

FROM

SIR DONALD MACKENZIE WALLACE, K. C. I. E.,
Private Secretary to the Viceroy.

TO

J. A. GODLEY, Esq., C. S.,
Permanent Under Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA;

June 20th, 1888.

MY DEAR GODLEY,

As a question has been asked in Parliament about a Bengal Police Circular issued last winter, I ought, perhaps, to make you acquainted with the facts of the case.

You know, of course, that we have organized in the Thuggee and Dacoity Department a special Branch for the collection of certain kinds of useful information, and you will find the latest information about it in a despatch which is being sent home by this mail from the Home Department. The means by which the information is collected is the ordinary police, and it is necessary to instruct them how the work is to be done. For this purpose the Inspector-General of Bengal issued a confidential circular to his subordinates, and a copy of the document was surreptitiously obtained by the editor of a vernacular newspaper, who at once published it with anything but favourable comments. The Indian Association, which is one of the chief foci of political agitation in Calcutta, took up the matter, and addressed a memorial on the subject to the Lieutenant-Governor, with a view to having the circular in question cancelled, but the Lieutenant-Governor very properly declined to do anything of the kind. In order that you may judge of the matter for yourself, I have, with the Viceroy's permission, requested the Chief Secretary of the Bengal Government to send you privately by this mail a copy of the circular, of the memorial, and of the reply. It must be admitted that the Bengal Inspector-General of Police committed a grave mistake in scattering broadcast numerous copies of his confidential circular, and I understand that he has been severely censured by his immediate superiors for having done so, but it is rather absurd that the Bengalee agitators should complain of the means taken by the Government to keep itself informed regarding movements which might easily lead to a grave breach of the public peace. The system of collecting information, which has now been introduced into Bengal, has existed for years in the Punjab, and I have never heard of its practically inconveniencing any one except perhaps a few fanatical Kukas who would like to assassinate all Mahommedan butchers and establish a Sikh regime of the Puritanical type.

The great obstacle to the establishment of an efficient Intelligence Department is the incredible stupidity and *gaucherie* of the police of all ranks from the Inspectors-General downwards. Some incidents, which have recently occurred, make me almost fear that we shall be obliged to abandon the scheme altogether, and trust to Providence for getting the information of which we urgently stand in need.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) D. MACKENZIE WALLACE.

FROM THE HON'BLE A. R. SCOBLE, q. c.,
Legal Member of the Viceroy's Council.

To SIR DONALD MACKENZIE WALLACE, K. C. I. E.,
Private Secretary to the Viceroy.

February 16th, 1888.

MY DEAR WALLACE,

I return the Thagi and Dakaiti file, as to which His Excellency has asked for my opinion.

Sir Lepel Griffin has an objectionable way of expressing himself, but he seems to me substantially right in both his contentions.

Upon the first point that numbers of innocent persons are now suffering punishment on convictions obtained by perjured evidence, I think his challenge should be accepted, and the Legislative Department would be ready to examine the cases which he proposes to send up. When an officer in Sir Lepel Griffin's position makes such a charge, and is prepared to support it, I think Government is bound to investigate it as fully as possible.

Upon the second point that in these enquiries the Courts should follow the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Act as nearly as possible, I quite agree with Sir Lepel Griffin. Thagi no longer exists, and dakaiti is an offence under the Penal Code. The Supreme Government in 1836, and the Finance Committee last year, advocated the re-organization of the Department on the ground that, as regards its apparent duties, it is a mere "survival." I am not prepared to say that the procedure laid down in the "Manual" is unsuitable to existing necessities, but I think it might be revised with advantage, and brought as closely as may be into conformity with the general law.

I would not, therefore, answer Sir Lepel Griffin's letter in the argumentative and rather grudging tone of Mr. Cuninghame's draft. *Fas est ab hoste docteri*, even if you don't accept all his teaching; and I should prefer to limit the answer to accepting his apology, asking for the records in the cases in which he believes injustice has been done, and enquiring whether such a qualified application of the general law as is contemplated by Section 9 of Act XX. of 1886 would, in his opinion, be sufficient to provide the safeguards which he desires.

Upon the general question I think it would be very desirable to take advantage of Sir Charles Aitchison's presence in Council to revise, not only the Manual for which he is partly responsible, but the whole scheme of the Department. For my own part, I am not disposed to break a lance in defence of an institution so generally condemned as regards its existing organization. With the minutes of the Council in August 1886 on record, it seems superfluous to argue points of detail with Sir Lepel Griffin, or to do anything more than express the readiness of the Government of India to redress proved injustice, and to amend procedure where amendment is shown to be desirable.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) ANDREW R. SCOBLE.

787

BXXIV/3

K. W.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FINANCIAL DEPARTMENT.

Proceedings, July, 1878.

EXPENDITURE.
[Political.]

Nos. 245—247.

Pay and position of the General Superintendent, Thuggee and Dacoity Department, and his Assistants, as well as that of the Assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad.

NOTES IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

For an account of what has been said on the subject of the re-organization of the Thuggee and Dacoity Department see the notes placed below.

No. 1042G., dated 24th August 1876.

In August 1876 Major Bradford was asked to express his opinion on the working, organization, &c., of the Department.

In the memorandum now forwarded Major Bradford considers the question under the following heads:—

- (1.) Whether a separate department should be kept up.
- (2.) Whether the present organization of the department is the best for the purpose.
- (3.) What alterations can be suggested.

As regards No. 1, Major Bradford observes that there is a general consensus of opinion in favor of keeping up a separate department, and that it may be taken for granted that it is advisable to maintain it. Regarding the question of the re-organization of the department, Major Bradford explains that the department is worked on the approver system by officers who are under the General Superintendent and are at the same time Assistants to the chief Political Officers in the Native States in which the Departmental Agency is situated.

Major Bradford proposes to appoint special officers, instead of Political Officers; he writes on the subject at length, and recapitulates what he has to say thus:—

“It may be stated that Political Officers have more influence with Durbar officials, and hence can work an Agency to the greatest advantage; but this position is considerably weakened by the proposition to post separate officers as Political Assistants: *per contra*, the special and separate officers can devote more time to the special work;

- “ (2) can acquire requisite experience and peculiar knowledge;
- “ (3) can exercise greater supervision;
- “ (4) that knowing his advancement depends on his special work, he would feel greater interest and zeal in doing it;
- “ (5) that he is the only Agent competent to deal successfully with the crime of thuggee by means of poison.”

Major Bradford thinks—

“that the department is not at present being worked to the fullest advantage, and the most effectual steps towards re-organization must be in the direction of the appointment of separate officers with a status in the Political Department, *i.e.*, they should be graded in the Political Department.”

He proposes that these officers should be appointed to the Rajpootana, Central India, and Hyderabad Agencies, and that they should be subordinate (1) to the General Superintendent, (2) to the Resident or Agent to the Governor General.

Their duties would be to operate against registered dacoits, and to collect information connected with crime.

Major Bradford observes that the scope of the department should not be too widely extended, but that it should operate only against members of the wandering criminal tribes, whose only means of livelihood is crime, and who shift the scene of their depredations as often and to as great a distance as their safety seems to require. The annual cost of the proposed scheme would be Rs. 1,21,917.

Regarding the reforms which could be effected in the department, Major Bradford states that the principal points needing reform are—

- (1). The recording of the narratives or confessions of approvers.
- (2). The preparation of the departmental registers.

