

Separate Despatch to Bengal ( No 71 of September 21, 1785; Bengal Draft Despatches No 1 pp 549, 1784-1786 March)

- B-XII/11
1. Board's instructions to prepare draft: 16.6.1785 (pp 150-54)
  2. Court's reply to Board: 29.6.1785 (pp 194-96). seeks clarification, expresses concern about constitution of military board etc..
  3. Draft of No 71 ( pp 222-304). Court's draft of August 11, 1785 ends on page 233. From para 16 only Board's draft is there till para 100 on page 304.
  4. Regulation on military hospitals (pp 304a-304g). Board's addition.
  5. Board's letter explaining alterations and additions dated August 18, 1785 (pp 305-7).
  6. Board's letter to Court asking preparing of similar draft to Madras and Bombay dated August 24, 1785. (pp 311).
  7. Court's letter dated August 26, 1785 to Board, expressing criticism of Board's alterations and additions. (pp 312-321).
  8. Board's reply of September 5, 1785 (pp 322-31) explaining purpose of changes and accepting a few minor suggestions.
  9. Board's memorandum of accepted suggestions to be incorporated (pp 332-4).

( The volume deals with drafts by Court, alterations made by Board of Commissioners ( Henry Dundas, Walsingham, W.W. Grenville, Mulgrave; William Pitt also with regard to transfer of debts from India to England. )

Para 16 Instead of the various sub-divisions of departments, by which the business of our settlements is now conducted, it is our order that the whole detail should be carried on under the following branches:

first The Board of Council

second A Military Board

third A Board of Revenue

fourth A Board of Trade

Para 17 The first of the Boards is to be the same in its constitution as the Council, lately established by the Act of Parliament, for regulating the affairs of India, and with which, so constituted, the legislature has intrusted the Supreme Government of our respective settlements; in them is vested the general executive government together with a superintending power over every other department, subject only in the exercise of their authority to such rules and limitations as the legislature has prescribed. The superior council will still continue to act in its double department of Public and Secret, and the duties respectively belonging to each seem to be accurately defined in the Minute of the Governor General and Council of the 23rd of September 1783, to which we refer you; except in so far as in the definition of the business of the Public Department it mentions " matters which regard commerce and shipping", our intention is that matters of that description are to belong to the Commercial Department.

Paras 18-29 The Military Board

Board of Revenue

Para 30 Various plans have been devised and carried into execution within these fifteen years for the collection of the revenue. It is no part of our intention at present to enter into a discussion of the merit or demerit of these various plans, but thus far we are clear, that the present variations of system which have occurred, have been attended with much inconvenience and great expense. It is therefore full time to adopt a settled plan; and for that purpose we direct that there be a Board of Revenue to reside at Calcutta, to consist of one of the junior members of Council, without any addition to his present salary, and four other of the most intelligent of the senior servants of the Company.

Para 31 To this department is to belong, subject to the control of the superior council, the whole administration, settlement, collection and receipt of every branch of our revenue together with the control of the several officers concerned therein; but they are to have no power of issuing any money for any purposes whatever, except in consequence of orders or warrants from the Board of Council, in whom this authority is

to be exclusively vested.

Para 32 We think it unnecessary to detail the particular regulations by which you are to arrange this department, we think it sufficient to refer you to the institution of the present Committee of Revenue, upon the foundation and principles of which we mean this Board should be established, and their general line of  ~~duty~~ their duty to be the same.

Para 33 The experience you have had of the conduct of your business of revenue, will enable you to judge how far the original regulation of that institution will admit of correction or improvement; and to that consideration your serious attention will be directed; and with respect to collectors and all other officers subordinate to the Board of Revenue, you will in concert with them, give a complete revision to the whole system of the Establishment, and will arrange it with due attention to the strictest economy, and to the general rules which we have prescribed for your conduct.

Para 34 We trust that long before this time you have made great and useful progress in this business and if in the arrangements you have already made either from motives of lenity or from your having been persuaded by the importunity or remonstrance of our servants, your measures have not coincided with the rules we now prescribe, you will revise your own conduct in those respects, and conform yourselves to the orders we have given.

Para 35 We think it almost unnecessary to add, as in justice to you we must suppose that immediately upon the receipt of our letter of the 11th April last ( reproduced in vol IX of Fort William- India House Correspondence, pp206 ), you will have, according to the terms thereof, reduced the whole of our revenue expenses within the sum of seventy two lakhs sicca ruppees. The further orders and directions we now give are founded on a full conviction, that by a steady adherence to the principles we have directed you to observe, a permanent establishment may be formed for the administration and collection of our revenues considerably below the large sum of seventy two lakhs of sicca ruppees.

Para 36 As an essential part of the conduct of this Board of Revenue, will be connected with a steady adherence to just and uniform principles in their transactions with the zemindars and other landholders in the provinces under our government, we have bestowed much attention upon that subject. To arrange a final system upon that head would certainly require other aids than that of General Theory and would require the benefit of local knowledge, but being possessed, as we are, of much useful information by the able writings of our servants in India, who have discussed that subject, and having the still further advantage of the assistance of some of our most able and experienced servants who are now in England, we propose in one of the early ships of this season, to transmit to you our sentiments, upon the general principles which we conceive ought to operate in regulating the tenures of the landholders in India.

Para 37 The proceedings of our Board of Revenue will ofcourse be regularly reported to you, and by you transmitted to us in a separate packet under the head of Revenue Department.

Board of Trade Paras 38-45

Para 46 As we take it for granted you will instantly carry into execution the arrangements for the conduct of our business, which we have now ordered, it only remains for us, upon this subject to inform you, that all our subsequent despatches on that supposition, will be addressed to you in your Public Department, Secret Department, Military Department, Revenue Department or Commercial Department.

Para 47 Despatches under the two first addresses will ofcourse remain with the superior council, in one of its departments, Public or Secret, and orders will be given by them to the inferior Boards, conformable to the despatches they shall receive in their Military, Revenue and Commercial Departments.

Para 48 By this means all correspondence will continue to pass through you, at the same time by a sub-division of the detail of our business, the whole will be conducted with regularity, dispatch and economy.

Para 49 Despatches from you are to come addressed to us under the same heads of Public, Secret, Military, Revenue and Commercial and the business of this Court will be arranged by us in a manner corresponding thereto, except so far as concerns business of a secret nature, which in terms of the Act of Parliament, must be conducted through the medium of the Secret Committee.

Paras 50-51 Steps to deal with leakage of official information through servants etc.  
ends ~~Madras~~ Para 100 with

we are, your affectionate friends,  
( Madras : Your loving friends )  
W. Devaynes plus 14 others

Variations in Despatch to Madras of same date

1. Para 16 and part of 17 upto "....as the legislature has prescribed." are joined together and reproduced as para 13 in Madras.
2. Rest of para 17 with slight modification becomes para 14 in Madras.
3. Paras 18-29 on Military Board become paras 15-26 in Madras.
4. Part of para 30 is omitted upto "... full time to adopt a settled plan." and the rest is made para 27 in Madras.
5. Paras 31 and 32 become para 28 and 29.
6. Para 33, 34, 35, 36 are omitted. The following is introduced as para 30.  
Para 30: However by alluding to the Committee of Revenue in Bengal we do not mean that you are literally to adopt every article of the regulations prescribed for them by the Governor General and Council, some of which might be inapplicable to your usual course of business. It will be a necessary object of your care to form in concert with your Revenue Board, and to transmit for our approbation, such a permanent system of rules and directions for their proceedings as you may judge best adapted to the circumstances and situation of our territorial possessions on the coast of Coromandel; and you will be cautious to arrange the Establishment with the strictest regard to economy and to the general rules which we have prescribed for your conduct.
7. Para 37 becomes para 31 of Madras.
8. Paras 46 to 49 become paras 40-43 of Madras; and 50-51 become 44-45.

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7. We will not now enquire whether the demand which Lord Hastings desires to make, in the form of a suggestion, upon the Nizam, be reasonable or not, nor shall we in this place make the observations which seem to us upon the objects to which (as we learn from another communicated letter to us by the chairman) Lord Hastings destines the sum to be received from the Nizam. Even if it was desirable to build a cathedral and an episcopal palace at Calcutta, we fear that the connection of these objects with the system proposed to be adopted towards the Nizam will more than counterbalance any moral advantage to be derived from them.

8. But there is in the present project (if it is so far advanced as to deserve that name) this peculiar cause of jealousy, in addition to all others which have attended former transactions of the kind, that at the very period in which the final ruin of the Nizam is become matter of no distant speculation, British subjects are encouraged and empowered to supply the pecuniary wants of that prince, in contravention of the repeated orders of the Court of Directors enforced by the Legislature. Upon this part of the subject you have already received the instructions of the Court in which we entirely concur.

9. We shall not now discuss the extent of interference on the part of the British Government through its accredited agent at the court of Hyderabad which it may be necessary to admit, with a view to the improvement of the Nizam's financial system. It is not easy to estimate the degree in which the extension of the sphere of interference recommended by the Resident in his despatch of November the 24th 1819 will tend to avert or to accelerate the crisis in which a more authoritative interposition would, according to the views of Lord Hastings, become unavoidable. But it is clear, that in so far as the line of policy suggested by Mr Russell would tend to avert that crisis, its tendency to that effect must consist in correcting extravagant expenditure, in mitigating the rigour of the revenue system, and in avoiding the necessity of those loans which according to Mr Russell can only be supplied by British subjects.

10. Under these impressions we have no hesitation in directing that no further step be taken, without our previous authority, for increasing in any shape, the sum to be paid to us by the Nizam, and particularly that the scheme of inducing the Nizam to contribute to the expense of public works at Calcutta be entirely abandoned.

India Board  
22nd June 1820

The Commissioners for the affairs of India direct that a letter be despatched by the Secret Committee in the usual form, according to the tenor of the foregoing Draft.

(signed) The Pere Courtenay

Secret Despatch to Bengal: 22nd June 1820

*complete*

Secret

22nd June 1820

To  
The Governor General in Council at Fort William  
in Bengal

1. The Chairman of the Court of Directors has communicated to us a letter which he has recently received from the Governor General in Council dated on the 21st of December 1819 enclosing copies of one addressed by his lordship to the Resident at Hyderabad on the 26th of October and of a despatch from the Resident of the 24th of November.

2. We will not here say anything of the irregularity of a mode of communication, by which a document of as great political importance as any that ever was transmitted to this country from India was placed entirely at the discretion of an individual, who might or might not think it advisable to make it over to the authority to which it ought properly to have been addressed. The tenor of the documents themselves requires an early and distinct expression of our sentiments.

3. We shall not until we are informed upon the subject in the regular mode by your lordship in council enter at any length into a consideration of the validity of the Nizam's claim upon the late acquisition of territory, or of our claim to the tribute due from that prince to the Peishwah, upon which points a discussion appears to have arisen.

4. Our attention is drawn by the Governor General's */an eventual interference* correspondence to the manifest danger of ~~our constant~~ *influence* in the affairs of the Nizam tending finally to our assumption of his territory. While Lord Hastings expresses his convictions of the very unfavourable light in which this extremity would be viewed in England, his lordship nevertheless appears to view what would undoubtedly be the prevalent feeling here as likely to originate in an erroneous or incomplete understanding of the exigency of the case. It is an extremity however which would in our opinion upon any grounds yet stated to us be wholly without justification.

5. It has been with great reluctance that we have approved of acquisition of territory in wars occasioned by the wanton aggression of princes from whom that territory has been taken; But we do trust that no occasion will ever again be sought or found for deriving an increase of power or dominion from the necessities of an ally and a tributary.

6. That public feeling is not a mistaken feeling which regards as discreditable to the national character a system under which a series of pecuniary exactions, however just in their origin and principle, ends at last in the annihilation of the native power from whom these exactions have been made, and assuredly the discredit is greatly more manifest when the pecuniary difficulties of the native prince are enhanced by transactions, which professedly operating to his relief, and in the first instance really palliating his difficulties must ultimately lead to the utter ruin of his finances.

from Secret Despatches 1817-27, vol 34, pages 113-8 ,  
in the Political and Secret Department Records, India Office  
Library.

