To,

The Right Hon'ble Henry Fox, Esq.,
One of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State.

Sir,

The East India Company having, for several years, been in a State of Hostility in the East Indies with the French Settlements there, your Memorialists, and the Committee appointed by them, have by their several Memorials, to which they beg leave to refer, represented to His Majesty's Ministers such advices as they have received from thence, and besides using the utmost efforts in the Company's Power, to oppose the Incroachments of the French, they have humbly desired, and obtained the aid and assistance of His Majesty's Ships and Forces, and are most gratefully thankful for the Protection and support already afforded them.

That as the War now declared against France puts an end to the Provisional Treaty made in the East Indies, between your Memorialists Governour at Fort St. George and the French Governour at Pondicherry, it is to be expected, that as soon as advice of this Event can be received in the East Indies, Hostilities will not only be renewed there, but will also be extended to the other parts of India, where the English and French have any Settlements or Commerce, and though your Memorialists will give (p.12) orders to repell them with all the Force the Company are able yet it will be impossible for them, from their own strength, already so much exhausted, by their immense expences they have for some years been at, in the Defence of their settlement and the preservation of so valuable a Trade, which besides the many advantages the Nation receives thereby, brings into the Publick a Revenue of near seven hundred thousand pounds a year; which, without His Majesty's Gracious and Effectual assistance, must be diminished or lost in proportion as the Company suffer.

Should the condition of His Majesty's ships in India, or any exigencies of the State have made any orders necessary for the recalling of any part of that Squadron to Europe, Your Memorialists presume to hope that the late event of a Declaration of War (perhaps unforeseen at the time of despatching such orders, if any should have been sent) will influence the administration to give such directions by the ship they are informed will shortly be dispatched with advices thereof; to order such of them, as may be in a condition

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there, to remain till such other assistance as His Majesty may be most Graciously pleased to afford, may arrive, for the protection of Our Settlements and Trade ~~with~~ India, which must fall a prey to our enemies there, unless supported by a Naval Force superior to Theirs, and which is out of the power of your Memorialists to send or maintain.

We therefore most earnestly and submissively recommend to you, and His Majesty's Ministers, the care and protection of the Company's settlements and trade in the East Indies, in such manner, as you, Sir, and His Majesty's Ministers shall think most effectual and proper.

We are with the greatest Respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient and
most Humble Servants
The Court of Directors of the United East India Company

East India House,
Lond. 19th May 1756

To

The Right Hon'ble Henry Fox, Esq.,
One of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State.

Sir,

After the many and repeated representations, made by the Court of Directors of the East India Company, and Their Committee, to His Majesty's Ministers, desiring and imploring His Majesty's support and protection of the Company's settlements and trade, and the assistance His Majesty' has been graciously pleased to afford them, both with His Ships and Forces, it is with the utmost reluctance we find ourselves obliged, on behalf of the Company, still further to desire the interposition of His Majesty's Ministers for their safety.

From the time of the conclusion of the Peace between the English and French Nations at Aix La Chapelle in the year 1748, and notwithstanding the same took place in Europe, yet Hostilities were continued between the English and French Companies in the East Indies, under mutual pretence of Auxiliaries to the country powers, in the course of which proceedings, the Company, besides the assistance they received from His Majesty's have been at immense expense and charge, in defending their settlements and trade against the attempts and encroachments of the French, in which had they succeeded, the whole trade on the Coast of Choromandel would have been engrossed by the French, and that in other parts of the East Indies would, in all probability, have been before now rendered very precarious to the British Nation.

In this situation matters continued till December 1754, when a Provisional Treaty and Truce were made between the Agents of the Two Companies in the East Indies for suspending further Hostilities till the pleasure of their respective sovereigns should be known.

Nothing being concluded by this Treaty and the time for the duration of the Truce agreed upon in consequence of it being determinable on the arrival of any orders or advices from the sovereigns of either of the contending Parties had not the Event of a Declaration of War since happened a renewal of hostilities in those parts was most probable, but must be the immediate consequence of the arrival of the first advices of such Declaration; and as the

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French Company are supported at the expence of the Crown of France, who seem intent upon extending their Commerce all over the World, to the exclusion of the subjects of most other European Nations, and more particularly those of Great Britian, it is impossible for the East India Company of themselves, notwithstanding their utmost endeavours to furnish an expence sufficient to encounter that of the French Nation, who, we have reason to apprehend take all occasions to send Ships and Forces and Warlike store to the East Indies, and We fear are, at this time, preparing to send a Reinforcement thither; so that, unless supported by (p.21) His Majesty's, all the Company's Settlements must fall an easy prey to the French, whereby, and by the superior force in the Indian Seas, they will secure the Whole Trade and Navigation thereof to themselves.

Should such an Event happen, how Great must the distress be that will then attend this natioh. The East India Company must be no more. The Proprietors of their stock will be clamorous for the loss of their capital. The owners of the shipping, engaged in the Company's service, and in which several hundred thousand pounds are employed will add to the public discontent. The navigation of the Kingdom will be greatly diminished. The very large revenue arising to the State from the duties on East India goods will cease; a general distress upon public credit will succeed, and the Government will be in all probability, if not totally, in great measure deprived of a supply of salt-petre from the company, which, till some new channel is found out, they could scarce procure the quantities wanted from any other nation, more especially if the war should extend itself on the Continent.

The affairs of the Company being in this melancholy situation, we think it our duty to our proprietors and to the public thus humbly to lay them before you, Sir, and to desire you will be pleased to communicate our apprehensions to the rest of His Majesty's Ministers, and to intercede with His Majesty for such assistance and support as the present exigency will permit, and particularly that, if His Majesty shall (p.22) think fit to recall His Ships now in the East Indies under the Command of Admiral Watson, another Squadron of sufficient force, may in proper season (which we humbly apprehend should not be later than the month of October) sent thither,

as we are under the greatest apprehensions for the consequences of the return of Admiral Watson's squadron, should not the orders signified by you, Sir, to have been most Graciously given by His Majesty, for the further continuance thereof in those Seas, reach India before the time first limited for the Departure thereof for Europe.

We are with the Greatest Respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient and
most Humble Servant

The Secret Committee of the East India Company

East India House, London
the 18th August 1756

Sir,

Before you had entered upon the business of your office, as one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, we had waited upon the Earl of Holdernesse, to represent the great danger the East India Company was, at present, threatened with from the armament the French were making for the East Indies, and the inability of the Company to protect their Trade and Settlements, without His Majesty's assistance, and having, in consequence of that conversation, prepared a Letter for His Lordship, together with some accounts necessary to illucidate the same; we now take the liberty of delivering to you, Sir, a copy of that Letter, also of the several accounts and papers, which we proposed to lay before His Lordship, when his health would permit; all which we humbly submit, Sir, to your serious consideration.

We are with the greatest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient and
most humble servants

The Secret Committee of the East India Company

East India House,
the 21st December 1756

The Right Honourable William Pitt, Esq.

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My Lord,

When Mr. Godfrey and Mr. Burrow had the honour of waiting upon Your Lordship on the 1st instant, to represent the great danger the East India Company was threatened with from the great armament, the French were making to send to the East Indies and the inability of the Company to protect their Trade and Settlements without His Majesty's assistance, Your Lordship was pleased to express your sentiments of the present danger, and to say that the Company would be assisted by the Government, but in order thereto it would be proper for the Directors to form some plan of operations together with an account of what charges and expences the Company had been at since the embroils with the French in India, that Your Lordship might lay the same before His Majesty.

We, the Secret Committee, in consequence of Your Lordship's intimation, do beg leave to say, that we humbly hope His Majesty will send out such a Fleet and Body of Land Forces, and give such directions to His Commanders, as in His Great Wisdom he shall think most conducive for the defence of the Company's Trade and Settlements and the reducing the great power of the French in India, more particularly on the Coast of Choromandel.

And we beg leave to inform Your Lordship that (L.61) although the Company are making all possible efforts to get a number of recruits for their Forces in India, by ill success they have hitherto had, and the difficulties they daily experience, they have great reason to apprehend that the whole of what they shall be able to procure will make but a small number, and fall greatly short of what they intended.

Your Lordship may please to remember that in the end of the year 1754, a Plan was concerted with and approved by the Lords of the Administration for the Supply of the British Possessions, Trade and Privileges in the East Indies; When His Majesty was pleased to order Four Companies of Artillery to assist in carrying it into execution, which was for marching them with what force the Company could spare from the Mallabar

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Coast to act in conjunction with the Morattas, for dispossessing Salarjung and the French of the Province of Golcondah. We now lay before Your Lordship a copy of that Plan, and at the same time beg leave to observe, that it is in our opinion a good foundation to build one.

Although the Provisional Treaty and Truce, which were soon after agreed upon between Mr. Saunders and Mr. Godeheu prevented the said Plans being carried immediately into execution, the Governour and Select Committee at Fort St. George had actually concerted Measures for entering upon the same, even while the said Treaty and Truce subsisted, and communicated their sentiments thereon to the Governour and Select Committee at Bombay, (p.62) a copy of which letter we now enclose for Your Lordship's information.

The Select Committee at Bombay having considered that Letter, and being then intent on the expedition against Angria, although they did not disapprove of the Plan in general, were apprehensive that during the continuance of the Treaty and Truce it was not to be attempted, but might be a very proper Plan to proceed on in case of a Rupture with France, and the Governour of Bombay was strongly of opinion, that an Alliance with the Morattas was easily to be effected, it is true, upon the coming away of the last advices the Company were informed the Morattas had taken umbrage at their not being admitted to a share of the Plunder on the reduction of Angria's Fort of Ghereah, but by the same advices it appears a Treaty was going on with that people and their pretensions and demands were in a fair way of being accommodated.

To show what immense and extraordinary expenses the Company have been at since the Embroils with the French in Inda we have caused an account thereof to be stated and a copy accompanies this letter for your Lordship's information.

Your Lordship will please to observe by the said account that the annual expenses of the Company in India amounted in an average before the loss of Madras to about the sum of £182,269.10.11 and after that time to £292,168.11.1 the difference between which two sums amounting to no less than £109,899.-.2 is the yearly (p.63) exceedings in the Company's expenses during the period of the French Embroils, besides which we must beg leave to refer Your Lordship to the

several items in the account mentioned under the Head of real losses and expenses to be exclusive of the said annual exceedings such of which as can be ascertained amount at and since the taking of Madras to the further sum of £490753.19.11.

Should the account now stated and herewith submitted to Your Lordships observation not be thought, of itself, an object sufficiently striking, to evince the inability of the Company's continuing this expense, which, at this ~~India~~ instant is greatly encreasing, we beg leave to refer Your Lordship to Our Memorial, addressed to the Right Honourable Mr. Secretary Fox, under date of the 18th of August last, of which Your Lordship had a copy, as well as to our humble Reply to that Gentleman's Letter to us of the 10th of September under date of the 22nd of the same month.

We are with the Greatest Respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordships most Obedient and
most humble servants.

Peter Godfrey,
John Payne
Roger Drake
Christ Burrow
Jones Raymond.

East India House,
the 21st December 1756

with one copy.

BV.2

Company's affairs in Bengal
1747-48

.....(1522) are likely to be so) who will have money somewhere, but is never known to seek it of us, unless his wants are great. Considering what he can do, he is the least enemy the company have, and should be properly kept in temper. I say they do pay, must pay and always will pay him indulgence money, and I am much out, if they do not feel it more from the man who may succeed him and still they must pay, nor can they afford to do otherwise, when it is insisted on; having hinted to you by what trick the company lost their towns, I shall now relate the trick of tricks, to shew how important it is, that even the proprietors be diligent, in spying out the characters of all employed in the management of their fortunes, and at the same time show you how necessary it may be in respect to this Government, when our troops have blustered, to file off. In Jaffier Cawn's time, the company ordered Maulda factory to be settled, it was set on foot at a great expence, and a favorite relation (sot & fool) appointed to be chief. It was then, as it has ever been, the most advantageous branch of the company's investments to the Blackmerchants who managed matters so with the Phouzdaar (or Commander) at Maulda) to overset the expedition, which he undertook. Jaffier Cawn did not appear in this affair, but left it with the Phouzdaar to dispute it with us; till the Cassimbazar Politicks began to work upon his court; as it would have been a great detriment to the private trade of that settlement, as the Calcutta Black Merchants, had this Expedition succeeded.

IOR: Orme : Letter 1st from Captain Fenwicke on the Co's affairs in Bengal 1747-48.

In short, we having fallen upon his troops twice before day light, killed them a number of men as also women and then Jaffier Cawn let us know, since we delighted in massacre, he would send us men enough, but at the same time advised us to reflect, they should be as many as there crawled ants upon the ground; which threat induced our Governor and Council to withdraw their troops, and Maulda was never settled, though the Directors positively ordered it should; and is the Company's right by the Emperor's grants. Yet the Nabobs will not only slight them, but treat the company as their servants; and in effect we are no more, when Nabob's please to say so. I am sure we had then for the small number of soldiers, as stout a garrison of Dutch, Germans and Swedes as any in Europe, and now to appearance the worst in the world. But suppose it was otherwise and the Company could afford to make tryal by force, the situation of Bengal is such it would be impracticable to bring the country Government to submission, though we should maintain a far greater body of men than is consistent with the Company's interest to keep up. It is not in these provinces as upon the coast of Coromandel, where they can march an (1523) Army of a million of men with heavy artillery, but in this country, what is not cultivated, is impassable, so that we can only stand upon our Defence at Calcutta, if we are attacked and make our peace on favourable terms as soon as possible, for it is not the Government's interest to distress us, nor the Company's to struggle for a superiority for upon urgent occasions they will be satisfied,

and such exactions are no greater hardships than are practised in all eastern governments. I have heard gentlemen in general extol the eastern politicks, but never saw any one could explain those nice turns they conceive to be in their system of government. They have appeared to me to be all alike, patient, crafty, soothing, treacherous and cruel treating the best men in the kingdom they fix upon with the same ignominy and barbarity as the meanest, tho' their extortion being with soothing and kind promises. These are their daily politicks, in which they are so artful, that the wisest with the same disposition, have been drawn in and assassinated at the instant, the murderers are complimenting him with posts of honour and advantage, which practise sometimes ends in a private assassination and often in a publick one. The subjects have all the same turn of temper to conceal, as the government to exact, and by a peculiar steadiness in their degree of politicks, will suffer severe ~~guilties~~ cruelties before they pay; and under this saving maxim, never to do it, till they can suffer the punishment no longer, by which ~~further~~ persevering they lessen the demand, for if the man has resolution to die (which is sometimes the case) and save all his money to his family, the Government loose their aim, therefore are ever inclined to compound; and if the sum extorted is very considerable, are often promoted or restored, to such posts as will reimburse the sufferers by dealing out their new authority over others, as they have experienced themselves. Nor is this sort of ignominy accounted any disgrace, for the man whipt today, will appear with a powerful attendance

and torment a hundred tomorrow. As I am writing to show the general bent of a Mahometan Government, and the slavery of their subjects, even for every inferior person to be insulted over by the next above him, I shall give you two or three examples (by way of amusement) as specimens of what the whole Empire practice; every man to the utmost of his power or cunning; first, the cutmars, the greatest bankers in the world, and are employed by our (p:1524)

B IV. 3

A NARRATIVE OF THE PRINCIPAL OCCURRENCES AND
FROM THE REIGN OF MAHMUD SHAH, DATED JANUARY

(1355) The day after the action towards Akbarabad with all his effects and treasure, the latter of which must have been very considerable, as his government had been a continued scene of rapine and extortion. It is said that he was stopped in the way by order of Soorujmul, theJaut, stripped of all his ill gotton wealth and left to pursue his journey in equal distress and terror to Akbarabad. The next day a detachment sent by Sujah Dowla entered the city and took possession of the palace and Jehan Cawn the former subedar, who had gained the affections of the people by his moderate and just administration is expected there shortly in the same capacity. On the 16th, Mirza Baaber, the son of Allee Gowher rode out attended by his Court to visit the Abdulla and congratulate him on his victory.

It will be proper now to take a short sketch of the affairs of Bengal. The Prince assembled an immense army, defeated Rajah Ramnarain, who then commanded the forces of Jaffer Allee Cawn in those parts, but was soon after attacked and worsted by the young Nabob & Major Caillaud. By the advice of Camgar Cawn, he suddenly passed by the young Nabob and entered the province of Bengal by the passes of the mountains, but was so colsely pursued that despairing of success he returned by the same road, and without losing time, laid close siege to Patna, which was gallantly defended by the English garrison till the arrival of Captain Knox with the detachment of Europeans and seapoys, who relieved it. The Prince immediately raised the siege and returned to Jikarree where he passed the rains. The young Nabob and Major Caillaud arrived soon after and after a few days spent in the pursuit of Khadim Hossim Cawn Naib of Poornea, (who had sided with the Prince) in which the young Nabob perished by lightning, the troops retired to their quarters in Patna. In the month of October the Nabob Jaffar Allee Cawn resigned his government to his son-in-law Cossim Allee Cawn, and retired to Calcutta. After the rains, the two armies again took the field. A treaty of peace was set on foot but broke off by the means of Camgar Cawn. At

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IOR: Orme. Mss. India Vol.6 : A Narrative --- and revolutions at the Court of Shahjahanabad --- Jan 20th, 1762, Author to be by Mr Hastings (Extract)

length Major Carnac, who commanded the English forces, marched against the Prince on the 15th January, attacked and beat him, taking Monsieur Law and the French party prisoners. They pursued the Prince very closely for some days, till he found himself so straightened that he offered to throw himself upon the protection of the English, which was accepted, and on the 8th of February he joined the English camp and proceeded with them to Patna. His views are yet to the throne of Indostan, and he has earnestly solicited the assistance of the English for the attainment of that end. This is at present in debate, and the result must turn on the following points. Whether the Prince can depend on the friendship of any of the considerable powers, and if the Abdulla is still disposed to support him. The above transactions afford the strongest hopes in his favour. The Abdulla himself has proclaimed him King, repeatedly invited him to go and take possession of the throne and even appears to have approved of the nomination of his son to the regency, though that appointment was made by the Morattas, then actually at war with him. Sujah Dowla and Najeeb Cawn are his ancient friends, have ever pursued the same interest with him and the former is bound to him by the strictest engagements, which he appears to have made the guide (1356) of his actions. Gazoodeen Cawn his ancient enemy and the scourge of his family, is no longer in power and scarcely known. So far it is evidence that the ruling powers of Indostan have hitherto favoured tho Prince; nor can there be a just cause to suspect a continuance of the same sentiments in them towards him since their late amazing successes. Nothing is wanting to fulfil our assurances of their assistance, but an invitation from them to the prince and without some assurance that they will side with him, the enterprise would be too hazardous, as it would throw the whole weight upon our forces, which it would be madness to think of exerting alone in the midst of many hostile nations (perhaps against them all) and at a distance from our own colonies, which must cut off all possibilities of receiving fresh supplies. It is certainly much to be wished that the resources which the Prince expects (for a certainty there cannot be and to run some hazard will be justified by the palpable advantages that will accrue from the success) may be such as will warrant our engaging with him in the execution of his designs. Though the Abdulla is become

very powerful, yet he can never he in a capacity to hurt the interests of the Company. His late successes he has derived rather from his alliance with the Moguls, than from his own strength. He has no fixed establishment in India, and must draw all his supplies from a distant country. His own kingdom is surrounded by powerful neighbours who may oblige him in the midst of his conquests in this empire to fly to the defence of his own possessions. But supposing him for ever at peace with his neighbours, supposing him in quiet possession of his acquisitions in Indostan, he is still too far removed to become any subject of apprehehsion to us, and will even be a curb to that power which we have a real cause to dread, that is the Morattas.

As it is evident that it cannot be prejudicial to us to join the Abdulla, on the other hand, every consideration of policy and self interest strongly impels us to seize such an occasion to reduce the overgrown power of the Morattas. By the advantages which the divisions of the Empire have given them and by continual encroachments on their neighbours, the Moratta state has arrived to a height of splendor and greatness, to which the Mogul empire in its most flourishing state scarce ever attained. They are not only in possession of a fourth part of the revenues of the empire, but have reduced the greatest part of it to their own authority, which till their late defeat extended beyond the capital, and (what ought the most to alarm us) now reaches to our own ~~agents~~ gates. Their resources are all within themselves and their establishment built on and confirmed by a series of continued successes. Though so mighty an empire is not to be overturned by a single blow, yet the great shock which they have lately experienced will doubtless require the exertion of their whole force to retrieve it, and leave us little room to dread their invading this province, whilst we are engaged against them in a distant region. The only quarter from whence we run any great risque, is Nagpoor, a long tract of country lying southwest of Bengal and Cuttac, and governed by Jannojee (p. 1357) a Moratta Prince. This province, together with the Chout of Bengal which was stipulated at 12½ lacks was given to Raghoojee, the nephew of the late Sahoo Rajah as a recompense for his services in the

reduction of Bengal. He died and left this inheritance to his younger son Janno, and the country of Chanda together with the Chout of Patna, which amounts to 3 lacks, was afterwards assigned to Muddajee, the eldest son of Raghoo. Upon the demise of the Sahoo Rajah Jannoo made interest to succeed him, but was opposed by Ballajee, who raised a son of the Sahoo Rajah to that dignity, which he still possesses, and the affairs of state have been ever since managed by Ballajee, his minister. This caused a variance between Jannoo and Ballajee, which has subsisted ever since, and though the former has never dared openly to disclaim the authority of the Moratta government, yet he has frequently sided with the Nabob Salabat Jung against Ballajee, and it is not to be questioned but ~~the~~ he would gladly throw off his dependence, whenever he could do it with impunity. Mudda his brother, whose territories lie contiguous to Nagpoor, and who is in dread of his brother's superior strength, has generally hitherto taken the part of Ballajee against him. Thus much may serve to show that it will not be impossible to divert the Morrattas from attempting any thing to our prejudice by raising up some power within themselves against them, not to mention the Nabob Salabat Jung, the Rana (a powerful Prince) and their actual enemies, the Abdulla and his allies.

The benefits the Company would reap from their support of the Prince in his pretensions to the Throne, and the re-establishment of the Mogul empire, are so obvious and would so immediately affect all their settlements, that it would be needless to particularize them. It is from hence alone that we can ever hope to derive any fixed establishment, or the confirmation of our present acquisitions, which we only hold at this time by the right of our own power and by the weakness of the government and as we cannot expect that the latter will for ever continue in the same loose state, it is for our interest to provide against what may happen, by insuring to ourselves the protection of the government, which can never be done so effectually as by engaging in the restoration of it. A fairer opportunity with respect to ourselves could never happen. We at present enjoy a profound peace obtained by the repeated success of our arms. The French power in India is totally crushed and destroyed. The Dutch are become too despicable to attempt to disturb us. We are possessed of a numerous force, which will

become a heavy and useless burthen on the Company, if not employed. and the English name is now at the highest pitch of glory. In a word every advantage seems united in making this the crisis of raising the British empire in the East, which (if properly maintained) may rise superior to all the vicissitudes, and precarious contingencies of future times.

(1358) The former part of this Narrative takes in the state of affairs to the month of March 1761; soon after certain accounts were received of the Abdallee's resolution to return to his own country and of his actual march after placing Mirza Bauber, the son of Allee Gowher in the regency of the Empire, and of Sujah Dowla's being on his march from Dillee to meet the Prince and attend him to his capital. In the meantime he continued his residence at Patna and the Nabob allowed him a handsome revenue for his subsistance. He frequently urged the necessity of his setting out soon for Dellee and was very pressing for a detachment of English forces to accompany him, and this it was resolved to grant him in case Col. Coote's regiment should arrive from the Coast in time. Sujah Dowla advanced by quick marches so that about the end of May he arrived at Banaras a town of his own dominions bordering on the frontiers of the Bahar province. Upon his approach, the Prince urged more and more the necessity of his speedy departure, and Sujah Dowla wrote also to the same effect representing that this was the time when they might take possession of the Capital with little opposition; it was therefore thought improper to press the Prince's longer stay, and as the regiment was not yet arrived it was resolved that he should proceed according to his desire to join Sujah Dowla and that our forces should accompany him only to the borders of the province. He went from Patna, the 8th of June and as a great number of the Chiefs of the empire had acknowledged him for King by the name of Shaw Aulum, it was determined that he should be proclaimed also by the Nabob and the English in the Bengal provinces and that the Siccas should be struck in his name; he on his part promised to grant the Company the confirmation of all their lands, rights and privileges, and having joined Sujah Dowla and invested him with the office of Vizir of the Empire they proceeded without delay from Banaras to the Northward. The rains which came on about this time did not prevent their going

forward and they very soon reached Coregionabad. Here they made a stay of some months which were employed in negociations with the Rohellas, Jauts, Ahmud Cawn Bungesh and other Chiefs in order to engage them to join heartily in the King's party and Sujah Dowla went for a short time to his capital of Lucknow, from whence he returned with a considerable supply of money and all necessary stores for continuing their march to Dellee. It was not till the month of November that they proceeded forward from Coregianabad and directing their march towards Agra crossed the Jumna at Calpis, since which time we have no very certain intelligence of their progress, but it is confidently reported that Ahmud Cawn Bungesh, some Rohilla Chiefs and several considerable Zemindars have joined the Royal Standard, that the Jauts themselves, who have always favoured the party of Gazoodeen Cawn, and opposed the King, have now made their peace with them and that Gazoodeen Cawn despairing of forming any considerable league is about to retire to the Deccan. The Marhattas far from recovering the blow, they received last year from the Abdallees have fallen into still greater (b:1359)

(1490)..... accordingly, a reasonable valuation; this would be a very essential diminution of their dead stock, which stands a heavy article on their books; another heavy and annual expence their trade would be relieved from, which is the necessity their agents are under, of sending parties of military to escort their goods from different parts of the country, which in Boat hire and Diet money to their soldiers, amounts annually to a very considerable sum, though at present, I cannot exactly specify how much . Add to this the great advantage of employing so large a sum, thus annually saved, when their trade already is oppressed with so heavy a load of interest in this country. On the whole, therefore, I think it needless to urge anything further to support my assertion, that the East India Company must be immense gainer by this change.

Having cleared the way to my subject, which seemed to be clogged and obstructed with the preceeding objections, I am now the better enabled to proceed in my scheme and shall consider it under four principal heads. 1st The utility of it. 2nd The ways and means and facility of the attempt. 3rd The obvious methods of retaining the provinces when conquered, and 4th How far this acquisition to the Crown of England, may affect the other European trading powers.

1st. A retrospection of what is said in the foregoing part, touching the trade, Revenues and Riches of Bengall, will make it useless dwelling long on the subject of my first general head, the immense gain that must accrue to the nation from subduing it, will be demonstrative under the present oppressive Government. Its revenues are moderately calculated to the annual amount of 11 Corore of Rupees, or £ 13,750,000, and how immensely they might be enhanced under such a government as that of England is very perspicuous. The conquest of this province would not only retrieve our name and reputation in a country where with grief, I may too justly say, our several miscarriages, and supineness has rendered us in the greatest contempt, but be also

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IOR: Orme Mss. India Vol.6 : Plan of the Means to conquer Bengal and to keep it as a province dependent on Great Britain supposed by Col Scott.

the obvious means of reducing our heavy national debt, and once more to restore to us the Ballance of Power in Europe, these considerations that ought to be upper most, not only in the breasts of those who are entrusted with the helm of state, but also of every good subject of England.