788

(2)

With respect to No. 1, he dwells on the importance of care being taken in taking the records, which have with few exceptions to be made in the Vernacular, and recommends that they should invariably be recorded in English by the Assistant General Superintendent; he adds that endeavours have been made to adopt this reform, but that it has been found impossible to insist on all that is required, without the appointment of special officers to conduct the Assistant's duties.

The departmental registers should also be prepared in English with care.

In paragraph 13 Major Bradford represents at length Lieutenant Newill's claims to advancement.

The report, mentioned by Mr. Daukes, in his note placed below, promised by Mr. Melvill on the question of jurisdiction in Baroda, has not as yet been received.

H. M. T.

6th February 1877.

The re-organization of the department for the suppression of thuggee and dacoity in Native States has formed the subject of correspondence since the year 1863.

None have asserted—indeed none could assert—that the department has been inefficient; on the contrary there are few pages in the history of British administration which can be regarded with greater satisfaction than the success which has attended the operations of this special agency.

But great as have been the achievements of the agency, it is admitted that there are defects and evils in its working which demand the serious attention of the Government.

Without going into details—which will be found set forth in the notes and correspondence in the Foreign Office—it may be briefly stated that these defects and evils are mainly traceable to a want of cordial and active co-operation between the Thuggee Department officers and establishments and the Political Officers attached to Native States.

To remedy this evil and secure greater harmony of action between the two departments, orders have been issued from time to time by the Government of India, but have failed, as yet, to bring about the result desired. Of late the opinions of Political Officers and those of the responsible head of the Thuggee Department have been invited as to the best means for effecting the required object, but from the replies received it appears that there is a considerable divergence of opinion between the Political Officers on the one hand and the special departmental officers on the other.

Major Bradford, the Superintendent General of the Thuggee Department, on the one hand, presses for the appointment of three special officers of political rank to be stationed with suitable establishments at Aboo, Indore, and Hyderabad respectively, and to be under his direct orders; the high Political Officers, on the other hand, deprecate the establishment or continuance of anything like a special agency independent of the political.

With regard to the additional and special agency proposed, I am of opinion that in view of the financial situation and the fact that the crime of thuggee and dacoity in Native States is happily not increasing but diminishing, it cannot, for the present at any rate, be thought of; but I am not without hope that it may be possible, after consultation with the high officers of the Political Department and Major Bradford, to secure the object we all have in view without extra expense by a little re-arrangement and clear and well-considered instructions.

I believe that the present time is a most favorable opportunity for carrying out the above suggestion.

There are, at present, at Simla—

The Governor-General's Agents for Central India and Rajpootana;

Major Bradford, the head of the Thuggee Department; and

Mr. Aitchison, the Foreign Secretary,

who has long been intimately acquainted with the subject from every point of view.

I propose, therefore, that before Mr. Aitchison resumes the duties of the Foreign Department, he be placed on special duty from the 18th to the 24th October, both days inclusive, for the purpose of presiding over a Committee of the above-named officers, and in consultation with them revising the Thuggee Departmental arrangements and drawing up detailed instructions for securing the active co-operation of Political Officers, and diminishing, so far as possible, the evils of an independent agency.

The Committee might also take into consideration the position of the officer on special duty with the Superintendent General, and in the event of their considering his appointment to be necessary, submit proposals for placing it upon a definite and proper footing.

17th October 1877.

L.

Financial Department for concurrence.

No objection in the Financial Department.

17th October 1877.

R. B. C.

I wish to bring under the consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy my position in respect to the manner in which my official emoluments are at present fixed. The salary of the office of General Superintendent of the operations for the suppression of Thuggee and Dacoity is Rs. 1,700 per mensem. On my appointment in 1874 I was entrusted, in

789

addition to my duties in the Thuggee Department the duty of collecting intelligence on other matters connected both with the internal and political police of the country, and in this capacity was brought into more immediate relations with the Foreign Office. Lord Northbrook, considering my regular salary insufficient for the double duties thus entrusted to me, was pleased to assign to me, in addition, an allowance of Rs. 800 per mensem out of the Secret Service Fund, an arrangement which Lord Lytton has been good enough to continue. I was also graded in the Political Department as a Resident of the 3rd class. My official emoluments thus amount to Rs. 2,500 per mensem, but of this sum nearly one-third consists of an allowance, the continuance of which depends upon the will of the Viceroy for the time being, which, in the event of there being heavy demands upon the Secret Service Fund, it might be found difficult to continue, and which, in case of my being obliged by ill health or by any other cause to go to England on furlough, would not be counted as forming part of the salary on which my furlough pay would be calculated. What I would ask His Excellency to consider is whether, in substitution of the allowance which I now receive from the Secret Service Fund, an equivalent addition might not be made to the salary of my appointment so as to raise it to Rs. 2,500 per mensem, the sum which I now receive in the form above described. I may remark that this salary is not more than is received by more than one of the Inspectors General of Police under local Governments, whose duties are not more responsible, probably in some respects less responsible, than those which I discharge. The increase of salary would not entail any increase of charge on the State, so long as the expenditure from the Secret Service Fund was not raised above its present amount, after deducting the sum which I now draw from it.

23rd October 1877.

E. R. C. B.

HIS EXCELLENCY'S ORDER.

Should be approved and sanctioned with concurrence of Financial Department, in which it is hoped no objection will be taken. Financial Department will also say whether sanction by Secretary of State is necessary.

29th October 1877.

C. U. A.

Financial Department.

The Superintendent of Thuggee and Dacoity Department has a substantive salary of Rs. 1,700 a month; but he has been graded with Political Officers as a Resident, 3rd class, the salary of which grade is Rs. 2,000 a month.

The Superintendent receives in addition Rs. 800 a month from the Secret Service Fund, whereby his total emoluments are Rs. 2,500 a month.

It is desired to treat this sum as the substantive salary of the appointment of Superintendent of Thuggee and Dacoity, on account of his superadded duties in the secret service of the Political Department.

It being presumed that the amount of the Secret Service Fund will not be reduced, the revision involves an additional expense of Rs. 9,600 a year.

At the date of Sir H. Ricketts' report in 1857 on civil salaries, the salary of the Superintendent of Thuggee and Dacoity was Rs. 1,400 a month. The increase to Rs. 2,000 a month was recommended in the report; but eventually Rs. 1,700 a month was given by, as it were, splitting the difference.

There may be some difficulty about the inclusion of the revised salary in the graded list. The pay of a 2nd class Resident is Rs. 2,500 a month, and if the Superintendent be graded in that class, the salary now to be given to him will, in the event of a vacancy, be available for transfer to another post in the Political Department. Should an officer of junior grade hereafter succeed to the appointment, a future Viceroy might feel the same difficulty as that which embarrassed Lord Northbrook, and feel constrained to supplement the grade pay afresh from the Secret Service Fund.

The Foreign Department will doubtless prepare the draft of a despatch to the Secretary of State recommending both this revision and the appointment of a Personal Assistant to the Superintendent of the Thuggee Department, with the revision of salaries for that appointment and the Jalna appointment.

6th November 1877.

R. H. H.

The Secret Service grant must of course be reduced by Rs. 10,000 a year.

6th November 1877.

R. B. C.

Financial Member.

There is apparently no financial reason why this Department should object to the arrangements proposed by the Committee for the General Superintendent of the Thuggee Department with the assistance which he needs.

In regard to Major Bradford's salary, I think the representation made in his memorandum perfectly reasonable. The regular salary of Rs. 1,700 per mensem attached to the appointment is very incommensurate with the importance of the duties which devolve upon him, some of them of a most responsible and delicate character; and it is not fitting that

790

nearly one-third of his emoluments should rest upon the precarious tenure on which they now stand. If the salary be fixed, as proposed by His Excellency the Governor General, at Rs. 2,500, it would seem deserving of consideration in the Foreign Department whether the General Superintendent should not be graded as a Political Resident of the 2nd class, Rs. 2,500 being the salary assigned to officers of that class.

