this letter was begun, I have, upon application to the President of the Board of Control, been favoured with the perusal of the official answer from your Lordship in Council, to the two Despatches of May & June 1820; and of some previous "Consultations" of the Bengal Government, which (whenever they may have been transmitted to England) I had not seen before; particularly those of the 1st of January 1820, including Mr. Stuart's most clear & able Minuta of Nov. 10. 1819, & your Lordship's reply thereto of the same date.

Having no longer any official responsibility, I am not called upon to pronounce on the matter, as it stands after these additional illustrations.

But as it would have been unhandson to your Lordship not to have avowed a change of the opinions which I have already expressed, had any such change been effected by what has subsequently come to my knowledge; so would it be unjust to myself not to declare, with equal frankness, that those opinions, so far from being shaken or qualified, are, on the contrary, in every material point, confirmed.

It is a great relief to my mind
however,

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however, that (as the result of the late
communications) I am now enabled to
specify without indelicacy, the nature of the
"business" to which I could only before refer
indistinctly.

They related to that circumstance
which your Lordship has recorded with so much
feeling & propriety in your Minute of June 17th
1820, - the connection of Sir M. Rumbold
with the House of Agency at Hyderabad.

Copy No. 10.
Mr. Canning
to the
Magazine of Hastings

Leford Aug. 20 } 1821.
Sept. 1. }

Wing. Lt. Ganges, sailed Oct. 10th.
Capt. of Army Powder, sailed
Oct. 8.

Canning bundle 99A

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OF THE EARL OF HAREWOOD.

Canning - Amherst
Correspondence

Barrackpore
23rd November 1824.

My dear Canning

BTW. 4

We are gradually collecting our means for conquering if possible, a peace from the Burmese in the course of the present cold season, but as war has not been carried on since the day of Lord Clive on the side of Bengal and as all our resources are in the Upper Provinces, I scarcely think that operations can fairly commence on the Eastern Frontier before the 1st of January. Meanwhile we are using every exertion to strengthen ~~his~~ Sir Archbald Campbell at Rangoon, and it is there, I think, that our chief impression is to be made for what with the impracticability of the country and unwholesomeness of the climate in our Eastern and South Eastern Districts, it is not easy (p) to carry on offensive operations either to a considerable extent or for more than a very limited period of time. I have from the first contemplated this war, the seeds of which were sown a short time before my arrival, as a new page in the history of India; and although upon the best consideration and reflection, I am not aware that any false step has been taken, I cannot but regard myself as singularly unfortunate to have been left without the assistance of Mr. Adams, the man of all others to whom I should have looked with most confidence for advice in the new situation in which our affairs were placed. It

Leeds Public Libraries: Canning 80: Lord Amherst to George Canning: 23-11-841824.

is true that I or some of the servants connected with the Government have been in constant correspondence with him and that we have the satisfaction of knowing that he has approved of our proceedings. But his absence from Council almost ever since I (p) have been here and during the whole period of our most important discussions has caused me frequently to feel somewhat diffident of the measures we were adopting or at least has deprived me of the sure confidence with which I should have proceeded had they partaken of his immediate concurrence. Another event which I have sincerely deplored is the death of Major Canning. He was the person to whom we confidently looked for the best information on all subjects connected with Ava. On him I depended for the opening and safe conduct ~~of~~ of any negotiations which might be entered into for settling our differences with the Burmese Government. He was personally known to the King and some of his Court; fully aware of their customs and peculiarities, and more likely than anybody now existing to be able to avail himself of favourable opportunities of bringing (p) them to reason. He was on his voyage to Calcutta from Rangoon fully charged with all the information which we ~~were~~ desired to possess, and would have ~~x~~ returned with ample instructions for the further prosecution of the war. But the hand of death seized him before he quitted his ship and he landed at Calcutta only to breathe his last without having recovered the power of speech or the apparent use of his ~~xx~~ faculties.