2nd. I am now ~~xxxxxx~~ secondly to investigate the means, by which this province may be subdued and imagined. I shall give some (1491) surprise when I expect that 10,000 effective regular troops are amply sufficient for the purpose, and that the only circumstance that can render our project abortive is its being known in Europe before the embarkation of the troops (as every European power is so materially concerned to prevent our succeeding in so advantageous a scheme) to obviate which, they must be some time before, disposed in proper sea ports, on the most probable pretences, though the most distant from the real design they are destined for and other necessary precautions used, as the nature of the affair may require, which I must submit to superior Judges in these matters. The embarkation of these troops, must be preceded by the dispatch of a trusty person, well acquainted with the whole enterprize, and qualified to confer with the president of Bengal, who alone should be entrusted with the intended invasion. The time of his departure from England should be so calculated, that he may arrive in Bengal, some 2 or 3 months before the arrival of the troops, that no time may be lost in providing boats, etc. to facilitate their immediate proceeding up the river to Muxadabad, the capital of the provinces, and least death should make this precaution useless, the person thus previously dispatched, should likewise have proper instructions with him, sealed and addressed to the said President.

Though I have stipulated 10,000 effective men, as sufficient for the conquest of these provinces, I must not be understood that half that number is any way necessary for the reduction of this capital; on the contrary, I believe, I shall meet with no contradiction from any who are acquainted with the place or nature of the people, when I say that 20,000 regular troops with a few pieces of Artillery, will with ease, become masters of it, though as this must be the first service entered on, the whole may be employed in it.

The reduction of this place, would afford great wealth, and be immediately followed by the revolt of all the Rajahs and people of the provinces, the more especially if proper manifestos were previously circulated, on the first public step taken, in which they should be promised a remission of some part of their annual tribute, and the country to be protected in their Liberties, and properties, agre able to the laws and constitutions of England, which should be inviolably observed, and as much clemency as possible used to those who were subdued or submitted. Let the nature of things speak, how natural a consequence this is, when we view a people or country abandoned by its Prince, to the oppressions and tyranny of an usurper, universally hated, as the cause of every misery, his country has felt for these 10 years last past, or ready to fall a prey to a foreign Banditti, yet more dreaded and hated by them. I say, whoever (p. 1492)

BIV.5

CAPTAIN CAILLAUD TO THE PRESIDENCY OF MADRAS
Tirnavelly April 5th, 1757

...

To

The Hon'ble George Pigot, Esq.,
President & Governor and Gentlemen of the
Committee at Madras

Hon'ble Sir and Sirs,

I had the honour of addressing you last on the 18th No.3 and have at length carried my point with Moodillee, for a remittance of two lack and 60000 Arcot rupees; some of the merchants who advanced this money not having correspondents at Madras, I was obliged to take half the sum in bills on Trichinopoly which I have sent to Captain Smith when you will honour with your orders in consequence the other half; 130000. I now send enclosed by bill on Buckangee at Madras payable fifty days after dated.

(The delays I met within every transaction with these people made my stay longer here than I first intended, or could have wished, and when that obstacle was almost removed, another far greater succeeded. I mean the violent rains which have fallen here days past, swelled and increased the currents of the rivers so that they are impassable even for boats, and the roads impracticable for carriages, the violence of the storm seems over, but it will require six days fair weather and strong sunshine before I can hope to move. It hath done irreparable damage I fear to the harvest, happening when the grain was fit to cut, the greatest part of which was still on the ground.)

I am afraid to give any thing for truth in my account of the enemy so little are the reports we receive to be depended upon; thus much I can affirm that Mauphuscawn is still at the Pollitaver's place encamped, and that for these two days past the news of Hydernaig coming to their assistance is confirmed. I had also a letter of advice of it from Tonddiman; the following are the conditions agreed on between them. The Pollitaver is to give two lack of Chuckraes ready money and also the fort and country of Cholerandam near Madura, that district is not so valuable as to its revenues, but that it gives a free passage to the masters of it from Dundigall to Madura; but after all Hydernaig's assistance is not given to got. Mauphuscawn the country , it seems is to be consented with a fort and the country belonging to it, somewhere in the Mysore country with the yearly revenue of two lacks; the grant scheme is to set up a King at Madura who as formerly is to

IOR: Orme MSS: India: Vol 12

command the whole country; this pretender to the Kingdom resides in the Morrawar coun ry whom they are to call in.

Let what will be their designs, the best I think I can do is to march the soonest I can for Madura, if they intend to relieve the place it cannot be done without coming to a battle, either on my march or after my arrival near the port, and if I may be allowed to deliver my sentiments on the success of the engagement without an imputation of vanity or presumption, I may say, I do not in the least doubt it let who will be joined with them; my principal point in view is the getting that place once more in our hands, and hope I shall succeed.

I propose leaving for the defence of these parts thirteen companies of seapoys, included in which are the thousand belonging to the renter nine companies; the four others are left in those garrisons which are kept in the company' s hands, the whole under the military command of Bascapanaig, a good soldier; by the military command I have understood the duty and discipline of his seapoys, for everything else he is to receive his orders from the renter. I have left him written instructions; copy of which I have also given to Modellee; so that no misunderstandings I hope can happen betwe n them, with the remaining part of the force, the Europeans, Coffres and sixteen companies of seapoys with Isoufcawn I propose to march.

The renter is apprehensive that on my moving the enemy will enter the country to the southward; this objection will never be at an end with him, all I could do was to provide against it, in the best manner the strength of our force would admit of; if it happens as he says and that they move their whole force for that purpose, I must return to oppose them, if they only send a part, what troops I left with Modellee joined with his horse and peons and certainly sufficient against them; besides it is not probable but that they will attempt something to prevent our designs against Madura, and in such case they will hardly think of dividing their force, all that I can say, if they do, they do, they could not act more in our favour than by such a disposition.

I have made another effort towards drawing off Mouphuscawn from his purpose, the success of which I have not heard yet, the person I sent is one Moor Iaffier, a relation and intimate with

his wife, who by what I have heard has great sway over him.

As to our alliance and interest in the country, it stands thus, the eastern Polligars are quiet and say they are our friends; and certainly did refuse joining Mauphuscawn; Katabomanaik who is the most considerable of them has sent me a Vacqueel with strong assurances of fidelity. Modelliee is gone there on the pretence of his son's wedding to which he was invited, but his design is to see how far he can engage him on our side, and what forces he will spare to keep things quiet here while I am on my expedition towards Madura.

You will, I hope, be pleased to pardon me, Gentlemen, if on some particular occasion I do not wait for your approbation and orders, but act to the best of my judgment and capacity when I think a retardment (such as there must be were I to wait until I could receive your directions) might not be for the good of the common cause, or that doing them immediately would have a better effect than waiting longer. I have acted so in the following cases which I submit to your judgment. The first is with regard to Katabomanaik in granting a fir favour which I think thought might be further means of securing his friendship. The second is with regard to an act of liberality which I took the liberty to make in the name of the honourable company.

When Mauphuscawn came to Katabomanaig this last time, requiring his assistance and help as I have said before, he was refused as by all the other Polligars of that side amongst the rest was the Ottaporum Polligar; vexed at his disappointment it seems that Mauphuscawn on his march back laid waste his country, drove off a great deal of his cattle and burned several of his villages; marks of which ravages I saw when I marched through. This Polligar's securities are still at Trichinopoly for 15000 chuckrees unpaid, Katabomanaig hath interceeded strongly in his behalf for some abatement, seven thousand was at first asked; as I could not but think there was some reason in his request considering what the man had suffered for his adhering to our cause. I compounded the affair and reduced the demand to an abatement of five thousand, but also upon these conditions that merchants should be given as security for the

immediate payment of the other ten, and that Katabomanaig should join Modellee with whatever force he might require. This done, that Polligar's securities at Trichinopoly should be set free.

The second article a present I made on my first arrival to Isouf Cawn and to Modellee, the former when he met me acquainted me of two elephants which he had taken from Mauphuscawn, which he would send to me to dispose of as was proper for the Hon'ble Company, the best use I thought I could apply them to, was to present him with one on his first visit in the name of the Hon'ble Company, and a reward for his services, and success over the enemy; and in order to encrease the credit and reputation of the renter in the country people's eyes. I presented (at Modellee's request) the other to his elder brother Datoway Modellee, who is head of the family as the greatest mark of favour and honour the company could do him. I own for these presents I might have staid for the sanction of your orders to make them, but that I thought the effect and consequences would be better if done immediately on my arrival; should it be my misfortune though, that this should not meet your approbation, I must submit to your ordering me to pay for my indiscretion.

To return to the country affairs, besides the friendship of these eastern Polligars we have many others, in short at present there are but three with the Pullitavor and Mauphuscaun's party, but you will easily conceive that fear not love can only keep up such friendship, and that while the profession of the country is any dispute their remaining neuter is the most we can expect, or hope, sometimes they may join, but that not with an intention to put an end to the troubles, but rather keep them up, for nothing they fear more than a master and the country settled; it is the divisions in it which support their power and make them of any consequence, while both parties are courting their alliance, they are going on unmolested in any encroachments they are pleased to make, keep the war out of their own country and so grow rich and insolvent, these present troubles at one end, the peaceable profn possession of the country afterwards depends upon a strict hand being kept over them.

I have forwarded your letter with one of my own to the chief of Anjango, requesting that gentleman to use his interest and

influence over the King of Travancore not to disturb the Tirnavelly country, he chooses the times for his incursions, when he knows our troops are employed in other parts of the country, and the instant a party marches against him, he returns behind his wall; but this is a great inconvenience and prevents our acting in the manner and with that freedom which is necessary for the success of a war. I hope that Gentleman's remonstrances may have some effects; in the meantime to keep him in as well as we can, the fort of Calcarra on which he first always attempts is well garrisoned with three companies of seapoys and 200 horse and some poons.

From this general representation of affairs it will occur of course to you, Gentlemen, that the expenses of keeping the necessary forces in this country at present, runs away with the greatest part of its revenues, it remains then to be considered (though the troubles may be settled by the expiration of the year) whether the renter can maintain himself afterwards and pay the sum agreed for with the Hon'ble Company for the second, I believe it may be doubted, from what I have before represented of the disposition of the people round him, and the situation of this country to theirs, which exposes him to their insults without a sufficient force to keep them in; if he gives security for that sum it may be said everything is safe, but that he will get any security for such a sum (his above situation considered) I believe is also much to be doubted; if the troops already here are kept up, he cannot he will say pay so much; I believe therefore for the next year, the matter of consideration must be, who will give most for the country clear to the company with good security, and all expenses and losses fall to the renter; what the country will afford to pay upon such conditions must be the objects of my attention and enquiries, that from the reports I may be able to make you, you will be better judges who bids fairest, many I dare say will offer, but those alone who give security can be accepted Modellee's excuse at present is that the country is not settled. We may hope it will be so by the expiration of the year, but that alone will not do for to get security. for he, if he continues it, or the man who takes it must prove to the merchants that he xx can keep the country

settled and quiet, and that alone cannot be done by words, but by showing the number of troops he ~~xxxxxxx~~ proposes to maintain for that purpose, as I gain more knowledge and insight into affairs, I shall take the liberty to submit my further thoughts to your considerations.

There is an article in military regulations which I found impossible to comply with in regard to the payment of the coolies at 2 fanams a day. I could not get one to march with me from Trichinopoly at that rate; and on my arrival in this country, I enquired of the renter if he could supply me at that price, but he informed me he could not. I was, therefore, obliged to keep them up to their old establishment until some favourable change in the price of provisions will admit of the alteration.

I have received from the renter two months' subsistence for my detachment, the accounts of last month cleared and this one in advance, a custom which I intend to keep him to, that I may always have a month's pay before hand, if I do not immediately transmit my last month's accounts I hope you will be pleased to allow it for an excuse the little time I have had to spare, to regulate and settle everything in that order and method in which I would choose to lay my accounts before you.

It would be of great service and absolutely necessary indeed that you would be pleased to send some new arms for the seapoys, many of their pieces are unfit for service and irreparable, and I believe not less than five or six hundred of that sort. I have, therefore, made out the enclosed indent for these and some other necessary articles which I request you will be pleased to take into consideration; the best and cheapest method of conveyance at this season is to send them by sea and recommend them to the care of the Dutch Chief at Tutucorin, from whence I can have them with ease brought to Palamcottah (I was obliged to move from Tirnavelly to that fort about four miles distant to keep my soldiers more together, and under the eye of their officers, that place as the only defence of Tirnavelly and to where the inhabitants can take refuge from an enemy would require to be put into a better state of defence, though indeed the greatest piece of service would be to demolish it quite and with the materials

construct a new fort on some convenient spot near Tirnavelly, for this, four miles distant, and a river between not always fordable and no bridge cannot be said to be of great use or security to the other place, at a more convenient time. This, however, may be considered with the means of finding money for the expence which I think might be brought about by a general contribution on the inhabitants of the town and country round. At present it must remain and will be of sufficient strength I dare say to resist all that will come against it).

I remain with great respect.

TIRNAVELLY
5th April 1757.

+2 copies

LETTERS FROM CAPTAIN CAILLAUD TO THE PRESIDENCY OF MADRASS FROM THE 10th JUNE 1755 TO THE 19th JUNE 1757

June 10th, 1755

Hon'ble Sir & Sirs,

Enclosed I have the honour to transmit to you Gentlemen, an account of the revenues to be collected from the Trichinopoly district for this next year beginning the 10th of June 1755 as also the yearly tribute as usually paid by the Polligars depending on that fort, the revenues cannot be so considerable as formerly but if a peace continues, will pr improve each year, most of the countries continuous I have mentioned have as yet paid nothing; and it is now only by encouragement that the inhabitants begin to return to their old habitations, and that not without money advanced for their present support and maintenance, the only country which has paid is the Nangevarem, from which last year was collected 67,000, but the next year it is to be rented as I have set it down in the account, the country mortgaged to the French by the Mysorians and dependent also on Trichinopoly yields to them now within a trifle of 4 Lack yearly, and next year they expect six.

The Nabob has informed me that he has wrote to you, gentlemen, with regard to his right on the Arrieloure and Worriapolum countries, those Polligars have acknowledged him and paid tribute all the war, and continue doing so now,

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but he has advice that the party with Mr. Malsin when he has settled the Terriour business designs to go against the first of those Polligars. I should be glad to be informed from you, Gentlemen, how to act should that happen; as I can't find by information, that the French have any right from possession or rents being ever paid them to molest these people, what money has ever been got from either was by force by Morarow or the Mysoreens.

BIV.6

MEMOIRS OF THE CAMPAIGN ON BEHALF OF
RAGONATH RAO : 1775

Domus, March 14, 1775

Raghoba's women, who had no other place to retire to than the serjeant's house; it was impossible to avoid pitying their distress, and condemning the pride and state of the Eastern princes, in exposing their women to the severe toils and dangers of war. These girls followed him on horseback through all his forced marches on his retreat from the plains of Arras. I saw seven at Domus, none of them remarkably handsome or fairer than the generality of the Hindoo women. They were richly adorned with pearls and jewels, and not very shy, tho' observed by Europeans - a sight perhaps they had never met with before, and were willing to indulge their curiosity, at the same time affording us a fine opportunity of gratifying our own, but the eunuch to whose care they were entrusted, soon deprived us of our mutual satisfaction, and conducted them to a Pagoda at some distance in the village.

It being too late when Ragoba arrived at Domus to pay him the complimentary visit intended, it was deferred until tomorrow morning and he retired to a Pagoda to perform his devotions. We all supped and slept at the serjeant's house at Domus. (p.83)

At sun rise I walked out inthe village and adjacent country, but met with nothing meriting a description.

At eleven O'clock Ragoba and his son came to the Chief's tent, pitched under a large Banian tree; where he was received by the Chief, Colonel Keating, M/s. Shallon & Day.

IOR: MSS Eur B.33: Memoirs of Campaign on behalf of Raghobath Rao by James Forbes, FRS, etc. (Chaplain to the Regiment commanded by Colonel Keating).

After a short conference, Mr. Gambeer presented him in the Company's name with two handsome horses for himself, and one for his son; also several pieces of hinccbs, muslins and shawls with a few bales of superfine broad cloath. The gentlemen then took leave, and he remaimd with his son in the tent, until the tide served for embarking.

At two in the afternnon Ragobah and his family went on board the yacht; the Chief and other gentlemen attending him to the water side. Before he was carried on board, he stopped on the bank of the river, look stedfastly at the sun for a few minutes, then prostrated himself on the ground, and uttered a short ejaculation. The Colonel embarked soon after, but the boats grounding several times, we did not get over the bar until midnight, and then came to an anchor.

(1742) The officers on the present service are:

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Keating Commander-in-Chief

Artillery	Infantry & Sepoys	
Major	Major	
Gaspar Dagon	Robert Hassard	
Captains	Captains	
John Westphall	John Hopkins	
John Nugent	Charles West	
Lieutenants	Michael Frith	
James Macneal	James Hastley	
John Sam Terriance	James Steuart	
Thomas Dighton	Robert Scott	
John Hallamby	Lieutenants	: 13
Lieut. Fireworkers (four)	Ensigns	: 12
	Cadets/Volunteers	: 6

Staff - Double Appointments etc.

Mr. John Forlesse	-	Commissary
Mr. James Forbes	-	Chaplain
Mr. George Livibond	-	Judge Advocate
Mr. Thomas Holmes	-	Paymaster & Secretary
Capt. James Steuart	-	Major of Brigade
Capt. James Hartley	-	Quarter Master General
Lieut. I.S.Terriano	-	Chaptain of Pioneers
Lt. Fire John Bellass	-	Aid du Camp
Mr. Samuel Richardson	-	Surgeon Major
" Peter Fraser	-	Surgeon
" John Blaheman	-	-do-
" Thomas Cumming	-	-do- (h.93)

Cambay, 22nd March 1775

These few days past I have spent in viewing the city; which is situated at the head of the gulf of Cambay, seventy miles from Surat, inthe Latitude of 22 Deg. North. It is now only three miles in circumference, surrounded with a brick wall about five feet thick, flanked with fifty two round towers; but the greatest part of the fortifications are out of repair; there are cannons mounted in several of the towers, but the Asiatics are not famed for good gunners. The curtains are filled with loop sides for musketry, but the rampart is too narrow for cannon. Cambay is built on uneven ground, tho' on the whole it may be termed an eminence. There is no ditch round it, but ~~towers~~ houses, mosques and tombs close to the very walls. The suburbs to the north are surrounded by a wall and towers, and included as part of the town. But these are all modern

works in comparison to the city itself, which was founded near twelve hundred years ago and was then of great extent.

Cambay once so famous, so renowned a city, is now entirely changed, and all its grandeur burried in ruins! Cast your eyes around, and you meet with nothing but desolation; uninhabited streets....(p.96) of the Most High. This is a reason I heard for not rebuilding this fallen minaret.

There is also a curious Gentoo Pagoda in this city, where, for a small present to the Brahmins, strangers of any religion are admitted. I went there, and being desirous of drawing some of the images,, was permitted to remain there three or four hours. I was first conducted into a court almost square; with a skylight at the top; and the walls adorned with images, niches and mosaic work in stucco. On the east side was an inner temple, the whole length of the outer court, and about six feet broad. In this were placed several deities in the Hindoo mythology, carved in marble, nearly of the human size. Most of them were white, one of a glassy black, and another small one of a yellow marble, or some composition in imitation, numbers of their divinities of an inferior size, and cast in silver, brass and other metals were ranged below them. After seeing all that was curious here, the Brahmins lighted candles, and descended about thirty feet under ground, desiring me to follow them. I went down a tolerable stair case, which led into a temple nearly thirty feet (p.97) square, without light, and forming a dome at the top.

On three sides of this subterraneous temple were niches, or separate cells, capable of holding one person each, a step higher than the floor. On the east, as above was an inner temple, five or six feet broad, the whole length of the large one. In this sanctum-sanctorum were five images cut in white marble; the deity in the center (called Parisnaut) is sitting in the eastern manner; but if upright would measure thirteen feet in height. I cannot say much for the sculpture, tho by far the best I have seen in India. The face expresses no character; and tho the limbs are not inelegantly turned, no vein or musele appears throughout. This is a general fault of the statues in the Gentoo Pagodas; the caves at the island Salsette and Elephanta are the same. And here I cannot help remarking the great similitude, between the _____ in those caves; and the images in this Pagoda. The same flat faces inthe Egyptian taste; the head dresses much alike; and the Cobra-capelle so often met with there, is here carved in the most conspicuous place, among the sanscreet characters below the principal deity. The small images, pillars and the ornamental works surrounding (h.98) this statute are highly finished, but what appears disagreeable is the gold plate on the pit of the stomach, round the eyes, and on the breasts. The eyes are jewels, or perhaps a composition in imitation and the eye brows on all painted black. Such ornaments would spoil the most beautiful sculpture; and of course add no beauty to this; which in comparison to the admired statues in Europe is indifferent. The figures on each side of the principal image are much smaller; two entirely plain; the others ornamented exactly as the above is desèribed.

In the suburbs are still some beautiful monuments in the form of small temples; and the remains of others that in the Indian style are elegant in ruins. An inscription on one of them mentions its having been erected to the memory of a rich Mogul, who died of hunger inthe time of a most grievous famine, that almost depopulated the Guzerat province. So great was the scarcity, that this tomb records the deceased offered a measure of the most precious pearl, for an equal quantity of grain, but not being able to procure it, he perished thro want. (h.M)

From the quantity of massy stones and scattered reliques of marble sculpture now lying about this town, one may judge of its former magnificence and welath. Since the charges of bringing them hither must have been immense, being conveyed by land carriage some hundred miles from hence, so fine in the Asiatic taste, is some of the workmanship, that I have been credibly informed the dust of the marble, worked out from the mosaic figures, was weighed against an equal quantity of gold, as a compensation for the artificers' trouble. Indeed the ancient opulence of ~~Cempery~~ Cambay, and the trade carried on, must have been prodigious; since the customs on so trifling an article as tamarinds, alone amounted to twenty thousand Rupees per annum.

The trees growing among the houses in this city, are filled with parrots, doves, and other beautiful birds; and squirrels innumerable jumping from spray to spray; it struck me as something very remarkable in so large a house town.

But it was the case when much more populous than at present; for neither the Moguls or Gentoos ever destroy them; as they are never molested, they are not at all shy, (p.100) and I have often sat for hours together under a tree filled with cooing doves, and chattering parrots, that took not the smallest notice of me.

The manufacturers of chintz and fine piece goods, for which in more prosperous days this city was famed, are dwindled to nothing. The weavers are few, and those very poor, hardly a merchant of eminence or credit to be met with. Many reasons may be ascribed for this decline of commerce; a principal one, the oppressive government of the Nabob. Another the retiring of the sea, which one[c] flowed within a few yards of the city walls, but now the boats anchor two miles off.

Indigo was formerly a staple commodity here, and is still manufactured in large quantities. Great pains is taken in the cultivation of this plant and many extensive grounds near the city entirely filled with it. I have annexed a drawing of the Indigo plant, by which you may form a better idea of it than from a dry description. The Indigo blue as is used in England, is made from the leaves of the plant; which they cut just as the leaves begin to fall off; and after stripping them from the stalks, they infuse them in a certain quantity of water, with a small proportion of sweet oil, for thirty or forty hours, after which they pour off the water, then inclining to a bluish hue; afterwards the are taken out and strained ——— bags to separate them entirely from the water; when it is spread ~~and~~ out to dry in the sun; and made into small cakes for use. (p.101)

Cornelians, Agates, Arrangoes, and those beautiful variegated stones, generally known by the name of Mocha-stones, are manufactured in Cambay. The former are produced in a peculiar spot a days journey to the south, nearer Baroche than Cambay. They are dug out of the ground about thirty feet deep, and when cleansed from the dirt, are exposed to the sun for two years. They are then boiled for the space of forty eight hours, and brought to Cambay to be cut and polished. Their being found in Myhi river near Cambay is a mistake, they are dug out of the earth as above described, and if exposed to the sun only a few months are of little value; the longer they remain in the heat, the brighter and deeper is the color, fire will not do; the stones crack, have but little lustre, and will not receive so fine a polish. The Agates are of various colors; those more generally understood by the name of Cornelians are red, white and black. Those pretty variegated stones for rings, bracelets and snuff-boxes, with the trees and landscapes so beautifully delineated, are brought from Coppenwange and other places adjacent, forty or fifty coss from hence.

The country in the vicinity of Cambay is very fertile and pleasant; abounding in the most luxuriant crops of wheat, and several other valuable grains.

..(D.M.). It was this day given out in general orders, that Rugobah had signed a Phirmaund, in which he promised the English forces now on this service under Col. Keating the sum of thirty lacs of rupees, to be paid on his arrival at Poonah, and being established there as Peshwa. And this donation is meant in lieu of all plunder, as prize money or

any demand whatever of that kind.

This method of recompensing the English for their services in war, has always been adopted by the princes on the other side of India.

(b:146) destroying the treaty, when Mr. Lovibond, some days ago was sent to his camp to procure a ratification and his having openly fought against us in every engagement, plainly evinces that he was only deceiving us, which indeed is entirely of a piece with Futtee Sing's general character.

Neriad 12th May 1775

We have remained encamped under these walls since the 8th without any molestation from the confederate army. The reason of remaining here so long, is owing to Ragobah having imposed a tax of sixty one thousand Rupees, on the inhabitants of Neriad. This is customary among the Indians on an enemies town, and is indeed at present a piece of good policy in Ragobah, whose distress for money is very great, without any prospect of a supply from his southern territories, or expectations from the English. His army is in long arrears, is very discontented and his principal officers all as needy as himself.

The inhabitants of Neriad at first refused to submit to this imposition, but being threatened with the worst consequences, most of the casts at last thought it proper to comply; and the money has been hitherto (b.147) recovering by slow degrees. Each cast is taxed according to its wealth and numbers. The Brahmins and

Bhauts claim a privilege from time immemorial, of being exempted from paying imposition of any kind. As the latter have something very singular in their manners and customs, I shall here just give a short account of them.

The Bhauts are a set of people, chiefly employed in repeating verses in the Gentoo Shasta; many of them pretend to be poets, and make verses themselves, which they chant in a particular method; modulating their voices in a manner they think adds to the strength or beauty of their poetry, and peculiar to this set of people. These verses they generally make in praise of some great man, or in commemoration of a particular battle. The Rajas and Princes of the East have generally a Bhaut belonging to their house, whom they pay well; he always attends them in public, particularly on a visit, and in loud notes (disagreeable to a European ear) sounds forth their praises. This tribe among the Hindoos in every respect much resemble our ancient bards and minstrels; like them repeat their legendary tales, and are in a manner the oral historians of the country.