*Hyderabad  
British demand  
for Nizam  
contribution  
to building  
of Calcutta  
Cathedral*

VII  
Securing a Contribution from the Nizam

11th Article in Treaty

B-XII/3

11. His Highness the Nizam contemplating the great benefits which he has reaped from the late military operations in the extension of his rule, the protection of his people, and the security of his dominions, and being anxious to manifest his sense of those advantages, desires to contribute the sum of 16 lakhs (payable by annual instalments of four lakhs till the amount be completed) to be expended for public purposes in the capital city of Calcutta, and the neighbouring pergunnahs, on the condition that the expenditure of that sum for these purposes shall take place according to the will and judgement of his excellency the Governor General.

C. T. Metcalfe  
Acting Resident

Secret Letter from Bengal: 13.1.1821.

7. Immediately after the perusal of your letter, injunctions were despatched to the Resident not to let the matter be broached to His Highness. They arrived a few days too late. The suggestion had been made to the Nizam by his minister, and His Highness instantly declared his most cordial assent to the proposition. An article notifying his spontaneous boon in token of gratitude for experienced benefits, was sent by him for our approbation of its being inserted in the treaty. A copy of it is enclosed. We shall profess a due sense of His Highness's generous wish; but shall consonantly to your command decline acceptance.

We have the honour to be with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sirs,  
Your Most Faithful Humble Servants

Hastings,  
J. Adam,  
John Fendall.

from Enclosures to Secret Letters from Bengal 1819-23  
vol 21.  
from Bengal Secret Letters 1820-22, vol 19, pages 423-7.  
Volume also contains Hastings Letter of 1.3.1820  
(pages 5-169, 148 paras); Hastings letter of 21.8.1820  
(pages 257-401, 125 paras) regarding Peshwa and Berar;  
and Hastings letter of 17.10.1822 (pages 467-540, 66 paras).  
Letter of 1.3.1820 is a review of events including  
Oodeypore etc.

Re: Nizam's Etiquette 1821

To

G. Swinton, Esq.  
Secretary,  
Secret and Political Department.

Sir,

In a former letter I adverted to an attempt made by the Nizam to alter the etiquette of his court with regard to the reception of the Resident. I now proceed to submit the particulars of that affair, with some other remarks on points of a similar nature.

2. There are forms in the intercourse between the court and the Residency, which appear to me to be objectionable. One is, that all gentlemen presented to the Nizam, with the exception of the Resident offer Nuzzurs, a practice which I had supposed to be exclusively confined to the court of the Great Mogul, the nominal and heretofore acknowledged emperor of India. The same practice however has hitherto existed at the court of his Viceroy in the Dekkan, with the exception above mentioned of the Resident.

3. On my introduction, though I was surprised and disappointed at the intelligence, that the gentlemen who accompanied me, would have to present Nuzzurs, I did not chuse to commence my intercourse with the Nizam by the abolition of an established practice, as such a measure would most probably have created a personal disgust.

4. Therefore in that respect and all others the established etiquette of the court was scrupulously attended to on my part, though it appeared to me in some respects to be inconsistent with the relation existing between our government and that of the Nizam.

5. I notice this because it makes his Highness's attempt to detract from the forms of attention hitherto observed towards the British Representative the more unreasonable.

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India Office Records: Bengal Political Consultations: 10th March, 1821 (No. 84): Letter from Secretary to Government, Secret and Political Department to C.T. Metcalfe, Resident at Hyderabad.

6. It is customary for the Nizam to embrace the Resident on their meeting; and this form was duly observed towards Mr. Russel and myself at the interview at which he took leave and I was presented.

7. The ceremony of embracing implies that the Nizam must be on his legs at the time, and therefore that he must have risen to receive the person embraced.

8. The public compliment of rising, His Highness has always evaded, by not being in the Reception Chamber at the time of the Residents arrival, and by either making him wait, or coming to meet him from one door, as he enters at another. The last was the course adopted on the occasion of my introduction.

9. In short the embrace is the only ostensible compliment paid by the Nizam to the British Representative. In other respects generally the forms of Royalty are assumed by the Nizam, and admitted by the Resident, such as the application of the Title Hoozoor ~~to~~ i-poor-Noor to his highness. The placing of his designation at the top of any written communication, and not where the sense of the text would require it, with other similar forms.

10. On my second visit to His Highness undertaken for the purpose before described, he received me in a part of the palace called the Khawanbgah or sleeping apartment, where he was seated awaiting my arrival. He did not go through the form of embrace. I did not observe, or do not recollect, whether he rose to receive me or not, but as doing so, would not have been consistent with the manifest design of his avoiding the embrace, it is most probable that he did not.

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India Office Records: MSS European  
P 109/G: J. Adam Papers:  
Letter from the Resident Hyderabad  
(C.T. Metcalfe) to Government  
Dated 13. 2. 1821:  
(Extract)



11. It is singularly strange that I did not at the time notice any omission in the form of my reception. The truth is that my mind was so full of the object which I had in view, which was to lay the foundation of a cordial intercourse that I did not give a single thought to the affair of my own reception; not suspecting the possibility of any attempt to lower its respectability; and my only anxiety was, that every attention, which it rested with me to pay to His Highness's dignity should be strictly observed.

12. With the exception of the omission mentioned, His Highness's reception of me was as kind and gracious as I could possibly wish; and the omission having entirely escaped my notice, did not in the least affect the cordiality of my communication, nor disturb the execution of the purpose for which I had gone to court.

13. It did not occur to me till after my return home, that the embrace had been omitted. I afterwards found that the circumstance had not escaped the notice of others.

14. It was my duty to make a remonstrance; and I was assured that the omission should not occur again; but I regret the circumstance described very much, for it is not improbable that the Nizam from being under the necessity of doing what he tried to evade, may do it with reluctance and ill will, and that it may be a perpetually recurring source of annoyance to him.

15. It will be in his Lordship's recollection that a similar attempt was made on the arrival of my predecessor.

16. Being on the subject of ~~R. Fiquitti~~ <sup>Le Fiquitte</sup> it may be right to mention, that in personal communication with the Ministers of the Nizam, it has been customary at this court for the Resident to wait on the Minister, and not for the Minister to come to him.

17. This appeared to me to be derogatory to the ~~perma~~ paramount dignity of the British Government in India, in as far as respects the want of reciprocal attention on the part of the Minister, and I was desirous of altering it.

18. In preference however to making any demand on the subject, I adopted another course, which I thought would affect my purpose, without the necessity of any discussion. When I had any communication to make to the Minister, which required personal intercourse, I sent my first ~~let~~, *assistant* instead of going myself. In a short time the Minister proposed that he should pay me a visit on business; and our inter-~~course~~ *course* is now on what I consider a proper footing. He comes to me, or I go to him indifferently.

19. With reference to the practice of giving Muzzurs alluded to in the first part of this letter, it is my intention to bring it ~~and~~ gradually into disuse, and to drop it entirely in the end, if I can do so without giving great offence.

I have etc.

C.T. Metcalfe,  
Resident

Hyderabad  
13th February, 1821.

To

C.T. Metcalfe Esq.,  
Resident at Hyderabad.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch of the 13th ultimo, reporting the attempt made by His Highness the Nizam to alter the etiquette of his court with regard to the Resident's reception.

2. The course which you adopted on the occasion adverted to in your Despatch is entirely approved. His Excellency-in-Council also approves the change which you have effected in the mode of communications between the Resident and the Minister and which you have now placed on the proper footing.

3. With regard to the presentation of Nuzzurs His Lordship does not attach much consequence to it so long as the Resident who is the immediate organ of his Government is not required to offer them. Your intention however to drop the practice, if it can be done without giving offence to His Highness is approved.

I have etc.  
Geo Swinten  
Secretary to Government

Fort William  
10th March, 1821

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India Office Records: Bengal Political  
Consultations: 10th March, 1821 (No.85):  
Letter from Secretary to Government,  
Secret and Political Department to  
C.T. Metcalfe, Resident at Hyderabad.

VII  
B-XII/5

Secret Despatch to Bengal: 5th December 1821

Secret

5th December 1821

To  
The Governor General in Council at Fort William  
in Bengal

1. We have received your despatch of the 13th January last in answer to that which we addressed to you on the 22nd June 1820, in reference to the proposed advance of money from the Nizam.
2. The loans negotiated with the Nizam, under your sanction, by the British commercial house at Hyderabad, having been under the consideration of the Court of Directors, we have communicated to that Court your despatch of the 13th January, in order that the whole subject of pecuniary transactions with the Nizam, in which the British Government is in any way concerned, might be treated in one despatch; and we have to express our full concurrence in the observations upon these subjects, which are contained in the Political Despatch of the Court of Directors dated on the 28th ultimo.
3. In reference however to the topics of your letter of the 13th of January which more particularly arose out of our former Despatch, we are sorry to observe, that the explanation which you have given to your motives of addressing to the Chairman, rather than to us, the information contained in Lord Hastings letter of the 21st December 1819, is far from satisfactory. Without adverting again to the importance of the matter to which the letter referred, it may be sufficient to remind you, that it placed in the power of an individual, the correspondence between the head of the Government in India, and its official representative at a foreign court. And your irregularity consisted, not only in failing to transmit these documents to us, but in communicating them to any other person. At the same time we have no doubt it was only through inadvertance that you overlooked the intimation; which however we have of late taken repeated occasions of conveying to you, that the Chairman of the Court, the President of the Board of Commissioners and all other persons except this Committee, and the Court of Directors, are, in reference to the correspondence of the Indian Governments, only private persons.
4. We cannot recognise the distinction between the public and private treasury of the Nizam, so far as to be induced to retract the observations which we made on the inconsistency of seeking or even accepting money from a foreign prince, & necessities of whose Government you were at the same time supplying; by means inconsistent with the general principle of your Government, contrary to our repeated orders, and tending to perpetrate the embarrassments of the state itself.
5. If the prince himself having at this moment the means of relieving his own Government from a part of these embarrassments, preferred, through a strange perversion, the method of borrowing money at a high interest from individuals, it

From Secret Despatches 1817-27, vol 34, pages 151-4, in the Political and Secret Department Records, India Office Library.

was surely incumbent upon you rather to use your influence in persuading him to a wiser administration of his affairs, than to encourage him in his imprudence by consenting to derive advantage from the misapplication of his revenues.

6. As to the grounds upon which you state your claims to a concession from the Nizam, we must observe, that we cannot approve of an attempt to recover from a weaker ally by persuasion any portion of a political advantage regularly given to him, though it subsequently deemed improvident or excessive. The only legitimate object with which it could be right to remodel the arrangement by which the Nizam had profited, would surely have been that of securing to the Hyderabad state the benefits of your former concessions in such manner as to augment the prosperity and stability of the Government. Any other course, however innocent in its true motives, must be liable to the suspicion of originating in an intention to enhance the difficulties of an ally, with a view to its annihilation.

7. While we think it necessary, in explanation of our former instructions, to make these observations, we recognise with satisfaction the promptitude with which you have carried these instructions into effect; and we trust that your future transactions with the Nizam will be conformable to the policy which we desire to pursue towards the princes of India who still retain their sovereignty.

India Board  
5th December 1821

The Commissioners for the affairs of India direct that a letter be despatched by the Secret Committee, according to the tenor of the foregoing Draft.

(signed) Thomas Pere Courtenay.

VII  
Secret Despatch to India: 10th March 1823

10th March 1823

To  
The Governor General in Council at Fort William  
in Bengal

B-XVII/6

7. The situation in which the new Governor General will find the relations of the British Government with the native powers of India, will be such, we trust, as to ensure the continuation of peace.

8. There is no power nor any combination of powers, which could make head against us or furnish reasonable ground of a attack. No further acquisition of territory can be desirable. The extent of empire which you have to govern ( in the detail peculiar to Indian Administration) is such as it would not only be unwise, but hardly safe to exceed. Upon this conviction we rely for the preservation of peace.