We have certainly not derived from the occupation of Rangoon, in the month of May last, all the advantages which I think were reasonably to be expected. We did not anticipate that the power of the Burmese Government should be such as to remove from an entire district the whole of its population as effectually as if it had been swept off from the face of the earth. But one of the ^{expect} ~~capu~~tations which we formed from the possession of Rangoon has been completely realised. It has (p) entirely withdrawn from our own provinces the ^{since} ~~prepare~~ of a hostile force which, at that season of the year, could not have been removed by any direct exertions even if our force had been collected. The long occupation too of their principal sea port has unquestionably caused considerable inconvenience to our enemy; and the disgrace of ~~bearing~~ a hostile army in possession of the chief commercial mart of the empire, has weakened the respect and obedience paid to the terrific despotism of the Government, and caused insurrections to threaten even the capital itself. I therefore am prone to indulge the hope that much may be affected when danger approaches from ^{the} ~~Avacan~~ as well as from Rangoon; and if an opportunity is afforded of a fair contest in the field, I shall then be sanguine in my ^{expect} ~~capu~~tations than our superiority in arms once acknowledged, the desire entertained by the King ^(p) of measuring his strength with us will be finally subdued, and that a secure and unmolested frontier, our only object in this war, will be at length obtained.

The opinion entertained in England of the profound tranquillity of Hindostan did not prepare me for the

inflammable materials of which I now find Central and Western India is composed. It is incredible with what avidity reports have been received and spread in the Upper Provinces of signal defeats sustained by us at the very gates (if there were such things) of Calcutta - how prophets have sprung up announcing the exten^ction of the British Power - and, what is more serious, disturbances, not to say insurrections, have broken out in various parts of the Country. It is true that the leading native Govern- ment, that (p) of Scindea, appears not to have given much credit to these rumours. It is true that ~~R~~unjeet Sing would seem rather to be directing his attention towards Caubul than to be willing to take any advantage of the supposed embarassment of the British Government; but in the neighbourhood of Delhi there has been a defiance of our authority - In Rohilkhandan extensive assemblage of marauders who went about proclaiming our downfall, untill dispersed by the gallantry of some of our civil as well as military servants - a Pindarrie sprung up on the Nerbudda, though I hope he is by this time suppressed - and in Jyepore there still exists a spirit which I am not satisfied will yeild to any other than coercive measures with whatever reluctance I should resort to them. Jyepore indeed is, and I think will be a source of trouble and inconvenience to us, the more so as our interference at all is a question of doubtful policy, and whether we recede or advance we

equally encounter ^{er}plexity and embarrassment, (p) ~~on~~
In this part of India too we have had the misfortune to
lose some of our best Agents at a moment when their services
were most wanted; and it is just now that we are compelled
to urge Mr. Jenkins to remain at Nagpore though his health
requires that he should visit the Western Coast. We must
be prepared to hear of further disturbances in the Western
Provinces. The rains have failed this year, and the scarcity
in some places amounts, in consequence, almost to famine.
It has been deemed advisable to augment our force of
irregular horse in that part of the Country. This answers
the double purpose of giving us further means of putting
down insurrection, and employing, to our own advantage,
the very men whose swords would be turned against us.

I read with great interest, as you may suppose, the
debate on the Indian Press, and cannot tell you how grate-
ful I feel to you for the kind and handsome manner in which
you spoke of me. I care not how often I am attacked as
long as I am so defended. I wrote very fully to Wynn a
short time ago upon the subject, and pointed out to him
some of the gross falsehoods to which Mr. Buckingham had
given circulation. Mr. Arnot, I see by the shipping report,
has taken his passage to England in the Mellish. He applied
lately to be suffered to remain in India, and I would have
consented to it, notwithstanding the charge of inconsistency
to which we should have been open, could I have had any
satisfactory assurance of his being usefully or even

harmlessly employed at Calcutta. I certainly have had no (p.) occasion to change the opinion which I formed in England, that a wholly unrestricted press could not be tolerated in India. I am willing to hope that you will not find the power of the Government abused ^{dur} ~~serv~~ing my administration and I trust you will approve my having permitted, contrary to the opinion of some of my advisers, the publication in our newspapers of the debate on Lambton's motion. But before the state of our press is assimilated to that of England, so should our Government be also; and I cannot conceive but that the greatest ~~ixit~~ evil would ensue from such a latitude as Mr. Buckingham is disposed to advocate. The only valuable opinion which I ever received in favour of an unrestricted press was from Smith, formerly our Advocate-General. Pray ask him if he remembers telling me as we were walking in ^v ~~Governor~~ Street (p) that you might as well expect to see a Hindoo wear leather breeches as to be influenced by a newspaper. Now the fact is that all the Cavalry do wear leather breeches - such is the progress of events since Smith was here.