These Bhauts also stand security (p.148) for debts of the villagers to the government; from one government to another; or even between private persons. No security is looked upon so sacred or so certain as upon failure of the bond or obligation between the parties, they certainly would destroy either themselves or one of the tribe, and spill the blood before the face of that person who broke the engagement or refused payment. This is looked upon as

the most unfortunate circumstance, and the Hindoos are taught to believe that the blood of the Bhaut thus spilt, will most assuredly be demanded at their hands from Heaven, so that one seldom hears of an instance of a debt not being paid where a Bhaut stands security.

Many of this tribe hold and cultivate lands, but pay no kind of taxes; and an attempt to levy any on them would most assuredly be attended with no other consequences than their being guilty of the Tarakaw, a most horrid method of murdering either themselves or one another. This they say it is absolutely incumbent on them to do; as were they voluntarily to submit to pay any tax or imposition, those of their own cast, in other towns and countries, would refuse eating or drinking with them, or giving their children (h.149) in marriage. They therefore prefer a voluntary death to such a state of ignoring ignominy and disgrace. This I tought not unnecessary to promise to the following circumstance.

The town of Neriad has been no less than thice taxed and plundered within these few months by Futtee Sing and Conda Rao. The tax now lewied by Ragobah reduces the inhabitants to the most cruel distress indeed. The most shocking scenes hourly present in every quarter of the town, of ruined families delivering up their last mite, which if insufficient to answer their quota of the tax, their houses are instantly stripped of every moveable, every necessary of life; and the poor creatures left to the severity of poverty and want, nay, under pretence of their

having burried valuables, which perhaps they never possessed, tortures are inflicted, and with no sparing hands. Sorry I am that an English army has even the appearance of being concerned in such measures: if the master has offended, let him suffer, not his innocent subjects: at least let not the British sword be drawn in behalf of such Asiatic cruelties and compulsions !

In Nariad reside a number of Bhauts, who sonner than pay the share of the tax demanded from them, rushed out men, women and children armed with swords and and threatened to put themselves and one another to death. The tax was not remitted when several cut themselves to pieces, and died in the most cruel tortures, before they could be disarmed. One man in particular, brought out his family before Captain West, consisting of two brothers and a most beautiful girl his sister - all under eighteen yearsof age; sooner than submit to the imposition, he murdered his sister and one of his brothers, and desperately wounded the other, before he could be siezed. With this tribe a Parricide is a hero of the first stamp; I myself saw a man, who boasted, as of a feat of the highest glory that he had a few months before murdered his father in the like cause.

The Brahmins, something wiser than the Bhauts, bought two old women of their cast for forty Rupees a piece from their daughters, and brought them before the English troops to shed their blood. There they murdered them, calling aloud for vengeance; and after this sacrifice at the shrine of liberty and independence they hold it not so much disgrace to submit to their fate exacted indeed by one of their own tribe.

The city of Nariad is the capital of Conda Rao Guicawar, where he usually resides. Tho his Durbar is by no means a magnificient building. This town is near three miles in circumference, fortified in the Eastern manner with a wall flanked by round towers. This wall is at present mostly mud; but some parts lately built are composed of brick and chunam, very strong; and from appearance the whole town will soon be surrounded with a wall of this kind. Nariad has nine gates, most of them strong and neatly finished, seemingly just built. There is a small ditch round great part of the town, not many yards over, but from ten to fifteen feet deep, at present dry. Nariad contains twelve thousand houses; several manufactures are carried on here, particularly fine Baftas; and the strong stones from Coppenwange, mentioned at Cambay, are cut and polished here. Contrary to most other large towns, I have seen in India, Nariad appears in a flourishing condition, whilst the others are on the decline. Its revennes are about three lacks of Rupees of per annum.

Adjoining Nariad, are several groves of Sandal wood, of an inferior kind to that produced in the Bednore country; but still might be turned to some account. Its smell, tho not so powerful, exactly resembled the true sandal wood, nor was it of a bad color.

(1:172) are now encumbered with a large hospital. We have no battering cannon with us, and the season is too far advanced to wait for any from Broach, or our other

settlements. Lastly it is a measure that at present has no relation to our grand object, conducting Ragobhh in the most expeditious manner to Poonah. For which purpose alone the lives of our Europeans should be risked, and our ammunition and stores expended.

Padrah 23rd May 1775

The siege of Brodera being dropped for the present, we marched ~~four~~ hour coss at sun rise. After travelling three miles thro a fine country, we halted a short time at a village called Sevasee-Contra, which was large, with tolerable houses, and a small neat Pagoda; a good tank and plenty of wells. One of them highly deserving a particular description.

On a plain without the village we observed a building of handsome masonary; the walls not very high, and domes at each end, which make it appear like a mosque, or Mahemedan tomb. This wall formed an oblong square of at least two hundred feet, by forty or fifty. I went to the entrance at the west end (p.173) which in the Asistic taste was not inelegant. This entrance was a handsome porch or alcove, supported by strong well cut pillars, each of one solid stone, ten or twelve feet high from whence I descended by an hundred and sixteen stone steps, to a reservoir of exceeding fine water, tho the steps I could plainly distinguish reached much lower under the water, allowing each step to be half a foot high, which I believe to be nearly right, it makes the top of the well, equal with the surface of the plain, to be nearly sixty feet above the water.

This space is filled by six heighths of pillars of a singular order; but not all alike; supporting large cross stones the breadth of the well. Each pillar is ten feet high, and each of one solid stone with base, shaft, and capitol, in due proportion. There are four rows of these colonades, two of pillars, two pilasters, forming three magnificent avenues down the stairs, to the water. A handsome, tho gloomy view from the top; but from the bottom, to cast one's eyes directly above, it inspires an idea awful and grand. There is sufficient light to observe all the beauties of this extraordinary place, even to the very bottom. There are several landing places, with niches on each side, and a small mosaic work well finished. On the first landing place, over the (p.174) cross stone is some curious sculpture, and an inscription in Indian characters, but our halt was too short for me to take them off, knowing the enemy were in the rear.

When we consider that in this country for some hundred miles around there is not a stone of any kind to be met with, the price of this grand reservoir must have been immense. The expense of bringing the materials, exclusive of the workmanship was I doubt not a very considerable part. The Maharattas with us, who are judges of these things estimate the cost at fifteen lacks of Rupees (or one hundred and eighty seven thousand, five hundred pounds sterling). This sum to a European is almost incredible, and may perhaps be exaggerated, but let us remember the antiquity of this work, and the former

wealth of the Guzerat province. Let us recollect what has been before observed, how noble a charity it is to dig a well in these thirsty climates, what high encomiums have ever been lavished onthe memory of such public benefactors, both in scripture and profane authors; and what at this day gains a man the greatest credit throughout Hindostan. Thevenot, the famous French traveller, admired for his veracity, mentions a well of this kind at Ahmedabad, built by a nurse of a king (A.D.1175) of Guzerat, which cost thirty millions.

About two O'clock we encamped under the walls of Padrah, a large town in the Brodera district, belonging to the Guicawar family, tolerably defended by a wall of mud and brick, and several strong x towers. The houses were very good, and the inhabitants not deserted them, which was the case in most other places we passed. This town and villages under it yield a revenue of fifty thousand rupees a year to Brodera. We marched this day in a south direction without molestation.

The Brodera Pergunnah and the districts belonging to Conda Rao near Neriad are the richest plains that can be imagined. The land is laid out in extensive inclosures, all cultivated, and the hedges full of mangos and other fruit trees. The groves of Tamarinds in this month, adorned with a new verdure, and also in full blossom, diffuse a most fragrant smell all around. These plains likewise abound with a variety of other kind of trees. One in particular of the size, and at a small distance exactly the appearance of the English oak. It bears a small fruit called the Kehny;

of a pale yellow, very sweet and luscious, in shape and taste much resembling a date.

(h-190) he fled from his capital into the cooly country, where he shortly after died of a broken heart, and was buried far from the sepulchure of his forefather. During the siege General Wedderburne lost his life; and a tomb is erected to his memory near the flag-staff tower, with a long inscription, setting forth his martial feats.

Near this city have been several magnificient mosques, and mahometan tombs, now going fast to decay, particularly that of Bourah, a mile from town. The Nebob's gardens arethe best laid out and most extensive of any I have seen in India, abounding with all kindsof India fruits and vegetables; and containing several pleasurex houses, fxnxit fountains and tanks; the whole since the capture of Baroche, much out of repair and going fast to ruin.

Situated in so fertile a province, it cannot be supposed that Baroche is in want of provisions. It abounds with fine beef, mutton, kid, and fowls; venison and wild fowl in their season; fruit and vegetables in plenty; and the river Nerbedah which washes the southern walls, furnishes it with fine carp and other fish.

(h-191) Baroche has always been a place of considerable trade, very fine manufactures in cotton have been constantly carried on and great part of the cotton from all the adjacent country, as also from Ahmood and Jambooseer is sent off from hence in boats to Surat, for the other parts of India as from the difficult and dangerous navigation in the gulph of Cambay, few ships venture higher up than Surat.

The river Nerbadah takes its rise in a mountain far to the eastward, near a place from whence a branch of the Ganges is supplied; if not from the very same source. It is esteemed by the Hindoos a most sacred stream, but little inferior to the Ganges, Throughout the whole day the Hindoo women of the highest ~~xi~~ casts in Baroche are bathing in this river; without paying the least attention or being at all abashed by spectators, even Europeans. Indeed I must do them the justice to acknowledge that they shift their garment (which is only one long piece of drapery, hanging in negligent and easy folds) in the most expeditious manner imaginable without giving the least offence to modesty. Custom reconciles everything. A Banian husband is not in the least jealous, tho he sees his wife, in the prime of life and (p.192) bloom of beauty, bathing in the same stream with a hundred of the opposite sex. I must here quote a remark of Mr. Popes, which I believe in describing the Malabars, I had once before occasion to mention:

"It is in manners, in some degree as in dress, if a fashion never so indecent prevails, yet no person is ridiculous because it is fashionable; so in manners, if a practice prevails universally, tho not reconcileable to real modesty, yet no person can be said to be immodest who comes into it, because it is agreeable to the custom of the times and countries."

I think I observed fairer and handsomer women in the Nerbedah, than I have met with in any other part of India;

and as to symmetry of shape and regularity of features, I fancy there are few but will allow that the Gentoo women of the high tribes equal any in the world while young, it is in point of complexion only they fall short of Europeans; I mean in external graces; for as to mental accomplishments they are so infinitely inferior to my fair countrywomen that I draw no comparison; and must also add that after they attain the age of twenty, all (h.193) personal beauty and comeliness is lost.

Besides the daily sacrifices offered to the Nerbedah, and other solemn rites at stated periods; there is one in fortyfive years, when some particular constellations meet, a very great festival at this river, near Baroche, called the Great Jattarah, a resort of pilgrims from all parts of India; high and low, rich and poor, in short every Hindoo that can travel, once in his life wishes to be present at this solemnity; as much as a zealous mussulman desires to visit the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina. This festival happened last year, when a sickness little less fatal than the plague raged among them and carried off thousands.

In the neighbourhood of Baroch aresome fine wells, particularly one built by Leellaboy a famous Banian in this city, and bearing his name, but all these wells are much inferior to that at Sevasee Centre?; nor do I recollect anything else meriting a description.

(h.198) ....Thus is the face of things altered within these few months in Ragobah's favour. It cannot be thought I pay the English too high a compliment when I attribute

this success entirely to them. For Ragobah must have been totally ruined after his defeat on the plains of Arras, if the Company had not assisted him. This defeat I look upon to be of very essential service to us; otherwise from the pride and haughty spirit of these Maharattas, they never would have thought so much of an assistance, but attributed the present turn in their favour to their own prowess. We found Ragoba's troops dispirited, fearful and timid to the last degree, (h. 199) backward to advance even when headed by our troops.

Succession to the Throne of Delhi

In response to a communication of the Governor General on the subject, in early 1849, the Court of Directors of the East India Company drafted a reply which after explaining the reasons of their disagreement with the suggestion put forth by the Governor General, instructed him to take the required steps in getting a particular son of Bahadurshah II declared as heir-apparent to the throne of Delhi. The reply in its original form (as given from pages 139-163 in volume No. 64 of "draft Despatches to Bengal and India" for the period January 2 - March 27, 1850, in the India Office Records) consisted of 14 paras. In the final form the first three paras were retained as in original, paras 4-13 were expunged and a new para 4, which wholly reversed the orders in the original, added as the final para by the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India. The several steps in the finalisation of this Political Despatch to India and its text, as signed, are reproduced here from page 137-142 of the volume referred to above.

1. Laid before Political and Military Committee		September 26, 1849
2. Approved		October 3, 1849
3. Laid before Court		" "
4. Ordered to lie for further consideration		
5. Ordered to lie until Friday, next, the 26th instant		October 24, 1849
6. Approved by the ballot Court		October 26, 1849
7. Altered Board		November 8, 1849
8. Letter to Hon'ble M. Eliott at Board	approved	November 26, 1849
9. Letter from Mr Stark in reply		November 29, 1849
10. Further letter to Mr Eliott	approved	December 18, 1849
11. Letter from Mr Stark in reply		December 31, 1849
12. The draft as altered by the Board having been framed into a Despatch was signed		January 16, 1850

The signed Despatch

We now reply to the Governor General's 'Foreign Letter', dated 16th February, No. 10 of 1849, relative to the succession to the throne of Delhi.

2. The heir apparent having died, and no successor having been yet recognised, you consider that, on the demise of the present king, the titular sovereignty may be abolished; that the junior branches may be made independent of the head, receiving separate pensions from the British Treasury; that the palace of Delhi may be evacuated and another place of residence be provided for the Royal Family; and that the Prince and his immediate family should be alone exempted from judicial process.

3. We have given the most careful consideration to the subject of this letter, and to the grounds adduced by you for the measures which you propose.

4. We are satisfied that these measures will be politic with reference to

the general interests of India and that they are not unjust to the individuals immediately concerned. We have therefore come to the determination of conveying to you full authority to carry them into effect.

16th January 1850 A. Galloway (and 13 others)

Note: The two letters from Mr Stark, Secretary to the Board, noted at Nos 9 and 11 above, are given on pages 161-5 and 175-84 of volume No 16 'Letters from Board'(for the period January 1,1849-July 25,1850), respectively. A letter conveying the reasons for the alteration made by the Board is on page 149-52. While asking the Court to send the Despatch (Draft No 747) as altered, the Board, in its final letter of December 31,1849, accepts the Court's disclaiming responsibility for the consequences resulting from the instructions issued under their signatures. Para 4, the Board's addition, is in red. The volume of Despatches, above referred to, consists of 1310 pages and is without any list of contents or index. The volume of 'Letters from Board' has a fairly detailed index but does not contain a list of contents.

VII

EIV.8

Draft of a Treaty between East India Company, the Nabob of Arcot and the Dutch East India Company (FF.59-61) 7.1.1781

1. It is proposed, and recommended by the Governor General and Council to the Nawab Walajah Bahadur that, he shall upon his part grant and assign by proper sunnuds to the Dutch East India Company, his right and property in the province, or district of Tennevelly together with the exclusive right of the Pearl Fishery of all the Coast lying to the south of Remisseriar to the Dutch East India Company, who shall be permitted to take possession thereof from the date, on which this treaty receive its final ratification, without any let or impediment on the part of his Aumils, or officers of whatever denomination; and the said province or district shall remain the property of the Dutch East India Company for ever.

British Museum: Add.MS.22441: Macartney Papers: FF.61-80 has a discussion on the Northern Circars (in July-September 1781)

by any means procure goes to the Army. The civil servants are greatly in arrears. Provi-sions at a most exorbitant prices, and no trade but in that Article; upon which a most enormous profit is made at the expense of the Company and of the poor inhabitants. I endeavour to practice every possible economy where the Company's interest is concerned and by a comparison of the expenses here with those of other settlements I believe it will turn out much to our honour. But if peace were once re-established the savings only which ought to be made would amount to a great sum. We shall send out a Committee of Circuit to the Circars because it is the Company's orders. There can be no other reason for it. A thousand good ones might be urged (36R) against it. I shall endeavour however to pick out the best men I can for it. Good ones are very scarce.

At all events the Circars must be differently administered than they have been, but I fear very strong opposition to any new system where the profits of individuals are to be affected by it.

I have written you a long letter and I am quite ashamed when I look at the number of pages. I shall not therefore increase them, but conclude with those assurances of my sincere regard and esteem with which I a m

Dear Sir

Very truly yours

(Signed) Macartney

P.S. I have a very satisfactory letter from the Resident of Tanjore. He is well, and very busy. I mentioned to you his Brother Mr. Richard Sillivan in my letter of September last and expressed my regret at the distance between us. I hope it will be soon removed. Harry is a very fine young fellow, and promises to be every thing his friends can wish him.

I have waited to the last in hopes that before I sealed my letter I should be able to give you an account of the arrival of General Meadows and the ships of war. We expect the Hero, Monmouth, Iris with the transports and the Loche, Asia, Osterley and Hinchinbrooke India men, but have no news of them since the 27th of July. They were to recruit at Madagascar, and then proceed hither. They must arrive soon if no accident has happened to them. I think from my intelligence none was to be apprehended.

VII

Macartney Correspondence

BIV.9

Fort St. George
January 28th, 1782

Private

My dear Sir,

I wrote to you by the Nymph a few days since, and I now resume my pen to tell you by the' swallow which sails tomorrow, that since my last Sir Eyre Coote is returned to Madras after having relieved Vellore and thrown near three months provision into it. He was attacked by the enemy both in going and returning, but his loss was very inconsiderable, not above 50 or 60 killed and wounded in both actions. Hyder finding that he could not make any impression retired with precipitation, and our troops for want of cavalry were unable to pursue him with any effect. Sir Eyre Coote seems much shaken by his late excursion. He was seized with an apopletic fit at Trippassore on the 5th instant and it was some hours before he recovered. So great however was his zeal for the service that this accident did not prevent him from proceeding with the Army the next day in prosecution of his object. His mind is too active for the strength of his body, and the fatigues of his exertions seem considerably to have affected both. In truth on recollecting several passages I am almost led to think that the apoplexy has been hanging about him for a considerable time past. This hint will account to you for some strange letters he has written of late to the Select Committee; which have been answered with a temper, and in a manner which we hope you will approve. Our situation has been not a little delicate and embarrassing. We never could persuade him to come to Council or Committee, and from the conversations we have had with him, we never could collect any precise ideas of his opinions or intentions. To those accustomed to regularity of business and to act upon (32-v) system and fixed principles, you will easily conceive how unplesant my situation must be and nothing but a strong mind and steady temper could bear a man thro' the difficulties which daily arise from the failures of others. In this situation we are to look towards the next in Command. Sir Hector Munro is long known to you as a soldier, and in that line I have endeavoured to employ him

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Scottish Record Office: Nat Library of Scotland
MS 8327

to the best advantage for the Company. Whether arising solely from indisposition, or whether some little dissatisfaction at something that happend in Camp might not have been mixed with it, I know not, but when the Army returned to the field in September last, Sir Hector remained at Madras. He had it seems some time before made a rash vow never to sit in Council with Mr. Sadlier and nothing that I could urge was sufficient to induce him to alter his resolution. Here again we became lame for want of military assistance in our deliberations. In the beginning of October, I began to apprehend by the letters I received from Sir Edward Hughes and Colonel Brathwaite that my favourite project of getting possession of Vigapatnam would be frustrated. I well knew the importance of it; I knew the mischief of delay, and determined to do very thing that was possible to reduce it before the setting in of the Monsoon, or if not effected within that time even to risk continuing the siege during the Monsoon. Sir Hector Munro's taking the Command could give no umbrage to a junior officer; but the difficulty lay in Sir Hector Munro's determination not to act under orders signed by Mr. Sadlier. To obviate all objections and to accelerate the service, the select Committee consisting of Mr. Sadlier, Mr. Williams and myself, very handsomely vested me with powers to enable me to carry on any expedition against the Dutch in conjunction with the Fleet. Sir Hector set out for Nagapatnam. The orders, instructions, letters and c were regularly laid before the' Committee tho' signed only by me; and in less than a month we were masters of the place. At the same time that I ~~signed~~ give Sir Hector Munro full credit for his share of merit on this occasion, I cannot but highly (332) condemn any man in the Company's service suffering a private disagreement to influence his public conduct, and I cannot avoid mentioning here that the lead and authority which your military have been permitted to assume within these few years, if not soon properly checked and regulated, may prove as fatal to the public interests as the attacks of an enemy. Sir Hector has taken his passage on Board the Rochford and will sail for Europe next month. By his departure together with that of Sir Eyre Coote, which seems now certain; the Command will devolve upon General Stuart; whose late mutilation will probably in —

capacitate him from any very active situation. He is however full of spirit and ardour and seems to make light of his late accident. Colonel Munro is not yet arrived. Colonel Bathwaite according to your late orders follows in point of rank, as that of Colonel Larg's has been superseded by the appointment of those two officers above him. There seems to be a want of capital office in every line of the service. So much for the military process of this Government. I must now say a word or two of the civil orders. mes.

Of the present Council, Mr. Holland, you know is at Hyderabad, the rest can give but little assistance to as Governor. Mr. Sadlier has the best abilities of them, but he is so obnoxious to the whole settlement, and so very much disliked that his standing forward in any measure is almost a certain method of defeating it. The proceedings will inform you at large of the Nabob's assignment of his revenue. In the course of my life I have had the conduct of several very difficult negociations with very difficult men in different part of the world, but never had I more occasion for all the (33v) little prudence, caution and address that I may possess than on this occasion. And after all I will fairly confess to you that I believe I never could have made any impression upon him, if I had not given him the most convincing proofs that he could make no impressions upon me. And if any of my predecessors had acted upon my system, good God what a golorious situation would your affairs in the Carnatick have been in. I cannot without tears of grief and indignation think upon the subject for a moment. And here it may not be improper to mention that tho' there is not a man in the settlement white or black who does not firmly believe and even tell you, that he believes all the stories you have heard of Sir Thomas Rumbold, yet I don't think it possible to obtain evidence to any one of the facts which he is charged with. You will see on the consultations the steps we took in order to prosecute the Enquiry; but I confess to you I don't think the person sent from Bengal was the best qualified to conduct a business of the kind. Perhaps I may be able to write to you hereafter upon this subject. According to the lights that

may appear at Madras there is little likelihood of obtaining any. What may break out from the Circars when the Committee of Circuit proceed I know not, but I shrewdly suspect that the same darkness will prevail there.

I had proceeded thus far in my letter when your Packet to the Select Committee of the 9th of June last arrived here this day together with your private letter to me. I return you my best thanks for it. If all you recommend to me can restore your affairs here, it shall not be wanting. The most cordial concert, union and cooperation with the Supreme Council of Bengal. You may rely upon everything is now upon that footing and the most laborious diligence and attention to the public interests shall not be wanting. But let me observe that such diligence and attention joined to the steadiness with which I have acted has, and will always excite the enmity of those whose private views are disappointed or counteracted by them. This is a time in which it is necessary to speak plain. I have been much decieved in the opinion I had entertained of some persons. Most fortunately I have been undeceived in time; and I think it necessary to undeceive others, if it should happen that they may be in an error. There are few people who can resist showing their real character when vested with influence or power, and it is happy for the public that the want of principle is generally discovered by the want of prudence; otherwise, men might go on imposing upon the world to the end of their lives. I have been led into these observations by the conduct of Mr. Benfield who was so strongly recommended to me and who carried matters so smoothly that I was disposed to entertain an opinion of him totally different from his real character. I accordingly put him at the head of the Committee of Assigned Revenue, but I soon discovered such conduct in him that I was obliged to take the first occasion to remove him. The Committee has gained exceedingly by the change. Instead of a dark Lanthorn, there is now Mr. Ockley, a man of bright parts, at their head; a man of open character and honourable principles who considers the public in the first place. Mr. B is a man whom I think the Company ought never to employ on any pretext whatsoever. I think however that it is very likely he may some time or other be employed by them; If he be, you will remember what I now say to you, tho' I do

not t enter into particulars at present, you may suppose almost any objection against him that you (3HV) please, and you scarely be mistaken.

Your system of peace with all the country powers you will observe by my letters is perfectly my own ideas and believe me no other can now be adopted. If we crush Hyder, I hope we shall be disposed to set an example of moderation and equity in the partition of his spoil. I approve much of your idea of giving all power to the Governor General and Council of Bengal. The making the Governors of Bombay and Madras, Members of it will be necessary, otherwise, they will have no authority in their own Presidencies, and such is the jealousy of this place at least that it will require great address and steadiness to engage the people here to relish the alteration.

With regard to myself, I will now say to you what is the real truth, upon the word of a gentleman. I feel so interested in the recovery of our affairs here that I am determinexd to sacrifice every private consideration to accomplish it and I will serve in such situation either here or at Bengal as may be judged most conducive to that end. When that is done, I may be allowed to expect some reward, and I will wait till then. The appointments I have, are little more than maintenance; and I am now not a ~~trifling~~/richer 2 shillings than I was when I left England. By observing this conduct, I am sure the public may gain millions. Such an example is absolutely necessary, and you may rely on my presevering to give it. At the same time, my Dear Sir, don't imagine that I wish to impose upon you with a system of this kind as arising from heroic virtue or better motives than those which actuate tho generality of mankind. I will pretend to no such; but own frankly, that I have a stranger passion than (35R) the love of wealth; and if I can contribute to reinstate this country in its fomer glory, I shall feel infinitely more pride and ₤ satisfaction than all Sir Thomas Rumbold's fortune could give me. In truth I think it a very bad calculation in the accounts of the world, to sacrifice reputation for any increase of fortunes. And where a man has no children, if he leaves behind him his paternal estate without diminution no man has a right to complain of him. Such have

always been the ideas of your humble servant upon this subject; who has had it twenty times in his power to make a large fortune, and yet never had it in his thoughts. But enough of this at present.

I will now at the close of the Packet just give you in two words a short sketch of our situation. The main Army is now encamped at 5 leagands distance from hence. We are doing Lucs everything that can be done to supply it with the means of taking the field again, and proceeding. I hope upon some decided object. The ~~caputa~~ capture of Arcot seems to me to be of the first consequence. The possession of even tho' nominal capital of the country makes a very strong impression both on the people in the neighbourhood and at a distance; and has been of infinite advantage to Hyder. If we take it, and I believe it practicable, I think the neck of the war ~~effectively~~ Lbroke. Leffectually Sir Eyre Cooke's health is so much impaired, to say no more, that I imagine he never can serve again in this part of the world. But God forbid that we should depend upon one man's services only.