9. At what point, or whether at any point, it would have been practicable or politic to arrest the progress of a dominion, now fearfully large, would at this moment be a vain enquiry.

10. But a more difficult part of your political administration is the management of your relations with allies and feudatories. With respect to these anomalous connections, we hope at least that it is even now not too late to profit by experience, especially in avoiding a course of measures tending to the ruin of an ally, at whose misrule we have connived, and by whose annihilation we are aggrandized.

11. Upon this topic, as affecting particularly the state of Hyderabad we addressed you on the 22nd of June 1820 and 5th December 1821. Further reflection has confirmed us in the impression which we then felt, of the dangerous position of our connection with the Nizam.

12. We are aware that it is not easy task so to regulate our interference, as at once to maintain in any degree of independence a government so powerless and inefficient, and to preserve his dominions from that state of anarchy, which is alike dangerous to his neighbours and to himself. Without our aid, he can neither enforce the collection of his revenues, nor defend himself against his lawless subjects; if that aid be not conceded, the government is dissolved, if it be largely and continually afforded, the government is suspended.

13. Yet however difficult it may be to lay down precise rules of conduct in a dilemma like this, some leading principles may be stated, from which it can scarcely in any case be wise or just to depart.

From Secret Despatches 1817-27, vol 34, pages 165-70, Despatch No 506 in the Political and Secret Department Records, India Office Library. The complete Despatch, from which the above is an extract, consists of 34 paras and is on pages 163-182.

14. In the first place we rank the principle laid down in our former Respatches of not aggravating by any proceeding whatsoever, and least of all by any proceeding from which we are to derive a profit, the financial distresses of a native state. This is a clear and simple position of which you ought never to lose sight.

15. The others are in their nature less precise; that advice should be given as rarely and always with as little of authority as possible and that the measures of active interference should be effected in the name of the native prince himself, with the least practicable assumption of superiority.

16. Principles such as these are laid down by Lord Hastings in his Secret Letter of the 21st August 1820 (paragraphs 109 and following). We take this opportunity of expressing our general concurrence in his Lordship's views upon this subject, at the same time expressing our earnest hope, that the modifications of his policy, which he felt himself compelled to admit in respect of the Nagpore state may have already ceased. Even these modifications, we trust, where we had the right of conquerors, will be avoided at Hyderabad where our character is that of an ally.

17. The reference to Nagpore leads to another question of policy, nearly affecting the present topic, as it regards both the Nagpore Rajah and the Nizam upon which we addressed you so long ago as the 3rd of April 1815, a Despatch which has been for eight years unnoticed by the Government. Upon this question we refer you to a Despatch which you will shortly receive from the Court of Directors in the Political Department.

18. It cannot be denied that the difference of situation is not greater between a country of which the affairs, civil and military, are in a great part administered by a foreign power, and one which has no pretence to the character of a separate and independent state, nor can the tendency be doubted of the real, to slide into the avowed, subjection. Nevertheless it is our earnest and sincere desire to preserve as completely as possible to all our allies the degree of independence which they now enjoy; and we should more willingly listen to a suggestion for emancipating them, than to one for bringing them under further control.

19. We conclude these observations without laying down any positive injunctions for the guidance of your conduct, but we have thought Lord Hastings entitled to a record of our opinion upon the line of policy which he has recommended in regard to dependent states, and Lord Amherst to a general declaration of our sentiments, and to our acknowledgement of the difficulty of his task.

20. One caution the history of late years suggests to us; you are not to apprehend a dangerous league against you such as to justify wars and conquests from the mere existence of a correspondence among native princes, in which a jealousy of Europeans, and restlessness under their yoke is betrayed. This feeling must always exist among the natives. But you must look rather to their means of supporting their complaints than to the terms in which they express them. It is right to enforce the stipulations which exist against such

communications but it is not every casual deviation from them which indicates an intention of resistance, or ~~is~~ is to be treated, as an act of war.

21. We now think it necessary to make some observations upon the situation of those states, with which our relations were materially altered in the progress or result of the late war. And first of Holkar. ...

India Board  
10th March 1823

The Commissioners for the Affairs of India direct that a letter be dispatched by the Secret Committee, in the usual form, according to the tenor of the foregoing Draft.

(signed) Thos Pere Courtenay.



Political Despatch to Bengal: 21.1.1824

B-XII / 7

Sixthly general considerations affecting our practical policy in regard to the Nizam and other native princes; suggested by the information derived from the correspondence between the Bengal Government and the late and present Residents of Hyderabad.

Summary  
System  
Hyd, Nagpur

68. Important as are the transactions of the house of Mr W. Palmer & Co with the Nizam's minister, both as they affect the interests of His Highness's state and the credit and character of the British Government, there still remains for consideration a question of far greater difficulty than any which they suggest, a question which sooner or later, would have required attention even if that house had never existed, because it has grown out of the system of policy which has been pursued by us in regard to the Nizam during a long period of time, although the crisis which has forced it into present discussion has doubtless been accelerated by the transactions of that mercantile firm. The question to which we allude is no other than this. By what means can the government of an ally be saved from dissolution, and the character of a substantive power be preserved or restored to the state of Hyderabad? In the successful solution of this problem, however perplexing and beset with difficulties it may be found, both our honour and interests are doubly involved.

69. The extinction of the Nizam's Government, the great evil to be apprehended, and the consummation of which we have most sincerely at heart to prevent, may be brought in two ways. It may be subverted should we withdraw our support from it; or it may be superseded by our active intervention.

70. The probability of its subversion & in the event of our withdrawing our support is founded on the reigning Prince's alleged inaptitude for discharging the duties of a ruler; the state of his family; and the chances of a struggle among his sons for the succession; the habit in the Government of depending on foreign aid, and its consequent supposed disability for independent action if left to itself and lastly the corruption which pervades the whole system of internal administration and which in order to find the means of gratification might if unchecked by us resort to measures so intolerably oppressive as to excite the people to resistance and thereby throw the country into a state of inextricable confusion and anarchy at once incompatible with the stability of its own Government and the tranquility of its neighbours.

71. From the minutes recorded by the members of the present Government it appears to us that whilst they overrate the danger of withdrawing and the immediate advantage of actively interfering in the Nizam's internal administration they are not sufficiently impressed with the consequences to which the latter course may eventually lead.

72. A desire to secure the objects of the alliance and to render the connection subservient to British interests led originally to our interference in the Nizam's internal government, and an apprehension whether well or ill-founded that we cannot withdraw that interference with safety to the interests of either state has been given by Sir Charles Metcalfe as a reason not only for continuing but greatly extending it.

73. The policy of this extended interference consisting not merely in a vigilant control on the part of the Company's resident over the different branches of internal administration but in an active concern and participation in all its details has been advocated by Sir Charles Metcalfe, Mr Adam, Mr Fendall, Mr Bayley, and latterly by Mr Harrington since his accession to a seat in council as absolutely necessary to secure that reform which they deem indispensable to the salvation of the state; whilst on the other hand, it has been condemned by the late Governor General as a deviation from the line of conduct which had been prescribed to the Resident as an unwarrantable infringement of the just rights of the Nizam, and as more likely to defeat than to promote the object which it professed to have in view.

74. In many of the general observations contained in the minute of the Marquis of Hastings dated the 19th December 1822, we are disposed to concur but we cannot help observing that the objections so forcibly urged by His Lordship against a direct interference in the civil administration of the Nizam apply with equal justice to the measures which have been adopted for some years past with the view of improving the discipline and efficiency of His Highness's army, measures which notwithstanding the disapprobation of them expressed in the Despatch from our Secret Committee of the 3rd April 1815, have been preserved in and extensively applied both at Hyderabad and Nagpore, and were defended in your political Letter dated 3rd June 1820 on the ground that the reformed corps as they are called "become in effect part of our army."

75. The Marquis of Hastings may have been right in considering all apprehensions of political danger to us from the system in question as unfounded and the contrast which had been drawn in the Secret Committee's Despatch of 1815 between the subsidiary system and the system of officering the native troops as not supported by facts. But it would not follow that after having taken on ourselves to defend the territories of our allies as we have done by our subsidiary treaties, we should also undertake the training and officering of the troops which they employ chiefly in the performance of municipal duties: neither can we conceive how the latter system can be reconciled with the argument against direct interference in the Nizam's affairs, so ably maintained in His Lordship's minute of the 19th December last.

76. In our view of the matter the policy of disciplining and officering the Nizam's army is as much part of the question now before us as the settlement of His Highness's land revenue undertaken by Sir Charles Metcalfe; and we regard both measures as open to the most serious objections.

77. These objections we proceed to state in the expectation that they will receive from you the most deliberate consideration and that, if you cannot retrace your steps (a course which we should nevertheless be sorry to consider as hopeless) they will at least have due influence on the future policy of your Government in cases where you do not stand committed to a specific line of conduct, and have not yet advanced too far to recede.

78. In judging of any arrangements, it is desirable that all the good and all the evil attendant upon it should be brought distinctly into view, and it appears to us that all the advantages to be derived from appointing European

officers to discipline and command the troops of states in alliance with us, consists in this; that the corps will ~~it~~ thereby be rendered more efficient. This is doubtless an advantage, though by no means so important an advantage in the present state of India as it was when there was a greater probability of wars and warlike confederacies being directed against British interests; nay, it is not perhaps going too far to say that under existing circumstances it is desirable that the native princes should be discouraged from entertaining large military establishments, and it even merits consideration whether in cases where they are bound to us by treaty to maintain a certain force, it might not be politic, if not altogether to absolve them from such engagements, at least to modify or relax their obligations so as to bring the cost of them within the means of the native state. When a larger force is kept up than the state can afford to pay, revenue for a time is extorted from the people at the point of the bayonet. Rapacity soon defeats its own ends, the public resources instead of improving ~~in~~ decline, the pay of the troops falls in arrear. Discontent leads to mutiny, the soldiers are converted into freebooters, and predatory associations are formed which the protection due to our subjects and the interest we have in preserving the general tranquility compel us to put down at whatever cost.

79. But supposing the advantage of securing to our allies the possession of an efficient military force to be far more (cons)quivalental than it appears to be, it surely will be allowed to be an advantage which may be purchased at too high a price. It is material therefore to enquire what is the price paid for this advantage, such as it is, or, in other words to consider the evils attendant on the policy, as it affects first, the native states, secondly, our own interests, and thirdly, the interests of both conjointly.

80. First: As it affects the native states. It appears to us to be humiliating and galling in the extreme. The proceeding of appointing European officers to the command of corps raised and maintained by princes whom we have not as yet at least professed to treat as dependent, must be felt as a fresh inroad on their remains of independence, as an exclusion of the higher class of natives from the places of power, trust and emolument which they have hitherto held and of which it is both cruel and unjust to deprive them and as indicative of further designs on our part which we assuredly do not entertain and which it is very undesirable to have implied to us.

81. With reference also, to the 13th article of the treaty of 1800 with the Nizam, it appears to us very doubtful whether the proceeding be consistent with good faith & particularly if as stated by the Marquis of Hastings "the mode of officering and paying the reformed corps <sup>render</sup> ~~shall~~ them in effect a part of our army upon whose fidelity we may rely even in a rupture with their nominal chief."

82. The separation which this view implies of the military from the civil power cannot fail to paralyse the energies and, in course of time, to destroy the existence of any government which submits to it. That our subsidiary system tends to produce these results cannot be doubted but the results were at least retarded by the possession, on the part of the native states of a military force of their own

over which we exercised no control. Deprived of control over that force they cannot long retain the internal management of the country, and when this is given up it is clear that the governments exist ényly in name.

83. Secondly: The inconvenience of this policy as it affects the Company's interests, though serious, may be stated in a few words. You are already in possession of our decided opinion that Company's officers ought exclusively to be selected for the service in question. But the narrower the field of selection, the greater in some respects is the inconvenience. If the officers be well selected they will be those who can be least spared; Men skilled in their profession, conversant with the languages of the country, and qualified, by their disposition, manners, and experience, to conciliate and influence the natives. Men of that description are extremely valuable and the loss of them must be most sensibly felt by the corps from which they are detached. If on the other hand they are chosen without discrimination, they will in many instances, be ill-qualified for the service in which they are deputed, and perhaps in some, discredit their appointment and bring into disrespect the European character.