I have lately received 4 letters from you recommending Mr. Sinclair, Mr. Mellish and M. Miches and Mr. Tierany. The first wrote to me honestly confessing that though enjoying a lucrative situation in the Nagpore subsidiary force, he was still hampered by the effects of early extravagance. If I can do anything to help him, it shall be done. The second ~~den~~ed with me during the few days he remained at Calcutta previously to going up the

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country to join his Regiment. The third belongs to Madras and is therefore removed from my immediate patronage. The 4th I keep in my eye together with his two brothers, all recommended to me by Sir Mathew^F.

I did not think when I sat down to have written you so long a letter. I (p) hope William is going on to your satisfaction.

Believe me my dear Canning

Sincerely and affectionately yours,

sd. AMHERST

I do assure you I am not becoming a tiger - and yet I have just seen a memorial to the Court of Directors from Mr. Macnaghten, son of Sir Francis, in which he likens me to the wolf in the fable, ^{and} ~~be~~ to the judges in Hell, and doubts if he could remain in safety in Calcutta while I am there, and all because it appeared just not only to Meno's but to ~~QA~~acus and Rhadamanthus also (for we are three in Council) that he should be temporarily suspended for an act of insubordination.-

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CANNING. 80.

Barrackpore
23^d. November 1824.

'A'

My dear Canning

We are gradually collecting our means for conquering, if possible, a peace from the Burmese in the course of the present cold season, but as war has not been carried on since the days of Lord Clive on the side of Bengal and as all our resources are in the Upper Provinces, I scarcely think that operations can fairly commence on the Eastern Frontier before the 1st of January. Meanwhile we are using every exertion to strengthen Sir Archibald Campbell at Rangoon, and it is there, I think, that our chief impulsion is to be made, for what with the impracticability of the country and the unwholesomeness of the climate in our Eastern and South Eastern Districts, it is not easy to

leeds. : Canning 80. Lord Amhurst to G. Canning
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have been here and during the ^{whole} period of our most
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 Another event which I have sincerely deplored is
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 personally known to the King and some of his Court;
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them to reason. He was on his voyage to Calcutta from Rangoon fully charged with all the information which we desired to possess, and would have returned with ample instructions for the further prosecution of the war. But the hand of death seized him before he quitted his ship and he landed at Calcutta only to breathe his last without having recovered the power of speech or the apparent use of his faculties.

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Mr William is going on to your satisfaction.

Believe me My dear Canning
sincerely & affect^{ly}. Yours

Amherst.

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Canning bundle 80

Low August

Banackpou Nov 23
1824

Recd April 28
1825

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Low August

Banackpon Nov 28
1824

Paid April 28
1825

Private and Confidential

B.W.S.

Calcutta

8 August 1825

My dear Canning

I believe you know me well enough to take upon yourself to say that I should not complain if a better man than myself were sent to govern India. But what I should complain of is if I were adjudged, upon the authority of private letters from Calcutta, which Wynn tells me may be the case, to have been the cause of the Burmese War or to have misconducted its' operations.

I have had infinite pleasure in reading a memorandum which Wynn transmitted to me from the Duke of Wellington. It contains the plan of a campaign for the next season, drawn up under a misapprehension for which I am at a loss to account, that we intend^{ed} acting on the defensive only during the last. You will know, long before you receive this, that we have not only anticipated the plan which suggested itself to the Duke's mind, but that we have exceeded it beyond the spirit if not to the letter. Where we have not executed it beyond to the letter it is because natural obstacles, with which the Duke was unacquainted, prevented its' accomplishment. But I think we occupy a position on which the most sanguine minds would scarcely have calculated in the month of January last; and if we are not able to conquer a peace, we will at least shew, if the health of our troops is preserved, that we can dismember an Empire.