I gather from the Foreign Office note that the expenditure from the Secret Service Fund will for the present, at all events, be diminished by Rs. 9,600, the amount at present assigned from that fund to Major Bradford.

9th November 1877.

A. J. A.

To Secretary.

21st November 1877.

T. J. C. P.

There will be no difficulty in the Foreign Department in grading Major Bradford in his proper grade on Rs. 2,500.

But before the scheme is sanctioned the Financial Department wish to cut down the Secret Service grant by Rs. 9,600 or Rs. 10,000 a year.

Draft on supposition that His Excellency will agree to the reduction, and submit draft to His Excellency for sanction.

30th November 1877.

C. U. A.

[A. G.]

RH

FROM

H. M. DURAND, Esq., c. s. i.,
Secretary to Govt., Foreign Dept.

TO

D. MACKENZIE WALLACE, Esq.,
Private Secy. to the Viceroy.

SIMLA;

August 31st, 1886.

DEAR MACKENZIE WALLACE,

I send herewith the papers about the proposed abolition of the Thuggee Department and Griffin's differences with Henderson.

You will see that the general tone of the Council notes is that the former question should not be complicated by reference to the latter, but should be settled on its own merits. As to the personal question, the Council would "let it drop." They say Griffin has made a sort of apology which should be accepted. Now, in the first place, the two questions have been separately treated—*vide* the separate drafts A and B. In the second place, the Council appear to be under a misapprehension as to what has been written and proposed. There is no proposal to revive the controversy about Griffin's rudeness to Henderson in November 1885. My draft in no way refers to this. Henderson was on that occasion advised to accept Griffin's explanation, and did so. The "personal question" now at issue arises from Griffin's letter of the 5th June—slip C. He there takes up Henderson's correspondence with the Departmental Assistant, Davies; accuses Henderson of criticising in a captious and discourteous manner the proceedings of the Central India Agency; remarks that his unnecessarily aggressive tone furnishes a strong additional argument in favour of the decentralisation of the Department; asserts that so far as he was aware, the Department took no action in the districts bordering on Datia and Jhansi, where dacoity had much increased; and finally calls upon the Government of India to consider the tone of Colonel Henderson's letter "objectionable and detrimental to the interests of the public service."

This is the matter with which our draft B is meant to deal. There is no question of an apology here. Griffin brings definite charges against Henderson, and calls upon the Government of India to condemn him. Having received from Griffin a copy of the letter making these charges, Henderson

(2)

has replied at length, and has appealed to the Government of India for a decision "which will put an end to the unceasing attacks of which he has been the object." I do not see how the Government of India can "drop" this question; and as I hold that Henderson has established a most complete defence and justification of his proceedings, and that Griffin is bullying him in a most indefensible manner, and rendering it impossible for him to work his Department, it seems to me that the Government of India is in duty bound to clear Henderson's reputation and pull Griffin up.

As to the "general question" of the proposed abolition of the Thuggee Department, if it has been in any way complicated by this personal matter, the fault is Griffin's. As I have shown, he uses Henderson's correspondence with Davies as an argument for his decentralisation scheme. But I have dealt with the two matters in two separate drafts.

On the merits of the general question you will perceive that the only Member of Council who has the smallest practical acquaintance with the operations of the Department in Native States recognises the value of centralised control. He would recognise it much more clearly I think if his experience had lain in the States of Central India and Rajputana. On this point I may fairly claim to know something. I have seen the working of the Department from both sides, and having started with a strong prejudice against it, I have come round to the opposite view. The question was most exhaustively considered by a Committee not ten years ago. Since then dacoity has not been extirpated. So long as political officers obstruct the operations of the Department, it will not be. Ilbert says—"Thuggee no longer exists." It is true that the primitive and picturesque form of the crime, "Rumal Thuggee," has gone down before the spread of civilisation. But I have myself been concerned in the trial of Thug gangs, one of which, if my memory serves me, confessed to 117 murders by datura poisoning. I have little doubt that there is a good deal of it still in secluded parts.

Putting this aside, the appointment is absolutely necessary as a general police and intelligence appointment. The supply of secret information is a recognised part of the Superintendent's duties, and he does supply such information. I think Henderson might do more in this way, and that we are perhaps to blame for not using him more, but he is not without such work. We always put him on the track of suspected foreigners going to Native States, seditious preachers, &c. He has this season got me valuable information from Cashmere and Hyderabad, and he is at this moment working up a case at Indore whereby we hope to expose a system of illicit sale of arms in Government arsenals. As you know, I am not in the least prejudiced in Henderson's favour. I think he has been foolish, and has not done all he might have done. But the Members of Council do not know what he does, and they are unfair to him. He sees more of natives, and knows most of

(3)

what they are saying and thinking, than nine men out of ten. Lambert, working for his own hand, did Henderson all the harm he could, and this I think is not fully comprehended. Henderson has pulled himself together now, and will, I think, do well again if he is given a chance.

To make an end of this very long letter I would draw your attention to Sir Theodore Hope's comments upon my drafts. Such language has never before been applied to any work which I have submitted, nor have I seen it applied by any Member of Council to any draft of any Secretary's. If comments of this nature are permitted to remain on record, I do not see how Secretaries can work with any freedom, or retain the confidence and respect of their subordinates. Admitting that the draft B was too strongly worded, it must be remembered that it was written in defence of a man whom I believe to have been most unfairly assailed, and in answer to a direct demand by Griffin for a censure to be passed upon his proceedings, which were in fact open to no objection. Griffin has insulted him before others, impeded him in his work, upheld his subordinates against him, misrepresented his action, and called upon the Government of India to declare the tone of his correspondence detrimental to the interests of the public service. I think such conduct justifies decided language, and though I greatly softened the original draft, I left it couched in very unusual terms. If the Viceroy knew the intense distress which has been caused to Henderson by Griffin's behaviour to him—and undeservedly caused—he would, I am sure, feel equally strongly about it. In any case I submit that there is nothing in the draft which can justly cause it to be characterised as "most objectionable in tone and terms." Nor I think can draft A be properly described by implication as controversial and discourteous.

That draft must now in any case stand over, until we have considered the proposals of the Finance Committee, to which Sir Auckland Colvin refers.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) H. M. DURAND.

Bxxiv/5

FROM

THE RIGHT HON'BLE ROBERT BOURKE,
Governor of Madras.

TO

D. MACKENZIE WALLACE, Esq.,
Private Secretary to the Viceroy.

December 31st, 1886.

MY DEAR MR. MACKENZIE WALLACE,

Many thanks for sending me the confidential Memorandum about the Police.

I hope you will kindly continue to send me in this way any papers of interest. It is a great help to me to know in what groove you are all moving at Calcutta upon any subject.