84. Nor do we deem an arrangement well devised, or even reasonable under which the Company are subjected to the burthen of paying 50 or 60, or it may be 100 officers employed and paid also by the Nizam and the Nagpore Rajah or any other Indian princes.

85. Thirdly: A few observations remain to be added respecting the present policy as it affects the native states and British interests conjointly. The British Government is deeply interested in the good government of these particular states not only on account of its general concern for their welfare as allies but because its constant and active interference for a series of years in the management of the affairs of the Nizam and more recently in the administration of the Nagpore Rajah have to a considerable extent staked its honour and character on the result. Seeing the importance, then, not only to our allies, but to ourselves, that our policy should be so shaped as to insure good government in so far as depends on us, let the arrangement under discussion be tried to that test.

86. It is ~~only~~ a self evident proposition that in proportion to the extent of power vested in any individual ought to be the strictness of responsibility for its due exercise, and the checks upon its abuse. The European officers in the service of the Nizam and the Nagpore Rajah are vested with with power civil as well as military. They (not) only discipline and command the corps to which they are severally attached but they are entrusted with the administration of revenue and police, and in both capacities they appear to us to be equally exempt from responsibility. The authority of the Residents however great in other respects does not legally extend to those officers; and, even were the native governments less inefficient it is not within the competence of the British Indian Government to render British subjects amenable to their laws. Setting aside, too, the anomaly in the constitution of a military force of which the troops would be subject to one law and the officers to another, we are doubtful whether the articles of war contain any provision applicable to offences committed by British officers when employed in the service of a foreign prince.

87. Here then are a number of individuals, many of them very young men, entrusted with most extraordinary powers & placed in circumstances of strong temptation to abuse these powers and subject to little or no responsibility for the exercise of them. We are far from wishing to exaggerate the probable evils of such an arrangement, but a solemn sense of duty does not permit us to suppress our apprehensions that it will be attended with practical abuses most calamitous to the countries which may be the theatre of them, and injurious, little less to the reputation of the Government which does not prevent them, than to the character of the immediate actors in them.

88. Our anticipations from such a state of things are unfortunately justified by experience. In 1775 the assistance of British officers was granted at his request, to Nabob Aseph ul Dowlah to command six battalions of sepoy, six regiments of cavalry, and three companies of artillery. But in less than two years, it was found necessary to discontinue the plan for the following reasons, as set forth in a minute recorded by Mr Hastings on the 5th May 1877. First: The superior pay and emoluments enjoyed by the officers in the Nabob's service, excited murmuring and dissatisfaction among those who remained in the Company's service, and by discouraging their zeal and attention to their duty, tended to the general relaxation of discipline. Second: The want of effectual checks had been deeply felt, the principle of moderation which should actuate the conduct of officers in their public disbursements having been found to have little influence when the expense was defrayed by a state on which they had no natural and permanent dependence. Hence the burthen had become too enormous for the Nabob to bear. Thirdly: The service having been too remote for the British Government to observe and restrain all abuses in it, local interests were acquired, and opportunities of making undue advantages, afforded. Fourthly: The officers employed on this service being exempt from the articles of war, the British Government had no further influence over them than such as was created by a dread of losing their profits, which alone was insufficient to restrain excesses proceeding from, the same principle.

89. It may perhaps be said that the greatest change which has taken place in our political situation in India, renders any inferences deducible from these early transactions inapplicable now. Although our situation/doubtless /has changed in many respects in the course of nearly half a century, yet this change does not in our judgement, prevent the military arrangements which took place in regard to Oude in 1775, 1777, and 1781 from being highly instructive at the present juncture. The Arrangements for disciplining the troops of the Nabob Vizier and the Nizam are exactly similar, and the results depending, not on accidental circumstances of time and place, but on the unalterable laws of human nature, we greatly fear will be the same in both cases.

90. Indeed the chances of abuse are greater now than they were then, in as much as the officers appointed to discipline and command the Nizam's corps (as has been already observed) have been entrusted with civil as well as military duties. Civil duties presenting strong temptation unaccompanied with any efficient check, or more than nominal responsibility. For their military duties, they may at least be qualified, but we cannot comprehend how a few young men with no other

experiencethan they can have acquired in serving with their respective corps or in the office of a political Resident could without having the ordinary advantage of instruments of their own selection be at all competent to superintend the revenue settlement of an extensive country, a task requiring a combination of qualities which it is difficult to find even among those who have devoted a considerable portion of their lives to the practical study of revenue business.

91. But supposing the settlement to have been judiciously formed, the object of protecting the agricultural population would still be unattained unless security were afforded that the collection should not exceed the sums assessed. We were not, therefore, surprised to find it stated in Sir Charles Metcalfe's report of the 7th November 1821, that the satisfaction of the cultivators at the settlement was "clouded by a dread that the systematic bad faith of the Nizam's Government may render nugatory the benefits of the arrangement." That the apprehensions of the cultivators were by no means groundless fully appears from Sir Charles Metcalfe's subsequent letter dated the 31st May 1823, wherein he states that he had been obliged to resort to the nomination of "officers charged with the general duty of receiving the complaints of cultivators or others oppressed by the Government, and obtaining redress for them either by application to local authorities or by representation to the Resident, and, though, him, to the Nizam's Government." These officers were also empowered to apprehend banditti and other criminals, and to deliver them over to the local authorities. Although these expedients did not quite amount to an assumption of the judicature of the country, they show how one act of interference naturally and almost necessarily leads to another; that revenue settlements are of little value unless security be afforded to the Malguzars that no more will be exacted from them than they engaged to pay; and that if an interference is to be effectual for the /our protection of the people in whose behalf it professes to be exerted, we cannot stop short of taking into our hands the whole administration of the country, or, in other words, of entirely superseding the existing Government, This being an end which we (have) no right to compass, we cannot stand justified in pursuing a course of measures inevitably leading to it, however good may be the intentions by which they are dictated, and however considerable may be the immediate benefit derivable from them. But even were the end unobjectionable, the means far from being so, because consisting of power without check, and agents exempt from responsibility they constitute a certain guarantee for bad government.

92. Entertaining these sentiments, we cannot caution you with too much earnestness to avoid all interference in the internal administration of those states which we have lately, entered into subsidiary engagements and we wish you to consider the system of officering the troops of these states with European officers as a branch of that interference, from which we are very desirous to withdraw, whenever you shall see an occasion for accomplishing that object, with facility and safety. The obligation which we have incurred to act as arbitrators in their disputes with each other neither bind nor entitle us to interfere in their domestic concerns; and should you perceive any disposition to such interference on the part of your political Residents, we desire that it may be promptly and decisively checked,

93. The question as to the practical policy, to be observed in regard to the Nizam's Government is perplexed in some degree by the character of the reigning prince but still more by a long course of past interference and by the 17th article of the treaty of 1800, under which we are bound, in certain cases, to employ our military force in quelling disturbances within His Highness's dominions.

94. Sir Charles Metcalfe in his letter dated the 20th June 1822 expressed a doubt "whether His Highness's abstraction from public business, which is of long standing, proceeds from natural indolence and love of ease, or from that control exercised by his minister with our support." It is very desirable that this point should be settled because, if there be no natural incapacity in His Highness, one objection to our placing him in the exercise of his proper functions as sovereign of the country, would disappear.

95. With respect to our past course of interference, it may be traced to the appointment, in 1809, of Rajah Chundoo Lall to the office of Peshcar, at the instance of your Government, on an understanding that, nominally subordinate to Mooneer ool Moolk, he was to be active prime minister, or rather actual ruler of the country, and of course to attend to the views and wishes of the Government to which he owed his elevation, and from which he expected support. In so far as British interests are exclusively concerned, the Rajah seems to have furnished you with no ground of complaint; but of his internal administration, we fear that little can be said in the way of praise. Although represented by Sir Charles Metcalfe as the best man of business about court, he is at the same time described as rapacious, extortionate, and wasteful of the public resources, which he prodigally expends in bribery for the preservation of his power, and as being in the habit of secretly counteracting plans of reform recommended by the Resident, which he professed to favour.

96. But, notwithstanding these representations of the character of the minister, Sir Charles Metcalfe was told in Mr Swinton's letter dated the 25th October 1822, that "it would be the deepest stain to British honour were he (the minister) left to the ruin which must follow the discontinuance of our plighted support." And in the event of the Nizam manifesting any disposition to remove Rajah Chundoo Lall from office, the Resident was instructed to give His Highness to understand that such a step "would cause a material change in the connection between the two Governments"; and might give rise to a claim, on your part to all the rights possessed by the Peshwa over the Hyderabad dominions.

97. The instructions conveyed to the Resident in Mr Swinton's letter do not appear to us to be either sufficiently guarded, or altogether in accordance with the sentiments contained in the late Governor General's minute of the 19th December last.

98. Although it is incumbent on us to protect Rajah Chundoo Lall from any vindictive feeling on the part of the Nizam, and even to use our influence, in the event of his removal from office, to obtain for him a provision suited to his rank and station, we are not aware of our having incurred any obligation to continue our support to him as minister longer than his conduct deserves it; and if, as Lord Hastings seems to have been of opinion, all the advantages of direct

interference might have been secured through the influence of the Resident with the Nizam's minister, it seems essential to this influence that the minister should be in some degree dependent on the person exercising it, and that he should have to dread the discontinuance, as well as to hope for the continuance, of the Resident's support.

99. This, however, is altogether a forced and unnatural system of government; and we agree with Sir Charles Metcalfe that a "a system of non-interference founded on regard for the rights of an independent sovereign, if practicable under the circumstances of our intimate connection with the Nizam's Government, would have great and decided advantages, and is that which we ought to endeavour to establish provided always that the irresistible strength which our protection affords to the Government be not converted to the oppression of the people." (letter from Sir Charles Metcalfe to Mr Swinton dated 29th November 1822). The concluding consideration is most important, and constitutes, in our mind, the strongest objection against our withdrawing from all interference in the concerns of a Government which we are bound by treaty to protect, however tyrannical and oppressive may be its proceedings. As long as we have an army stationed within the Nizam's country, the objection never can be altogether obviated. But it would be very much weakened were we relieved from the objection contracted under the 17th article of the treaty of 1800, whereby we have agreed to employ the subsidiary force in enforcing the payment, from the Nizam's subjects and dependants, of his just claims upon them, and in reducing to obedience such as are refractory. And we think it not improbable, that the Nizam would be glad to purchase freedom of action by relieving us from this engagement.

100. We have thus put you in possession, generally of our sentiments on this very difficult and important subject. We abstain from issuing any positive instructions on this occasion, because we are unwilling to fetter your discretion on the judicious exercise of which we are disposed to place great reliance. We likewise entertain a high opinion of the probity and talents of the present Resident at Hyderabad, both of which have been conspicuously evinced in the transactions under review. Of Sir Charles Metcalfe's experience and information, you will, no doubt, avail yourselves; and we feel confident that whatever measures may be resolved on for upholding the Nizam's Government, the great object of our solicitude, will be executed by him with judgement, zeal and ability.

101. Since the foregoing paragraphs were prepared, we have received your Letters in the Political Department dated the 7th and 31st March, 8th and 31st May, 16th June, 1st, 26th, 31st July, and 9th August.

102. We shall reply to these communications on the subject of the Hyderabad transactions without any unnecessary delay.

East India House, the 10th January 1824.

India Board, 13th January 1824.

Approved with alterations by order of the Commissioners for the affairs of India. (signed) T.P. Courtenay.

The alterations were in para 67. The above text is unaltered from Draft Political Despatches (No 137), vol 7, 1823-4, on pages 521-686. The above extract is pages 634-686. No 137 is a revised version of Draft No 274 (on pages 117-78, correspondence pages 57-114) which was withdrawn after disagreements. Is also given in vol 6 of Precoms (sept 1823-aug 1825) on pages 1-190.