Leeds Public Libraries Archives: Canning 80: Canning Papers: Amherst to George Canning: Calcutta: 8-8-1825.

I remember well its' being said most justly before I left England that if a Conqueror were wanted in India I was not the man who would have been selected to go there. To be sure not - I would have declined the task then and am willing to relenquish it now. But it is not my fault if I have not had to administer a peaceful government. I defy any man to read over the correspondence and to say that every measure was not resorted to ^{to} avert the war. I ^{shrink} ~~think~~ not from any investigation of the mode in which it has been conducted; and as ^{success} ~~sweep~~ in with most people the criterion of the wisdom of a measure, I am willing that the results of the last campaign shall determine the question whether or not it has been judiciously conducted. The Commander in Chief will soon be at home to stand any examination to which he may be submitted.

Having written pretty fully to Wynn in answer to his letter, and thinking it probable you may see that answer, I will not trouble you further than to repeat that no man will be more ready than myself to give place to another more fitted to encounter the difficulties against which I shall yet have to continue provided my removal be not accompanied with a sentence of condemnation on the authority

- 3 -

of private correspondence. I cannot feel sufficiently thankful to you and to the King's Government for the support which you have already afforded me.

Believe me ever

My dear Canning

faithfully and affectionately yours

Amherst.

B III.5

B

CANNING 89

Private & Confidential.

Calcutta
8th August 1825.

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Amburst to Canning

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Lord Amherst
Calcutta August 8. 1826

My dear Canning

B III. 6

Barrackpore
9th April 1826

I told you in a former letter that we would dismember an Empire if we could not conquer a peace. I have sometimes regretted that I used those expressions, qualified as they were, because I think it unwise to venture a prophecy, and unbecoming to use what sounds like ^{boastful} ~~beautiful~~ language. But I have kept my word. One of the alternatives has been accomplished. We have at length conquered, within four marches of the Capital, an honorable and advantageous, and I would fain believe, a lasting peace. (p)

The most satisfactory proofs have lately been afforded us, if more indeed were wanting, that war with the English was the favorite measure of the Court. In the prosecution of this ambitious design, the spirit of the nation has been broken and its treasury exhausted. The Burmese now acknowledge our superiority and appear to be anxious to live with us on friendly terms. Our frontier is secured, while commercial relations are opening to a far greater extent than heretofore, and in quarters not yet resorted to by British ships. Without any undue extension of our own territory to the Eastward (for we look to the restoration of former independent Governments) without embroiling

Leeds Public Libraries Archives: Canning 80; Canning Papers: Amherst to George Canning; Barrackpore: 9-4-1826.

ourselves I trust in political connections with the Indo-Chinese Countries, without even destroying the salutary balance of power which has hitherto existed between (p) Ava and Siam, we have laid the foundation of highly beneficial intercourse with both those nations should their present friendly dispositions continue, or of keeping them both in check in the improbable event of either of them hereafter having recourse to hostilities.

We are beholden to Sir Archibald Campbell for the conclusion of the war in Ava. His activity and perseverance in the field and I may add the facilities which he afforded for opening negotiations and his firmness in conducting them, entitle him to a distinguished mark of His Majesty's favour which I trust will ever long be conferred upon him.

The commencement of this year is rendered even memorable in India by the fall of Bhurthpore. I am bold to say that under all circumstances no event could have occurred by which the foundations of our power in this Country are so effectually secured. It was supposed by many that those foundations were exposed to hazard by the war in Ava. The assemblage of one of the finest armies ever seen in Upper India, while the war raged to the Eastward went far to dissipate that illusion. But still, to native minds, Bhurtpore was the barrier to the

further progress of our arms. While Bhurtpore existed, there was always a rallying point for disaffection. Tranquillity was not firmly established as long as it was believed there was a place in India which our utmost efforts could not subdue. The desperate resistance made by the usurper and his troops was sufficient to manifest our superiority when opposed hand to hand, while the prudent operations of Lord Combermere before ordering the assault, achieved this conquest at an expence of lives far within the lowest calculation in which we (p) could venture to indulge. The capture of the Usurper secures us against the chance of future mischief from his adherents if any there be, and the placing the rightful Rajah on the throne will prove to neighbouring as well as to distant states that this great object has been undertaken and effected not with a view to our own aggrandisement.