I agree cordially that increased facility of transit must increase crime; that a special detective system on an extensive scale is very objectionable and dangerous; that the present system is susceptible of improvement; that the station diaries are very faulty and inadequate; and that the isolation of the present system is very disastrous: but I fear I should hesitate before giving to the police the duty of making the station diary "a complete résumé of the day's information on every aspect of the people's daily life, social, political, religious, mercantile, agricultural, as well as on the merely criminal"—

1st—because I do not see that such information would be of much use in preventing crime;

2nd—because the system would lead the peaceable and law-abiding population to regard the police as spies and a terror to those that do well, whereas I think for the *prevention* of crime the great object ought to be to make the police popular amongst the mass of the people;

3rd—because the whole of our system is already too much infected with the fault of investing power in subordinates who cannot possibly be controlled, and who in many thousands of cases are both corrupt and tyrannical;

4th—because I should fear that if the same agency were used for criminal investigation as you now use for gaining information with respect to the daily life—social, political, religious, mercantile—of the whole population, you would raise up in the

P5
P6

(2)

minds of the non-criminal classes a feeling that the police were their critics, informers, and enemies, rather than what they ought to be, the friends and protectors of the people. We have seen even in a free country like Ireland that the imposition of various duties on the police has had this effect, and has more than anything else rendered them almost useless in the prevention of crime.

5th—I believe all that the information about the social and religious and political life of the people is obtainable now through agencies other than the police.

6th—I believe that the great blot of the present system is that mentioned in your interesting Memorandum, namely, *Isolation*, and that if all the energy and ability at your disposal is directed to that evil, a complete remedy can easily be found.

I daresay I may be considered very presumptuous in giving my opinion so freely after, so short an experience of practical government in India, but the subject is one which is not new to any public man, and also one to which I have given some thought with respect to the police systems of other countries.

I wish you would kindly send us one of the Punjab station diaries. I daresay we may learn much from the Province whose administration I regard with the most profound admiration.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) ROBERT BOURKE.

[PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL.]

It has been brought to the notice of the Government of India that the recent great extensions of our Railway, Postal, and Telegraphic systems throughout India, and the cheapening of the means of transit and communication thus afforded to all classes of the community, have had a material effect in increasing crime. Cases have occurred in which those great material improvements have been turned to account by evil-disposed persons, not only for the actual commission of crime, but for the establishment of those relations and the acquisition of that knowledge which precede and facilitate offences against social order.

In order to counteract and neutralize the facilities for criminal enterprises thus afforded, it has been suggested to His Excellency in Council that the establishment of a special detective system on an extensive scale would be desirable. This suggestion, however, has not been accepted by His Excellency in Council as being inconsistent with the spirit of our Police administration and repugnant to His Excellency's own feelings.

Having carefully considered the matter, of which the importance is unquestionable, it seems to His Excellency in Council that, with certain improvements, our existing Police organization should suffice to meet the requirements of the case.

In order to render our existing Police system effective for the object in view, two points have to be attended to. These are,—the inadequate attention which in most Provinces seems to be at present paid to the "prevention" as distinguished from the "detection" of crime, and the isolation which at present characterizes District Police administration. In regard to the first point, His Excellency in Council desires very briefly, but emphatically, to say that he regards the prevention of crime as by far the most important aspect of a police officer's duty. An essential condition of the performance of this duty is the possession of adequate knowledge of what is going on, not only in the particular Police jurisdiction, but in other jurisdictions adjacent to, or within easy reach of it.

On such points as these, the present system of Police administration in some Provinces seems susceptible of much improvement. It has been represented to His Excellency in Council that in some parts of the Empire the station diaries, which should be the record of full and valuable information on every aspect of urban and rural life, are often nothing more than a record of mere unrealities. But it must be manifest that the care and fulness with which these reports are prepared, lies at the very root of successful Police administration. It is of no interest, or of but slight interest, to the authorities

REF: IOL: MSS EurFB/42 H
FOR:

(2)

to know when the station watchman was relieved of duty, or when the station post bag was received or despatched. But it is of essential importance that the responsible authorities should have early and precise information on such matters as the arrival in a town or village of a suspicious stranger, of his movements while there, and of his apparent object; and there are other matters of general or special interest which, as involving the comfort and well-being of the local population, have a direct bearing on social order, and, therefore, should find a place in the station diary. Such matters are the state of the crops, and of roads and communications; the state of public feeling on all topics of a local or general character; the relations of classes or sects to each other; movements among the people, and so forth. The police have, in their own observations and enquiries, and in the reports they periodically receive from the village watchmen, ample means of information on all these and such like matters; and it is fatal to all good administration that the fullest use should not be made of such opportunities.

If the information thus available to the local police were carefully reported to the district officer, and by him carefully collated, it is obvious that he frequently would have the means, not only of preventing crime in his own jurisdiction, but of communicating valuable information to his neighbours. Wherever a district officer now fails to make use of the means to good administration thus ready to his hands, he naturally is unable to help his neighbours; and thus this district isolation, to which allusion has been made above, is maintained and perpetuated. And not only does one district gain no assistance from another, but the Central Government is deprived of systematic and authentic information on subjects which, if the Government is to be effectively conducted, it should never be in want of.

The preceding observations have been made, not only, because the improvements indicated appear in themselves easy of attainment, but because in the Punjab they have actually been attained on the system suggested. There, for several years past, great attention has been paid to making the station diary what it ought to be—a complete *résumé* of the day's information on every aspect of the people's daily life, social, political, religious, mercantile, agricultural, as well as on the merely criminal. From the diaries so framed the district officer, collating one station's diary with another, is often able to see clearly where without such comparison all was indistinct. From the abstract which he submits to the Inspector-General, or other controlling officer, the latter is able to furnish important information to other districts or to the Central Government.

If such a system as this were generally enforced, there would be in the hands of the authorities ample means for preventing crime, and for detecting it when prevention was impossible.

REF: IOL MSS EUR F130
17

11A.

14.5.1888

(2)

the event of war, and which would be always procurable, though of course not in quite so convenient a manner, even if war unexpectedly broke out.

Secretary of
State's financial
despatch.

We have duly received your financial despatch, and I find that Westland is in entire sympathy with its general principles. As I presume Barbour also approves of it, I apprehend that we shall find no difficulty in acceding to its principal recommendations.

Oudh and Rohil-
khund Railway.

We are still waiting for your views in regard to the Oudh and Rohilkhund Railway.

Civil Service
Commission.

Report of.

With regard to the Public Service Commission, I think the Government of India will support its proposals, though we may suggest modifications in detail. We are still waiting for the opinions of the subordinate Governments, to whom we have referred the papers, and as they seem a little dilatory in sending in their replies, I have stirred them up with a reminder, pointing out the necessity of your being furnished with the views of the Government of India on the subject while Parliament is still sitting. One of the points which is indirectly raised by the Commission is the question of the age for the admission of candidates. The Commission was very properly precluded from dealing with the point as regards British candidates, but it felt itself authorized to make a recommendation in favour of raising the age of Native candidates. I do not yet know what the opinion of my colleagues may be, but wherever I have gone I have questioned our various officers as to the result of lowering the age of admission for Englishmen, and certainly the majority of them have come to the conclusion that the change has not been advantageous. In reference to this subject I send you an extract from a letter written to me by Mr. Scoones, who has been coaching one of my sons. His observations were volunteered, for I had not mentioned the matter to him, but they are worth considering.

Letter from
Mr. Scoones.
Enclosure No. 1.

Finance Com-
mission.

Action taken
by Government
of India on re-
commendations
of.

I have explained in a previous letter that we have already taken action with regard to a great number of the recommendations of the Finance Commission, and day by day arrangements founded on them are being submitted to us by the various Departments, but with respect to a great many of the Commission's proposals nothing can be done as long as the present occupants of the offices dealt with are in possession of their posts.

Indian Impri-
sonment for Debt
Bill.

I am very glad that you approve of our Imprisonment for Debt Bill. Some of us were afraid that perhaps we had gone beyond the limits laid down in the despatch of your predecessor, and I am much relieved to find that this is not the case.