16. It does not appear to us that the treaty with Bhopal affords a warrant for all this interference. It is not provided by that treaty that you should have either the power of interfering with the appointment of a Nawab, that of choosing a minister, or that of dismissing any of the Nawab's attendants. For the impropriety of interfering to Hounser Mohamed, we cannot do better than refer you to two minutes of Sir Thomas Munro and of the late Mr Thackeray, relative to the policy of interfering with the succession to the chiefship of Kurnool. Of the views and sentiments contained in these minutes, you signify your entire approbation in paragraphs 5 and 6 of your letter to the Secret Committee dated 16th March 1821.

"Could it be shown" observes Sir Thomas Munro, "that any material advantage, either immediate or distant is likely to result from this interference, either to the people of Kurnool, or to those of our own provinces, there might be some reason for incurring the expense with which it is always attended. But so far from doing good, we always do mischief by it. The Nabob whom we set up, will, from his confidence, in our support, commit many acts of oppression which he would not otherwise have thought of, because we remove the salutary check which the fear of his own followers and people imposes upon him. If we expected to make him act right by giving him advisers, we should only make him worse. He would become jealous and suspicious, and would punish every person either openly or secretly, whom he suspected of having complained against him. We knew perfectly that there can be no middle course in such interference, that, if we seek to interfere effectually in the internal affairs of Kurnool, or any other Indian principality connected with the Presidency, we must go on from step to step on the spurious plea of protecting the inhabitants, until we have usurped the whole government of the country and deposed the prince. Unless therefore we are beforehand determined to go to the extremity, we ought cautiously to abstain from entering upon a line of measures which must inevitably lead to it."

17. The language of Mr Thackeray is equally strong.

"If we place a prince on the musnud, he will expect us to support him at all events: the people will expect us to redress the wrongs the prince we have set over them may do. We deprive the court, the army, and the people, of the remedy for bad government in all eastern states. We prevent them from choosing their prince; and then by our authority, if not by our army, prevent their deposing him if he governs ill. No man can raise and maintain himself on the musnud without good qualities; but the worst and weakest may be maintained there with our assistance: indeed, a prince who exists on such foreign assistance can hardly be a good prince: he loses the proper pride of a prince: he will be jealous of the great power that maintains him: he is subject to the certification of appeals to that power from his own subjects, and will have recourse to fraud and force to deter them from complaining and to stifle their complaints. We take upon ourselves a heavy responsibility and risk by interfering, and unless it appears necessary to secure ourselves, or incumbent on us as a duty

Drafts of Political Despatches, volume 7, 1823-4 (pages 895-958)  
from pages 908-19, in the Political and Secret Department,  
India Office Library.

to interfere, it would be evidently better to let the people chuse their own prince; that is, to let that member of the family who has the strongest party establish himself."

18. There is not one of these arguments which does not apply with equal force to Bhopaul as to Kurnool. And we have no ~~desire~~ hesitation in apprising you of our opinion that your interference in the affairs of Bhopaul, which appears even to have occasioned the commencement of preparation by Colonel Adams for crossing the Nerbudda to put down the apprehended resistance of the refractory chiefs, was not a politic or justifiable measure.

Military Despatch to Bengal: 21.1.1824

B-xii/9

2. In the 3rd paragraph of our military Letter of the 30th January 1822 you were distinctly informed that no European officer not belonging to the Company's service "should be allowed to enter, or remain in the service of any native power, nor be employed in any native corps in the Company's service."

3. You have nevertheless interpreted these orders as if they were applicable only to His Majesty's officers, serving with the troops, of native powers, and have not carried them into effect even in reference to these officers.

4. We must express our entire dissatisfaction at this proceeding, and we repeat our directions, as well in relation to officers holding commissions in His Majesty's service, as to other individuals not belonging to our military establishments.

5. The modification of our orders, grounded on the speculations of Captain Currie, and the other officers named in your secretary's letter to Mr Metcalfe of the 14th June 1822, we altogether disapprove.

6. Such of these officers as hold commissions in His Majesty's service are at liberty to return to their stations in that service; and we can only consider the rest as belonging to a class of individuals whom it is the fixed policy of the state to exclude from the courts, and armies of native potentates.

7. We have also informed you of our fixed determination to exclude all officers not educated in the Company's service from commissions in native corps, whether regular or irregular. We therefore direct that Major Bruce be relieved from the command of the Nuzool Battalion.

8. Although we disapprove of the employment of Captain Frankland as surveyor we shall not direct his removal from that situation provided the survey in which he is engaged is likely to be terminated within a few months; but the appointment of Captain Mackenzie as military assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad is to be revoked without delay.

Military Despatches: vol 11, 7.1.1824- 19.10.1825, (approx 800pages)  
The above extract is in reply to Political Letter from Bengal dated 16.11.1822. The volume has no index or list of despatches.

Political Despatch to Bengal: 6.1.1827

Extract:

Communication from Mr Jenkins, stating the inconveniences which would attach upon paying the salaries and allowances of the Europeans conducting the administration of the Nagpore country, from the Resident's treasury. The arrangement was consequently dispensed with.

78. We have informed you in our political Letter dated 15th March 1826, that our orders concerning the mode of paying the allowances of Europeans in the service of native princes were framed without a knowledge of the arrangements (at least ~~in~~ in their full extent) which placed the administration of the territories of the Nizam and of the Raja of the Nagpore in the hands of British officers. We are therefore the less indisposed to take into our favourable consideration, any representations from your Government, calling in question the applicability of the arrangements prescribed by us to that state of affairs.

79. Our main object in issuing these orders was to mark our disapprobation of the principle of British officers receiving pay, salary or emoluments from any other source than their own Government. As long however as the practice continues (and you are aware of our earnest wish that it may soon be discontinued) of administering of other states through British agency, these states may justly be charged with the expenses of such agency, the precautions being taken that the Residents at the different native courts shall report to you the number and designation of the Europeans so employed, together with the amount of their allowances. And wherever as at Nagpore the treasury of the native state is as much under the control of the Resident as his own, the payments of the allowances from the latter, provided the detailed accounts are regularly transmitted to you, will afford the means of your obtaining the requisite information.

from Precom Political vol 8 (Dec 1825-Oct 1827), P.C. 395, in reply to Bengal Letters dated 15.4.1825 and 1.9.1825. (95 paras) P.C. 356 dated 30th May 1826 in the same vol(8) conveys some strictures on the court martial of Nagpore inhabitants in 1818. consists of 17 paras on 26 pages.

With copy

Bengal Political Despatch: 2.5.1828 (No 311)

Complete

BXII/9 (iii)

European  
~~Officers~~  
Officers  
with troops  
of native  
powers

1. Our last Despatch in this department was dated

2. We now reply to your Letter dated the 25th October 1825, on the subject of employing European officers with the troops of native powers.

3. After acknowledging the receipt of our Despatch of the 21st of January 1824 and referring to your previous Letter of the 18th December 1823, you express a hope that the arrangements therein contained will have induced us to review the whole question, and to modify the orders conveyed in our Despatch in the Military Department of the 21st January 1824, which, in consequence of a continued state of war, and the demand thereby occasioned for the services of the officers belonging to our army, you had hitherto been unable to carry into effect, without completely disorganising the disciplined corps of the native powers. You further advert to the tranquillity and good order which had been maintained during the late war, by means of these disciplined corps, in the states of Hyderabad and Nagpore; and, after quoting a passage from the minute of the Marquis of Hastings dated the 3rd June 1820 (which was before us when our Political Despatch of the 21st January 1824 was written) you conclude by urging on our consideration the extreme severity with which our orders would operate on the British officers not in the service of His Majesty or of the Company, now employed with these disciplined corps, should their removal be insisted upon.

4. That portion of your Letter which respects our orders in the Military Department has been replied from that department. That having been done, there is little for us to add in this department ((further than that our sentiments on the general question remain unchanged) omitted by Board).

5. The arguments contained in your Letter of the 18th December 1823, been exclusively on the view of the subject taken in our Secret Committee Despatch of the 3rd April 1815, and we are willing to admit that in that particular view of the question, they have great weight. But you must be sensible that the more serious objection to the system, which were stated, in considerable detail, in our Despatch from the department of the 21st January 1824, have neither been answered nor met, either in your Letter of December 1823, or without more immediately under reply. We have never denied nor doubted that the system is productive of some important advantages, but what we have contended is, that these advantages are too dearly purchased, and that, on the whole the disadvantages decidedly preponderate. It appears to us that you look to one side of the question only, whilst we have endeavoured to regard it in its various bearings; and until it is shown that we have committed some mistake either in our data or in our conclusions; we cannot be expected to alter our opinions.

6. That we never contemplated a sudden and total change of system, must have been obvious to you from paragraphs 78 and 90 of our Despatch from this department of the 21st January 1824. But there is a wide difference between

reluctantly tolerating, for a time, an evil which cannot be promptly and radically cured without the infliction of a greater, (every palliative of which it is susceptible being, in the meanwhile applied) and pronouncing it to be a benefit which, so far from wishing to withdraw, we should be anxious to diffuse.

7. In conclusion, we refer you to the positive instructions which have been conveyed to you, from the Military Department, in our Despatch dated \_\_\_\_\_ and which we now confirm in this department.

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VII  
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Secret Despatch to Bombay: 9th January 1829

B-xii/10

To  
The Governor in Council at Bombay

We wish it were as easy to lay down strict and satisfactory rules for our future conduct with regard to the affairs of Cutch, as it is to discover grounds for regret on a retrospective view of what has been already done. Of this however we are satisfied, that it is very inexpedient for us to maintain the sort of connection with Cutch which we have now: a connection which without giving us the means of affording to the people a good government makes us apparently responsible for the bad government to which they are evidently subjected, and involves us, as in border quarrels with Sind, without giving us the only military resource of the country which is to be found in the attachment of its inhabitants.

Our first interference in the affairs of Cutch was occasioned by our fear that the discussions existing in the country might enable the French to obtain a footing there and from that quarter to attack to attack our dominions and our allies.

Under the present circumstances of our relations with France and the state of Europe it is not very probable that the French should be desirous, with a view to an ultimate object, the attainment of which must to any reasoning mind appear to be extremely visionary, to endeavour to possess themselves of a peer country, where they would excite our jealousy and be unable to resist our power. You will however in any treaty with Cutch insist upon the insertion of conditions which would authorise you to oppose by force the settlement of any foreign power whatever within the limits of that country.

of

Since the immediate danger ~~in~~/any attempt on the part of the French to occupy Cutch has disappeared, our interference in the affairs of that country and the stationing of a military force there have been defended on the ground that by occupying positions in Cutch we would more easily protect the dominions of our ally the Guicwar and our own from predatory incursions than we could by remaining within our frontier.

Our frontier without Cutch would be formed by the Ran from where the river Ran enters it at Seoranchan to Mallia, and from Mallia by the gulph of Cutch.

Detached and in advance of that line we have at present the district of Anjar communicating with the gulph of Cutch by the port of Teenca, and affording us at all times an entrance into Cutch and the means of intercepting the retreat of any predatory bands which might attempt to pass through Cheerwanghur.

Whether if we were to withdraw from all interference in the internal concerns of Cutch, it would be advisable to retain Anjar as a military position for the purpose of overawing its government and intercepting the return of predatory bands, and whether if it were advisable to hold any military position in Cutch there might not be superior advantages attached to the possession of its port of Mandavi

from vol 36 Secret Despatches and Correspondence 1827-33 pages 90-

which might perhaps be obtained in exchange for Anjar are questions upon which we are desirous of receiving your deliberate opinion.

manner

To enable us to form our opinion in a/satisfactory manner to ourselves upon this point you will direct the completion of the map of Cutch commenced by Lt Barnes and you will desire that intelligent officer to make a plan of the port of Mandvi and of that of Teenca, to give a detailed statement of the military communications of Cutch particularly from the port of Mandavi, and an account of the general practicability of the Run from Seeranchun to Mallia.