The knowledge of my intended recal| has procured for me, in a variety of ways, the most unequivocal contradiction to the assestion of Mr. Hume and Mr. Buckingham that a general dissatisfaction with me and my measures prevailed in Calcutta; and I fee assured that if, notwithstanding the more favourable accounts brought by the last arrivals, the next ships should confirm the news of an intended change in the Government of (p) India, my departure will not be regarded with indifference,

- 4 -

nor shall I be classed low amongst those who have upheld
the honor, promoted the interests, and increased the
strength of Great Britain's Eastern Empire.

Believe me ever

My dear Canning

Sincerely and Affectionately yours

~~Edw.~~ Amherst.

B 44 '6

'c'

CANNING. 80.

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9th April 1826

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Amherst to Canning

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Britain's Eastern Empire.

Believe me ever

My dear Canning
sincerely & affectionately Yours
Amherst.

Canning P.S. Correspondence
Doc 779.

Festivals and Holidays in 1855

(Leeds Public Library: CANNING PRIVATE SECRETARY
CORRESPONDENCE, Doc 779)

PART I.]

FESTIVALS AND HOLIDAYS
BRITISH AND CHRISTIAN HOLIDAYS FOR 1855

Fixed and Moveable Festivals, Anniversaries, &c.

Epiphany	Jan. 6	Birth of Queen Victoria.....	May 24
Martyrdom of King Charles 1st....	30	Pentecost—Whit Sunday.....	27
Septuagesima Sunday.....	Feb. 4	Restoration of King Charles II...	29
Quinquagesima—Shrove Sunday ..	18	Trinity Sunday.....	June 3
Ash Wednesday.....	21	Corpus Christi.....	7
Quadragesima—1st Sunday in Lent,	25	Accession of Queen Victoria	29
St. David.....	Mar. 1	Proclamation.....	21
St. Patrick.....	17	St. John Baptist—Midsummer Day	24
Annunciation—Lady Day.....	25	Birth of Prince Albert.....	Aug. 26
Palm Sunday.....	Apr. 1	St. Michael—Michaelmas Day...Sept.	29
Good Friday.....	6	Gunpowder Plot.....	Nov. 5
EASTER SUNDAY.....	8	Birth of Prince of Wales.....	9
Low Sunday.....	15	St. Andrew.....	30
St. George.....	23	1st Sunday in Advent.....	Dec. 2
Rogation Sunday	May 13	St. Thomas.....	21
Ascension Day—Holy Thursday..	17	CHRISTMAS DAY	25

Rules to know when the Moveable Feasts and Holidays begin.

Easter Day, on which the rest depends, is always the first Sunday after the first full moon, which happens after the one and twentieth day of March. If the full moon happens upon a Sunday, Easter Day is the Sunday after. Advent Sunday is always the nearest Sunday to the Feast of St. Andrew, whether before or after.

Rogation Sunday is Five weeks after Easter.

Ascension Day is Forty days ditto.

Whit Sunday is Seven weeks ditto.

Trinity Sunday is Eight weeks ditto.

Hindoo Holidays for 1855.