C. D. and
Bazaar Regula-
tions for soldiers
in India.

Our C. D. despatch will go by next mail. It has taken a great deal of time to get together all the papers connected with this disagreeable subject, including the orders issued by the various Military Commandants. The result clearly shows that our officers, in their zeal for the health of their troops,

REF: IOL MSS EVR F130
11A.

(3)

have allowed during the last twenty years a system to grow up which in many ways outrages the public morality of the nineteenth century, and will expose us to a certain amount of not illegitimate blame. As we explain in our despatch, these rules and injunctions were issued without our authority, and we did not know of their existence until quite recently. What, however, is quite as inexcusable is the Quarter-Master-General's letter of the 2nd of August 1887, in which, in the face of his own recommendation to supply the soldiers with pretty and attractive women, he tries to make out that there is no foundation for the accusations preferred by Mr. Dyer and his friends. As soon as the subject was brought to my notice, I entreated Chesney and Roberts to avoid any appearance of prevarication or ambiguity in their replies, as the House of Commons will never be denied, and the only result in following a crooked course in regard to whatever is absolutely wrong will be to expose ourselves to suspicion and render it all the more difficult for us to defend the Cantonment Acts themselves. I am afraid, however, now that Chapman has been found out in what is nothing more nor less than a gross mis-statement, our promises to abolish the abuses which have been brought to light will not be believed, especially by the school represented by Mr. Dyer, who seems to be himself an unscrupulous and unmitigated cad.

I am afraid you will have been having a great deal of trouble about the Hyderabad business. I am anxiously awaiting your letter in regard to it, for I am still very much in the dark as to how the miscarriage occurred. It appears to me that the people who are really responsible to the shareholders are the Directors of the Company. It was they who made the bargain, and who must have consented to surrender £850,000 worth of shares as the price of the concession. How on earth they could have been induced to do this I cannot conceive. The intention of the Government of India was that only so many shares should be issued as would be sufficient to work the mines already susceptible of development, and that more capital should be called up *pari passu* with the opportunities of profitably employing it. Instead of following this method, the Company seems to have parted at one go with the money which ought to have been kept for the exploitation of its property, reserving in its own hands only a miserable £150,000 for this purpose.

I see that Moreton Frewen is trying to prove that Salar Jung was dismissed through Cordery's influence in order that Abdul Huk might be given a freer hand. This is absolutely and entirely untrue, as you will see by a little memorandum which I append. I understand that Frewen himself asserts that he and an impossible creature of the name of Seymour Key have been empowered to act on behalf of the Hyderabad Government. Mr. Howell, our Resident, has written to me to say that no such delegation has been committed to either of these gentlemen.

Hyderabad Mining Co.'s affairs.

Salar Jung.
Causes of dismissal of.
Enclosure No. 2.
Messrs. Moreton Frewen and Seymour Key and the Hyderabad Government.

70 71

REP: IOL MSS EUR F130
 11A.

NO. 30-

SIMLA;

June 29th, 1888.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD CROSS,

Many thanks for your letter of the 8th of June. In reply I beg to say that I have taken advantage of your hint, and have written direct to Lord Lansdowne, suggesting that he should arrange to arrive in Bombay about the 27th or 28th of December, stay there two or three days to rest, and to see Lord Reay and the Bombay Officials, and so reach Calcutta about the 3rd of January. I imagine this plan would suit him, and it would certainly suit me, as I should then both celebrate my fifth Queen-Empress's day in India, and not reach Rome until the neck of the winter was broken, which is rather an important consideration. I do not imagine that a fortnight, one way or the other, would really interfere with Lord Salisbury's wishes.

The account of the debate in the House of Commons on the C. D. Acts has duly come to hand, and, with the explanations which you have been good enough to give, make the case quite clear. Our Military friends have undoubtedly brought down the catastrophe upon their own heads by their silly and wanton misrepresentations, and I now hear from Chesney, though we have not yet had any further official communication upon the subject, that even the Cantonment Act is threatened. This I think will prove a misfortune, for I have no doubt that we could so modify the existing Regulations as to deprive them of all their offensive characteristics or of any appearance either of outraging feminine delicacy or increasing the temptations of our young soldiers. I have also received an account of the Exeter Hall Meeting, at which the language was certainly most insulting and outrageous. Amongst other niceties of speech I observe that Miss Josephine Butler alleged that the Viceroy of India must himself be a "prostitute." But what I feel most about the whole business is that the credit of the Government of India for honourable and straightforward dealing has been considerably and deservedly damaged. We were asked a question, and we told a falsehood in reply; information was required of us, and not only was that information deficient, but it was contrary to fact. As a consequence, any despatch or statement which we may hereafter send home in defence of any policy which may run counter to the prejudices or convictions of what I may call the "hysterical" interests, will be disbelieved and denounced as misleading and

Lord Cross's
 letter of 8th
 June.

Date for Vice-
 roy's departure
 from India.

Parliament and
 the Indian C. D.
 Acts.

115.7

(2)

untrustworthy. It is certainly most unfortunate, and the worst of it is we cannot place any prominent stress on the fact that we ourselves were deceived by those from whom alone accurate information could be obtained. For my own part I confess that the C. D. Acts and the arrangements connected with them have never occupied my attention, either at home or anywhere else that I have been, for it is not a pleasant subject to examine. Even in regard to the Indian Cantonment Act—I had only a vague notion that the professional prostitutes of India, who are a distinct and hereditary caste, were not allowed to frequent the Cantonments in a state of disease,—which seemed a very reasonable regulation. Then there came the Bishop of Lichfield's question and Chapman's answer to it which we forwarded to you as authoritative, though we had begun to entertain doubts, as we noted in our despatch at the time, that, at all events in parts of India, a condition of things existed which did not altogether bear out its statements, but of course none of us civilians knew anything about the exhortations issued to the Commanding Officers of various British Regiments to obtain pretty women for their men, or of the various other objectionable notifications which seem to have been sown broadcast over all our military stations; and even when at last we got an inkling of the height to which the indiscretion of the soldiers had run, we felt that in so grave a matter it would be necessary to act in full possession of the facts of the case, and in communication with the Local Governments. As a result, we suspended the C. D. Acts and cancelled all the objectionable circulars, but even the very thoroughness with which we endeavoured to probe the evil to the bottom has been made a fresh cause of complaint against us by our fiery assailants, and, what is very hard, it is even asserted that because the figures furnished by our medical men do not square with the wishes of the "shrieking sisterhood," they, the doctors, must be themselves personally steeped to the lips in the filth of impurity! Gorst seems to have made an excellent and a very judicious speech, as also did Sir Richard Temple. I suppose in due course we shall get the protest of the dissenting Members of your Council.

Sir T. Hope
and Hyderabad
mining enquiry.

I am glad to see that Hope has been examined in the Hyderabad enquiry, and I hope his evidence has proved satisfactory. I am told, however, that, as usual with him, he is trying to shuffle out of all responsibility in regard to the approval given by the Government of India to the terms of the contract. Indeed a letter which I have received from him on the subject implies that he was prepared to take this line. Anything more unjustifiable cannot well be conceived, for he was the prime mover in the whole business, as he was under the impression that the exploitation of the Singareni coal mines would prove of immense benefit to the Madras railway system. Moreover, it stands to reason that upon such a question it would be by the opinion of the Public Works Department that we would be principally guided, and that the Foreign Department would not concern itself

BXXIV/7

CAMP, DEHRA DUN;
April 11th, 1887.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD CROSS,

Many thanks for your letter of the 18th of March.