Sir Edward Hughes is gone to Trincomallee and proposes to return here on the 15th of next month. We shall then in concert with him such further operations as may be most expedient. Ceylon (Colombo) is the first object (35V) and must be attempted if there be the least probability of success. The capture of Batavia is, I believe not impracticable, and my idea would be to take it, blow it up, and leave it, without removing the Dutch. Let them settle with the Malays and new establishment there if they choose it; but the climate is so unhealthy it would cost us too dear to keep it. If Hyder were not on our backs, it would not be difficult totally to root the Dutch out of India. Be the circumstances what they may, we shall endeavour to do the best; and you shall have the earliest information of what is done. Our military expenses are enormous tho' I believe three times less than those of the other Presidencies. I do all in my power to reduce them, but whilst Sir Eyre Cooke is at the head of our Army, the Presidency cannot have that authority over the Army which it ought to have, without totally breaking with him; which we shall not do, if we can possibly help it. All the money we can

An Account of Establishment Civil and Military at the East India Company's last three Years; distinguishing each Presidency, and each Year; p Books last recei[ved]

Bengal

Bengal	Number on the Civil Establishment	Civil Charges	Number on the Military Establishment		Military Charges			
			Europeans	Sepoys	General Charges for Pay Batta &c	Expedition against the Mug	Expedition to Napaul	Detachment acting on the Coast
		£			£	£	£	£
May 1768 to April 1769	111	295,774	3,139	28,088	830,950	5,626	9,791	138,209
1769 .... 1770.	136.	300,598	3,239	24,397	998,570	2392	....	73,041
1770 .... 1771.	171.	265,984	3,890	26,132	1,019,967	....	....	ul. 70,039
		£ 862356			£ 2,849,487	8,018	9791	281,289

Fort St George

Fort St George	Number on the Civil Establishment	Civil Charges	Number on the Military Establishment		Military Charges	
			Europeans	Sepoys	General Charges for Pay Batta &c	War against Hyder Ally
		£			£	£
May 1768 to April 1769 ..	110.	41,154	4,551	17,592	173760	445,991
1769 .... 1770.	102.	57,762	4,642	16,674	267,104	100548
1770 .... 1771.	114.	50,279	4,410	18,339	301,856	....
		£ 149,195			£ 742,720	546,539

Bombay

Bombay	Number on the Civil Establishment	Civil Charges	Number on the Military Establishment						
			Europeans	Sepoys	General Charges for Pay Batta &c	Expedition against Hyder Ally	Expedition to Pen[...]	Charges Embassy to Shyraz	Char[ges] Allia[nce] Caren[...]
		£			£	£	£		
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]							

Military at the East India Company's Presidencies and of their Expences, for the Presidency, and each Year, of Books last received

Military Charges

General Charges for Pay Batta &c	Expedition against the Mhg	Expedition to Nagpoor	Detachment acting on the Coast	Total Military Charges	Fortifications & Buildings	Total Charges
£	£	£	£	£	£	£
830,950	5,626	9,791	138,209	984,576	270,875	1,551,225
998,570	2392	.....	73,041	1,074,003	272,165	1,646,766
1,019,967	.....	.....	ad. 75,039	1,093,006	460,625	1,219,615
£ 2,849,487	8,018	9,791	284,289	£ 3,151,585	1,003,665	3,017,606

Military Charges

General Charges for Pay Batta &c	War against Hyder Ally	Total Military Charges	Fortifications & Buildings	Total Charges
£	£	£	£	£
173760	445991	619,751	37,484	692,389
267,104	100548	367,652	26,215	451,629
301,856	.....	301,856	31,728	433,863
£ 742,720	546,539	£ 1,289,259	145,427	1,583,881

General Charges for Pay Batta &c	Expedition against Hyder Ally	Expedition to Persia	Charges Embassy to Shyraz	Charges Corum Khans	Secret Expedition	Charges on a Rupture with the Chauts	Total Military Charges	Fortifications & Buildings	Total Charges

	Lss 149,195		Lss 742,720	546,539

Bombay	Number on the Civil Establishment	Civil Charges	Number on the Military Establishment		General Charges for Pay Batta &c	Expedition against Hyder Ally	Expedition to Persia	Charges Embassy to Shyraz	Cha… Alli… Carn…
			Europeans	Sepoys					
		Lss			Lss	Lss	Lss	Lss	
August 1767 to July 1768	82	92,196	1,321	5,280	92,752	16,887	26,771	1,868	1…
1768 … 1769	91.	100,788	1,650	5,802	112,228	14,471	16,521	………	12…
1769 … 1770	96.	124,428	1,883	6,301	145,848	8,130	14,654	………	
		Lss 317,412			Lss 350,828	39,488	57,946	1,868	17…

Bencoolen	Number on the Civil Establishment	Civil Charges	Number on the Military Establishment	
		Lss		
May 1767 to April 1768	42.	22,021	255	72
1768 … 1769	49.	25,859	254	133
1769 … 1770	57.	24,843	247.	133
		Lss 72,723		

London 11th November 1772.

Errors Excepted (signed) J.H.

Auditor of Indian Accounts

Mem/

Of the…
Caun…
is carr…
at J…

£	742,720	546,539				£	1,289,259	145,127	1,583,821

General Charges for Pay Batta &c	Expedition against Hyder Ally	Expedition to Persia	Charges Embassy to Shyraz	Charges Alliance w.th Cauun Khans	Secret Expedition	Charges on a Rupture with the Chaub.	Total Military Charges	Fortifications & Buildings	Total Charges
£	£	£	£		£	£	£	£	£
92,752	16,887	26,771	1,868	4,321	.....	.....	142,599	34,194	268,989
112,228	14,471	16,521	.....	12,765	6,043	.....	162,028	42,725	305,541
145,848	8,130	14,654	.....	.....	7,573	6,164	182,369	78,827	385,624
£ 350,828	39,488	57,946	1,868	17,086	13,616	6,164	486,996	155,746	960,154

Total Military Charges	Fortifications & Buildings	Total Charges
£	£	£
13,340	1,434	36,795
13,960	1,336	41,654
14,921	3,262	43,026
£ 42,221	6,531	121,475

Mem.

Of the above Charges £100,000 will be paid by the Nabob Mah.d Ally Cauun towards the Expences of the War with Hyder Ally which Sum is carried to his Debit in the Statement of the Debts due to the Company at Fort St George.

Indian Accounts

it is literally so, and your departure adds to my distaste of it. I shall not say a word on your administration, that would be an impertinence now, but I must say to you with how much gratification I have served as *your* subordinate and what satisfaction I felt while sitting at the same board with your Lordship. That has happened which rarely occurs in life, my anticipations have been fully realized in the relations which have existed between us. I regret they will no longer exist in this country at least; to renew them in Europe I hardly hope.

My brothers will wait upon you soon after you reach London and I have referred them to your Lordship as being able to tell them more about me than anybody can. My father who is passing this winter and spring in London will I fear have returned to Scotland before you reach home, but I have told him if your Lordship should go into the north to waylay you and show you his [silver] firs and other things which he will delight to exhibit. . . .

My brothers know all your/my plans regarding my employment while I remain in this country and they know generally many of my opinions of things and some of men. Nor are they ignorant of my *love* of India and Indian employment. So if you choose to speak with them on these matters (as relates to me I mean) they will understand you.

I have been delighted to receive such good accounts of your health. Under the labour and excitement to which you have been exposed you owe this to sago and arrowroot and no wine, with the other accompanying selfdenying ordinances I hear you have so rigidly observed. To whatever cause owing the effect is a blessing and I hope you will improve on your way home and arrive quite reestablished.

810. *Bentinck's minute on military policy*

13 March 1835

Composition of the Army of India

Before I proceed to describe what the constitution of the army is, and to offer an opinion as to what it ought to be, a necessary preliminary enquiry seems to be as to the specific dangers by which our dominion may be assailed. It is easy enough to determine upon the general principles to be followed, and the great end to be attained, viz. that the military body should be so constituted and regulated, that, by its imposing moral attitude, by its established fidelity and allegiance, it should render hopeless all internal rebellion, as also that, by the adequacy of its members, and by its reputation for discipline and valour, it should be able, as well in the general opinion, as in reality, to overcome any foreign attack. But the elements both of our danger and of our security are of more difficult estimation, and without an exact knowledge both of the one and the other it is very possible that the

T. Munro
Indian State necessary for Indian army with discipline

precautions adopted for our security may become the very means of our subversion.

Of internal danger, nobody I believe entertains less alarm than myself. In answer to those almost universal representations from public authorities of the existence of danger, and of the consequent necessity of maintaining a large native army, I have in vain asked to have pointed out to me, what the danger is. Where are the horse, foot, and artillery, by which we are to be ejected? The most recent document of this kind, that I have seen, is the minute of the commander-in-chief at Madras, who describes disaffection as everywhere prevailing, and argues in consequence against any reduction of the army, and thinks necessary an augmentation of it. Indeed there are those who contend for the same establishment now, as when Hyder and Tipu were in the plenitude of their power, and when several substantive states existed in other parts of India. But in Madras, as in Bengal, there no longer exists a single chief, or a combination of chiefs, who possess even the semblance of a military force. Nor are there any large masses of the population, who have the least disposition to rebel against our authority. A vague expression is often used, that ours is a government of opinion. Our security rests upon a very much better foundation, upon the fact, which every one from his own observation and experience is thoroughly convinced of, and which is true, that our power is irresistible.

But though no danger appears in any real or tangible shape, it must be allowed, when one hundred millions of people are under the control of a government, which has no hold whatever on their affections, when, out of this population is formed that army upon the fidelity of which we rely principally for our preservation, when, our European troops, of whose support under all circumstances we are alone sure, are so exceedingly limited in number and efficiency, as to be of little avail against any extensive plan of insurrection, then indeed the truth of that expression of Sir John Malcolm is not without force: 'that in an empire like that of India, we are always endangered, and it is impossible to conjecture the form, in which it may approach.' This state of uncertainty is greatly aggravated by our condition of peace, by the spread of knowledge, and by the operations of the press, all of which are tending rapidly, as well to weaken the respect entertained for the European character, and prestige of British superiority, as to elevate the native character, to make them more alive to their own rights, and more sensible of their power. Of the dangers of our *old* possession, upon which men's minds continue to harp, and against which they see no security, but the largest possible native army, I have no apprehension. But there is much more reason to fear the changes incidental to our *new* position of peace, a more enlightened state of mind, a higher elevation of character, knowledge, improved morality, courage, all concurring causes that must produce effects to be dealt with by a very different philosophy from that which has hitherto obtained. So much for internal evils.

be brought nearer their homes, and to be saved the danger of the long journey which has been so fatal to many, when returning on furlough. The state, besides the saving from the reduction of the staff, would also make a great gain in the comparative cheapness of all camp establishments, of followers etc. It is an extraordinary fact, not yet accounted for, that in all the stations, occupied alternately by Madras, Bombay, and Bengal troops, the bazaar prices have invariably fallen with the latter force, and risen with the two former.

The Bombay division would, under this alteration, occupy only the stations within their frontier, transferring the southern Maratha country to Madras—Nagpur* and Deesa to Bengal.

In considering the question of internal danger, those officers most conversant with Indian affairs, who were examined before the parliamentary committee, apprehend no danger to our dominion as long as we are assured of the fidelity of our native troops. To this opinion I entirely subscribe. But others again view in the native army itself, the source of our greatest peril. In all ages the military body has been often the prime cause, but generally the instrument of all revolutions; and proverbial almost as is the fidelity of the native soldier to the chief whom he serves, more especially when he is justly and kindly treated, still we cannot be blind to the fact that many of those ties, which bind other armies to their allegiance, are totally wanting in this. *Here* is no patriotism, no community of feeling as to religion or birth-place, no influencing attachment from high consideration, or great honours and rewards. Our native army also is extremely ignorant, capable of the strongest religious excitements, and very sensitive to disrespect to their persons, or infringement of their customs. I shall quote from the evidence, a few of those passages bearing upon this subject which appear to me to have the greatest force and truth. Mr. Henry Russell observes: 'The greatest danger we have to apprehend is from our native army; our military force is the exclusive tenure by which we hold the government, and the fidelity of the troops of whom that force is composed is necessarily precarious; they are foreigners and mercenaries; they are attached to a government that pays them well and treats them kindly etc., but we have no hold upon them, through either national honour,

* *Note*: The following table of distances shows that Nagpur is as conveniently placed for support from three of the great military stations in Bengal, as from Bombay, and much nearer to the divisions in Malwa and Saugor, than even to Bombay.

Nagpur to	miles	Nagpur to	miles
Bombay	500	Saugor (*c*)	181
Madras	735	Benares	446
Mhow (*a*)	351	Allahabad	400
Nimach (*b*)	505	Agra	669

(*a*) left cantonment of the Rajputana force.
(*b*) centre of ditto.
(*c*) headquarters of Saugor division.

or national prejudices, and cannot expect from them, what we do from English soldiers, fighting for English objects. They are peculiarly susceptible of being practised upon, and may be induced either by our own mismanagement, or by the artifices of designing persons to turn against those very arms, which now constitute our only strength.' This intelligent officer makes a remark, too true, at the present day, with respect to Madras army. 'The details of the army had, for the first time in India, fallen into the hands of a school, which thought that everything depended on show, and that no sacrifice was too great for the attainment of outward smartness and uniformity.' There are parts of Mr. Holt Mackenzie's evidence well worthy of attention, for no man of his time in India possessed the same general knowledge, or could form a more accurate and enlightened judgment upon all subjects connected with our rule. He observes: 'I do not think the sepoys have any attachment to the English, as a nation. On the contrary, I apprehend that a considerable number of that part which consists of Moslems must generally have a national, or rather I should say, a religious dislike to the English.' He thinks the sepoys have a great deal of attachment to their officers, but that this rests upon personal character, rather than upon anything that may be called attachment to the nation generally.' He thinks 'the sepoys as long as they are well paid, will have a strong sense of the duty of being faithful to those who so pay them, to be only overcome by some powerful cause of discontent or excitement.' He thinks 'a large native army is quite essential for maintaining the tranquillity of the country but he would be very sorry to see its defence entrusted to them without a large European force. He is not aware of any circumstance causing immediate danger, but he thinks on general principles, that there is much prospective danger.'

It is only since I recorded different minutes, enforcing the prudence and expediency of bettering the condition of the native army and of preventing discontent by timely concession and precaution, that I have read a passage in a letter from Sir Thomas Munro, written in 1817, in which I find a view of our future situation, and the consequences appertaining to it, quite in unison with the sentiments I have so often expressed. He observes: 'But even if all India could be brought under the British dominion, it is very questionable, whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired. One effect of such a conquest would be, that the Indian army, having no longer any warlike neighbours to control, would gradually lose its military habits and discipline, and that the native troops would have leisure to feel their own strength, and, for want of other employment, to turn it against their European masters.' He concludes a long and able argument upon the question, whether in the event of our conquest of the whole of India, the condition of the people would be better than under their native princes, which he doubts, with this remark: 'There is perhaps no example of any conquest in which the natives have been so

completely excluded from all share in the government of their country as in British India.'

The only conclusion that I wish to establish from the preceding remarks, which contain indisputable truths, is: that in the native army alone rests our internal danger, and that this danger may involve our complete subversion; that the fidelity of our native army, though wonderfully great, and deserving of high confidence, cannot be considered exempt from the possibility of seduction; and that an adequate European force is the sole security against this, the greatest evil that could befall us. What should be the proportion of our European native force will be presently considered. The external danger comes next under review. The capability of the native army to meet it and the manner in which the native military means of India can be turned to the greatest advantage, are subjects of the first magnitude.

As far as experience can teach us, the prospect is discouraging as to any great degree of direct and positive assistance in the field, that is, in actual conflict, to be expected from the sepoy in a contest with the stronger and bolder races of central Asia, with or without the co-operation of a Russian force. Mr. Holt Mackenzie has given an opinion upon the question before us, which quite coincides with my view of it. 'My impression is, that, as far as regards any Indian enemy, the native army may be considered to be very efficient. I am not equally confident of their efficiency if placed in any new and unusual position and exposed to encounter enemies, that may possibly come upon us from without. I think the result of the war with the Burmese seems to show, that when brought against enemies, superior in physical strength to those with whom they have been accustomed to contend, and required to surmount obstacles of a different kind from what they have been accustomed to surmount, the native troops however well led, will be found to want resolution and nervous vigour, so as to be inferior to European troops in a degree not ordinarily to be perceived in Indian warfare. Consequently I should apprehend, that, if they were called upon to meet an European enemy in the north of India, they might fail partly from the want of physical strength, and partly from the want of moral energy.'

The defects of the native of India are a want of physical strength, and of a moral energy. The first is beyond our remedy. It only depends upon ourselves to raise the latter to a much higher standard. Our system has, I fear, tended to depress it.

The late wars have brought the sepoy in contact with enemies of a more masculine character, and have shown the justice of the preceding opinion.

Sir David Ochterlony in his confidential report to government, during the Nepal war, has recorded his opinion, that the sepoys were unequal to contend with the Gurkhas in the hills.

The Burmese war was exclusively carried on by British troops; the Madras troops entirely failed. It is understood that Sir Archibald

Campbell was strongly prejudiced against them, and, when granting the request of their officers to be permitted to lead their men to the attack, he neglected the practice, invariably adopted upon all other occasions, of joining with them a proportion of European troops. To this their ill success may be in part owing. My own impression is also, that in the short war against Coorg, the Madras sepoys showed the same want of energy.

With respect to the inability of the sepoy to contend with a European enemy, the concurrent opinion of all the evidence, to which may be added the inference to be drawn from all our own conquests in India, seems to be decisive upon the question.

For my own part I am not quite disposed to come to the same desponding conclusion, because if the bolder and larger men of the north were mixed with a due proportion of European troops, and excited to acts of valour by sufficient encouragement I know not why he should not acquire the same superior bearing as the Portuguese and the Neapolitans, under British and French direction.

But of the sepoys of the south of India, of those of the territories proper of Madras and Bombay, I entertain no such hope. Their case cannot be more favourably put for them than by supposing them to be Europeans and to have all the advantages of the European character, and then let it be asked if men of such physical inferiority would be received as recruits in any European army or if an army so constituted would not be considered perfectly inefficient?

All these facts and opinions seem to me to establish incontrovertibly, that a larger proportion of European troops is necessary for our security under all circumstances of peace and war. It surprises me to find how little attention was paid by the committee to one of the most important parts of the enquiry, the relative proportion between the native and European force; but we fortunately possess the opinion of Sir Thomas Munro, the first of authorities, confirmed by another, only second to his, that of Colonel John Munro, who filled the office of quarter-master general, when I was at Madras. The opinions on both these questions are worthy of being noted: 'The native troops are in an excellent state of discipline, but of course the Europeans are always superior to the natives.' Question 2—'What should be the relative proportions of the European infantry to the native infantry?' Answer: 'I should say one third of European: that was the proportion observed at Madras; indeed we had sometime rather more, now we have considerably less. I once conversed with Sir Thomas Munro, on that point, and he expressed his opinion very decidedly, that there should be that proportion.' This is also my own opinion, but I think that it would suffice at present to fix it at one fourth, being careful that the establishment should be always kept complete, and that on the most remote indication of danger, it should be increased to one third.

The abstract in the margin [overleaf] taken from the statements

Awadh, Pretenders, and the British 1720–1801

Charles Purling took charge of the Residency on 5 November 1779, with an unequivocal mandate to supervise the Nawab's entire revenue, if necessary, to secure the growing subsidy. He had been chosen because of his previous experience as collector in both Rangpur and Cooch Behar, and as a member of the Dacca Provincial Council of Revenue.[80] Even before his formal installation, Purling alarmed the Nawab by his announced intent and brusque manner;[81] and within a few weeks the new Resident had gained access to the entire state records and revenue accounts, over the Nawab's strenuous and histrionic objections to Warren Hastings.[82] To the Company this was a major achievement, for it provided heretofore hidden information on every aspect of the material resources of Awadh, including Asaf's household expenses, all the jagirs, and the cost of collecting revenues. Only the private wealth held by individuals and branches of the Nawab's family remained undisclosed. Whatever the historian's opinion on the tightening grip of the English on Awadh's revenues, he can only rejoice that Purling succeeded in extracting such detailed accounts from a regime so jealous of their secrecy. They are thus found intact in a form which no Indian historian in Awadh was able to imitate, and they deserve our special attention in the following chapter as profiles of exactly who controlled the distribution of wealth in 1780, and of how many ways the English had found to spend Asaf's revenues.

The latter is elaborated in Purling's "Estimate of Charges made on Asaf by the Hon'ble Company in 1187 Fasli,"[83] which represents the claim for the harvest year 1779–80[84] (see Table

[80]FDSC 2, 23 Apr. 1772; FDSC 1, 18 Mar. 1774; FDSC 11, 8 Mar. 1775.
[81]Āṣaf to Gen. Eyre Coote (?) October 1779, *CPC*, V, 383, no. 1654.
[82]Colored with phrases such as: "The knife has penetrated to the bone," "Inexpressible grief and affliction," and "It is impossible to live another instant." See Āṣaf to Hastings, received 24 Feb. 1780, *CPC*, V, 418–419, no. 1764.
[83]Purling to Council 19 Nov. 1779, FDSC (B), 13 Dec. 1779.
[84]The regime was continuing to use the Faslī (pertaining to the harvest or season) calendar used by the Mughals, who at the beginning of Akbar's reign followed the dynastic practice of other Muslim rulers by counting solar years from the Hijrī (lunar) year of accession, thereby avoiding the complications of the shorter lunar year. Compare the earlier use of the "Shahūr San" by the Bahmanī Sulṭāns in Muhammad Nazim, "Bijapur Inscriptions," *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*, no. 49 (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1936), pp. 1–110. I am indebted to Richard M. Eaton for this clarification.

Table 2

CHARGES MADE ON ĀṢAF UD-DAULA BY THE EAST INDIA COMPANY IN 1187 FASLĪ (1779–1780)

Balance due to the Hon'ble Company the End of Bhaudun 1186		20,60,608. 1.9
Army Subsidy[a]		31,20,000
Temporary Brigade[b]	26,13,559.13.9	
Cavalry Brigade[b]	10,80,000	36,93,559.13.9
Viziers Troops under British Officers as P. Estimate[c]		16,87,333.12.6
Saadut Allee's Stipend[d]		3,00,000
Rohilla's Stipend[e]		61,578
Loss by Exchange		6,00,000
Abdul Rahmaun Cawn's Russaulah		3,30,000
Donation to the Army[f]		10,00,000
Army Debts[g]—Vizt.		
Brigadier General Goddard	3,44,478	
Major Webber	2,49,611	
Captn. Bourke	30,464	
Lieut. Collins	1,18,876	
Lieut. McIntosh	15,680	7,59,109
Rupees		1,36,12,188.12

Errors Excepted. Lucknow the 19th November 1779
E. Purling

SOURCE: FDSC (B), 13 Dec. 1779.

a. Treaty of Banaras, 1773; increased by Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 2,60,000 per month by the Treaty of Faizābād, 21 May 1775.

b. Both in the "Temporary (or Fatehgarh) Brigade," formed in 1777.

c. Formed during the disturbances of 1776.

d. Guaranteed by the Company in order to control Āṣaf's half-brother.

e. Pensions to defeated Rohilla chiefs, begun in 1774.

f. Rohilla War donation: not stipulated whether this is a single overdue installment or if it had become an annual charge.

g. Either field allowances beyond those under treaty, or private loans to Āṣaf for the purchase of European curios. Although such debts were prohibited by Council orders, they were collected by the Company and remitted, with 12 percent interest, to those named.

Conclusion: Regional Politics in Eighteenth-Century India

This book has focused on four main features of North India's political life in the post-Mughal period: the process by which Awadh emerged from the empire to become a self-sufficient and expanding state; the way in which its regimes discovered and organized their assets, developed dynastic legitimacy, and interacted with neighboring states and foreign invaders; the changes forced upon the Awadh system after its first clash with the East India Company in 1764; and the capacity of its internal political structures to resist growing domination by the English, and to enable the state to avoid even partial annexation between 1775 and 1801.

Given the relative lack of comparative research on post-Mughal India and early modern Islamdom, generalizing about their common feature, the struggle between regions and empires, is still somewhat hazardous. Nevertheless, a general and systematic approach to the processes of decentralization has been suggested here. What follows, therefore, is a cautiously speculative treatment of an immense subject, offered in full awareness of scholarly differences on matters of factual importance and theoretical interpretation in a complex period of South and West Asian history. The aim is to compare developments in Awadh with events in other areas, with the twofold purpose of restating the arguments in the above pages and considering a tentative theory of imperial decentralization, political autonomy, and resistance to further centralization.

INITIAL FRAGMENTATION AND REGIONAL AUTONOMY

The nawabi political system took shape first on the foundation of an administrative province that had long been demarcated culturally and geographically as a "historical region." Such regions are the building blocks of most empires. They re-emerge during decline because administrative mechanisms allow imperial and regional elites gradually to retain for their own purposes those political resources previously surrendered to the empire. Such elites are always ready to change or abandon a central regime to enhance individual or corporate welfare. The resulting devolution of power is traceable through visible changes in political and economic functions; these include controlling provincial appointments, nominating successors, diverting the flow of revenues, building residences in regional capitals, and acting independently in internal administration and interstate relations. The imperial system is always vulnerable to such manipulations, and crises accelerate them. The function of subahdari succession is a strong example of this. Under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, regional dynastic tendencies had been checked by the twin devices of frequent transfers of governors and the appointment of royal princes to the more important provinces.[1] After Bahadur Shah I (d. 1712), however, Mughal succession wars at the center, and the imprisonment of their princely survivors to prevent rebellion, made this impossible. Many governorships were then entrusted either to central ministers, who tried to hold double concurrent assignments by serving in absentia, or to nobles who increasingly felt that they should be ousted and replaced only by superior military force wielded by their designated successors.[2]

At about the same time, the troubled Ottoman Empire was showing similar strains in the center and its regions. Imperial provincial governors, military overlords within regions and magnates locally in Rumelia and Anatolia, and the powerful

[1] M. Athar Ali, "Provincial Governors under Aurangzeb," in S. Nurul Hasan, ed., *Medieval India: A Miscellany*, vol. I (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1969), pp. 96–123; "Provincial Governors under Shah Jahan: An Analysis," in K. A. Nizami, ed., *Medieval India: A Miscellany*, vol. III (London: Asia Publishing House, 1975), pp. 80–112.

[2] Zahir Uddin Malik, *The Reign of Muhammad Shah: 1719–1748* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1977), pp. 207–211.

revenue farmers in the Arab provinces were zealously establishing or already enjoying some form of hereditary autonomy by the mid-eighteenth century.[3] Holders of former imperial offices in both Mughal and Ottoman provinces were consciously building dynastic patterns, as local ties assumed greater importance and convenience for regional rulers in the absence of checks from the center.

Mughal successor states, however, did not merely stem the flow of resources to imperial networks, but reversed it, draining them of whatever remained. Saadat Khan's and Safdar Jang's expropriations, annexations, and usurpations show that the most effective tool they used in state-building existed mainly in people's minds as a mental habit: the long-standing deference to Mughal authority, wielded with consummate expertise by both men against neighboring states, foreign invaders, and the tottering empire itself. The status of imperial wazir held great benefits, and Safdar Jang fought an expensive war trying to retain them. His son Shuja and grandson Asaf bid handsomely from a safe distance for access to the same authority. Co-sharers of the Mughal's disembodied voice were heard using it on their own long after all his other vital signs had disappeared, politically speaking. Moreover, the farther from Delhi they ruled, the safer they seemed from being drawn back into the battle over this mysteriously effective authority. Shuja husbanded this resource of status as tenaciously as he guarded his territory—indeed, it helped him do this; continuing as a Mughal, he banished Mughal influence and administration completely.