ENGLISH MONTHS.	DAYS OF WEEK.	NAME.	TIME.	HINDOO MONTHS.
January..... 22 & 23	Monday & Tuesday...	Sree Panchomee. . .	2 days	Maug (1261) 10 & 11
February... 15 & 16	Thursday and Friday...	Seebo Rattree.	2 days	Falgun... 4 & 5
March..... 3 & 4 & 5	Saturday to Monday..	Dole Jatra..	3 days	Falgun 20 21 & 22
March..... 16	Friday.....	Baronee..	1 day	Choitro..... 4
March..... 27	Tuesday.....	Sree Ramnoboomee..	1 day	Choitro..... 15
April..... 11 & 12	Wednes. & Thursday..	Churruck Poojah... .	2 days	Choitro... 30 & 31
May..... 26	Saturday.....	Dushoharah.....	1 day	Joistee.. (1262) 13
May..... 31	Thursday.....	Chann Jatra.....	1 day	Joistee..... 18
July..... 16	Monday.....	Ruth Jatra.....	1 day	Srabone... .. 1
July..... 27	Tuesday.....	Oolta Ruth.....	1 day	Srabone... .. 9
August..... 24	Monday.....	Rakhree Poornemah..	1 day	Bhadur... .. 12
September... 3 & 4	Monday & Tuesday..	Junno Ostoince... .	2 days	Bhadur... 19 & 20
October..... 10	Wednesday.....	Mohalyah.....	1 day	Assin..... 25
October... 16 & 23	Tuesday to Tuesday..	Doorgah Poojah... .	8 days	Assin 31 & Kart. 7
October... 24 & 25	Wednesday & Thursday	Lukkhee Poojah... .	2 days	Kartick... 8 & 9
November.. 9 & 10	Friday & Saturday...	Kalleeka Poojah... .	2 days	Kartick.. 21 & 25
November... .. 11	Sunday.....	Bhratesdetaah.....	1 day	Kartick... .. 26
November.. 15 & 16	Thursday & Friday..	Kartick Poojah... .	2 days	Kartick 30 & Ugran 1
November.. 18 & 19	Sunday & Monday....	Juggodhatree Poojah:	2 days	Ugraan... 3 & 4

days

Christian 32 (1 day each)

Hindoo 36 (Durgahya 8, Dol Jatra 3)

Muslim 47 (Ramzan 30, Moharram 10)

Mahomedan Holidays for 1855.

May..... 2	Wednesday.....	Shube Baraat..	1 day..	Boisakh..... 20
May 18 & June 16	Friday to Saturday..	Ramzaun..	30 days..	Joist.. 5 to Assar.. 3
June..... 17 & 18	Sunday & Monday..	Eed..	2 days..	Assar..... 4 & 5
August .. 24 & 25	Friday & Saturday..	Buqur-Eed..	2 days..	Bhadro.. 9 & 10
September 14 to 23	Friday to Sunday...	Mohurram.....	10 days..	Bhadro 30 to Assin 8

A holiday is observed only after the New Moon becomes visible, which on a clear evening, is generally one full day after New Moon.

The year 5616 of the Jewish Era, commences on September 13, 1855.

Ramdaan (Month of Abstinence observed by the Turks) commences on May 18, 1855.

The year 1272 of the Mahomedan Era, commences on September 13, 1855.

Mahomedan Holidays observed in Public Offices.

Ramzaun.....	30 days.
Eed after Ramzaun.....	2 days.
Bukuryeed, nine days after the New Moon, Zilhaj is seen.....	2 days.
Mohurram.....	10 days.
Akhree Chunar Shumba, in Safar.....	1 day.
Bara Wufat, 12 days after the New Moon Rabi-ulawul is seen.....	1 day.
Shube Burat, one day after Full Moon in Shabaun.....	1 day.

The Days of the Calendar.

JANUARY.

1. *New Year's Day.—Circumcision.*—This festival was originally called the Octave of Christmas; and the first mention found of it is in the year 487. It was instituted by the Church, to commemorate the ceremony under the Jewish law, to which Christ submitted, on the eighth day of the nativity; and was introduced into the Liturgy of the Church of England in 550.

6. *Epiphany.*—The word Epiphany signifies *appearance or apparition*. This festival is kept in commemoration of the "Manifestation" of the Saviour of mankind to the Gentiles, and appears to have been first observed, as a separate feast in the year 813. The primitive Christians celebrated the Feast of the Nativity for twelve days, observing the first and last with the greatest solemnity. From the circumstance of this festival being twelve days after Christmas, it is vulgarly called "Twelfth day."

8. *Plough Monday* is the first Monday after the Epiphany, and received this appellation from its having been fixed upon by our forefathers, as the period when they returned to the duties of agriculture, after the festivities of Christmas.

30. *King Charles the First's Martyrdom.*—The death of Charles I., is celebrated as a fast of the Church.