I will now discuss Afghan affairs. I have not gone into them very fully hitherto, because, beyond vague rumours, we had really very little to go upon, and even now, though I sent you the other day the substance of a report from one of our Candahar news-writers, it is impossible to predict what will happen. All that is certain is that there is considerable agitation amongst the Ghilzais and other clans, and that the Amir considers the situation serious. I myself am inclined to think that in the event of a collision, the Amir will win, if only his troops remain true to him, for he has artillery, ammunition, and weapons of precision, whereas the others have neither leaders, nor cohesion, nor arms. I had sent Durand up to Quetta, in order that he might learn what he could on the border, but he has not come back much wiser than he went. Our Native Agents are all sensation-mongers, and the description of a political situation even by an intelligent man like Ataoolla Khan, our Cabul Envoy, is apt to be distorted by his prejudices and excitable imagination. The latter came down after all, and met me at Saharunpore, but neither could he throw much light upon the future. Supposing, however, the revolt spreads and becomes serious, what are we to do?

Affairs in Af-
ghanistan.

Before answering this question it is necessary to re-examine our position in regard to the Amir, its obligations and its rights. Under Lord Ripon's agreement, while we undertook upon certain conditions to guarantee his frontier and to control his external relations, we bound ourselves not to interfere in the internal concerns of his State. On the other hand, the Amir promised to abstain from all political trafficking with Russia. Up till a little while ago his general attitude and proceedings were satisfactory, and sufficiently in accordance with the agreement we had come to. We suspected of course that he occasionally communicated with the Russians, but his public utterances and general proceedings implied that he still considered it his interest to side with us against Russia. The other day, however, we heard a rumour that he was proclaiming a Jihad, or sacred war, and that a proclamation had been issued in which both the English and the Russians were held up as the enemies of Islam. This proclamation we have now got, and it turns out to be pretty much what was described, but I am inclined to think that its publication was merely a ruse either to divert the minds of his subjects from his domestic

57

(2)

difficulties, or to afford him an excuse for getting his troops together in view of the threatened revolt of the Ghilzais. At all events, as at present advised, I am not inclined to take any notice of the document in question, as, if we were to remonstrate with him, he would probably say it was a forgery, and of course we could not bring the matter home to him. A more serious circumstance, however, is the following, positively vouched for by our Cabul Agent, namely, that two Russians were admitted into Cabul, were entertained by the Amir, and had several secret conferences with him by night. But here again we are very much in the dark, for Ataoolla Khan did not himself see the men, and what he reports is on hearsay evidence; nor is he able to say what passed between them and the Amir. We thought that perhaps Colonel Maclean could throw some light on the mystery by obtaining information about the alleged emissaries on their way back to Turkistan, but though they seem to have left for Herat, Maclean has not heard of them. Eventually, however, we shall no doubt discover the truth, and if the facts turn out as stated by our Agent, they look very like an infraction of his agreement on the part of the Amir, and might be considered to set us free from our obligations in his regard.

The next question is that of policy. Is it more for our interest still to maintain the Amir, or to allow the tribes, if they can, to overthrow him? As far as the individual is concerned, there is little to be said for him, except that he is self-reliant and energetic. His rule has been a horrible tyranny, and he has shed blood like water. He murders, he tortures, he robs, and it is a disgrace to have anything to say to him. Even admitting that he has not intrigued with the Russians, he has paid but little heed to our advice and recommendations, on the plea that were he to show himself too subservient, he would alienate the confidence of his people. On the other hand, it is a very grave matter in the East to swerve from any fixed line of conduct which has been publicly and formally adopted. The Amir is our creature, and our relations of friendship with him have become a matter of history. If only he had been a more humane, conscientious, and wise ruler, the union of the Afghan tribes under a strong Chief would be the best arrangement that could be arrived at, and, on the whole, unless we get more positive proof that the Amir really means treachery and mischief (and I don't see what he is to gain by breaking faith with us), it is desirable perhaps that he should remain on his throne, if he can manage to do so, but I am very doubtful whether, even if he should ask us for assistance, we should interfere actively on his behalf. An Afghan Prince who cannot guard his own head would be of little use to us as an ally, and, considering the cruelty of the man's disposition, it would be a very grave matter for us to help him to exterminate the tribes he has driven into revolt. On the other hand, it would be out of the question for us to assist the tribes, unless, indeed, we could produce more damning evidence of the Amir having been absolutely and unmistakeably false to us than we possess.

(3)

Supposing, however, that the tribes get the upper hand, and that the Amir is killed or driven off, a still more difficult problem presents itself; nor am I prepared to answer it until I have seen Roberts and Chesney (who have been recently at Peshin) and the rest of my colleagues at Simla. Roberts, however, does not arrive until the 20th, a day or two before I do, so that I shall not be able to deal again with this part of the subject for a fortnight, but, speaking for myself, and without having heard the matter re-discussed with whatever new lights Roberts and Chesney may have acquired, I should be very much tempted, if the day goes against the Amir, to try and deal directly with the tribes. From all accounts, they are now very well disposed towards us. They have begun to understand the danger of having Russia for a neighbour and such a cruel brute as the Amir for a ruler, and that their best chance of protection and fair treatment is from us. They are not wilder or fiercer, or more blood-thirsty, than were formerly the tribes of the Lebanon, and I do not see why we should not be able to establish such relations with them as have subsisted for so many years past between the Druses and the Turkish Government. There does not seem to be any person who would be fitted to take the place of Abdur Rahman. Ayub Khan would not be desirable, and Ishak Khan, of whom I at one time thought, though apparently a good man, seems to be devoid of the energy and other qualities necessary for the occupant of such a post; but perhaps under our auspices some kind of tribal government could be established in Afghanistan, which, while not offending the national susceptibilities of the inhabitants, might give us a position of commanding influence in that country, and above all things enable us to do whatever is necessary for the defence of our natural frontier. Of course directly anything happens in Afghanistan, somebody at once suggests that we should take Candahar. Now, no one has been more alive to the ultimate possibility of such a necessity than myself, as is proved by the fact of my having insisted on the requisite amount of rails to connect the present terminus of our Frontier Railway with Candahar being stored up at Peshin, but I do not think it is a step which should be taken except after we have felt our way and have ascertained the effect it would produce upon the present temper of the Afghans, for I apprehend that the occupation of Candahar means the ultimate advance of our permanent frontier to the western ridges of the Hindoo Koosh. Moreover, in dealing with questions of Indian policy, I always have in my mind the way in which they will affect the position of the Government in Parliament, for nothing would give me greater pain than to do anything here which would embarrass you at home, and even the shadow of a rumour that we were contemplating an advance to Candahar would probably give rise to an inconvenient amount of Parliamentary controversy and discussion. For this reason, except in such a confidential communication as this letter, I am careful never to hint at the possibility of our taking such a step. In the meantime, as I have already said, I do not think at present that there is anything for us to do but to wait, and watch, in accordance with what was the

(4)

unanimous decision of my Council before we left Calcutta. Fortunately railway communication to Peshin is now complete, so that we can send up there any number of troops that we may desire without much expense or difficulty. As soon as Roberts rejoins and I reach Simla, we will have another field day in Council on Afghan affairs, and I will trouble you with a further disquisition upon them. I have had very satisfactory letters both from Chesney and from Roberts about the revised plans for the defences at Peshin and along the frontier generally. They both seem satisfied that they will prove more effectual and much cheaper than the scheme originally sanctioned. In fact they each say that the Peshin works will render the Amran range impregnable.

We will undertake to deal with the Jubilee letters which you have been kind enough to send me.