You will understand that we consider our connection with Cutch, and the possession of any district in that country to be only desirable, if desirable at all in a military point of view, and for the purpose of improving our frontier. Against a serious invasion of that frontier we have troops stationed at Deesa and Ahmedabad and the naval means would enable us at any time to throw a force into Cutch should an enemy advance through that country. But it is not so much against a serious invasion, as against predatory incursions that we have to guard. And it is to be considered how far we derive any additional security against such incursions from the positions we occupy in Cutch.

These positions in no respect interfere with the passage of predatory bands through the district of Parkar and over the Run between Seeranchun and the northern parts of Cheerwanghur, they have been chosen to protect Cutch against predatory attacks from Sind. They have not prevented those attacks. Nor have we hitherto succeeded in inflicting such exemplary chastisement upon the persons engaged in those attacks as will alone deter them from a repetition of them. The plunder has been in a majority of cases carried off with impunity, and you have been induced by prudential considerations to overlook the really hostile conduct of the Amcers of Sind.

The inhabitants of Cutch were formerly animated by hereditary enmity to the scindians; an enmity justified by the ~~misdeeds~~/the Scindians had inflicted upon their country. /evils They had succeeded in preserving their independence, and they stood between our frontiers and that of Sind the resolute defenders of their native land.

Of late years we have seen two members of the Regency of Kutch, and many of the people of that country aiding the plundering expeditions directed against it by Scind.

So great a change in the feelings of men cannot have been effected without some strongly operating cause. It is impossible to disguise from ourselves that the Government of Cutch, in which we exercise a qualified influence is not a government beloved by the people. Instead therefore of having between our frontier and that of Scind a people willing to defend itself against Scind we have a people of which a considerable portion seems not unwilling to favour the Scindians against us even when they themselves must suffer by the conflict.

We have transferred the quarrels arising out of predatory incursions from a weak state we might easily punish and control to a state difficult of attack, and not worth conquering.

It is to be observed too, that the recent alterations affected by the flood of 1826 in the course of the eastern branch of the



branch of the Indus appear likely to afford to the Scindians, new means of attack, and to deprive the frontier of Cutch of the means of defence it has till lately possessed. When the Scindians threw bund across the course of the eastern branch of the Indus, they undoubtedly inflicted a most extensive injury upon the rice cultivation of those districts of Cutch which drew their supplies of water from that river; but depriving themselves of all means of access to Cutch, a tract of country passable with difficulty and affording no subsistence, they materially lessened their own power of aggression.

The earthquake of 1819 had by casting up a bund which intercepted altogether the passage of the river, completed the object of the Scindians; but the consequent influx of the sea had at the same time thrown our improved barrier between the Scindians and Cutch.

The flood of 1826 having broken through all the bunds, even that raised by the earthquake of 1819, and having not only restored the old course of the river but having produced a depth of from two to three fathoms in places previously dry has given to the Scindians immediate access by water to the frontiers of Cutch and will probably at no distant period lead to the improvement of the country on the banks of the river - thus at once increasing the inducement to attack and facilitating aggression.

It is but too much to be apprehended, that we may be obliged to resent the conduct of Scind, and to endeavour to chastise the unprovoked hostility of the Ameers. With a view to the possible occurrence of this event we are desirous of being much better informed than we are now, as to the actual state of Scind, and its means of offence and defence, and more particularly as to the main stream of the Indus, and our own means of making the Scindians feel the weight of our resentment, by an attack conducted by that river. We therefore direct you to obtain the fullest information upon these points, and to keep us constantly in possession of the most recent intelligence you may acquire.

We acknowledge that we look with great apprehension to the contingency of a war with Scind, not from any doubt of our success in such a war, but from our unwillingness to be drawn into a new system of political relations. Once engaged in hostilities with Scind we are drawn into the system of the states on the right of the Indus and of the Sutlege.

It is with this view of its ultimate consequences that we are desirous of withdrawing ourselves from all connection with the country bordering on Scind. We wish to maintain that country as an impassable barrier between us and Scind, between our domestic system of alliances, and the political system of states beyond the frontier.

The frontier of Cutch even in its most favourable state before the flood of 1826 seems yet to have been pervious to all the predatory attacks directed against it from the side of Scind, and it is not unreasonable to expect, that under circumstances producing any diversion of our military force, such attacks would be renewed with increased audacity and increased facilities.

Undoubtedly the Run as it has been described seems to present an impassable obstacle at some seasons of the year, and at all seasons an obstacle which a regular army dragging with it all the incumbrances of European warfare would be extremely unwilling

would be extremely unwilling to encounter. But passable as we apprehend it to be for a considerable period of the year in various directions, it is the least available and the most embarrassing defence against the attack of predatory bands which traverse it like a sea on many different points, and appear when they are the least expected, and where it is least possible to provide against them,

Such being as we are at present informed the difficulties of our position in Cutch, we are naturally desirous of changing it, either by withdrawing altogether from all interference in the affairs of that country or by so increasing our influence over the Government as to enable ourselves to wield all its resources and to give to the inhabitants something which would be worth their fighting for.

We should much prefer the former alternative. What we desire is, to see Cutch under a national government powerful enough to maintain order amongst the people and good enough to obtain their affection.

If it be hopeless to expect that any national government can, after the concessions of late years, effect the objects we have in view, these objects we must endeavour to effect by ourselves, but what is essential is this, that a people situated between our frontiers, and that of a powerful neighbour, should not be disaffected to us.

We are desirous of receiving your opinion as to the line of conduct which it would be expedient to adopt hereafter with regard to Cutch, at the earliest period at which it can be communicated to us, consistently with that mature deliberation on your parts which is essential to the formation of a correct opinion, on so very important a subject. We are by no means unaware of the difficulties which would be opposed to our withdrawing ourselves from a connection we have sought, and in which we are now engaged by treaty.

The opportunity of effecting that object should we determine on prosecuting it might not be afforded before the period at which the Raa will attain his majority. Much previous preparation will in any case be required before we can safely change the line of policy upon which we have however undecidedly been acting for many years. But it is always an advantage to know what we want and to have distinct object in view. If the object of a government be always the same the changes produced by time, will ultimately afford the means of obtaining it; but neither success nor credit is to be found in following languidly and without plan, decision, or pertinacity, any object however desirable may be its possession.

India Board  
January 9th 1829.

The Commissioners for the affairs of India direct that a letter be despatched by the Secret Committee in the usual form according to the tenor of the foregoing draft.

G.B. (signed)

Ellenborough Correspondence

B-XII/11  
Nagpur

Lord Ellenborough to Duke of Wellington: 20.5.1830 - 1842

India Board  
May 20, 1830

My Dear Duke of Wellington

I send you the papers relative to the new treaty with Nagpore and the treaty of 1826 for reference. I enclose likewise the letter which it seems to me expedient to send out without delay.

The view I from the first took of the impolicy of the new treaty has been confirmed by my conversation with Mr Jenkins.

Believe me,  
My dear Duke of Wellington  
Very faithfully yours

His Grace the Duke of Wellington Ellenborough

Bd-cl-  
an  
Nagpur

Memorandum by the Duke of Wellington on treaty of Nagpore

Memorandum

June 5th 1830

The transfer of the territory is one thing; that of the army and particularly the departure from the obligations of the 15th article of the treaty are quite different.

The former might be expedient, and might, if besides attended by a reduction of the strength of the Rajah's army, have increased his pecuniary resources.

But this was not the object of the measure. That object was to get from the Rajah a subsidy of eight lacks; and for this everything else is sacrificed without consideration.

I don't see upon what ground these eight lacks are claimed. Sure I am that the former arrangement was worth double the money.

In my opinion the Governor General ought to be ordered not to alter the treaties with the native powers without previous explanation to the Court; and orders from home.

Public Record Office, London: PRO 30/9/4 Part 1.1  
( Colchester Papers ). The Memorandum, though probably in the Duke's own hand, is unsigned as are several other papers from the Duke to Lord Ellenborough in this collection.

Ellenborough to Chairman, Court of Directors: 16.6.1830

Private

India Board  
June 16, 1830.

My Dear Sir

I am sorry it will not be in my powers to receive you and the Deputy on Saturday as the further moving of the price clause is fixed for that day before the Privy Council. I hope you sent off the Nagpore letter. Rajpootana is coming; but in any case there should be no delay in sending off the Nagpore letter.

I am really nervous until the Government had instructions as to their future policy and I much regret that accidental circumstances have delayed this letter three weeks after it was written by me.

I remain, My Dear Sir  
Yours very faithfully

W. Astell Esq

(signed) Ellenborough

Ellenborough to Chairman, Court of Directors: 18.6.1830

Private

India Board  
June 18, 1830

My dear Sir

The receipt of the information from Bengal that the treaty with Nagpore has been modified in the manner we before knew that the Bengal Government intended to modify it, will not induce the necessity of altering the words of the letter the Board have already directed the Secret Committee to transmit to the Supreme Government upon that subject. I send herewith a short letter acknowledging the receipt of the treaty which is all that is required.

I have already intimated to you my great regret that so much unavoidable delay took place in transmitting the letter to you after it was written and my anxiety that it should be sent with all speed, for I am really fearful of what may be the next measure of foreign policy adopted by the Indian Government.

You and the Deputy have already privately stated to me your impression upon the subject of the treaty and of the letter. The act of Parliament does not make provision for an official representation on the part of the Secret Committee where they may happen to take a different view from that adopted by the Board, and I could not officially receive any such representation.

I do hope that you will forthwith forward the letter in question.

The least delay in its transmission to India is in my opinion injurious to the public service.

Believe me, My Dear Sir  
very faithfully yours  
(signed) Ellenborough

W. Astell Esq

FR0/30/9/4-III-4 in Public Record Office, London.

Nagpur

Secret Despatch to India: 9th June 1830

9th June 1830

To  
The Governor General in Council at Fort William  
in Bengal

We have perused with sentiments of equal surprise and regret your political Letter dated the 19th December 1829 and its several enclosures by which we learn that on the 25th of the preceding November you issued instructions to the Resident at Nagpore for the conclusion of a treaty with His Highness the Bhonsla, whereby the districts now under British control, producing a revenue of seventeen lakhs of sicca rupees, will be given up to his sole management. The auxiliary force now commanded by British officers will be disbanded, our right of interference in the administration of His Highness's dominions materially modified, and an annual payment of eight lakhs of sicca rupees promised to your Government.

The correspondence with the Resident at Nagpore arose out of a note of your assistant secretary, Mr Stirling, dated the 15th September 1829. It commenced on the 30th of September and it is not till the 19th of December, that is, three months after the first ascertainment of the proposition for an entire change in the nature of our relations with Nagpore, that you afford to us any information on the subject.

We must express our strong disapprobation of this neglect, and of your conduct in adopting without any previous communication with us, a measure involving most important consequences, which not only did not press for immediate decision, but which many circumstances should have induced you to defer.

Had your intention gone no further, than to give up to His Highness the entire civil administration of his territories, prudence should have led you to defer such an arrangement until you had had a somewhat longer experience of the success of His Highness's management in the districts made over to him in 1827; and still more should you have taken a longer time for reflection and consultation when your contemplated measure involved the abrogation of a treaty concluded but three years ago before, by which the Government of Berar was practically as much vested in your hands as the Government of Bengal.

When we consider the provisions of the treaty you have instructed the Resident to conclude, the spirit in which it appears to have been conceived, and the precipitancy with which you have proceeded, we cannot be without the fear that you may have already issued instructions for the conclusion of a similar treaty with the Nizam, and that before you can receive this letter you may have entered into engagements beyond our power to recall, the practical effect of which will be to establish in the centre of India,

From Secret Despatches and Correspondence 1827-33, vol 35, pages 211-8, Despatch No 740 in the Political and Secret Department Records, India Office Library.

two native princes having the absolute control over their armies and over all the resources of their dominions, and whose independence in all matters of internal policy will only tend to generate the desire of equal freedom in all their external relations.

But that freedom is inconsistent with the tranquility of India, and with the possession by us of that nondisputed supremacy which is the fruit of continued war, and which is become now as essential to the happiness of the natives as it is our own security.