This pattern of claimed or borrowed authority appears widely between the Indus and the Cauvery rivers, with a few exceptions such as the Sikh Confederacy of the Panjab.[4] No one challenged the emperor's right to speak on behalf of the em-

[3]H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, vol. 1: *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century*, pt. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950; repr. 1957), pp. 173–199; 253–266. This is updated by Norman Itzkowitz, "Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities," *Studia Islamica* 16 (1962): 73–94; and Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1: *Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1808* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 204–210, 253–255, 264–271, 280–284.

[4]W. H. McLeod, *The Evolution of the Sikh Community* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976).

pire; all, however, sought to have him speak to their benefit. The most telling example is that of the Peshwa himself. Even after smashing the Mughal army at Amjhera in 1728, staging a daring attack on Delhi, and routing the formidable Nizam ul-mulk in 1737, Baji Rao I never became the de jure ruler of Malwa, considered by many as an integral part of the Maratha Confederacy. On the contrary: according to Muhammad Shah's farman of 1741, he was named merely Naib-Subahdar (deputy governor) of Malwa, with obligations to make ceremonial gifts to the emperor and to preserve all rent-free tenures inside Malwa that had been granted from Delhi. He also shared symbolic power with the defeated Nizam of Hyderabad, by accepting the latter's mansab of 7,000/7,000. Moreover, he was not above writing to the Muslim governors of the North to restrain the movements of his own chieftain, Raghuji Bhonsle.[5] As a participant in the imperial symbolic system, the Peshwa thus gained much more than he would have by the far more expensive alternative of defying it and declaring his complete independence.

Formal Mughal paramountcy served regional rulers for a remarkably long time, because at least until 1858 no rival transcendent value system could lay claim to all-India legitimacy, in spite of numerous successful or near-successful invasions. There were also limits to its use: when kingmakers violated the common pattern, by in effect going beyond the bounds of legitimate manipulation, they were effectively eliminated by rivals who raised the cry of Empire in Danger. The Saiyid brothers, the eunuch Javid Khan, and Ghulam Qadir Rohilla found to their cost the deadly truth of this tendency to react against usurping imperial authority. In the final case, by 1788, the only part of the empire that was salvageable was precisely this shadowy authority, and its alleged rescuers were none other than Mahaji Shinde's troops, now its most effective rivals. The Marathas had, in fact, sealed their control of Gujarat's surplus resources early on, not only by coercion, but by avoiding the mistakes of its previous Mughal governors, who rashly

[5]Malik, *Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp. 106–110, 130–137, 225, 273; Stewart N. Gordon, "The Slow Conquest: Administrative Integration of Malwa into the Maratha Empire," *MAS* 11, no. 1 (1977): 14–15.

flouted Mughal central authority.[6] No one has argued, nor do I here, that either the Peshwa or his chieftains in the North would have failed there had they ignored the weighty influence of formal imperial sanction. I merely note the fact that even they acknowledged that this major factor, among others, helped them build the legitimacy they enjoyed until 1818. Clive's methods in 1765 are remarkable only insofar as he admitted them in frank detail; they were fairly obvious to elite groups in all regional capitals.

Interestingly, this pattern did not characterize the Uzbek or Safavid systems, and it can only partially be applied to the Ottoman successor states. When intense Russian commercial pressure began to affect Muslim Central Asia, regional political networks centered around (from west to east) the old Khwarizmian capital of Khivah, Bukhara in the Zarafshan Valley, and mountainous Khoqand had emerged as independent khanates. They interacted largely on their own with one another and with the Czar's aggressions, without pretending to defend Uzbek sovereignty.[7] In Iran, the Safavid dynasty survived the Afghan occupation of Isfahan in 1722[8] only to be replaced altogether in 1736 when the general, Nadir Khan, who had ruled in its name, threw off the cloak of Safavid legitimacy, crowned himself Nadir Shah, and led his armies to victory not only against Bukhara, but in opposition to the Ottomans and the Mughals. In a bold, creative effort to forge a new imperial ideology, which almost succeeded, he tried to narrow the Sunni-Shi^{c}i rift which had distinguished the Safavid polity by persuading the Shi^{c}i learned elite to consider their community as belonging to just another legal school on a par with the four recognized schools at Mecca. Because reaction to this, and to his savage terror tactics as well, unseated his family soon after his death in 1747, the damage done to Safavid loyalties rendered

[6]Malik, *Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp. 211–223.

[7]Bertold Spuler, "Central Asia: Sixteenth Century to Russian Conquests," in P. M. Holt, *et al.*, eds., *Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 468–494; Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974, repr. 1977), III, 155–156.

[8]Lawrence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958) gives a reliable political narrative, if his analysis of decline is read with caution.

a restoration impossible. Karim Khan Zand, while keeping a male Safavid in protective custody, accordingly abandoned his short-lived pretense to it in 1753.[9]

The question of Ottoman political authority is more complex than in other Islamic empires, due to its geographical setting, the continual reform at the center, and varied demographic and political configurations in Africa, Europe, and Asia. De facto regional autonomy was indeed maintained, but often under the cover of actual or putative sanction from Istanbul. No informed governor, magnate, or reformer went beyond noncooperation with the center to actual rebellion for long, but preferred to retain the sultan's patent in hand to fend off local competitors. The major alternative ideology to Ottoman rule, defined by the Wahhabis, was not challenged, even temporarily, by Ottoman lieutenants until 1812. After that, the rise of European and Egyptian nationalisms ushered in wholly new rules of political competition.[10]

FUNCTIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AT MID-CENTURY

The political and administrative identities of regional regimes in India, Mysore excepted, were fairly well defined by the 1750s, being expressed variously as each state's elite groups took advantage of new conditions. Considerable redistribution of power within each area took place because claims of distinct political sectors had to be met in order to secure the regimes in power. In Awadh, the first four decades of nawabi rule (1720–1764) involved the marked increase in revenues during both the recovery from previous disorders and the expansion of frontiers in all directions. Revenue rights in jagir form were curtailed, but revenue contracting placed large tracts in a few hands. Military units of demostrated prowess were hired as mercenaries, both from Nadir Shah's invading army and from unique itinerant groups like the Gosains. The social limits of a

[9]Hodgson, *Venture of Islam*, III, 153–154; John R. Perry, *Karim Khan Zand: A History of Iran, 1747–1779* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 214–217.

[10]P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent: 1516–1922* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 85–165, 179–180; Halil Inalcik, "The Heyday and Decline of the Ottoman Empire," in *Cambridge History of Islam*, I, 324–353.

ruler from an ethnic and ideological minority were defined, establishing an unwritten yet binding code for his later conduct. The tolerance—or, more accurately, the indifference to religious allegiance—which characterized the middle nawabi, whose highest generals were Gosain monks, was a function of Shuja's need for maximum legitimacy, necessarily reflecting perhaps an exaggerated version of similar policies under Akbar, who faced the same problems. Indeed, one could question the applicability of the very notion of "Muslim dominance" anywhere in India after 1724. Thus did Awadh emerge as certainly the most prominent, if not the paramount power in North India, especially during the campaign against the Marathas in 1761 and against the British three years later.

A point could be made here concerning the eighteenth century's acknowledged trend toward cultural syncretism and great tradition eclecticism. Even with all its achievements in integrating different sections of society, Awadh certainly had no monopoly on the process of enlisting Hindus into positions of administrative or military eminence, or patronizing non-Shiah or non-Muslim sectarian activities. Hyderabad under the nizams distributed as much status and power to non-Muslims as did Awadh, following regional patterns set under the Qutb Shahs of Golconda and the Adil Shahs of Bijapur.[11] The same syndrome is notable in other parts of India as well, including what remained of the Mughal court at Delhi.[12] It is anything but a new feature on the political landscape; but if, as most current scholars insist, it is more visible and intense during this period, it can be explained at least partly as a function of decentralization itself. Regional regimes were seeking their own politically effective and economical mixture of transcendent Mughal and immanent local-regional traditions, abandoning the solely transcendent method of legitimation—that is, a putative Shar^{c}i

[11]Haroon K. Sherwani's writings articulate this theme and are neatly summarized in his "Deccan: The Region of Coexistence and Integration," in Irfan Habib, ed., *Medieval India: A Miscellany*, vol. IV (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1977), pp. 139–150.

[12]Hermann Goetz, "The Crisis of Indian Civilization in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," Calcutta University Lecture Series, Chowkhamba Sanskrit ser. repr., 1938; Zahir Uddin Malik, "Some Aspects of Mughal Culture during the First Half of the Eighteenth Century," *Studies in Islam* 2, no. 1 (January 1965): 17–44.

Islamic one—for more relevant and therefore unique regional modes.

In addition to the rise of regional and local elites and the related trend toward cultural fusion, political systems between empires in India—as in most imperial systems throughout the history of Islam—seem virtually unanimous in their preference for revenue contracting to extract any agrarian surplus. Quantifying historians may be able to gauge this as a basic process of economic and administrative decentralization, it seems so universal. But as part of the pretense of continued imperial practice, officials under ijarahdari settlements tended to retain Mughal designations. As mentioned in Chapter 6, for example, Awadh's manuals confused many historians by using the title of amil. The nawabs of Bengal, to be sure, continued not only regular mansabdari methods, but regular payments to the center (for yet inexplicable reasons) until the 1730s;[13] but this Mughal survival had been largely replaced by revenue farming according to eyewitnesses in the 1760s.[14] Although Nizam ulmulk maintained Mughal forms down to the pargana level in the Deccan,[15] his efforts were nullified soon after he died in 1748; and by the third quarter of the century a system of revenue contracting had arisen under speculators who called themselves *taluqdars*.[16]

The most interesting example of the same phenomenon occurred in Malwa, where the new Maratha revenue system sanctioned rights over relatively small areas—200 to 300 villages, distributing them to a new foreign elite of about five dozen Chitpavan Brahmans, who were then termed *kamavisdars*. The description of their functions clearly reveals that they

[13]Philip B. Calkins, "Mughal Decline in the East: The Mansabdari System Rebuilt," paper presented to the Conference on Social and Political Change in Eighteenth Century South Asia, University of Pennsylvania, May 1974.

[14]Zahir Uddin Malik, "Agrarian Structure of Bengal at the Beginning of British Conquest: A Contemporary Persian Account," in Habib, ed., *Medieval India*, IV, 177–202.

[15]Zahir Uddin Malik, "Documents Relating to Pargana Administration in the Deccan Under Asaf Jah I," in K. A. Nizami, ed., *Medieval India: A Miscellany*, vol. III (London: Asia Publishing House, 1975), pp. 152–183.

[16]Karen I. Leonard, *The Social History of an Indian Caste: The Kayasths of Hyderabad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), chap. 3; also, her "The Hyderabad Political System and Its Participants," *JAS* 30, no. 2 (May 1971): 576–577.

were simply mustajirs on a smaller scale than in Awadh. Such Maratha reliance on this caste-specific administrative elite—they were kept apart from the warrior aristocracy, which remained Maratha—might be one reason why they failed to integrate indigenous elements at hinge levels and give local magnates a stake in Maratha dominance.[17]

Such administrative decentralization within post-Mughal regimes, which tended to delegate authority and devolve power to territorial units of vested interests within segments of locally dominant social structures, was basically a form of disengagement by regional rulers. By mid-century, courtly administrators were forced to recognize the political decentralization which had taken place, having found it impossible to revitalize the machinery of direct administration at the pargana level. The dynamics of redistribution by heirs-apparent coming to power led to even more rapid fragmentation and adjustment of power relations, quite apart from their individual preferences or character traits. Cornwallis' "permanent" settlement of 1793 in Bengal, which ended a long and damaging series of experiments with just such structures, was accordingly extended to the Ceded and Conquered Territories after annexation in 1801. Even the efficient British preferred this disengagement, and had yet to amass the political resources of information, legal jurisdiction, administrative skill, and local status required to set up the later detailed settlement under Holt Mackenzie based on village surveys.[18]

ADAPTATION TO MILITARY DEFEAT AND DEPENDENCE

Just when its regional integration and stability had been attained, the nawabi faced a challenge from the British in the East, and met it as best it could. But Shuja lost the battle of Baksar because his army, like his realm, was a segmentary concatenation of units rather than a stratified organization under a unified command. Although it was a costly victory for the Company's forces, the clash typified the unequal match between indigenous warfare and foreign military techniques,

[17]Gordon, "The Slow Conquest," p. 31.

[18]Asiya Siddiqi, *Agrarian Change in a Northern Indian State: Uttar Pradesh, 1819–1833* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973), pp. 66–113.

which at this time stood as the most modern achievement of the Europeans in Asia. Even after subduing Bengal, the Carnatic, Awadh, and Hyderabad, however, the British remained a regional power for almost a generation, learning from other regimes especially how to manipulate Mughal authority. Clive could never have ruled Awadh, so he reinstated the nawab as a once-beaten neighbor on the same symbolic level with the Company, hoping the arrangement would render Shuja amenable to British advice and willing to part with some of his revenues. While this was true during the early connection between them, this first alliance was less than satisfactory to the English because Shuja still had the means to repulse their commercial ambitions, greatly enlarge and modernize his army, and annex large areas such as Etawah with impunity.

Changes in military technology occurred fairly rapidly in regional states during the period of confrontation with European powers, and seemed to proceed through three stages. First, often in preparation for a violent clash, there was a burst of "perfective" reform, to ensure that military standards were equal to those known to have made the imperial army invincible in its heyday. This is often called traditionalist reform; but I prefer Hodgson's more active label. Then, attempting to equalize after an initial loss, defeated rulers quickly borrowed European equipment and methods: new muskets, light artillery, mobility, and infantry trained to march and volley under fire. The final stage was the outright hiring of European officers, not merely as advisors or individual mercenaries, but as a self-aware class of senior commanders in the indigenous army with powers to recruit, train, provision, and command large numbers of regular Indian troops.

The timing and rate of such changes, which were of immense importance to the politics of each region, depended upon the degree of conflict with the European power and the geographical location of the state itself. Bengal, for example, never went beyond stage one, which ended at Plassey; Haidar Ali telescoped all three without being defeated in Mysore, and his successor Tipu Sultan reaped great benefits from such military preparedness until the end of the century. Awadh's phase one began in preparation for Baksar, and Shuja frightened the English in his phase-two zeal for imitative reform in the late 1760s.

But in 1773 the complexion of regional politics in India was transformed, when the English applied what they had learned from the French: that their major resource, superior military technique, could be bartered wholesale for a generous revenue allotment paid for by the ally who was to be protected. From this point on, regional sovereignty in hinterland India was increasingly threatened, since the Company used its control over the army to supervise both borders and foreign policy, and could claim to act in the regime's interest by intervening to crush actual or perceived rebellion. This subsidiary principle was a wedge which could be driven deep into any region's resource base and used to try to chip away segments of its system for exclusive Company control. Awadh was the first system in which this principle was carried to its logical conclusion. The Nizam-i Cedit or "new order" of Selim III in late eighteenth-century Turkey,[19] Muhammad Ali's reforms in Egypt,[20] and Nasir ud-din's extensive military reforms and technical innovations in nineteenth-century Iran replicate this basic sequence.[21]

RESILIENCY AND RESISTANCE UNDER PRESSURE FROM A NEW EMPIRE

The British had indeed altered Awadh's internal power structure by replacing its military aristocracy, guaranteeing the security of its borders, and trying to siphon off the 53 percent of its net assessed revenue stipulated by treaty. But they soon discovered that further attempts to seize greater amounts of regional resources had definite limits, which could not be exceeded without destroying the value of the alliance. The Banaras outbreak of 1781 and the expulsion of the Resident, John Bristow, in 1783 were but two of the more visible proofs that continued pressure on the state's internal structure would nullify the benefits of the existing connection.

[19]Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, I, 262–263.

[20]Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, pp. 176–210.

[21]Hafez Farman Farmayan, "The Forces of Modernization in Nineteenth Century Iran," in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 119–151; Hasan-e Fasā'i, *Fārsnāma-ye Nāseri*, translated by Heribert Busse, *History of Persia Under Qājār Rule* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 374–385.

For in addition to the violence and attendant disruptions from within the segments of its political system, the Awadh regime reacted in its own unique way to the new situation, and to the Company's continually increasing demands for cash and administrative intrusions. Realizing that greater efficiency in revenue collection would simply provide more visible resources for the British to appropriate, the nawabi relaxed its hold on the entire process, diverting resources away from its own control—and hence Company access—and into the hands of two major sectors: the revenue contractors in charge of sizable administrative networks and the noble dowagers who held Shuja's treasure in Faizabad. This process of dispersal and alienation of power was a disintegrative one that loosened linkages downward from the regional capital to the ijarahs and remaining jagirs. It was these segments of the regional system that the English subsequently thought they could focus on and isolate for their own immediate benefit, but they found them very resilient indeed. Coercion alone was insufficient to gain control of local systems; information, status, legitimacy, and administrative skills had also to be developed in order either to take over these segments in isolation, or altogether to replace the regime under which they enjoyed such relative autonomy.

As part of any decentralization process, in other words, other sectors within regional systems emerged, if not on a par with the regimes themselves, at least as prominent co-sharers of power and authority within the areas they represented. Moreover, not only is this dispersal a function of immanent networks being more suitable to regional rule, but it is a kind of protective syndrome. It acts to shelter those resources redistributed during the initial stages of decentralization, so that they remain inaccessible to any proto-imperial power lacking massive amounts of transcendent-network resources. New empires seem generally to be satisfied in the early stages with tribute, symbolic deference, and negotiation with regional elite representatives during a period of testing and discovery before they integrate newly conquered areas. Ijarahdari, indebtedness to the Company, and the spread of the 1793 zamindari settlement from Bengal to Upper India after 1801 are all partial products of this dispersal, which went on in spite of imperial attempts to stop it. The fact that empire has been, on balance,

rather rare in South Asia is due to the inability of empire-builders to overcome the pulls, pressures, and deceptions of linguistic, caste, kinship, and local dominance networks that, even today, control political resources in distinctive ways throughout the historical regions of the subcontinent.

By 1785 Awadh was still a valuable ally, from the Company's point of view, but it was saved from further inroads on its wealth and income by the innate impenetrability of its segmentary political structure. The British thus withdrew to assume a stance of noninterference for the last fifteen years of the century, inasmuch as their regional rule in Bengal was being consolidated, and demanded relatively more attention. Only after the instruments of empire had been tuned, and a Governor-General with expansionist views had taken command, was there sufficient justification for annexing half of Awadh outright. Looked at from every side, English dominance to this point had been one of mere revenue skimming, severely limited in its ability to alter the regional and local structures of social and political ties that made up Indo-Muslim civilization. As one of the largest, richest, and strategically most important of these political systems, Awadh had by the turn of the century nurtured its resources tenaciously, enjoying three generations of relative autonomy and security. But by 1801, another dynamic imperial polity had emerged to replace that of the Mughals and was drawing the regions of South Asia into its transcendent, centralized orbit.

Glossary

amānī	revenue collection by salaried government officials
ʿāmil	government-appointed revenue official
croṛ	one hundred lākhs, or ten million
darbār	public court assembly, of a prince or ruler
dāroghā	superintendent of a department
dīwān	revenue office, or official in charge of revenue
farmān	royal decree
Faṣlī	the harvest calendar, reckoned in solar years from 10 September 1555, which Akbar decreed to be the beginning of 963 Faṣlī; it is more convenient than the Muslim lunar Ḥijrī calendar for tax collection purposes
faujdār	Mughal commander of peace-keeping troops within a region or district of empire
ijārah	lease binding its holder to pay a fixed amount to the regime, allowing him to keep what he could from the named territory's land revenues
jāgīr	land revenue assignment, made for government service, which was usually military during Mughal times
jāgīrdār	person holding a jāgīr
jamaʿ	assessed land revenue
Kāyastha	scribal Hindu caste category in North India and Bengal
Khatrī	scribal Hindu caste category in North India and the Panjab
khuṭbah	sermon delivered before the Friday noon congregational prayer in mosques throughout the Islamic world
lākh	one hundred thousand
manṣab	Mughal official rank, expressing personal status and military responsibility in a public and numerical fashion
manṣabdār	person with an official Mughal rank

mustājir revenue contractor, leaseholder, revenue farmer
mutaᶜyinah irregular troops, posted to enforce revenue collection
nā'ib deputy or first assistant to a superior official
nawāb title given to dignitaries, especially regional rulers; also, the honorific plural of nā'ib
pargana smallest Mughal administrative unit; a sarkār could contain twenty to sixty parganas
peshkash gift from a subordinate to one from whom an appointment is expected or received
qāẓī judge
saiyid descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad
sanyāsī Hindu monk who has renounced all ordinary social, physical and ritual attachments
sarkār administrative district
sazāwal revenue collections enforcement officer
shaikhzāda descendant of Muslims who colonized India from the twelfth to sixteenth centuries
sharīᶜah the law of Islam, governing appropriate actions in mosque and marketplace, public behavior, and criminal punishments
ṣūbah province
suwār Mughal command rank, designating the size of a manṣabdār's cavalry contingent
tankhwāh revenue assignment reserved for a specific purpose
vakīl agent, ambassador
wazīr first minister to the Mughal Empire, theoretically second in command to the emperor
wizārat office of wazir
zamīndār local-level revenue collector, recognized but not appointed by the regime; usually head of the locally dominant lineage
zanāna Women's quarters within larger houses.
ẓāt Mughal personal rank, designating private salary and a manṣabdār's place in the status hierarchy at court

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of Calcutta. This battle showed that the English and their drilled Sepoys were more than a match for the huge, but undisciplined, armies of the Indian princes.

The second is the battle of Wandewash, fought in 1760. This battle was fought near Madras between an army of Englishmen and an army of Frenchmen. Clive was not there himself, but his troops were led by another great officer, Sir Eyre Coote, who stands only second to Clive in the annals of early Indian warfare. In that battle the English won, and some of their Sepoys who saw the action, thanked Coote afterwards for showing them what a battle between Europeans was like. This victory was of immense importance. Hitherto the natives had been accustomed to think the French better soldiers than the English, but the battle of Wandewash changed their minds. The victory of Plassey over the Nabob of Bengal, and that of Wandewash over the French, are well worth remembering as turning points in the history of India.

To beat the Nabob of Bengal and the French was not the only thing that Clive did; he first made the Company the rulers of a part of the territory of India. This he did by undertaking the government of the lands belonging to the Nabob. He did not depose him. The Nabob still enjoyed his title, his splendid palaces, his princely income; but he only reigned, he ceased to govern; and the English Company became the virtual rulers of a territory, of which Great Britain and Ireland only make up an area

equal to four-fifths of its extent. To make his title thoroughly good, Clive for a sum of money obtained from the Mogul of Delhi a legal document sanctioning this arrangement.

Now, this arrangement of Clive's deserves well to be remembered, for it was the model on which all the additions to their territory which the Company made were based. The Company never destroyed a native government altogether; sometimes they set up a new ruler, sometimes they restored a family who had been expelled, but they never took territory from the natives and ruled it in their own name. They played a more modest part. They always acted as the agents of a native prince. That prince might not have a vestige of power, but he was always there to be looked at. Orders ran in his name, taxes were collected by his authority, but the orders really came from the Company, and the taxes, excepting the prince's revenue, were paid into the Company's exchequer. Of course the first interest of the traders was peace and order; and they soon began to take into their hands the native courts of justice, and to appoint magistrates who looked after the police and enforced the orders of the Company.

This change was at first by no means a good thing for the natives of Bengal. It was not likely that it should be. Their new rulers were simply a company of English business men, whose main object was to make money. The first thing they thought of was, of course, their *dividend*, and they

We may also be quite sure that India will do its business with us and with our Colonies. At the present moment India is just as free to trade with one country as another, but the value of its imports from the United Kingdom and the Colonies is twelve times as great as those from all the rest of the world put together. Of the whole trade of India, the United Kingdom has 56 per cent., France only has 6 per cent., and Germany still less. Of the vessels that passed through the Suez Canal in 1882, 2,565 flew the English flag, and the rest of the world only supplied 635. This shows us who has most interest in the Suez Canal, and when we add that last year 87¾ per cent. of our traffic with India passed through the canal, and only 12¼ went by the Cape of Good Hope, it is clear, whoever else can look with indifference on the politics of Egypt, we, at any rate, cannot stand aside.

Now suppose for a moment that we were expelled from India or abandoned it. What would happen? Would things go on as they are? Certainly not. In the first case, a terrible blow to the purchasing power of India would be struck in the desperate struggle that would certainly ensue before we were defeated; and after we were gone, Russia would certainly endeavour, by hostile tariffs, to cut us and our Colonies out of all share in what trade might be left. In the second case, our abandonment of India would certainly be followed by an anarchy such as on a small scale followed the withdrawal of the Romans from Britain 1,400 years ago. In it all the work we have done

for the material prosperity of the country would disappear; capital would fly before its attacks; and the commercial prosperity of India, built up with so much toil, would perish like a dream.

I need not picture to you the terrible results to England of such a catastrophe. We know something of bad times. No *bad times* that we have ever known would be even a shadow of what would ensue. Lancashire would be utterly ruined; Yorkshire would feel a terrible blow, and I hope you will agree with me that when we think of what value India is to us in the present, and what a mine of wealth it will be to our children and grandchildren, that any one who even for a moment suggests indifference to its fate, or stints his hand in doing what is needful for its maintenance, is trifling with the well-being, not only of his fellow-citizens, but of millions yet unborn.

But there is another side to the picture. Hitherto I have looked only upon the material importance of our connection with India; I must now ask you to look upon its moral side. To abandon or to lose India would not only be a blunder of the greatest magnitude, it would also be a stupendous crime.

It has been the pride of Englishmen that they have always regarded themselves as endowed with great responsibility in having alien races entrusted to their care. The deep sense of duty, which we believe to be a special heritage of the English nation, handed down to us from the days of our Puritan ancestors, has made us scorn the idea of holding rule over others solely for our own benefit. This feeling, I believe, has

202 to 39;[d] but, by this struggle, the right of publishing parliamentary debates was substantially established, and it is therefore to be reckoned a remarkable æra in our constitutional history.[e]

In the following session the Minister was much puzzled in meeting General Burgoyne's motion to censure the proceedings of Lord Clive in the East Indies, by which a new empire was added to the Crown of England. The considerate were aware that this extraordinary man deserved to have statues erected to him, but there was a public clamour against him which the Government was afraid to face. It was, therefore, left an open question. "Lord North himself spoke for the inquiry, but faintly and reluctantly,"[f] while the Solicitor-General was required to oppose it, and the Attorney-General to support it. The latter, who had no notion of ever fighting with muffled gloves, fell foul of his colleague, and of Indian conquest and Indian peculation:— May, 1773.