I have read with great interest Sir Owen Burne's Memorandum upon the Persian Railway. We have so many searchings of heart in regard to guaranteeing our own Indian Railways that I hardly know what to say about India's guaranteeing a Persian one. There are hundreds of miles of famine lines still unbuilt in this country, besides greatly needed commercial ones, and I cannot help thinking that there is something incongruous in asking India alone to bolster up Persia. If it were a joint guarantee, the case would, I think, be different, and certainly it would present a different aspect to the Indian public. However, I will go into the matter very carefully with Colvin and Hope, and write to you again.

With regard to Hyderabad, up to the day before yesterday I was flattering myself that everything was going on as well as possible, so much so that even the press was beginning to comment in very favourable terms on the success which had attended the appointment of Marshall. In fact, as far as the Nizam's conduct is concerned, which of course at the time was the chief difficulty in our way, the arrangement has worked admirably. His Highness has become a changed man, lives a great deal more outside his Zenana, is ready to transact business, and has been remarkably civil to Salar Jung, though I imagine his feelings towards him remain unchanged. And now, here we have Salar Jung kicking his heels over the traces. A little while ago he shut himself up in his country-house because the astrologers told him that the stars indicated that he was in danger of assassination, and now, under the plea of indisposition, he has left the State without taking leave or even notice of the Nizam, and has ordered all papers to be sent after him. I thought at the time I saw him that he was a feather-headed fool, but his present conduct seems to be unaccountable.

Believe me,
MY DEAR LORD CROSS,
yours sincerely,
(Sd.) DUFFERIN.

Jubilee letters
from the Queen.

Proposed Per-
sian Railway.

Hyderabad
affairs.

Afgha
imper
disqu
now
my u
It se
of Sta
throu
be de
or de
with
mote
reason
wish
to ou

FROM

THE EARL OF DUFFERIN, K. P.

TO

THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE VISCOUNT CROSS, G. C. B.,

Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA;

May 19th, 1887.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD CROSS,

The Afghan problem is so difficult, and its elements so shifting and obscure, that you must forgive me for continuing my examination of them, but I would observe that the choice of one or other of the various alternative courses which are likely to present themselves upon the disappearance of the present Amir must depend upon the sense in which two preliminary questions of tremendous importance are decided, namely, first, whether or no England is prepared to threaten Russia with hostilities if she violates the new Zulficar-Khoja Saleh boundary line, and, secondly, whether such a threat will deter her from doing so. Two years ago when Russia showed aggressive tendencies, we put our ships into the water, we called out our reserves, and we told the Amir that if his country was invaded, Great Britain "would go to war with Russia all over the world." Since then a good deal has happened, and our difficulties with Ireland, our embarrassments in Egypt, and a reflux in the temper of public opinion generally, may perhaps have superinduced a change in the intended policy of Her Majesty's present advisers. On the other hand, Russia's means of assaulting Afghan Turkistan have been considerably augmented by the extension of her Central Asian Railway and the consolidation of her authority at Merv, Sarakhs, and Panjdeh, consequently she may be inclined to risk more now than she did in 1885. If, however, both the questions which I have noted above are answered in the affirmative, the course to be pursued here would be much simplified; as in that case, in the event of Abdur Rahman's death, our best plan would be to put Afghanistan in its present entirety under another Amir, that is to say, either under Ishak Khan, Yakoob Khan, Ayub Khan, or such other Chief as may be found expedient; for it is evident that the mere change in the

Afghanistan.
Future policy
in regard to.

(2)

personality of the Amir would in no way minimize any of those treaty and moral obligations under which Russia is now bound to respect the integrity of Afghan territory.

On the desirability of keeping Russia as far off India as possible, and consequently to the north of the newly-demarcated frontier, I need not insist. Were she a Power in whose good faith and respect for international rights we could confide—do any such exist!—the case would be different, and a good deal might be said about the benefits to be derived by civilization from two great European Empires joining hands in the East, but the worry, the political disturbance, the expense and the additional taxation occasioned to India by Russia's advance even to her present limits are significant indications of what would happen if she were comfortably and securely established at Herat, Maimana, and Balkh. Even admitting that her Statesmen were disposed to rest satisfied with these acquisitions, and that her most ambitious Military Chiefs should recognize the insuperable difficulties in the way of an advance upon the Indus, we must take it for granted that the idea of the ultimate invasion and conquest of Hindustan would never be absent from the minds either of one or of the other, and that, cloaking herself in the garb of an Eastern or of a Mahomedan Power, as might best suit the occasion, she would be perpetually fomenting revolt among the savage and predatory tribes on our border, and discontent and disloyalty at the Courts of our Princes and at the chief centres of our native population. But, however lamentable and inconvenient such results might prove, it may be necessary to forestall and to face them. As I have already said in a previous letter, as far as India's own power of resistance is concerned, Russia is absolutely master of the military situation in Afghan Turkistan. She could occupy Herat and advance to the foot of the Hindoo Koosh to-morrow if she chose, for all that the Amir's subjects or his troops in that part of the world would or could do to prevent her, and once she had set up her standards in the Valley of the Hari Rood, her rule and authority would be far more rapidly and auspiciously established over her new subjects than it has been either at Khiva or Samarkand, while the Indian Government would have no other alternative than to remain a helpless spectator of an aggression which, though by no means fatal, would be undoubtedly very detrimental both to our prestige and our authority amongst our Indian subjects, even though it should be found advisable to seek for some sort of consolation in the occupation of Candahar and a demonstration on the Helmund.

Our own military programme, in the opinion not only of Sir Donald Stewart but even of Roberts, the most enterprising of Commanders, being restricted within these impotent limits, you can understand how anxious we must be to know whether the Government of Great Britain is prepared to forbid from London the violation of the newly delimited boundary. If, however, she is *not*, and the present Amir is defeated or murdered, it might be

(3)

worth while to examine other combinations than that of a united Afghanistan under an independent Ruler. In my letters of the 11th of April and 1st of May, in the latter of which I detailed the general conclusions of myself and my Council in regard to the existing crisis, I referred to the possibility of substituting a tribal system of government, such as was established in the Lebanon in 1860, in lieu of the present régime. The tribes of the Lebanon at that date were as wild, as fierce, as blood-thirsty, and as difficult to rule as ever have been the Afghans. Blood feuds were universal, and the traditional jealousies of the clans, though themselves sufficiently intense, were still further embittered by animosities of race and religion, constantly fanned into a flame by foreign influences. Various expedients had been tried to introduce something like order into the Mountain. At one time it was placed under a native Amir; then divided under two Governors: then the Turks endeavoured to establish their own military ascendancy; but every plan failed in turn until we put each principal section of the people under its own Chiefs, assisted by divisional Councils, with an inter-tribal police under an independent Governor appointed by the Turks, though not himself a Mahomedan. Under this system, the domestic independence both of the Druses and of the Maronites remained perfectly free and uncontrolled. The Turkish troops garrisoned certain strategical points outside of the privileged limits, but no Turkish soldiers were permitted to be quartered on the villagers or to enter within the "liberties" of the tribes. Within a couple of years after these arrangements had been carried into effect blood feuds entirely ceased, and from that time till the present day the Lebanon has been the most peaceful, the most contented, and the most prosperous province of the Ottoman dominions. Of course no two schemes of government, no matter how analogous may be the conditions of the districts dealt with, can be completely assimilated, but it has more than once occurred to me that by breaking Afghanistan up into various geographical divisions, determined by their ethnological affinities, and placing each under a suitable tribal Ruler, we might contrive to reserve to ourselves, with the consent of those concerned, the right of guarding the passes of the Hindoo Koosh and of keeping the general peace of the country without in any way interfering with the communal independence of its inhabitants. But the practical surrender to Russia of everything to the north and west of Afghanistan proper, would be the necessary postulate to the institution of such an order of things, for it is obvious that any petty Chiefs we might establish beyond the reach of our military jurisdiction, whether at Balkh, at Herat, or elsewhere, would inevitably gravitate towards Russia and fall sooner or later under her influence. Our Biluchistan Agent tells me that the Ghilzais are so sick of their Amir that they would hail our advent into their country with enthusiasm, and it is just possible, if such a feeling as this was universal, and if we could succeed in thoroughly establishing ourselves in the affections of the Afghan people, that, from the position thus

100 ?