When we consider the treaty you have proposed to the Bhonsla we are almost as much disposed to disapprove the compensation for which you stipulate, as of the concessions for which you are to receive it.

We are surprised that the mention of the tribute from Jeypore in the memorandum of your deputy secretary did not bring to your minds all the evils which have been found to arise from the system of exacting tributes from native states.

What reason have you to expect that the Rajah of Nagpore will be more able or more willing to pay his tribute regularly than the princes of Rajpootana and that you will not be compelled to resort in his case to sequestration and the various measures of rigour which in other cases have been deemed necessary.

At the present moment we doubt not that the Bhonsla would be ready to promise any payment you could demand; but we view with equal suspicion his readiness to enter into onerous pecuniary engagements and his anxiety to be relieved from that article of the treaty of 1826 by which the troops of your Government were at all times to be admitted to his fortress.

The Bhonsla may without British officers have an army equal in numbers to the auxiliary force, and much less expensive, but it will at the same time be much less efficient, and it must be recollected that it has only been by the means of the auxiliary force as now constituted, that the refractory zemindars have been reduced, the revenue regularly collected, and tranquility preserved in Berar.

It is our apprehension that if the Bhonsla should maintain an efficient force capable of preserving tranquility and of exacting the payment of his revenues he will have no surplus where with to pay the stipulated tribute, and if he should make such reductions in his military establishments as will cover the new charge of tribute he will be unable to collect his revenue.

If this apprehension should be realised you will at an early period be obliged either to renounce the tribute for which you are now led to sacrifice so much of strength, or to revert to the system you are now about to abandon.

But it should be erroneous to imagine that you can revert to that system without having lost anything by the experiment of departing from it.

You will have lost much in character, for there is nothing which so much disparages a government as vacillation of purpose and you will have lost much in the deteriorated condition of the country you resume.

The territory of Berar is almost encircled by hilly districts occupied by more than ninety zemindars whose

turbulent and predatory habits have only been repressed by the disciplined auxiliary force you have resolved to disband. These districts border upon others in our possession which are similar in local circumstances and held by zemindars of the same character.

In-subordination commencing in Berar would soon spread by contact and by example to our semindarries on the Nerbudda, in Orissa, and in the Northern Circars. All the commercial communications through Berar would be interrupted, and along an extensive line of frontier in the centre of India would be generated a petty harrassing warfare which would afford no compensation for the risk and the expense it would occasion.

Such it appears to us would be the state of things under which you would proceed to reestablish the treaty of 1826.

But if contrary to our expectation the Bhoonsla should succeed in preserving the tranquility you have established and in paying his tribute regularly you will only have replaced our relations with Berar in the position from which they were relieved by the victory of Nagpore and have created again the danger from which we then escaped.

You will have more than nullified the subsidiary force, for under the treaty of 1826, you could have moved a large portion of that force beyond the frontiers of Berar, and have added to it some regiments of the auxiliary troops. Now you will in the event of war be obliged to retain the whole of that force at Nagpore to watch the army of the Bhoonsla, and probably to bring forward in support of it troops from Taulna and Hyderabad.

We cannot therefore think that even were you to receive regularly the tribute for which you stipulate you would in any degree be indemnified for the loss of real military strength which seems to be the necessary consequence of the treaty you intend to conclude; and you must bear in mind that from the gross receipt of tribute whatever it may be, must at all times be deducted the increased charge upon your finances by the return to their regiments of the officers now employed with the auxiliary troops; nor can we refrain from observing that in the present temper of your army, as described to us, the infliction of a new, unexpected, and extensive hardship upon a large body of meritorious officers, and the return of those officers in a state of dissatisfaction to their regiments, was in itself a circumstance not unworthy of your consideration and which might have suggested the postponement of a measure not otherwise pressing for immediate adoption.

Neither is the throwing loose upon of several thousands of disciplined men without present means of subsistence a step which should have been lightly taken.

There are some expressions in the papers before us which lead us to apprehend that your views of the general policy, which it has become our interest and our duty to pursue towards the remaining native states of India, may not be such as would meet with our concurrence.

While there existed in India many native states of various

strength, all accustomed to independent action, and all naturally jealous of our increasing power, it was our interest that each should be a substantive state, disposing freely of its own army, and administering its own territory. But since the Pindarry war our power has been predominant in India, and no native state has possessed a substantive existence.

We may not have desired this result but it has taken place; and we cannot, without wilfully incurring all the dangers from which we have escaped, and exposing all India to the appalling calamity of general war, loosen the hold we now have upon its princes.

We may permit them to administer their territories, not only because we should take from them only what is required for our own security, but because a native administration when good, is necessarily better than any we can establish; it is cheaper, and it is more congenial to the habits of the people. From a good native administration, such as we have seen in Mysore and in Bhopaul., we have yet far much to learn.

To a native administration in Berar we have on principle no objection. It is a mode of administration governing that conquered country to which we have looked forward as an object it would be desirable, ultimately, but gradually to accomplish. But in giving to the native Rajah of Berar the means of war you have acted on views which we are unable to understand.

To what purpose should the Rajah of Berar possess an army of his own? We cannot permit him to use it in a contest with a native power, for we must preserve the peace of all India. It is against ourselves only that it can be available at some moment when a war upon a distant frontier, or any internal convulsion may distract our forces.

It is our wish to respect all the rights of the native princes. Where treaties directly authorise, or individually involve our interference with their internal administration not to interpose without necessity, nor longer than necessity may require; but misgovernment constitutes that necessity, and in the preeminent station in which it has pleased providence to place us, we have not a higher duty than that of securing to all within the sphere of our legitimate influence a beneficent government.

When our interference in the internal administration of a state is neither directly or indirectly the result of our engagements with it, nothing but the just and reasonable apprehension that its maladministration may endanger the general peace can justify our authoritative intervention in its affairs. The benefits which in a particular case might attend our intervention, would be more than counterbalanced by the danger of violating a principle of national law.

Whether the civil administration of India be conducted by Englishmen, or by natives is to us a matter of indifference provided that everywhere that mode of administration be adopted which may seem best calculated to secure the welfare of the people; but for the safety of our power, and for the maintenance of peace, it is essential that the whole military force of India should remain in our hands.

We direct that if the projected treaty with Nagpore should not be finally concluded when you receive this letter, you will as far as may be consistent with good faith, endeavour to avoid entering into any such engagement



and that you will not, except in case of emergency alter any existing treaty with a native power without previous communication with us.

India Board  
9th June 1830

The Commissioners for the Affairs of India direct that a letter be despatched by the Secret Committee in the usual form, according to the tenor of the foregoing draft.

(signed) J. Stuart Wortley

Secret Despatch to India: 18th June 1830

18th June 1830

To  
The Governor General in Council at Fort William  
in Bengal

Since we addressed you on the subject of the modifications you proposed making in the treaty with His Highness the Bhoosla, we have received a copy of the treaty concluded with that prince on the 26th December 1829.

That treaty is in conformity with your project; and our opinion thereupon has been already communicated to you.

It now only remains for us to express our hope that your judgement may have been more correct than ours; and that the results of the new treaty may not realise the apprehensions it has raised in our minds.

India Board  
June 18th, 1830

The Commissioners for the Affairs of India direct &cc

(signed) J. Stuart Wortley

From Secret Committee to Commissioners: 24th June 1830

Secret

East India House  
24th June 1830

Sir,

I am directed by the Secret Committee to request that you will be pleased to move the Right Hon'ble the Commissioners for the affairs of India to authorize the Committee to communicate to the Court of Directors the Despatches addressed by the Committee to the Governor General in Council of Bengal on the 9th and 18th instant relative to the affairs of the state of Nagpore.

To  
The Hon'ble J. Stuart Wortley

I have & c  
W. McCulloch

From Commissioners to Secret Committee: June 26th, 1830

Secret

India Board  
June 26, 1830

Sir,

I am directed by the Commissioners for the affairs of India to acknowledge the receipt of your letters dated the 23rd and 24th instant and to acquaint you that the Secret Committee have the Board's authority to communicate to the Court of Directors the secret documents therein referred to, viz:

The Despatches addressed to the Governor General in Council on the 9th and 18th instant, relating to the affairs of Nagpore

and

The Secret Letter from the Governor in Council at Fort St George dated 16th February 1830, together with its enclosures relating to the affairs of Travancore.

To  
W. McCulloch Esq

I am & c  
(Signed) J. Stuart Wortley

From Chairman and Deputy-Chairman to Commissioners: 21.6.1830

Secret  
No 749

East India House  
21st June 1830

My Lord,

Though we are aware that the legislature has not formally vested the Secret Committee with the right of remonstrating against instructions to the Indian Governments prepared by the Commissioners for the affairs of India, and are aware of your lordship's objection, as expressed in conversation and by letter, against receiving officially the representation of what appears to us exceptionable in the Draft of the Secret Letter transmitted from the Board on the 9th of June, we think it due to the freedom which we wish should characterise our communications with, and to our respect for, your lordship, to make you acquainted beforehand with the reasons which will probably induce us to leave it upon record, that we only sign the letter ministerially, and we are no parties to some of the sentiments which it conveys. Though this has produced some delay, it is the less to be regretted, as no opportunity for transmitting this and the

From Secret Committee Drafts and Correspondence 1824-30, vol 2, pages 243-6, in the Political and Secret Department Records, India Office Library.

subsequent letter of the 19th June, to India, has occurred since the transmission of the latter to the India House.

The act of the Bengal Government to which the Draft above alluded to, refer, consists of two parts, 1. relieving the Rajah of Nagpore from the controul which the British Government has exercised over a part of his dominions; and 2nd taking from him, in return, an annual payment of 8 lakhs of rupees.

The last mentioned part of this transaction, is no doubt liable to a diversity of opinion; and we do not think it necessary, at present, to enter upon the question, whether, if we had been previously apprised of the measure, we should have approved of this part of it, or not.

With respect however to the part first mentioned, namely, receding from controul over a native government, as far as is consistent with the security of our own government, this has been long recognised by the authorities at home, as our true policy in respect of every native government still existing in India, and has been enjoined upon the Indian Governments by unvarying instruction, both public and secret for a series of years. We confess that we are so far from concurring in a condemnation of this course of policy that we censure with your predecessors and ours, in approving it, and think it our duty to do all that lies in our power to prevent it from being altered.

We also think it incumbent upon us to state, that so far as the language of the Drafts conveys a censure of the Bengal Government for withdrawing its controul from the Government of the Rajah, we are unable to adopt it; because we think that our Governments in India are bound, in pursuance of the instructions which they have received, to omit no opportunity of adopting measures of this nature whenever they think it can be done with safety.

There is still another consideration which we beg leave to submit to your lordship, and which presses upon our minds as a matter of great weight; that when our important course of policy, deliberately adopted, and long pursued, is to be changed, it ought to be done with great deliberation, and with a full communication of the grounds upon which the change is adopted; and that, in the deliberation, upon such a change in the policy of the Indian Governments, the Court of Directors ought to be parties. It appears to us that this is clearly the intention of the legislature; and that they are divested of their legitimate share in the government of India, if this is denied them.

This is a very summary indication of the reasons which render us averse to the signing of such a letter as that, the Draft of which you have forwarded to us. It appears to us to be sufficient in the meantime to apprise your lordship, generally with the state of our sentiments; and a more detailed exposition can be made, if it should hereafter appear to be necessary.

The Right Hon'ble  
Lord Ellenborough

We have the honour &c &c  
(signed) W. Astell  
Robert Campbell

Letter from President, Board of Commissioners to Chairman:

Private & Confidential  
No 750

India Board  
2nd July 1830

My Dear Sir,

I have read again the letter of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors in which they desire the authority of this Board to lay before the Court the letter addressed by the Committee to the Government of Bengal on the affairs of Nagpore, and I find it as you stated.

I had certainly imagined that the letter the Secret Committee wished to lay before the Court was one addressed to them by the Bengal Government and in this error acquiesced in the desire expressed.