"The evils complained of," said he, "have been slurred over, or ingeniously palliated, by my honourable and learned friend. How can we better begin the work of Indian reform, which all admit to be necessary, than by resolving that the acquisitions here described are illegal? and how unjust, nugatory, and ridiculous would it be to come to such a determination without taking a retrospective view, and enforcing future regulations by present vigour! I admit that what is done in the heat and hurry of conquest, in the moment of revolution, is not to be examined too critically by the rules of school philosophy and the morality of the closet. But, Sir, these misdeeds are of a very different complexion —cool, deliberate transactions—treaties—negotiations—wars or no wars —the event the same in all—one general scene of rapine and plunder—nabobs dethroned—nabobs elected—pretended conventions with these children of power—these ephemeral sovereigns not for the advantage of the Company, but for the profit of individuals. Did John Duke of Marlborough make treaties with foreign powers, stipulating that himself, Prince Eugene, and the Grand Pensionary should be paid so and so?

[d] 17 Parl. Hist. 58—163.

[e] The right never has been questioned since. There is still a foolish standing order of both Houses against publishing debates; but this is a mere dead letter, and the minister who would try to enforce it would be like Canute on his throne forbidding the flowing of the tide. Indeed, there are very few members who would now speak, if their speeches were not to be reported; and, after a division, proceedings are suspended till the reporters' gallery is re-opened.—The effectual protection of the press and of the public would require an enactment that no one should be liable to an action or indictment for publishing a fair and *bonâ fide* report of the proceedings of either House. I introduced a clause to this effect into my Libel Bill; but though it was warmly supported by Lord Denman, it was opposed by Lord Brougham, and I could not carry it.

[f] Gibbon to Mr. Holroyd, 11th May, 1773. Miscell. Works, i. 469.

To what purpose produce cases, if they are not cases in point? The oppressions of Bengal have been as severe in time of peace as in time of war. Can this be right? And if wrong, why not inquire into it? And why inquire into it, if, when your inquiry is finished, it is to produce nothing? No mode of conduct can be so weak as that which only points out crimes, but takes no measure to punish them."

Thus ran on for a long time the powerful but turbid stream of his eloquence, and, notwithstanding a touching address from Lord Clive himself,—to the great embarrassment of the Government, the resolutions were all carried by a large majority.[g]

In the beginning of 1774, Thurlow had his first encounter with Horne Tooke—in which he was foiled. The parson was brought to the bar of the House on a charge of being the author of a libellous letter in the "Morning Advertiser," addressed to Sir Fletcher Norton, the Speaker; but he did not choose to plead guilty, and, there being no evidence to prove the authorship, Mr. Attorney boisterously supported an inquisitorial motion, that certain journeymen printers from the Morning Advertiser office should be examined to know from whom they received the manuscript. He thus concluded:— Feb. 17, 1774.

"With respect to any cruel intention against Mr. Horne, I disclaim, for one, so foul an idea. It is well known that in my official character I want no author. The printer of a libel is enough for me, and I ever think it injudicious to look beyond the printer. I am not Mr. Horne's prosecutor, and, personally, I am not his enemy. Further than the cause of justice is concerned, his acquittal or conviction is to me a matter of utter indifference. If he be innocent, I shall be glad to see him discharged; but if he be guilty, I should be sorry to see a man escape with impunity who has daringly libelled the British Commons legally assembled in parliament."

Although Mr. Burke declared that "the motion—begot by folly, and nursed by despotism—was without a precedent in the annals of infamy," it was carried by a large majority;[h] but the printers, being called in, professed the most profound ignorance on the subject, and this time the parson walked off triumphantly.[i]

As the Grenville Act was passing, Thurlow opposed it, and truly foretold that the time would come when the decisions of the committees under it would be deemed as corrupt as those of the House in a body—the distinction in practice being only that the ballot gave a petitioner or sitting member belonging

[g] 17 Parl. Hist. 850—882. [h] 132 to 44. [i] 17 Parl. Hist. 1003—1050.

Account of Presents received by the Army & Navy in General, and by Individuals in the Company's Service extracted from the Report of the Select Committee

In 1756.

Governor Drake	31,500
Colonel Clive	211,500
Mr. Watts	117,000
Major Kilpatrick	60,750
Mr. Manningham	27,000
Mr. Becher	27,000
Mr. Frankland	11,367
Mr. Mackett	11,367
Mr. Pearkes	11,367
Mr. Collett	11,367
Mr. Boddam	11,366
Mr. Amyatt	11,366
Mr. Walsh	56,250
Mr. Scrafton	22,500
Mr. Lushington	5,625
Capt. Grant	11,250
Army and Navy	600,000
	1238,375

In 1760

Governor Vansittart	58,333
Mr. Sumner	28,000
Mr. Holwell	30,937
Genl. Caillaud	22,916
Mr. McGuire	29,375
Mr. Smith	15,354
Major Yorke	15,354

In 1763.

Major Munro	13,000
Officers of Do. Family	3,000
Army at Benaras	46,666
Army and Navy	437,499

In 1765

Governor Spencer	23,333
Mr. Johnstone	27,650
Mr. Leycester	13,125
Mr. Senior	20,125
Mr. Middleton	14,291
Mr. Gideon Johnstone	5,833
Mr. Playdell	11,667
Mr. Burdett	11,667
Mr. Gray	11,666
Genl. Carnac	32,666

In 1766

Lord Clive Legacy	58,333
£	2,169,365

Account of Restitution for Losses sustained by British Subjects, Armenians & Natives, in the Course of the War — stipulated by Treaty.

In 1756	950,000
In 1763	600,000
£	1,550,000

Amount of what received by the Company in Presents, and the Revenues of Lands obtained for them.

In 1756.

The Rents of the 24 Purgunnahs from 1756 to 1773 is 17 Years at £100000 pr Ann is	1,700,000

In 1760

Present made by the Nabob to carry on the Siege of Pondicherry	62,500
The Rents of Burdwan, Midnapore and Chittaghong from 1760 to 1773 is 13 Years at £600,000	7,800,000

In 1764

The Grant of 5 Lacks of Rupees for 1 Year	720,000

In 1765

The Receipts from Sujah ul Dowlah on the Peace	583,333
The Receipts of the Duanny from 1765 to 1773 is 8 Years at £1,500,000 pr Ann is	12,000,000
£	22,865,833

Account of Restitution received by the Company for Losses sustained by them in the Course of the War — stipulated by Treaty.

In 1756	1200000
In 1763	375 000
£	1,575,000

Money received in India

552/7/37

Advantages accruing to Government for 5 Years before and 5 Years after the Agreement with the East India Company for the Payment of £400,000 pr Annum.

The five preceding Years from 1762 to 1767.		The five subsequent Years from 1767 to 1772.	
Customs	£ 3,306,568	Customs	£ 5,136,184
Excise	2,550,560	Excise	1,674,775
		Indemnity on Sea	398,205
		Annual Payments as pr Agreement	2,000,000
	£ 5,857,128		£ 9,209,164
Average of 5 Years	£ 1,171,425	Average of 5 Years	£ 1,841,832
		Amount of the 5 preceding Years	5,857,128
		Do for the 5 subsequent Years	5,857,128
		Increase for Do	3,352,036
			9,209,164
			£ 15,066,292

Advantages accruing to the Proprietors for 5 Years before and 5 Years after the Agreement with Government for the Payment of £400,000 pr Annum.

The five preceding Years from 1762 to 1767.		The five subsequent Years from 1767 to 1772.	
Dividend on their Capital of £3,194,080 at 6 pr Ct	£ 958,220	Dividend on their Capital of £3,194,080 at 10, 11, 12, & 12½ pr Cent	£ 1,772,713
Average of 5 Years	£ 191,644	Average of 5 Years	£ 354,542
		Amount of the 5 preceding Years	958,220
		Do for the 5 subsequent Years	£ 958,220
		Increase for Do	814,493
			1,772,713
			£ 2,730,933
Amount of Debts exclusive of Goods in the Warehouses & Balance of Cash 1st March 1772	£ 1,335,576		

Amount of Expences in Bengal from May 1765 to April 1772 with the Increase during the last 5 Years

	Civil Charges	Military Charges	Buildings & Fortifications	Total Expences	Increase in 5 Years
From May 1765 to April 1766	214,353	886,909	109,098	1,210,360	
1766 1767	269,855	903,831	100,407	1,274,093	
1767 1768	273,308	991,966	222,109	1,487,383	213,290
1768 1769	296,373	1,018,577	258,179	1,573,129	299,036
1769 1770	300,598	1,102,132	349,826	1,752,556	478,463
1770 1771	254,908	1,093,006	384,174	1,732,088	457,995
1771 1772 estimated the same as the foregoing	254,908	1,093,006	384,174	1,732,088	457,995
Average of the 5 last Years total Expences	£ 1,655,448				
Do Increase	381,356				
	£ 1,864,303	7,059,427	1,807,967	10,761,697	1,906,779

552/7/26

Amount of Duties upon Salt and Betlenut for 6 Years from September 1767 to September 1773 upon the Scale of the Establishment for the Year commencing September 1766.

The Duties upon Salt and Betlenut for one Year from September 1766 to September 1767 amounted to £144,218

The Amount in 6 Years £865,308

Amount of Commission upon the Revenues for 6 Years from September 1767 to September 1773.

The Commission drawn upon the Revenues at 2½ p.Cent was as follows.

1 Year from September	1767	to September	1768	£63,244
"	1768		1769	66,820
"	1769		1770	56,335
"	1770		1771	56,494
½ Year from September	1771	to March	1772 ..... £28,237	
" March	1772	to September	1772 by estima. 28,237	56,474
1 Year from September	1772	to September	1773 by estimation	56,474
				353,841

Comparison of the Advantages received by Government with those received by the Proprietors during 5 Years from March 1767 to March 1772.

Government received £9,209,164

The Average is £1,841,832

The Proprietors received £1,772,713

From which deduct the Debt incurred by the Company in the period of 5 Years 1,113,501

659,212

The Average is .. £131,842

which is about 1/14th part

552/7/26

New Charter

Direction for a Number of Years

No Director concerned in the Funds or Company's Trade

The Qualification of Directors increased

The Salaries of Directors increased

No Cash nor Diamonds remitted but by the Company

No Cargoes furnished forreign Companies

The Company Liberty to send home refractory Persons.

The Directors by whom nominated

Advantages accruing to the Government & to the Proprietors for 5 Years before & 5 Years after the Agreement for paying £400,000 p Annum

Amount of Expences in Bengal for 7 Years from May 1765, with the Increase for the last 5 Years.

Amount of Duties upon Salt & Bettlenut & of Commission upon the Revenues for 6 Years from September 1767.

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ART. IV. 1. *A Review of the Financial Situation of the East India Company in* 1824. By HENRY ST GEORGE TUCKER, Esq. pp. 244. Lond. 1825.

2. *Tables with respect to the Revenue, Expenditure, Debts, Assets, Trade, &c. of the East India Company.* By CÆSAR MOREAU. 4to. Lond. 1825.

3. *East India Annual Revenue Accounts. Printed by order of the House of Commons, 9th May* 1826.

OUR purpose is to be very practical in this article. We shall leave it to others to cast the horoscope of Hindostan, to speculate on the future fate of that vast region, and to decide the *vexata quæstio*, whether Mr Buckingham was legally or illegally sent to England. The object we have in view is of a different, though not, as we apprehend, of a less profitable description. We shall be satisfied if we succeed in making our readers tolerably well acquainted with the actual results and practical operation of the systems under which the Financial and Commercial affairs of our Eastern empire have been and are conducted. And though the difficulty and extent of the subjects of which we shall have to treat, and the limits within which we must compress our remarks, require that we should be very brief, we are not without hopes that the facts and statements we are about to lay before our readers may excite their attention; and that they may assist them in coming to a correct conclusion with respect to some of those vitally important questions that must speedily be agitated, in reference to the renewal of the Company's charter, and the future government of India.

Our colonies in the West Indies and in America have never been regarded as valuable on the ground of their being able to remit any surplus revenue to the mother country; but solely on account of the supposed advantages resulting from the monopoly of their trade. But the case is supposed to be different as to our dominions in the East Indies. Here too commercial motives undoubtedly led to the formation of our first establishments. We appeared originally in Hindostan in the character of merchants; and a considerable number of years elapsed before we assumed another. But from the age of Alexander the Great down to that of Lord Hastings, the visible wealth of the country has never failed to excite the cupidity of foreigners, while the feebleness of the natives has been totally unable to resist their attacks. 'From factories to fortifications, from fortifications 'to garrisons, from garrisons to armies, and from armies to

'conquest, has been the invariable progress of the European 'settlers in the East.'—The progress has been in some instances slower than in others; but the gradations, and, if foreign force be not interposed, the result seems certain and unavoidable. The conquest of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa by Lord Clive, raised us to a high rank among the territorial powers of India; And, notwithstanding the solemn declaration made by the Legislature in 1782, 'that to pursue schemes of 'conquest, and of extent of dominion in India, are measures 'repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of the Bri-'tish nation,' they have ever since been zealously and successfully pursued; and at this moment our dominions embrace the whole of the Mogul empire, and comprise a population of 80 or 90 millions.

The most exaggerated statements have been current in Europe from the remotest ages respecting the riches of India. The people of England were long of opinion that their Eastern Empire would form an inexhaustible source of wealth, and that so large a surplus revenue would be remitted home as would materially lessen their burdens. It would not perhaps be going too far to say, that these expectations have proved *entirely fallacious;* but at all events, the following statements will serve to satisfy our readers that they have been realized only to a very small extent.

After the great acquisitions of territory made by Lord Clive, a Parliamentary investigation into the state of our Indian affairs took place in 1767, when the Company agreed to pay the sum of 400,000*l.* to Government for three years, on condition that they should be allowed to retain possession of the conquered provinces and their entire revenues; and in 1769, this agreement was extended for four years more. But instead of fulfilling the terms of this contract, the Company's affairs fell into such disorder, as to render them totally unable to pay the stipulated sum to the public, and even obliged them to apply to ministers, in 1773, for a loan of 1,400,000*l.*; which was granted on condition that they reduced their dividend from 10 to 6 per cent.

No improvement seems to have taken place in the Company's financial situation from 1773 to 1782, when they were authorized to negociate a loan for 800,000*l.* In 1783, when Mr Fox brought forward his famous India Bill, he stated, in his place in the House of Commons, that the Company was completely insolvent; that their debts amounted to 11,200,000*l.*, and that they had not more than 3,200,000*l.* to meet them. The fate of the bill introduced by Mr Fox, for remodelling the government of India, is well known. After a violent Parlia-

mentary struggle it was rejected; and the plan proposed by Mr Pitt, according to which the government of India has ever since been conducted, was adopted in its stead. But notwithstanding the superintendence of the Board of Controul, the financial affairs of the East India Company have continued nearly in the same unprosperous state as before. We have been favoured, from time to time, with the most dazzling accounts of revenue that *was to be* immediately derived from India; and numberless acts of Parliament have been passed for the appropriation of surplusses that never had any existence except in the imagination of their framers. The proceedings that took place at the renewal of the charter in 1793, afford a striking example of this. Lord Cornwallis had then concluded the war with Tippoo Saib, which had stripped him of half his dominions; the perpetual settlement, from which so many benefits were expected to arise, had been adopted in Bengal; and the Company's receipts had been increased, in consequence of accessions to their territory, and subsidies from native princes, &c. to upwards of *eight millions* a year, which it was calculated would afford a future annual surplus, after every description of charges had been deducted, of 1,240,000*l.* Mr Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville, availed himself of these favourable appearances, to give the most flattering representation of the Company's affairs. There could be no question, he affirmed, of the permanence and regular increase of the surplus revenue; and he entered into a minute specification of the mode in which it was to be appropriated.* He asssured the House and the country that the estimates had all been framed with the greatest care; that the Company's possessions were in a state of prosperity till then unknown in India; that the abuses that had formerly insinuated themselves into some departments of the government were

* It is worth while to specify one or two of the most prominent points in this choice specimen of castle-building. 1*st*, 500,000*l.* a year were set aside for reducing the debt in India to 2,000,000*l.* 2*d*, 500,000*l.* a year were to be paid into the Exchequer, to be appropriated for the benefit of the public, as Parliament should think fit to order: 3*d*, When the India debt was reduced to 2,000,000*l.*, and the bonded debt to 1,500,000*l.*, *one sixth* part of the surplus was to be applied to augment the dividends; and the other *five sixths* were to be paid into the Bank, in the name of the Commissioners of the National Debt, to be accumulated as a *guarantee fund* until it amounted to *twelve millions*; and when it reached that sum, the dividends upon it were to be applied to make up the dividends on the capital stock of the Company to 10 per cent.! &c. &c.

now effectually repressed; and that the period was at length arrived when India was to pour her golden treasures into the lap of England!

We do not concur with those who think that Mr Dundas was himself satisfied of the hollowness of his statements. We believe they were made in good faith; and that Mr Dundas really thought that the golden visions, with the exhibition of which he had been gratifying the House and the country, would be realized. Unluckily, however, Mr Dundas proved but an indifferent soothsayer. His magnificent promises had the same fate as those of his predecessors. No trace whatever of his surplusses, guarantee funds, &c., is to be found except in his speeches. Instead of being diminished, the Company's debts began immediately to increase. In 1795 they were authorized to add to the amount of their floating debt. In 1796 a new device to obtain money was fallen upon. Mr Dundas represented, that as all competition was destroyed in consequence of the war, the Company's commerce had been greatly increased, and that her capital had become insufficient for the extent of her transactions. In consequence of this representation, leave was given to the Company to add *two millions* to their capital stock by creating 20,000 new shares; but as these shares sold at the rate of 173*l.* each, they produced a sum of 3,460,000*l.* In 1797 the Company issued additional bonds to the extent of 1,417,000*l.*; and, as the result of all this, on the 12th March 1799, Mr Dundas stated in the House of Commons, that there had been a deficit in the previous year of 1,319,000*l.*!

During the belligerent administration of the Marquis Wellesley, which began in 1797-8, and terminated in 1805-6, the British empire in India was vastly augmented; and the revenue which had amounted to 8,059,000*l.* in 1797, was increased to 15,403,000*l.* in 1805. But the expenses of government and the interest of the debt increased in a still greater proportion than the revenue; having amounted in 1805 to 17,672,000*l.*, leaving a deficit of 2,269,000*l.*! In the following year the revenue fell off nearly a million, but the expenses continued nearly the same. And there was, upon an average, a continued excess of expenditure, including commercial charges, and a contraction of fresh debt up to 1811-12.

The Company having obtained a renewal of their charter in 1813, under the modifications with respect to commerce, to which we shall afterwards allude, the subjoined abstract is drawn up from an account, intended to exhibit a statement of their affairs on the 1st of January 1813.

Stock of the East India Company, 1st January 1813.

Merchandise, stores, &c. and debts due to the Company in India . .	L.25,821,587	L.36,691,719
Immoveable stock, consisting of buildings, fortifications, &c. in India . .	10,870,132	
Merchandise, debts, and other moveable stock in England . . .	11,164,955	12,372,975
Buildings, ships, &c. . . .	1,208,020	
Total stock		L.49,064,694

Debts owing by the East India Company, 1st January 1813.

Debt in India . . .		L.32,213,759
Debt in England bearing interest	L.6,595,900	13,916,431
Bonds at the Bank . .	800,000	
Bills not due, arrears of duties, &c. &c.	6,520,531	
Total debts due by the Company		L.46,130,190

From this account it would appear, that the assets then in possession of the Company exceeded the claims upon it by nearly *three* millions. It is clear, however, that no reliance can be placed on this or any similar statement. In the *first* place, debts due to the Company, and arrears of tribute, a large proportion of which can never be realized, form a very important item in the credit side of this account: And, *secondly*, the forts, houses, warehouses, &c. belonging to the Company in India and England, may be estimated at any sum; but if an attempt were made to sell them, where could a purchaser be found to buy them, even at a third part of the price at which they are here set down? All, therefore, that this account proves is, that the claims upon the Company in 1813, amounted to 46 millions; but it leaves it exceedingly doubtful whether they had really 25 millions worth of available property to set against them. *

Mr Moreau, whose tables are the fruit of great labour and research, gives the following statement of the total revenue of the East India Company's possessions in India, and of the total charges to be deducted from it, in the ten years ending with 1821.

* The Committee of the House of Commons, appointed in 1810, deducted about *a half* from the account which the Company exhibited of its assets in 1810.

	Total Rev.	Total Charges.	Excess of Rev. over Charges.	Excess of Charges over Rev.
1812.	L.16,488,984	16,935,470		L.440,486
1813.	17,267,901	16,801,016	L.466,885	
1814.	17,297,279	17,393,324		96,045
1815.	17,232,818	18,433,950		1,201,132
1816.	18,077,577	18,605,513		527,936
1817.	18,375,826	19,213,360		837,540
1818.	19,459,017	20,914,556		1,455,539
1819.	19,237,090	20,762,593		1,525,503
1820.	21,352,242	21,036,256	315,986	
1821.	21,803,207	21,060,811 *	742,396	

According to the official accounts rendered by the East India Company to Parliament on the 6th of May last, it is stated, that there was a surplus revenue of 2,294,600*l.* realized in India in 1822; that the surplus realized in 1823 was only 86,974*l.*; and it is *estimated*, in the same official account, that in 1824 there would be an excess of expenditure over revenue of 749,891*l.*† But it must be observed, that Mr Moreau has very properly included in his statement the *political charges* incurred in England on account of India, consisting of military stores sent to India, of payments and allowances to officers on furlough, &c. and a variety of other items not included in the Parliamentary accounts; all of which amounting, in 1822, according to Mr Tucker, to 1,434,327*l.*, must obviously be set down against India. And when allowance has been made for them, it will be seen, that the nett surplus revenue of India in 1822 really amounted to 1,507,971*l.*; that in 1823 there was a *deficit* of 1,347,353*l.*; and that the Company's accountants estimate the *deficit* in 1824, the latest period to which the accounts extend, at 2,184,218*l.*

The Company's debts in India at the end of 1823, are estimated in the official accounts at 34,579,498*l.*, and their assets of all sorts in India are estimated at 22,440,319*l.*, leaving a balance of 12,139,179*l.* of debt, according to this statement, but which must, for the reasons previously stated, be in reality a great deal more. The Company's debt in India in 1813, amounted to 32,213,000*l.*

But, however much this account of the financial concerns of

* The commercial charges incurred by the Company are included in the expenditure. Had they been excluded, the deficit would have been less considerable.

† East India Rev. Accounts, p. 19.

our Eastern Empire may be at variance with the exaggerated ideas entertained respecting it, as well by a large proportion of the people of England as by foreigners, it will excite no surprise in the mind of any one who has ever reflected on the subject. It is due indeed to the East India Company to state, that though they have occasionally acted on erroneous principles, they have always exerted themselves to enforce economy in every branch of their expenditure; and to impose and collect their revenues in the best and cheapest manner. But though the Company have certainly succeeded in repressing many abuses, it would be the extreme of simplicity to suppose that they should ever entirely succeed. How can it be imagined that strangers sent to India, conscious that they are armed with all the strength of Government, placed under no real responsibility, exempted from the salutary influence of public opinion, fearing no exposure through the medium of the press, and anxious only to accumulate a fortune, should not occasionally abuse their authority? or, that they should manage the complicated and difficult affairs of a vast empire, inhabited by a race of people of whose language, manners and habits, they are almost wholly ignorant, with that prudence, economy and vigilance, without which it is idle to expect that any great surplus revenue can ever be realized?

The collection of a greater surplus revenue in India than is sufficient to defray the necessary expense of governing the country, and the remittal of that surplus to England, have been stigmatized by Mr Burke and others as unjust, oppressive, and tyrannical proceedings. * But even if these censures were at bottom well-founded, they are totally inapplicable to the case of the East India Company. Whatever other charges may be justly made against that association, they certainly have not drained India of her wealth, in order to remit it to England. If the accounts between the two countries were fairly balanced, it would, we apprehend, be found that India is quite as much indebted to England as England is to India. But the principle on which the objection is founded is fallacious. The revenue of India is derived from a portion of the produce of the

* Among others, by the author of a clever work on the *Colonial Policy* of India. This gentleman is a strenuous advocate for the colonization of India; and, in point of principle, we think he is right. But he has prodigiously exaggerated its importance. A few land-speculators might emigrate to India; but it is ridiculous to suppose that there can be any considerable or really advantageous emigration to a country where the wages of labour do not exceed 3d. a day.

land, which the sovereign has uniformly been in the habit of collecting. If, therefore, it was not collected by the agents of the East India Company, it would be collected by others; and, provided the sums taken from the cultivators be equal, it is perfectly immaterial to them to whom they are paid. Nothing, therefore, can be more entirely destitute of foundation than the invectives of those who denounce what they are pleased to call *tribute:* For, in the *first* place, no such tribute has ever been exacted; and, in the *second* place, though it were exacted, it would be no injury to the natives. What is it to them whether the government, by whose authority taxes are imposed and collected, is resident in Delhi or in London? The merit of the Company's government in India must be determined by the condition of the people, subject to their authority, and by the nature and extent of the burdens imposed on them, and not by fantastical notions about absentee expenditure.

To enter at any considerable length on the much disputed subject of Indian Taxation, would far exceed the narrow limits within which we must confine ourselves. It is sufficient for our purpose to observe, that from the remotest era to the present times, the principal part of the public revenue of Eastern countries has always been derived from the soil. The land has been held by its immediate cultivators generally in small portions, with a perpetual and transferable title; but they have been under the obligation of making an annual payment to Government of a certain portion of the produce of their farms, which might be increased or diminished at the pleasure of the sovereign, the real proprietor of the land, and which has, in almost all cases, been so large as seldom to leave the cultivators more than a bare subsistence.