FEBRUARY.

2. *Purification.*—This day is kept in the reformed Church, as a solemn festival, in memory of the Purification of the Virgin Mary, who submitted to the injunction of the law, under which she lived, and presented the infant Jesus in the Temple. The festival was celebrated in the Christian Churches with an abundance of light, and was originally called "Candlemas Day," as well as the Day of Purification. The practice of lighting the Churches has been discontinued in this country since the second year of Edward the VI. In the Romish Church, the original name and all its attendant ceremonies, are still retained.

4. *Septuagesima Sunday.*—Septuagesima Sunday, is a Sunday dependent upon Lent, as that season is upon Easter. It is to be considered as the preparation for the last of Lent. Its observation was instituted by Pope Gregory the Great. The name of the first Sunday in Lent having been distinguished by the appellation of Quadragesima, and the three weeks preceding, having been appropriated to the gradual introduction of the Lent Fast, the three Sundays of these weeks were called by names significant of their situation; and reckoning by *Decades* (lents), the Sunday preceding Quadragesima, received its present title of Quinquagesima, the second Sexagesima, and the third Septuagesima.

Canning Papers: 1755-61
(Leeds Public Library)

Canning Notebook (medium, with lock and key; mostly blank; few pages on India)
(Misc: Cardboard box)

p.1. Some months ago I offered a lac (£10,000) for the Nana's person. He has now offered £ 20,000 for my head. Allahbad/58.

p.6. Ranees of Jhansi: Killed by a trooper of 8th...who was never discovered. Shot in the back her horse baulked. She then fired at the man and he passed his sword through her. She used to dress like aman; (with a turban) and rode like one. Not pretty, and marked with smallpox, but beautiful eyes and figure. She used to wear gold anklets, and Sindia's pearl necklace, plundered from Gwalior. (Sindia says its value is untold)...

Viscount Palmerston to Mr Vernon Smith: Broadlands, 7.1.1858 (No.4/46A)

If you are writing to Canning I wish you would mention that a statement has been made to me, that very lately a book of geography intended for use in some school in Bengal was objected to by a learned Hindoo (p.) on the ground that the geographical theory which it contained was opposed to the doctrines of the Hindoo religion and thereupon the book was withdrawn by order of government. This is too absurd to be true, but there must probably be some foundation for the statement. The fact is that we have been treating the Hindoos and Mahommedans (p.) in regard to religion as a timid rider treats a wilful horse coaxing and patting when a strong hand with which spur and curb should have been employed and the animal which should have been the obedient servant has become the perverse master.

Canning to Secretary of State for India: 9.9.1859 (No. 128/)

34 Legislature of India: I have not proposed this scheme as calculated to improve the laws in India. I believe that the laws which would be made under it would be neither much better nor much worse than those which we now work.

Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State for India to Canning: 27.8.1860 (128/No.1

Peacock and Wells have made themselves the representatives of the English as against the native interest. We may have the West-Indian case over again; when the government in England had to protect the negro against the planter interest in the assemblies of the colonies. I believe that the government and its servants are the best friends and protectors of the natives. But as the independent English element gains ground, and if India is to prosper it must come with its capital, the necessity of counteracting its natural tendency to oppress the natives is the greater.

Depend upon it, the disposition is the same in the East as in the West, and though you may counterbalance votes of English by votes of Natives, you must have a strong government element in the legislative council. To enable your men to do the work there, they must not be overlaid with departmental work.

G.V.Yule to Governor General: 15.8.1861 (Chief Commissioner, Oudh)

As to Mr Campbell's statement that Maun Sing denied the existence of inferior proprietary rights in his estate it arose from a misconception, at least I cannot account for it in any other way. The Raja fully allows the existence of all kinds of proprietary rights, but ignores all tenant rights and Mr Wingfield's record of rights bears him out in this. I have pointed this out to Mr Campbell and shewn him the inference which might be drawn from his statement and his reply will I hope clear the matter up. Inferior rights are not denied by any talookdar where they really exist except perhaps by Madho Sing of Amethee who ignores them in his old estate and I believe he has some ground for doing so, but I am making enquiry. ...