I very much regret this error which was common to Mr Wortley and me. However as you made the Court secret I do hope the substance of the Secret Letter will not transpire, as the giving publicity to the principles laid down in that letter for our future conduct with regard to the remaining native states of India might be very prejudicial. I refer particularly to the use which might be made by Russia of the knowledge of our policy &c. I again request you will have the goodness to explain to the Court the inadvertance by which the letter has been communicated to them, and to impress upon them the necessity of preserving secrecy upon the subject.

W. Astell Esq

Believe me &c &c  
(signed) Ellenborough

1830-1846

Affairs of Udaipur

Differences in approach between Court and Board in 1830. (as indicated Rajpootana Withdrawn Political Draft papers, Drafts 145 to 149 of 1829-30, Precom No 507, in Drafts and Precoms 1829-30 vol 2&3. The final letters ending in the withdrawal are from Board:21.5.1831, to Board:4.8.1831, agreement of Board to withdraw:9.8.1831.)

Proposed para by Court

146. The condition of the people does not appear to have been in any respect better than that of the Rana. They appear on the contrary to have suffered, in an aggravated degree, every evil which the most frightful mis-government can inflict.

Note on above by W.Cabbell, in the Board's Secret & Pol Dept.

The statement in para 146 that the condition of the people in Meywar is not improved, is opposed to the testimony of Bishop Heber and of Captain Cobbe, ( see the quotations in paras 87 and 108 of the introductory memo) and does not appear to be supported by any of the documents contained in the proceedings under review.©

(© Note: Since this was written, the passage, to which the Court probably refer, has been discovered, and it will be found at the end of the quotation from Captain Cobb in para 176: It is to be observed however in reference to this passage that Captain Cobb is depicting the oppression to which the Rana's subjects are exposed from his own officers, which compared with what they formerly endured from Marhattas and other plunderers, he describes as a comparative blessing. (see the quotation in para 108 of the introductory memo). It is conceived that para 146 ought not to be allowed to stand as it is liable to be misunderstood and that a para should be inserted to the effect suggested after para 176.

Secret and Political Department  
10 August 1829

W.C.

Para 176 as proposed by Court

176. Captain Cobbe says (15 September 1823), that on comparing the state of Meywar on his arrival with Captain Todd's reports he was reduced to the painful alternative of either supposing that officer either very much misled by his sanguine disposition and his partiality for the work of his own hands, or of giving his successor the officiating agent ( Captain Waugh ) credit for more mismanagement than is easily credible. "In one respect" he adds "Captain Todd was undoubtedly in error, I allude to his supposition that the influx of settlers would annually keep pace with or exceed, that of the first year, whereas, those who entered Meywar in that year were the natives of the country, who during the troubles which agitated the province, had sought refuge in Jodhpoor, Ajmere, and the neighbouring states: they gladly returned to their native spots when assured of the protection which a connection with the British Government always ensures. The influx was consequently very great the first year, but has gradually diminished and is now reduced to a mere trifle. The soil of Meywar is of proverbial fecundity, and inhabitants alone are wanting to make it probably the most productive in India; but it is vain to hope for settlers in any

The treaty with Meywar was signed by Metcalfe at Delhi on 13.1.1818. The terms stipulated a tribute of  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the state revenue during the first five years and  $\frac{2}{3}$  of revenue afterwards to be paid by the state annually to the British Government. The state also undertook to provide troops

according to its means

considerable number until there be some security for life and property. The government is a tissue of cheating and oppression, and its influence and example are evident in the demoralisation of all classes. From the prince to the peasant all are thieves and robbers; there is not even an appearance of law or justice.

Note by W. Cabbell(accepted by Board in final Draft)

It is proposed to insert the following after para 176.

We observe however that in his private letter of the 18th September 1823 Captain Cobbe has remarked as follows: "It will be satisfactory to Government, as it is honourable to Captain Tod, that our connection with Meywar is regarded by all the middling and lower classes of inhabitants as the greatest blessing heaven could have bestowed." We are somewhat at a loss to reconcile these two apparently contradictory statements made as they were about the same time, but we infer from the two that notwithstanding the oppression to which the people are still exposed from the Rana's own officers, their condition is infinitely preferable as compared with their former when exposed to Marhatta and other plunderers.

Further quotations in Court's Draft

Captain Cobb in para 176. ... It would be to deceive Government most grossly were I to talk of non-interference. I have been obliged to interfere in everything or more properly speaking to carry on every part of the government myself, and without it the country would be a desert. (20.2.1825)

Captain Sutherland, acting agent: 12.11.1826. ...The duties here seem to extend to a minute supervision and control over every part of the Rana's administration.

From Lt Col. J. Sutherland, Agent to Governor General for Rajpootana to Lt Col T. Robinson, Political Agent Meywar, dated 1.10.1846 in reply to Robinson's letter of 26.9.1846.

6. There is no doubt, I fear, that the examples of Oude and Hyderabad to which you refer in the 10th para of your letter, where our interference has been most extensively exercised are the worst governed states in India, but then they are Mahomedan principalities having ofcourse very different institutions from Rajpoot and other Hindoe principalities; to these you might perhaps have added Bhopaul and Tonk, the other two Mahomedan states. Yet at Hyderabad when Lord Metcalfe was resident there, and when our interference was extended to a degree before unknown and which latterly unfortunately has ceased, vast improvements were effected through the simple process of establishing British Superintendants throughout the provinces, and entrusting to them the duty of forming and superintending village revenue settlements which lasted for ten years. In Rajpootana in the same manner we were too long in taking a direct share in the administration of Jeypoor, since that was done in 1839 and our political agent has been head of the council of Regency, the state has been relieved from a debt of 70 lakhs of rupees, and on the anniversary of the Maharaja's 14th birthday in last month, only owed one lakh, whilst it had a surplus of income over expenditure of 3 lakhs per anum. In the same manner there can be no doubt I suppose we have conferred immense benefit on Marwar by taking a share in the administration of the principality in 1840.

Lord Ellenborough to Arthur, Duke of Wellington: 4.10.1842.

Extract

Sialah,  
October 4, 1842.

My Dear Duke of Wellington

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I could not have credited the extent to which the Mahomedans desired our failure in Afghanistan, unless I had heard here circumstances which prove that the feeling pervaded even those entirely dependent upon

there

Here ~~there~~ is a great preponderance of Mahomedans. I am told that the guns produced absolute consternation, visible in their countenances. One ayah threw herself upon the ground in an agony of despair. The commander in chief observed it amongst his own servants. I fired fortytwo guns for Ghuzni and Cabul; the 22nd -- which announced that all was finished-- was what overcame the Mahomedans. The Hindoes, on the other hand, are delighted. It seems to me most unwise, when we are sure of the hostility of one-tenth, not to secure the enthusiastic support of the nine-tenths which a-re faithful, and, avoiding everything which could be justly offensive to the Mahomedans. I would make the most of our successes and the recovery of the gates of the temple, treating it ostensibly as a great military triumph, but knowing very well that the Hindoes will value it as the guarantee of the future security of themselves and their religion against Mussulmans. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxx~~ All these who best know India tell me that the effect will be very great indeed, and I think it will.

On the morning of the first I wrote to the principal sovereigns of India, to announce our success, in terms adapted to the nature of our different relations with them. I believe I shall now keep all quiet very easily.

Our revenue is improving very rapidly. In the year ending in August the receipt is about £ 900,000 more than in the preceding year. Of this, £ 500,000 from opium. Amidst all the favourable circumstances which now surround me, I assure you my highest pleasure would be to know that you think I have done right.

Believe me & c

(signed) Ellenborough

from "History of the Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough in his Correspondence with the Duke of Wellington" 1874, pages 293-6, published 1874

B-XII/13  
Afghanistan War

Letter from Duke of Wellington to Lord Ellenborough: 4.2.1843

Extract

London  
February 4, 1843.

My Dear Lord Ellenborough

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A perusal of the debates in both Houses on the address to the queen will shew you what will be the topics in the discussion on the motions for thanks. In respect to yourself, they will be to your order of the 1st October 1842, in relation to the policy of the Afghanistan war, and your letter to the Rajwary of India in relation to the gates of the pagoda at Sannauth; the former will be made a bitter party complaint, the latter will be used as a means to excite against you the feelings of the religious parties in this country.

I am much more uneasy about the thanks to General Pollock than I am about those to yourself....

Letter from Duke of Wellington to Lord Ellenborough: 14.3.1843

London  
March 14, 1843.

My Dear Lord Ellenborough,

You will see that we had in both Houses of Parliament, on Thursday the 9th, debates on your proclamation, or general order, from India of the 1st October 1842, and upon your letter to the Rajwary upon the gates of Sannauth.

Nothing could have been more satisfactory than the debate in the House of Lords, and I am told it was equally so in the House of Commons. The resolution was rejected in the latter House by a very successful majority, and everybody has since appeared satisfied.

There is an end of the question.

Believe me  
Ever yours most  
sincerely  
(signed) Wellington

H. W. the Lord Ellenborough

from pages 293-6 and 365-6 of "Ellenborough Correspondence with the Duke of Wellington &c"



Succession to the Throne of Delhi

B-XII/14

In response to a communication of the Governor General on the subject, in early 1849, the Court of Directors of the East India Company drafted a reply which, after explaining the reasons of their disagreement with the suggestion put forth by the Governor General, instructed him to take the required steps in getting a particular son of Bahadurshah II declared as heir-apparent to the throne of Delhi. The reply in its original form (as given from pages 139-163 in volume No. 64 of draft Despatches to Bengal and India for the period January 2 - March 27, 1850, in the India Office Records) consisted of 14 paras. In the final form the first three paras were retained as in original, paras 4-13 were expunged and a new para 4, which wholly reversed the orders in the original, added a new final para by the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India. The several steps in the finalisation of this Political Despatch to India and its text, as signed, are reproduced here from page 137-142 of the volume referred to above.

- 1. Laid before Political and Military Committee September 26, 1849
- 2. Approved October 3, 1849
- 3. Laid before Court " "
- 4. Ordered to lie for further consideration
- 5. Ordered to lie until Friday, next, the 26th instant October 24, 1849
- 6. Approved by the ballot Court October 26, 1849
- 7. Altered Board November 8, 1849
- 8. Letter to Hon'ble M. Eliott at Board approved November 26, 1849
- 9. Letter from Mr Stark in reply November 29, 1849
- 10. Further letter to Mr Eliott approved December 18, 1849
- 11. Letter from Mr Stark in reply December 31, 1849
- 12. The draft as altered by the Board having been framed in to a Despatch was signed January 16, 1850

The signed Despatch

We now reply to the Governor General's 'Foreign Letter', dated 16th February, No. 10 of 1849, relative to the succession to the throne of Delhi.

2. The heir apparent having died, and no successor having been yet recognised, you consider that, on the demise of the present king, the titular sovereignty may be abolished; that the junior branches may be made independent of the head, receiving separate pensions from the British Treasury; that the palace of Delhi may be evacuated and another place of residence be provided for the Royal Family; and that the Prince and his immediate family should be alone exempted from judicial process.

3. We have given the most careful consideration to the subject of this letter, and to the grounds adduced by you for the measures which you propose.

4. We are satisfied that these measures will be politic with reference to

the general interests of India and that they are not unjust to the individuals immediately concerned. We have therefore come to the determination of conveying to you full authority to carry them into effect.

16th January 1850

A. Galloway ( and 13 others)

Note: The two letters from Mr Stark, Secretary to the Board, noted at Nos 9 and 11 above, are given on pages 161-5 and 175-84 of volume No 16 'Letters from Board' (for the period January 1, 1849-July 25, 1850), respectively. A letter conveying the reasons for the alteration made by the Board is on page 149-52. While asking the Honourable Court to send the Despatch ( Draft No 747) as altered, the Board, in its final letter of December 31, 1849, accepts the Court's disclaiming responsibility for the consequences resulting from the instructions issued under their signatures. Para 4, the Board's addition, is in red. The volume of Despatches, above referred to, consists of 1310 pages and is without any list of contents or index. The volume of 'Letters from Board' has a fairly detailed index but does not contain a list of contents.