The far greater part of the revenue of our Indian dominions is derived from this source. In Bengal, and generally throughout the Mogul Empire, the *gross* produce of the soil was divided into equal, or nearly equal shares, between the ryots, or cultivators, and the government. The agents employed by government to collect this revenue were denominated *zemindars;* and their office seems gradually to have become hereditary. That the zemindars were not proprietors of the ground, at least in the sense attached to this phrase in Europe, seems clear from the circumstance, that they could not legally demand more from the ryot than a half of the produce he had raised; and that, so long as he paid this portion, he could not be dispossessed of his farm, but might dispose of it as he

pleased. The *zemindars* were obliged to pay *nine-tenths* of the rents they collected from the ryots to Government; the other *tenth* being their compensation for the trouble and expense of collection. When the English obtained possession of Bengal, the vitally important question came to be considered, how they were to deal with the cultivators, and how the revenue was in future to be collected. As was to be expected, a great variety of plans were proposed for the regulation of the Company's conduct in this difficult and delicate undertaking; but of these, two only attracted any considerable degree of attention; and their principal features may be stated with sufficient distinctness as follows. The *first* plan was to supersede, or abolish the class of middle-men or zemindars, on paying them a fair equivalent for the loss of the rights they enjoyed, and to appoint agents, removeable at pleasure, to collect the rents payable by the cultivators for the behoof of Government, to whom the land really belonged, and by whom the rents might be increased, in the event of the country becoming more prosperous. The *second* plan was to make the assessment *perpetual* at the former rate; and to continue the *zemindars* in their former situation, making them directly responsible to Government for the rents or assessment payable by the cultivators in their districts, and leaving them, as before, 10 per cent. of the gross amount of the assessment, to indemnify them for the trouble and expense of collection. After a great deal of discussion, the latter plan was carried into effect under Lord Cornwallis. The zemindars were authorized to make new settlements with the ryots, without, however, being expressly bound, as they ought in justice to have been, to confine their demands upon them to what they had previously paid. In dealing with them they were merely recommended to conform to the custom of the place; but after the rent was once fixed, the zemindar was to give the ryot a *pottah*, or lease; and, so long as he fulfilled the conditions of that lease, neither he nor his disponees could be deprived of their possession. * Lord Cornwallis sup-

* Mill's India, vol. v. p. 411. 8vo. edit. 'He is to levy his rents,' says the author of Observations on the Law and Constitution of India, '*according to the custom of the Pergunnah rates*, which custom being 'different in every different place, was necessarily left for the owner to 'dictate. The *dictum*, therefore, of the zemindar is the *custom*. The 'contrary cannot be established against him, were the poor man, as I 'have before noticed, with barely enough to exist upon, able to carry 'his opulent oppressor into Court, to attempt so hopeless a cause.' (p. 206.)

posed, that, by thus fixing the assessment, and rendering both it and the rents payable by the cultivators unsusceptible of future increase, a powerful stimulus would be given to the progress of improvement. But it may be doubted whether the plans adopted by his Lordship were such as could realize his truly benevolent intentions. The rights and interests of the ryot and zemindar, under the perpetual settlement, seem altogether irreconcileable; the former being entitled to the continued possession of his farm, according to the terms of his lease, it is clear that the zemindar has no interest whatever in the improvement of the land which he occupies; while it is equally clear that he has a very powerful motive to rack his rent in the first instance, and to adopt indirect methods to make him pay a larger rent than he has stipulated for. * We shall not stop to discuss the abstract merits of one of the principal parts of the plan of Lord Cornwallis, but assuming that it might, under other circumstances, have been advisable to create at once a class of large land-holders, and to give them the greatest possible interest in the improvement of their estates, the peculiar situation of India presented an insuperable obstacle to this being done. The ryots, or immediate occupiers of the soil, had in reality become perpetual holders upon a quit-rent, and were to be continued upon that footing; and it is evident that the improvement of an estate, from the larger and better portion † of which the superior landlord gets only a quit-rent, must always be a matter of indifference to him. Since, therefore, the rights of the ryots did not permit that the zemindars should be invested with the full controul of the estates of which they were made superiors, the better course, we are inclined to think, would have been to have adopted the *first* of the plans we have previously mentioned; to have superseded the class of middlemen or zemindars altogether; and to have declared, either that the ryots were the absolute proprietors of the soil, on condition of their paying a certain share of the produce to collectors appointed by Go-

* There are good reasons for thinking that this sort of oppression is now sanctioned to a very great extent, and that the terms of the pottah, or lease, under which the ryots hold, are seldom respected by the zemindars. Mr White states that this is in fact the case in *almost every instance*. Considerations on India, p. 289.

† A considerable portion of waste land or jungle was attached to each zemindarry. And it cannot be doubted, that had the assessment been so low as to have enabled the zemindars to amass capital, the rendering it perpetual must have been a powerful stimulus to the cultivation of these waste lands.

vernment; or that the ryots were to continue as tenants only, Government reserving to itself the right to revise the assessment payable by them once every twenty or thirty years. Either of these plans seems to us preferable to that which was actually adopted; and we do not think that it would be very difficult to show that the last is, all things considered, the best of the two. *

The facility with which the revenue is collected from the zemindars has been urged as a powerful argument in favour of their establishment. It is said, that, under the present system, one individual is generally accountable to Government for the revenues of a large district. And a sum is thus obtained from him without difficulty, which could not have been levied from the cultivators without employing a host of collectors, and consequently opening a door to every species of fraud and abuse.

But, admitting the force of this statement, still it does not follow, that the rights granted to the zemindars ought to have been made hereditary. According to the *theory* of the perpetual settlement, they do not seem to us to be really landlords, but hereditary collectors of the revenue derived from particular districts; enjoying only the contingent advantages to be derived from the extension of cultivation over the waste lands attached to these districts. Now, we do not see why the revenue might not have been collected with equal facility and advantage to all parties, had the districts been merely let in farm to the zemindars for a given number of years. Had this been done, Government might have participated in the future improvement of the country; and it would have been in its power to interfere with infinitely more facility and effect than at present, to protect the ryots from the illegal exactions of the zemindars. Most of the recent writers on India seem to be of opinion, that the regulations, intended to secure the rights of the ryots, are trampled upon with impunity. † And if this be really the case, and we do not see the least ground for calling it in question, it will follow, that the effect of the perpetual settlement is merely to

* It is stated in some late works on India, that the zemindar is now authorized to demand an increased share of the produce from the ryot, in the event of the latter making any improvement. This, however, is a complete subversion of the principles of the perpetual system. That it will improve the condition of the zemindar, cannot be doubted; but it will proportionally depress that of the cultivators, or of the great mass of the population.

† Observations on the Law and Constitution of India, p. 166.

protect the farmers of the revenue from any farther demands upon them by Government, and to leave the whole population of the country a prey to their depredations.

But although the system adopted by Lord Cornwallis had been in other respects unobjectionable, the amount of the assessment, or of the payment to be made to Government, was so exorbitant, as to render it productive, in the first instance, of ruin to all parties. The claim upon the ryot, for a *half* of the *gross* produce of his farm, is so excessive, that it seems to be quite unnecessary to seek elsewhere for a satisfactory explanation of the causes of the extreme poverty and wretchedness in which the cultivators of land in India are involved. They are commonly obliged to borrow money to buy their seed and carry on their operations, at a high interest, on a species of mortgage over the ensuing crop. Their only object is to get subsistence—to be able to exist in the same obscure poverty as their forefathers. If they succeed in this, they are satisfied. Mr Colebrooke, whose authority on all that relates to India is so deservedly high, mentions, that the quantity of land occupied by each ryot or cultivator, in Bengal, is commonly about six acres, and rarely amounts to twenty-four; and it is obvious, that the abstraction of half the produce raised on such patches, can leave their occupiers nothing more than the barest subsistence for themselves and families. Indeed, Mr Colebrooke states distinctly, that the condition of Indian ryots subject to this tax, is generally inferior to that of a hired labourer, who receives the miserable pittance of two annas, or about threepence a day of wages!

It might have been easily foreseen how such a system would operate upon the zemindars, who were responsible to Government for the *gross* amount of the assessment charged upon their districts or estates. Had every imaginable facility been given to the zemindar to recover payment from the ryots, it is plain that he must, notwithstanding, in the vast majority of cases, have encountered the greatest difficulty in squeezing out of them so enormous a demand as that of half their produce. But, instead of having facilities allowed him, the zemindar was obliged to prosecute the ryots who fell in arrear, in courts whose proceedings were necessarily slow, and which were speedily choked up by an overwhelming mass of cases. He, however, was not permitted to fight the Government with the same sort of weapons that the ryots were authorized to employ against himself. The process followed by the tax-collectors was comparatively brief and compendious. If the zemindar could not pay the full amount of the assessment charged

on his estate, summary proceedings were instituted against him. In vain did he represent, that, to enable him to discharge his engagements, he must have as summary powers granted him to enforce payment from the ryots, as those that were used by Government to enforce payment from himself. A deaf ear was turned to every remonstrance; and, in consequence, the estates of the zemindars were everywhere exposed to sale; the oldest and most opulent families in the country were reduced to a state of beggary and destitution; and so general was the destruction, that the whole landed property of Bengal is said to have changed hands since the establishment of the *perpetual* system!

After the ruin of the old zemindars had thus been completed, the system was so far modified, that power was given to the new zemindars to recover the arrears of rent due by the ryots by a summary process. But it is stated by Mr Rickards, who has seen and ably pointed out the destructive operation of this system, that the present zemindars are mostly monied men of Calcutta, who employ agents or stewards to manage their estates, from whom the ryots are not very likely to experience as much lenity as they did from the old zemindars, who had an interest in securing the attachment of their dependents. 'It is also,' says Mr Rickards, 'as far as the regulation admits, a *recurrence to the former system of arbitrary punishment and imprisonment*, which Lord Cornwallis so anxiously endeavoured to avert from the ryots; and the only advantage of the regulation, in a public point of view, is, that it may cause the taxes to be paid with greater regularity.'*

If any doubt can remain in the mind of any one with respect to what must be the state of a country subject to such an oppressive system of taxation, let him read Mr Mill's profound and instructive review of Lord Cornwallis's financial and judicial reforms, and he will be satisfied. The fault, however, must not be wholly ascribed to his Lordship. That he acted with undue precipitation is certain. But had he supposed that it was in his power to have reduced the burden imposed on the cultivators, or to have obtained any better security for their rights, he would have done so. Lord Cornwallis was, beyond all doubt, a sincere friend to the people of India; and, however much he may have been mistaken in some points of his policy, his moderation, love of justice, and desire to promote the welfare of the natives, is unquestionable; and nothing but the

* Speeches of Robert Rickards, Esq. in the House of Commons on the Affairs of India, p. 18.

want of sufficient information, as to the effects of the system he was projecting, and the wish to provide a revenue to meet the increasing demands upon the Company's treasury, could have led him to propose giving perpetuity to a tax which strips every occupier of a few acres of half their produce. We can hardly conceive it possible that any considerable improvement can take place, while such a system is maintained. Unless we mean to render the poverty and misery of the ryots coeval with our ascendancy in Bengal, we must revise the settlement made by Lord Cornwallis, and consent to a temporary sacrifice, which will be amply compensated by the future increase of revenue of which it will be productive.

It was represented to the Company, at the time when Lord Cornwallis was arranging the perpetual settlement, that the assessment was far too low; and that, in consenting to it, they were making an unnecessary sacrifice of income! The Company replied, 'That an assessment below what the country could bear, was no detriment, in the long run, to the Government itself; because *the riches of the people were the riches of the state.*' This sentiment does honour to the Company. But should they, acting upon this sound principle, be inclined to revise the perpetual settlement, and to restrict the present oppressive demands upon the soil, it would be necessary for them to proceed with very great caution, and to adopt such measures as might prevent the boon which should be granted chiefly to the ryots, being intercepted by the zemindars. According to the existing regulations, when a zemindarry is sold by Government for arrears of revenue, *all the leases under which the ryots hold are set aside;* and it is affirmed that arrears have been allowed to accumulate, on many *improved and improveable* estates, in order that, by being sold, the leases might be voided; and that these estates have invariably been repurchased by their former owners!* This is evidently a gross abuse. If the rent or assessment is to be perpetual to the class of zemindars, justice requires that it should also be perpetual to the other and infinitely more numerous class of ryots.† But

* Observations on the Law and Constitution of India, p. 167.

† That such was the opinion entertained by Lord Cornwallis, is evident, from his Minute of the 3d February 1790. 'Every abwab or tax,' his Lordship observes, 'imposed by the zemindar over and above that sum (the rent fixed upon originally either by an expressed or implied agreement with the ryot), is not only a breach of that agreement, but a direct *violation of the established laws of the country.* I do not hesitate to give it as my opinion, that the zemindars, neither now,

when an estate falls into arrears, why should it be again sold in perpetuity? The rights enjoyed by the zemindars have then lapsed to Government, who may, if they think fit, let it under any conditions, at a given rent, for a definite number of years. Were Government to proceed in this way, they might gradually, and without either encroaching on the rights, or shocking the prejudices of any class, regain the superiority of the land, and might dispose of it as they thought best, for the interest of the cultivators and the revenue.

It seems, however, as if there were some strange fatality attending the government of India; and that the greatest talents and best intentions should, when applied to legislate for that country, produce only the most pernicious projects. The perpetual settlement carried into effect by Lord Cornwallis, in Bengal, had been keenly opposed by Lord Teignmouth, Colonel Wilkes, Mr Thackeray, Sir Thomas Monro, and others, whose opinions on such subjects are certainly entitled to very great respect; and it would seem that the Court of Directors and the Board of Controul at length became favourable to their views. In consequence of this change of opinion, it was resolved to introduce a different system, under the superintendence of its zealous and intelligent advocate, Sir Thomas Monro, into the Presidency of Madras, or Fort St George. This new system has received the name of the *ryotwar* settlement. It proceeds on the assumption, that Government is possessed of the entire property of the soil, and may dispose of it at pleasure; no middlemen are interposed between the sovereign and the cultivators; the ryots being brought into immediate contact with the collectors appointed by Government to receive their rents. Thus far the ryotwar settlement has some analogy to the plan we previously recommended; but it is, notwithstanding, essentially and completely different from it. It is impossible, however, for us to enter fully into the details of this system. They are in the last degree complicated—which is of itself a strong presumption of their inexpediency. But the radical vice of the system is, that the lands are not let at a moderate rent to the ryots, for a certain number of years. On the contrary, there is a constant tampering and interference with their concerns. '*At the end of each year, every ryot shall be at liberty either to throw up a part of his land, or to occupy more, according to his circumstances.*' When, owing to bad crops, or other unforeseen accidents, a ryot becomes unable to pay up his rent or assessment, which is fixed at a *third* of the gross produce, it is declared that '*the village to which he belongs shall be liable for him, to the extent of* 10 *per cent. additional on the rent of the remaining ryots, but no more.*' And to crown the whole, the tehsildars, or native officers employed in collecting the land-rents or revenue, have been invested with powers to act as officers of police, to impose fines, and even to inflict *corporal punishment* at their discretion!

It is really astonishing how acute and able men could have dreamed of establishing a system in an extensive country, that every one must see would be destructive of the industry of the tenants, and would lead to the grossest abuses, were an attempt made to introduce it into the management of a single estate in Great Britain. But instead of animadverting ourselves on this plan, we shall subjoin the remarks made on it by Mr Tucker, a gentleman who resided long in India, who now occupies a place in the Direction, and whose work on the Company's Finances, is written with laudable candour and fairness.

'My wish,' says Mr Tucker, 'is not to exaggerate; but when I find a system requiring a multiplicity of instruments, surveyors, and inspectors; assessors, ordinary and extraordinary; potails, curnums, tehsildars, and cutcherry servants; and when I read the description given of these officers by the most zealous advocates of the system, their periodical visitations are pictured in my imagination as the passage of a flight of locusts, devouring in their course the fruits of the earth. For such complicated details, the most select agency would be required; whereas the agency which we can command, is represented to be of the most questionable character. We do not merely require experience and honesty to execute *one great undertaking*; the work is ever beginning and never ending, and calls *for a perennial stream of intelligence and integrity*. And can it be doubted, that the people are oppressed and plundered by these multiform agents? The principle of the settlement is to take one-third of the gross produce on account of Government; and, in order to render the assessment moderate, Sir T. Munro proposed to grant a considerable deduction from the rates deducible from the survey reports. But if it *be* moderate, how does it happen that the people continue in the same uniform condition of labouring peasants? Why do not the same changes take place here as in other communities? One man is industrious, economical, prudent, or fortunate; another is idle, wasteful, improvident, or unlucky. In the ordinary course of things, one should rise and the other fall: the former should, by degrees, absorb the

' nor ever, could possess a right to impose new taxes, or abwabs, on the ' ryots; and that Government has an undoubted right to abolish every ' such tax, and to *establish such regulations as may prevent the practice of* ' *the like abuse in future.*' It is clear, therefore, that the principles of the perpetual settlement do not really prevent, but warrant our interfering to prevent the ryots from being illegally assessed by the zemindars.

possessions of the latter; should become rich, while his neighbour remained poor; gradations in society should take place; and, in the course of time, we might naturally expect to see the landlord, the yeoman, and the labourer. And what prevents this natural progression? I should answer, the *officers of government*. The fruits of industry are nipt in the bud. If one man produce more than his fellows, there is a public servant at hand, always ready to snatch the superfluity. And, wherefore, then, should the husbandman toil that a stranger may reap the produce?

'There are two other circumstances which tend to perpetuate this uniform condition. The ryots have no fixed possession; they are liable to be moved from field to field: this they sometimes do of their own accord, for the purpose of obtaining land, supposed to be more lightly assessed; at other times, the land is assigned by lot, with a view to a more equal and impartial distribution of the good and the bad, among the different cultivators. But these evolutions tend to destroy all local attachments, and are evidently calculated to take away one great incentive to exertion.

'The other levelling principle is to be found in the rule, which requires that the ryot shall make good the deficiencies of his neighbour to the extent of ten per cent.; that is, to the extent, probably, of his *whole surplus earnings*. Of what avail is it that the husbandman be diligent, skilful, and successful, if he is to be mulcted for *his neighbour's* negligence, or misfortune? A must pay the debt of B. If a village be prosperous, it matters little, for the next village may have been exposed to some calamity; and, from the abundance of the one, we exact wherewithal to supply the deficiency of the other. Is it possible to fancy a system better calculated to baffle the efforts of the individual, to repress industry, to extinguish hope, and to reduce all to one common state of universal pauperism?' (pp. 134–135.)

It is almost unnecessary to add any thing to these unanswerable remarks; but, as this is a subject which involves the interests of millions, we shall subjoin the following statement respecting it from a Memoir, drawn up in 1823, by Mr Fullerton, one of the Company's servants at Fort St George, and who was personally familiar with the details and working of the system.

'To convey,' says Mr Fullerton, 'to the mind of an English reader even a slight impression of the nature, operation, and results of the *ryotwar* system of revenue, connected with the judicial arrangements of 1816, must be a matter of some difficulty. Let him, in the first place, imagine the whole landed interest, that is, all the landlords of Great Britain, and even the capital farmers, at once swept away from off the face of the earth; let him imagine a cess or rent fixed on every field in the kingdom, *seldom under, generally above, its means of payment*; let him imagine the land so assessed lotted out to the villagers, according to the number of their cattle and ploughs, to the extent of forty or fifty acres each! Let him imagine the revenue, rated as above, leviable through the agency

of a *hundred thousand revenue officers, collected or remitted at their discretion, according to their idea of the occupant's means of paying, whether from the produce of his land or his separate property*. And in order to encourage every man to act as a spy on his neighbour, and report his means of paying, that he may eventually save himself from extra demand, let him imagine all the cultivators of a village liable at all times to a separate demand, in order to make up for the failure of one or more individuals of their parish. Let him imagine collectors to every county acting under the orders of a board, on the avowed principle of destroying all competition for labour by a general equalization of assessment; seizing and sending back runaways to each other. And lastly, *let him imagine the collector the sole magistrate or justice of the peace of the county*, through the medium and instrumentality of whom alone any criminal complaint of personal grievance, suffered by the subject, can reach the superior courts. Let him imagine at the same time every subordinate officer, employed in the collection of the land revenue, to be a police officer, vested with power to fine, confine, put in the stocks, and *flog*, any inhabitant within his range, on any charge, without oath of the accuser, or sworn recorded evidence on the case. If the reader can bring his mind to contemplate such a course, he may then form some judgment of the civil administration in progress of re-introduction into the territories under the Presidency of Madras, containing 125,000 square miles, and a population of twelve millions.'

Our readers, we presume, will consider it as almost superfluous to inquire whether the Madras revenues have increased under such a system. Though there had been no direct evidence on the object, it might have been pretty confidently concluded that they must have fallen off. But it is unnecessary to reason speculatively upon this point. No very recent accounts of the revenue have indeed been published; but the Court of Directors, in a letter to the Bengal Government, dated 14th May 1823, observe generally, 'That the *land revenues of Madras have fallen off considerably since* 1813–14;' and Mr Tucker states, that it was understood that the reduction had since become more considerable.

But the most extraordinary statement that we have ever seen with respect to the effect of taxation, is that made in a Report by Sir Thomas Monro, quoted by Mr Tucker, (p. 167), in which it is said that there had been a great increase in the cultivation of indigo and sugar since 1811. '*The increase of these articles being occasioned*,' says Sir Thomas, '*by the addition of an* EXTRA LAND RENT, AMOUNTING TO TWICE OR THREE TIMES THE ORDINARY RATE, *to which all land employed in their culture was subjected; and this increase is likely to go on progressively.*' This is a specimen of fiscal logic which, we frankly confess, very far transcends our comprehension. In Europe it is customary, when an effort is made to encourage any

species of industry, to reduce the duties affecting it, and even to give bounties to tempt individuals to engage in it. But *non una ratio omnibus locis convenit.* In India it would seem that a totally opposite course is pursued—that good usage is as much lost upon a ryot as upon a spaniel—and that, to double or triple his industry, you have only to double or triple the demands upon him! Mr Tucker was evidently under the influence of European notions when he asked, 'Will industry 'be called into action where the demand of the tax-gatherer 'keeps pace with its progress? Will capital accumulate where 'there is no security for property, no law but that which is administered under the auspices of a revenue officer? Will 'opulent consumers be found where no capital is allowed to 'accumulate? And can any country advance and become 'prosperous where the land has no saleable value, where there 'is no motive for laying out capital on its improvement, and 'where no order of human beings is to be found between the 'Government and the labouring peasant?' (p. 169.)

Under these circumstances, it would certainly be not a little rash to speculate upon the probable future revenue to be drawn from India. Mr Tucker says it may be relied upon generally as a firm and legitimate resource. And we are inclined to think that he is right, provided those reforms, which are so obviously necessary, are adopted. Whatever modifications may be made in the assessment imposed on Bengal, we hold it to be indispensable that the ryotwar system, as at present established in Madras, should be altogether changed. We must either make the ryots the proprietors of the soil, under payment of a *moderate* quit-rent to Government, or we must let the land to them for a period of years certain, *at such a reduced rent as they may be able to pay without difficulty.* Under either of these systems industry would revive, and the peasantry would become attached to Government. But so long as we compel the ryots to cultivate land that is over assessed—so long, in short, as we compel them to raise crops, not for their own advantage, but for the exclusive advantage of Government and the host of harpies it is obliged to employ, so long will the scourge of universal poverty continue to afflict the country; so long will the benevolent intentions of the Company be frustrated; and their Government be looked upon as the prolific source of Indian degradation and misery.

But notwithstanding the Company's government has been thus unsuccessful in providing for the prosperity of the natives, we see no reason to suppose that their condition would have been in any degree improved, had the Company been annihi-

lated in 1784, and the administration of Indian affairs placed entirely in the hands of Ministers. The Company's measures have all been sanctioned by Government; and how different soever they may have proved in their effects, they were honestly intended to promote the welfare of the natives. We have no hesitation indeed in subscribing to Mr Mill's statement, 'that there 'is no government which has on all occasions shown so much 'of a disposition to make sacrifices of its own interests to the interests of the people whom it governed, and which has in fact 'made so many and important sacrifices, as the East India 'Company.' Whether, therefore, India would gain any thing by the abolition of the Company's territorial rights and jurisdiction, is a point respecting which there is very great room for doubt. But that India and Great Britain would each gain a great deal, and the Company lose very little, by the abolition of her commercial monopoly, may, we think, be very easily shown. It would be difficult to exaggerate the loss that this monopoly has occasioned to the commerce of the empire. We take for granted that the Company have conducted their affairs as well as any similar association, placed under the same circumstances, could have done. But whatever may be the Company's merits, its affairs must, of necessity, be conducted, like those of all other great companies, according to a system of routine, and with an abundant alloy of carelessness and abuse. It is indeed quite visionary to suppose, that the servants of such bodies can have the same powerful motives to exert all their energies, or to conduct the business intrusted to their charge, in the same frugal and parsimonious manner as private individuals, trading on their own account, and reaping all the advantages of superior industry, economy and enterprise. Branches of commerce, productive only of loss, when managed by the former, have, in innumerable instances, become extremely lucrative the moment they were placed in the hands of the latter. Monopoly has always been, and must ever continue to be, the parent of indolence and profusion. 'By the establish-'ment,' says Dr Smith, 'of the commercial monopoly of the 'East India Company, the other subjects of the State are taxed very absurdly in two different ways; first, by the high 'price of goods, which, in the case of a free trade, they could 'buy much cheaper;* and, secondly, by their total exclusion

* The effect that the partial opening of the trade in 1815 had on the prices of mace and nutmegs, may be referred to in proof of this statement. The average price of mace during the three years ending with 1815, was 14s. 4½d. per lib.; and its price during the three years ending with 1823, was 5s. 1d. Nutmegs during the three years ending with 1814, sold at

ambassador, was secretly sold to Āsaf Khān at considerably less than its cost ; [1] and by this and other favours of a similar nature, the minister and his sister were completely won over to the English side. By the mediation of Āsaf Khān, an interview took place between Roe and the Prince, in which the ambassador was treated with some show of kindness ; and his new friend also undertook to obtain for him not only a *farmān* for Bengal (which he had previously solicited in vain), but also 'a generall command and grant of free priviledges' in all the Mughal dominions. Hopes were also held out that the Prince, who was about to take up the government of Gujarāt, would surrender, among other *jāgīrs*, that of Surat ; and Āsaf Khān would then apply for its grant to himself and 'make Englishmen content and happy.' In the sequel, however, these fresh promises of the minister proved as untrustworthy as his previous ones.

Towards the close of October, 1617, Jahāngīr struck his camp at Māndu and bent his steps towards Ahmadābād, the capital of Gujarāt. Roe, who, during the later stages of the march, had posted on in advance, reached that city on 15 December. As before, the presents from England, which it had been his special object to secure, became a bone of contention between him and the Prince. They had been sealed at Surat with the latter's seal, in order to make sure that they should not be opened except with his cognisance. Roe waited twenty days for the necessary permission ; and this not arriving, he boldly cut the seals and took possession of the goods. It was a great affront, as the courtiers told him ; and Āsaf Khān, though he seems to have assented beforehand, shrank from supporting the offender. The Prince complained vehemently, and Roe found himself virtually under arrest. For the first time the Mogul spoke roughly to his visitor, 'set on it an angrie countenance : told mee I had broken my word : that he would trust me no more.' The ambassador bore the storm unflinchingly, saying that he had done no wrong, and that if he had seemed to act offensively it had been done in ignorance. Before long, the Prince grew cool again, 'offered

[1] See p. 424. Roe is generally stated to have *given* the pearl to Āsaf Khān ; but this is a mistake.

his friendship, and wee were all reconciled fully, and promises too large' ; and the distribution of the presents sealed the reconciliation. On the following day the Prince received the ambassador with all courtesy, gave him a handsome cloak, and 'promised to be the protector of our nation in all things.'

In the middle of February, 1618, Roe made his yearly report to the Company (p. 432). By this time he had abandoned all hopes of securing the signature of a formal treaty ; but he trusted to obtain all that was practically necessary. 'Yow can never expect to trade here upon capitulations that shalbe permanent. Wee must serve the tyme. Some now I have gotten, but by way of *firmaens* and promise from the Kynge. All the goverment depends upon the present will, where appetite only governs the lords of the kingdome. But their justice is generallie good to strangers ; they are not rigorous, except in scearching for things to please, and what trouble wee have is for hope of them, and by our owne disorders.' 'You shalbe sure,' he added emphatically, 'of as much priviledge as any stranger, and right when the subject dares not plead his.' With the Prince, now all-powerful ('his father growes dull and suffers him to write all commands and to governe all his kingdomes') the ambassador was on much better terms. The policy of 'adventuring the feircnes of his wrath' had answered so well that Roe was resolved, if necessary, to push matters boldly to an issue. It was useless to attempt to win the friendship of the Indians by kindly treatment ; 'they are weary of us. . . . Wee have empoverished the ports and wounded all their trades' ; the only dependence was upon 'the same ground that wee began, and by which wee subsist, feare.' 'Assure yow,' he wrote, 'I knowe these people are best treated with the swoord in one hand and caducean in the other' ; and if his demands were not complied with to his satisfaction, he intended to seize the Indian shipping 'and make those conditions bee offered which now I seeke with despayre.'

Fortunately, it was not in the end found necessary to push matters to extremity ; but at the time the adoption of a vigorous policy seemed the more necessary, as Roe feared that the Dutch might 'doe it first and then hee wilbe the brave man.' The prospect of their competition at Surat Roe

TRANSLATE OF THE FIRMAN FOR COJA ARABS HOUSE IN SURATT, SENT DOWNE 3D AUGUST, 1618.[1]

(I.O. Records : *O.C.*, No. 675.)

There hath come to us a petition from the English resident in Suratt : that there was a house belonging to Coja-Arab Turbethee,[2] lying in Suratt, for the which the sayd English have, as they affirme, given mony for the tyme of three yeares to the people of Coja Arab, and accordingly have taken a writing in testemony of the same of the sayd Coja Arab or his assignes. [Whereof ?] take knowledge ; and if it bee so, and that the owner of the sayd house bee content that the English shall

trial indeed. . . . All our family (my Lord Ambassadour only excepted) were visited with this sickness ; and we all, who through Gods help and goodnes outlived it, had many great blisters, fild with a thick yellow watry substance, that arose upon many parts of our bodyes, which, when they brake, did even burn and corrode our skins, as it ran down upon them.'

What the particular form of disease was cannot be determined. Col. D. G. Crawford, in his *History of the Indian Medical Service* (vol. i. p. 44), notes that it was evidently not cholera and that the symptoms described do not correspond with those of the plague in its modern form.

Speaking generally of such experiences, Terry says (p. 244) : 'Death made many breaches into my Lord Ambassadors family ; for of four and twenty wayters [*i.e.* attendants], besides his secretary and my self, there was not above the fourth man returned home. And he himself by violent fluxes was twice brought even to the very brink of the grave.'

Terry also mentions (p. 380) that while at Ahmadābād he witnessed the spectacle of a malefactor being stung to death by snakes. On this see the *Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 453.

[1] This transcript is in Roe's own hand. In *Home Miscellaneous* 628 (No. ix.) will be found a copy (made in 1789) of an earlier order from Afzal Khān, dated 13 July, 1618, in these words : 'Whereas I wrote you to take Coja Arab's house for the Prince, being anciently his mint house, and to give the English another, I will you to give them as good a house as that, such as may content them, and to use them like friends ; and in no case to let them be unprovided of a house to remove unto.'

The dwelling here referred to had been hired for three years from Khwāja Arab in the middle of 1616 (*Letters Received*, vol. v. p. 74). Apparently he had now died, and the house had escheated to the Prince, who had decided to turn out the English factors.

[2] Probably Tūrbati, *i.e.* of Tūrbat (perhaps Tūrbat-i-Haidari, in N.E. Persia).

remayne and abide in the sayd house, then is it our pleasure that they abide in the sayd house ; but if the sayd English have not payd or given the sayd rent aforehand for the tyme of three yeares, but that they remayne therin by force, contrarie to his likinge, upon receipt hereof yow shall putt the sayd English foorth therof and deli[ver] therof into the hands of the sonne of the sayd [ ] therof according to his will ; and in lieu therof shall [give the ?] sayd English another fitt house, such as shalbe to their content ; and hereof signifie unto mee the answere of the premises.

ARTICLES PROPOSED TO THE PRINCE SULTAN CORONNE, LORD OF AMADAVAZ AND SURATT, BY THE AMBASSADOR, UPON THE BREACH WITH THE PORTUGALLS, AUGUST 15, 1618.[1]

(I.O. Records : *O.C.*, No. 678.)

1. That the Prince had received the English nation into his protection and favour, and had concluded peace and ametie with them, according to the command of the Great Kyng, and hereby doth give notice to all his Governor, Leiutenant and other officers of Suratt and all his other signories, to pu[b]lish the same and to obey it.

2. In consideration of this treaty, and that the Portugalls are common enemies to their peace and traficque, it shalbe lawfull for the English to land with their armes and to pass with them for defence of their persons and goods ; and if the sayd Portugalls should attempt any thing by sea agaynst the sayd English or the ships of the Kyng and Prince, that then the Governors of Suratt should deliver to the English as many frigatts as they should need for their mutuall succor, and in all poynts of releeve and succour should assist them as frends and as the naturalls of these kyngdomes.

3. That it should bee lawfull for the English to buy or hyre any house in his ports, where they might quiettly dwell and no man to disturbe or displace them ; and therin house their goods sufficiently and safely ; and that neyther Governor nor other officer should entermeddle neyther with them nor their goods, but, in case they were not or could not of them selves provide sufficient housing, that then the Governor should assist them and procure for them a safe and quiett habitation.

[1] In Roe's own hand. Endorsed : 'Articles and treaty with the Prince, Amad., August, 1618.' The occasion of the 'breach with the Portugalls' is not clear, but possibly it arose from the dispute described in the Surat letter quoted later (p. 485). From this it would appear that the Indians for a time resisted the payment claimed for the *cartaz* of the Gogo junk, and 'made greate shew off warrs.'

4. That the Governor of Suratt and other officers should receive and dispeed the English ambassador with honor and curtesie, and see him well housed during his stay in Suratt, and that he [be ?] offered no force nor affront to him nor to any of his servants, but they might live, goe, and pass at their pleasure.

5. And if it should fall out that they could not agree with the owner for the house they now resided in, having paid mony before hand, the Governor should cause the remayner to bee repayd to the sayd English.

6. That it should bee lawfull for the sayd English to land any sort of goods and to relade, at their pleasure; and upon the land in any part to trade, traficque, buy and sell according to their owne will; and that the judges and officers of the *alfandicaes* should not deteyne their goods longer then to take account and to agree for customes as by former treaty, and therin should give them dispatch, and in no sort nor upon any pretence should stay or take by force or deteyne any of their goods contrarie to the owners will, nor should doe them any injurie or violence whatsoever; and that for jewells, pearles and all sorts of that nature they should demand no custome nor duty; and that upon the wayes to and from their ports no exaction or duty should be taken nor demanded, but only at their port, according to custome.

7. That the sayd English might live in their owne houses and among them selves according to their owne religion and lawes, and for that respect no Governor, *Kazy*, nor other should doe them any affront nor in any sort trouble or molest them.

8. That if any quarrell or other controversie whatsoever did arise among the English, that the Governors nor any other officers should not intermeddle, but leave it wholy to the president of their owne nation; and if any English did escape or flye away from their obedience and service, the Governors should assist to take and deliver him into the hands and power of the English to doe in all thing[s] among themselves justice according to their owne lawes; but that in case any difference of what kynd soever happened betweene the English and any Moore or *Banyan*, the Governors and other officers in their place should take notice and doe justice according to the offence or complaynt of eyther syde.

9. That the linguist and brokars serving the English should have free libertye to speake and deliver any thing in the behalfe of their masters, and should have licence to bargayne, traficque, sell, or buy for them, and to doe them any other service; and for such occasion should not bee subject to any question or account, nor any way prohibited nor molested.

10. That all presents beeing showed at the custome house, that the officers might avoyd deceipt, beeing *chopped* by both

parts, should bee delivered to the hands of the English to send to the court at their pleasure.

11. That in all causes of complaynt or controversie the Governors and *Kazies* of the place should doe them speedy justice and protect them from all injuries or oppressions whatsoever, and should ayd and entreat them as frends with curtesie and honor; for that so it is the command of the Great Kyng, who hath given them his securitie, and that therfore it pleaseth the Prince to make declaration and confirmation of the sayd treaty by this writing, agaynst which no man shall presume to doe contrarie.

written under-neath:

That which I demand is bare justice and which no man can deny that hath a hart cleare and enclined to right, and no more then the lawes of nations doth freely give to all strangers that arrive, without any contract; and in no case so much as the Great Kyng doth promise and command. If it please the Prince to confirme these articles freely and without ill meaning or collusion and to command that they bee obeyed precisely, I shall rest content and shall give satisfaction to my master and to my nation; but if not, and that any part bee refused or written fraudulently, according to former experiences, then I desire the Prince to take knowledge that I wilbe free of my woord given the Great Kyng in his presence and of all blame or inconvenience that may happen after it, having given promese upon these conditions or els to bee at liberty.

After almost three yeares experience of the pride and falshood of these people, that attended only advantage and were governed by privat interest and appetite, I was forced to relinquish many poynts often insisted upon, when I could gett nothing, and to make offer of these few as the most necessarie to settle a trade and which might give the least offence and might pass with ease, leaving the rest to the generall order of the Kyng to receive justice from our procurador generall; and therfore seemed content and delivered it up to the Princes *Divon* for consideration and answere; who excepted almost agaynst all, or agaynst all that might serve to give us ease. But after many disputes I went to the Prince and had there read and discussed the articles as followeth:

To the first, it was wholy agreed unto.

To the second, to lend us frigatts was agreed unto, but more for the defence and bringing in of their owne ship then for good will to us; yet it passed sufficient for both. But in no case would the Prince consent that wee might land or weare armes in Suratt. First, they offered mee and my servants liberty; after, for ten merchants, and to more would not yeild, but that

they should leave their armes in the custome house to bee delivered at returne. They instanced the disorder and quarreling of our people, the offering to take Suratt, anno 1616, the erecting a bell, and many woords given out that the English would fortefie their house or surprise the castle, with many more foolish jealousies arising from our owne faults. So that I consented, to cleare all, to the grant of ten at a tyme and the merchants residing, on condition that other articles were granted sufficient for our securitie, and that our people going in defence of their goods to any other inland cytty might pass with their armes for their guard agaynst theeves and exactions upon the way.

To the third, it was absolutly refused upon no conditions that wee should buy or build a house, nor hyre none neare the castle or upon the water; but that wee should have given us in the cytty, in convenient place, a good, strong and sufficient house, one or more as wee needed, wher wee should live for our rent, as wee could agree, and no man should putt us out; and that the Governor should see us furnished and provided of such habitation to our owne liking.

To the fourth, it was fully agreed unto.

To the fifth, it was agreed unto; but withall they declared that that house of Coja Arab wee should not have upon any conditions; first, because our earnest sute gave them suspition; next, because it was the ancient mynt; thirdly, because it stood agaynst their great *mesquite*, and offended the Moores, especially our people pissing rudely and doing other filthines against the walls, to the dislike of the Mahometans, who with reverence reguard their holy places; lastly, because there was a rumor that wee ment to surprise the said *mesquite* and being of stone and flatt at the topp it was supposed that wee intended to make [it ?] our fort and to annoy the castle therefrom; which though it was a most frivoulous, idle, impossible suspition, yet they averring it arose from som rash speeches of some of our owne, they would not yeild; and that, seeing they offered us the choyce of all the towne, wee could show no materiall reason why only that house would serve us.

To the sixt, it was fully agreed unto.

To the sevventh, it was [a]greed unto.

To the eight, it was agreed unto that in causes of difference among ourselves it should wholy bee referred to the English; but in case the controversie were with More or Gentile, it should bee referred to the Governor or officers proper to doe justice. But to deliver up any English that fled, it was refused, upon pretence if they turned Moore they could not refuse them protection; to which I replyed that wee would never consent that any should leave his fayth, for under that coulor they might robb us of all our goods. After much contention it was

yeilded unto, because I utterly refused all if that libertye were left to any ill-mynded person.

To the ninth, it was fully agreed unto.

To the 10, it was agreed unto, the presents beeing opened and seene (that under coulor of them the Prince should not bee deceived of his rights) and sealed, should bee delivered to the English. But they added that if the sayd pretended presents were not given, that then in future tymes they should eyther pay custome or not bee delivered to the English; which, though most base, and in our power to give any or none, I consented too; but especially because ells I could have nothing, for these presents trouble all our busines.

To the 11, it was agreed unto.

Having thus gotten what I could, a draught was made to this effect and given to the secretarie writer of *firmans* to bee digested into forme, and was sealed and sent unto mee. But comming to reade yt, I found prohibition to land with any sort of armes, nor no English in Suratt to weare swoord, dagger, or other weapon but a knife, my selfe only excepted and nine that I would nominate as my servants, and in all other poynts with the like falshood and show of wicked cunning malice, not once mentioning free trade nor libertye upon the way to pass without exactions, nor any other poynt faythfully sett downe according to meaning and good intention, but mixed with exceptions and cavills to bring us into more danger and trouble. I had taken leave of Kyng and Prince [1] and could not come to complayne without leave, and they would also know or feare my intention that should aske yt, and so hynder mee. Wherupon I sent backe the *firmaen*, utterly refusing it, and withall these reasons ensuing:

First, that for this unwoorthy suspition of our ill intents to disarme us utterly, it was a signe of no frendship, good meaning, nor favour toward us, and for no respect I would take any so disho[no]rable conditions, but keepe our armes and use them agaynst our enemies or any that should wrong us. Neyther could I see the face of my soveraygne lord the Kyng of England and report to him I had made peace with the Ghehangier, who had given us full libertye of trade, and to that effect had written his lettres, and at the same instance bee contradicted by an under treaty with the Prince, for that one of these must needes seeme false and counterfayt; and the later most unjust and such as our enemies could show no more malice; that eyther wee would be frends as wee ought to bee, or enemies declared. How could I command my countrimen to draw their swoords in defence of the Kyngs [and Princes

[1] This seems to show that the negotiations were prolonged well into September.

A FEW SUGGESTIONS

BY

MAJOR G. T. HALY,

OF THE MADRAS ARMY,

ON THE ADVISABILITY OF

THE EUROPEAN COLONISATION

OF THE

MOUNTAIN RANGES AND TABLE LANDS OF INDIA,

Being the result of thirty-two years experience, during which period, from the peculiar nature of his duties, both in a military and civil capacity, he has had more than the usual opportunities of gaining a knowledge of the working of the system of Indian Government.

In submitting these suggestions, I trust to be exonerated for having touched only lightly upon the all-important subject of religion. In pursuing this course, I have been actuated by the dread of startling those of our rulers whose dependence has hitherto been upon a standing army, and whose total disregard of all true Christian principle has been urged. This is the rock on which the late Government foundered; and so will the present one, too, unless they manfully come forward at the onset, as *Christian* rulers, and show that they are neither afraid nor ashamed to acknowledge that religion which has been so long ignored and kept in the background by a false and pusillanimous policy; a policy which has been the ground of the present disturbance, and of our humiliation. This cannot but be the opinion of all those really acquainted with India. In proof of this, I ask—Who are more respected by the Natives, of all classes, than the Missionaries? And Why? Because they have not been ashamed to acknowledge and uphold their religion.

It is our mistaken policy that has chiefly maintained caste—to the detriment of our own; the religious toleration so much boasted of having been entirely in favour of the Heathen. This is, unfortunately, an undeniable fact, which I am prepared to prove, as well as all the other points advanced in the accompanying "SUGGESTIONS."

Colonize Eur

Education is another most important subject; but the innate thirst of knowledge that the native classes in India have, renders easy the education of the people, under judicious management. The present educational system is faulty, and not the least of its many defects is the showy, but hollow, university or college system, which embraces a certain class only, and goes above the capacity of that class's comprehension.

To this faulty principle of over-educating the few, whilst the many remain in stolid ignorance, may be traced, I think, not a few of the present evils.

Education for India, to do good, must be progressive. It must go on from one generation to another gradually. Our rapid flights in this direction must do harm with a people so peculiarly constituted as are the Natives of India. Normal district and village schools are what is required for imparting knowledge; and to these useful, unpretending schools, in connection with a more distinct recognition of Christianity, may we not reasonably look, under the Divine favour, for the happiest results.

G. T. HALY.

Our rule.

I. Although it cannot be said that India has ever yet been under *European* rule, it has long been well known to all who have given the subject a thought, that India has been won and kept by the European soldier, and even the most obtuse and bigoted must acknowledge that it has been saved by the European, and it is to them, and them only, that we can look to retain it, but not as hitherto—merely by the force of their arms.

Rebellious spirit of the Natives.

II. The simple question, therefore, is as to the best and most economical mode of keeping up a sufficient number of *whites*, as well by example to create the *spirit* of improvement as to check the inherent rebellious spirit of the Natives of India; for independent of the late revolting outbreak, not a year passes without numerous commotions of more or less magnitude occurring, throughout the length and breath of the land; and such has been the want of confidence that not even a court of justice has been left without a guard of soldiers, either European or native, and it may be truly said that the revenue of India has hitherto been levied at the point of the bayonet; and to this system, entailing the necessity for small detachments to protect the civilian, and in aid of and to back up the civil authority, may in a great measure be attributed the disorganised state of the native army.

Demoralising effects of detachments.

III. The paucity of European civilians has necessitated our trusting most of the work to be carried out by native functionaries, principally Brahmins, whose bigotry and antipathies, together with their well-known avaricious character and love of intrigue, render them at least but doubtful instruments for honestly carrying out the views and intentions of Government, and dealing out justice to the people. This is the belief of all classes; the universal cry being, "Give us Europeans to deal with and to rule over us, and we shall then have fair play." The truth of this will be fully shown by the "Madras Torture Report," and that on the "Public Works Department" of the same Presidency.

Paucity of Europeans.

Character of Native officials.

Opinion of the people.

IV. Manifold authentic instances could be adduced, to prove the existence, amongst the Government native servants, of a systematic practice of imposition, now become the "*Mamool*" (custom). In fact, in one way or other, it is generally believed that *at least* ten per cent. over the regular Government assignment is so levied—the unfortunate "royot" (cultivator) being the principal sufferer. These impositions can only be stopped by the increase of European Government servants, and by throwing more Europeans into the country, as their example, combining deference to the law with a manful resistance to such extortions, will greatly tend to check them, for it is well known that the Native, under the present system, dreads to make his complaint, owing to the persecution to which he is sure to be subjected by the native officials; consequently the frequent rising *en masse* of a district, as, in their opinion, the only means of bringing their grievances to the notice of Government and obtaining redress.

Mamool impositions.

Necessity for increase of European officials.

Frequent cause of petty risings.

V. The increase to the Christian population would of necessity have its own influence on society at large, and not the least of our short-comings in India has been the manner in which we have ignored our religion, more particularly by showing a PREFERENCE to heathen caste in filling the Government offices with Brahmins and other high castes, much to the detriment of the other *inferior* castes, which are understood to include Eurasians (Indo-Britons) and other Native Christians.

Beneficial influence of increased Christian population.

Christian religion ignored.

VI. The advisability, it may be said, the necessity for an increase to the European population in India can hardly at the present day be a question, though the feasibility and mode of accomplishing it may be.

Advisability for an increased European population.

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European colonisation.

VII. The European soldier, besides being the most expensive is also the most unprofitable means of keeping up the required material. Colonisation by emigration, on the contrary, will, at the same time that it secures the required bulwark, introduce a practical, scientific, and superior working class, and in no country in the world is this so much required; for India has much retrograded in this particular under our rule, owing partly to her *home-mades* not being able to compete with European goods, though the raw material in many instances is far superior. What, for instance, can surpass in durability the Bombay made ships? and these ships cost a third less than English built ones.

Indian manufactures retrograded under our rule.

Agriculture not understood.

VIII. Agriculture is carried on at present in the rudest and most primitive style. Manuring is not in the least understood, and but rarely practised except in the vicinity of the residence of Europeans; and attention to the breeding of horses, cattle, and sheep, is entirely neglected, except in isolated cases, either under or at the suggestion of an European. It must, therefore, be evident that India has much to gain by the introduction of Europeans, as well as regards the social well-being of the people and general advancement of the country, as the all-important advantage which would accrue to the British rule in India by the introduction and general establishment of a population on whose attached loyalty dependence could be placed in times of trouble.

No attention to the breeding of cattle.

Importance of a dependable population.

Diversity of climate.

IX. The climate of India is, of course, the principal drawback to its European colonisation; but this is not so great an obstacle as may at first appear, consequent on the great diversity of climate, caused, principally by its mountain ranges, viz.: in Bengal, the Himalaya; in Bombay, the Malabewashaar; and in Madras, Mysore, the Shevaroy, Pulney, and Neilgherry hills; the latter of late the sanatorium even for Bengal and Bombay, owing as much to the salubrity of its climate as to readiness of access—it being easier for those residing in Lower Bengal and Bombay to reach their vicinity by sea, being distant only about 80 miles from the western coast, and about 100 from an eastern seaport; and increased facility will likewise be afforded by the railway shortly to be opened, and running round the base-ment of these hills. The proof of the salubrity of the Neil-gherry Hills exists besides in the fact of its being the sanatorium for European troops. A station has been formed within the last few years at Jackattalla, on the top of the Eastern or Coonoor Ghaut, where extensive public buildings have been and still continue to be erected. It is likewise the resort of retired, and

Mountain ranges as sanatoriums.

Neilgherry Hills.

Colonize Eur

invalid officers, both civil and military, some of whom have opened large coffee estates that extend down the side of the mountain as low as 2,000 feet, the climate at which altitude agrees well (when the jungle has been cleared) with the European constitution; but the uncultivated table-land altitude (7,000 feet) would alone suffice for the occupation and maintenance of at least 5,000 families, and this without the least interference with the natives: the few who live on and cultivate the hills having been principally induced to do so by the presence and requirements of European residents and visitors. Coffee estates. Altitude.

X. There are, however, three classes of native occupants—viz., the Todawars, a nomadic tribe (fast disappearing); the Kotah, chiefly ironsmiths; and the Burghers, or cultivators on a small scale. The whole of these people were found to be eking out a miserable existence, when first these hills were resorted to by Europeans, some thirty-eight years ago, but the Burghers have much improved since it has become a sanatorium for Europeans. Tribes on the Hills.

XI. The area of the plateau of the Neilgherry Hills comprises about 300,000 square acres, of which not more than 25,000 acres have been brought under cultivation. The soil is exceedingly rich and productive, and the climate sufficiently cool to admit of Europeans labouring throughout the day all the year round. Area.

The mean temperature at noon averages 68° in the hottest weather, and the coldest seldom exceeds 42°, with frost at night, during the months of December and January. The natural consequence of so even a temperature is a most healthy climate, and these hills are one of the few places in the world that have not been visited by cholera. Temperature. Cholera unknown.

But for a full description of these beautiful hills, with this delightful climate, see Captain Ouchterlony's Report to the Madras Government, in the "Madras Journal of Literature and Science," No. 34, Vol. XV., for December, 1848.

XII. I have restricted myself to observations on the Neilgherry Hills, being those which I am personally well acquainted with; but the Koondahs, an extensive adjoining range, must be equally eligible, and abound with magnificent forests and virgin soil, and consequently are well suited for the culture of coffee. The Shevaroys are principally under coffee cultivation, but the Pulneys still remain waste. Koondahs.

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Wynaad.

There is another range, the Wynaad, distant about 30 miles from the western seaports, upon which large coffee estates are yearly being opened. These are lower (about 2,800 feet), therefore not so well suited to the European constitution; however, the clearing of the jungle, in opening these estates, has had a wonderful effect, the result being a healthy locality in a part a few years back noted for its deadly jungle fever, but admitting now of the residence of the European coffee planters with their families, enjoying excellent health, though their occupation naturally causes them much exposure.

Beneficial effects of clearing the jungle.

Teak forests.

XIII. There are considerable tracts of teak forests both in Coorg and Mysore, and coffee and sugar estates have been opened, under European superintendence, which is found necessary on all such estates throughout the country. But there being no lack of native labour in these parts, European managers, overseers, &c., is all that would be required, though the climate both of Coorg and Mysore is well suited to the European constitution; Bangalore, in Mysore, for instance, the largest European station in Madras, is noted as one of the healthiest garrisons out of England.

Necessity for European superintendence.

Mode of strengthening our possessions.

XIV. In a country like Great Britain, from which so much emigration has flowed, I shall not presume on any suggestions as to the most advisable mode to be pursued to gain the grand desideratum of strengthening and improving our possessions in India, by the European colonisation of its mountain tracts and table lands, farther than to remark, that emigrants for India should leave these shores so as to arrive at their destinations early in November—the commencement of the cold season—and that, of course, on the outset, it would be requisite to hold out a sufficient inducement in the way of free passage, grants of land, &c., or few would be found willing to proceed to a country so little known and understood, and, at present, under so heavy a cloud. Yet I am persuaded that there are few parts of the world in which the new-comer would so speedily meet with comfort, independence, and a return for his labour or outlay—the climate and soil being particularly well adapted for the cultivation of coffee, tea, wheat, barley, &c., potatoes, vegetables of all descriptions, and most of the European fruits, including the mulberry: and the climate has been proved well suited to the silk-worm.

Inducements to emigrate.

Soil and climate well adapted to European cultivation.

Invalid soldiers and emigrants as a militia.

XV. A most feasible mode, well deserving *immediate* attention, likewise exists for at once commencing in India a system of colonisation at little or no expense to the State—viz., by the inducement to

officers, European pensioners, and invalid soldiers, of grants of land; and, with the faulty and much-to-be-regretted system at present in vogue of reinforcing the army in India by drafts of mere *lads*, a third at least of those now going out will be *hors de combat*, as soldiers, within the first year, but would acclimatise well as *settlers on the hills*, and should be formed into a militia, in which all other European settlers should be bound to serve, if required; but which would not be likely to occur, as independent of the force of the example of the industrious and peaceable population, the fact of so many able-bodied *acclimatised Europeans* being within call, would have its due weight on the native mind, and obviate the necessity for an expensive overpowering European force.

Acclimatised Europeans.

XVI. It would require one much more gifted, and an abler pen than mine, to point out the numerous advantages to be gained by the introduction of European civilisation, enterprise, and energy, for it is a lamentable fact, and patent to all acquainted with India, that no attempt has been made by Government to develope the manifold resources of our Indian Empire; on the contrary, a mistaken and blind policy has existed of discouraging European settlers; but it is to be hoped that that dark day has closed, and that a more enlightened one is dawning, and that India in future may look to be liberally governed, and not, as heretofore, ruled by the screw and bayonet.

Good results to be expected from European civilisation and energy.

Settlers hitherto discouraged.

XVII. It may appear strange that these mountain ranges are so little known or appreciated as sanatoriums for *troops;* but this may be partly accounted for by their having only recently been experimentalised upon as such, but "*mamool*" (custom)—that millstone of Indian improvement (equally crushing with caste)—has had its weight, therefore "*mamool*" has kept the sick soldier in hospital in the plains till the last moment, the survivors, at the customary period, appearing before a medical board to be passed for transmission to England at an enormous expense to the State and ruin to most of them, as many are immediately discharged on their arrival, with broken constitutions, as unfit for military service, and return to their homes either to be a burden to their families or their parishes; and so ends the life of many gallant soldiers, who, with timely change to the hills, and care on arrival there, might have recovered and returned to their duty as able-bodied, acclimatised soldiers, or remained on the hills as useful and comfortable settlers.

Cause of the hills being so little known and appreciated.

Beneficial results to the Army.