(4)

secured, we should be able to dominate the western slopes of the mountain and the cities and plains beyond, as completely as the eastern ones, but I fear that St. John greatly over-rates the degree to which our favour with the tribesmen has progressed, and that their deep-rooted fanaticism and jealousy of strangers and "Kaffirs" would prevent their ever permitting Ghuznee or Cabul to pass into our hands as a safe, secure, and cheerfully surrendered base of British military operations, though it is possible that, under the conditions I have mentioned, they might be persuaded to allow us to make certain defensive preparations, such as roads or even earth-works along those outer lines in their country which are most exposed to invasion. Should this be the limit to the concessions we have a right to expect from the alleged change in the feelings of the Afghans towards us, it follows, as I have already said, that everything outside of the Hindoo Koosh and north of the Helmund must fall to Russia. It was the anticipation of this I imagine which induced Ridgeway to propose the naked division of Afghanistan between the two Powers.

But admitting, *ex hypothesi*, that England is neither willing nor able to interdict the advance of Russia's practical supremacy up to the foot of the Hindoo Koosh, it seems to me that under cover of the tribal jurisdictions described above, some of the evil consequences of the surrender would be mitigated and concealed. The "partition" of Afghanistan means Russian Governors at Herat and Balkh, with the Russian flag flying over the ramparts of these towns, and Russian soldiers within their walls, Russian outposts within a few miles of Candahar, and Russian Custom House officers co-terminous with Biluchistan—in short, a change of scene so sudden, significant, and dramatic as could not fail to impress the imaginations of all the peoples of the East with a sense of the White Czar's irresistible might and energy. If, however, instead of this we could come to a compromise with the Government at St. Petersburg, not for the material distribution of the country, but for an amicable division of our influence within it, the effect upon public opinion in India and elsewhere would prove far less disturbing and pernicious, for, though perforce we should have withdrawn our pretensions to exercise supreme influence at Maimena and Balkh and Herat, Afghan Chiefs would still remain the rulers of quasi-independent Afghan States; Russian soldiers and Russian Railways would be interdicted, as at present, from encroaching on Afghan-Turkistan territory, (unless, indeed, we agreed to make a through Indo-European line), and, for a time at least, what are called "appearances" would be kept up. Even so, I admit, the vices I have already indicated as inherent in any scheme of partition would remain extant; that is to say, while Russia could easily proceed to exercise the moral and indirect influence conceded to her over the affairs of the abandoned districts, the degree to which we on our side would be able to reap corresponding advantages would still remain very problematic; but one presumption at least would be in our favour, *viz.*, that the

(5)

small tribal Chiefs proposed by the scheme, whether Ghilzai or Durani, or whether located at Cabul, Ghuznee or Candahar, would be more easily controlled, and more likely to prove amenable to our counsels and wishes than a full fledged, far-ruling Prince of the existing type. Nor, while admitting that the scheme of tribal government I have indicated for Afghanistan proper may prove inapplicable or at least premature, am I at all disposed to look upon it as visionary. Human beings are the same all over the world. What they desire as a mass is security for life and property, just laws, and religious freedom. Though very slowly, the spectacle which India presents as the throne and seat of a humane Government is gradually penetrating to the knowledge of these wild mountaineers. The cruelties, the extortions, and the monstrous excesses of Abdur Rahman have brought home to their minds more vividly perhaps than ever before the priceless value of a just administration. The facility with which we conquered their country during the last war, and the magnanimity we showed in quitting it, have undoubtedly made a profound and lasting impression, and if only they could be persuaded that we were determined to respect their domestic and tribal independence and to leave their Chiefs in the possession of their traditional rights and jurisdictions, the time might very well come when they might be induced to accept the position of a protected State under the ægis of the British Government.

In further illustration of what I have said, I send you a very clever paper by St. John, together with a letter I have written to him in reply to it, and another letter I had already sent him before his memorandum had reached my hands. You will see that his ideas, though previously we had no communication on the subject, have been flowing in similar lines to my own, but in his desire to break up Afghanistan at once into Vilayets, which I understand has always been a hobby of his, he seems to have overlooked the inevitable hold it would give to Russia over all the districts to the north and west of the Hindoo Koosh.

However, all that I have written is very speculative. The Amir has recovered from his gout and threatens to take the field in person against the rebels. Though his Generals do not seem to have been able to do much during the last few weeks, neither have the insurgents on their side given signs of possessing greater strength or energy. Again, you and your colleagues and the British nation may be as determined as they were two years ago to make any sacrifices rather than allow Russia to take another step southwards, and if this is the case, my vote, and I think that of my colleagues, would still be in favour, should Abdur Rahman suffer shipwreck, of a united Afghanistan, under some other Princely Chief. Who this should be, however, is a very grave question. St. John says that the Duranis would never accept Ishak Khan, who in some respects might prove a desir-

Memo. by Sir
O. St. John on
Afghan Affairs.

Enclosures
Nos. 2 & 3.

REF: IOL: MISS KUR F 130 43D.

LOR: DIFFERIN COLLECTION.

DHARAMPAL

SIMLA;

May 12th, 1887.

[Private & Confidential.]

MY DEAR ST. JOHN,

I wrote to you a few days ago, but at the time I had not seen the clever paper which you sent to Durand in reference to the condition of affairs in Afghanistan. I am glad to find that your notions should so closely correspond with those which I myself had noted, for though perhaps I had in my mind a more minute sub-division, your plan of an Afghanistan divided into three or four Vilayets does not in principle differ very much from the tribal system that was present to my own mind. But it must be remembered that, while we are setting up our Kings of Brentford and delimitating their various jurisdictions, the Russians may perhaps discharge a bowl amongst our nine-pins and greatly disconcert our arrangements. Indeed, if such a plan as you suggest were instituted, we should have to carry it into effect in concert with Russia and submit to recognising Russian influence as supreme in the Vilayets of Balkh and Herat. This would amount to the partition of Afghanistan between England and Russia, but while Russia would enter into possession of a rich and fertile territory inhabited by a comparatively unwarlike population, who would at once acquiesce in her rule and would never give her any trouble, we should only get the mountains and the fanatical and bellicose populations that inhabit them. That this may come to be the eventual settlement of the matter may be very possible, but there is no reason why we should precipitate it. It seems to me the longer we can keep Russia on the northern side of Ridgeway's boundary the better, for every year our relations with the Afghans, or at all events with a considerable proportion of them, are likely to become more and more friendly, at the same time that our system of defence will be growing stronger and stronger. Still your notion that a Mussulman Vali of Herat, even though the humble servant of the Czar, would be a less inconvenient circumstance than the direct capture and occupation of Herat by Russia, has a great deal in it, and the arrangement would mitigate, if it did not entirely counteract, the blow to British prestige which would undoubtedly be dealt by the taking of Herat. As at present advised, however, and for the reasons I have given, I am still inclined to think that an Ameer of Afghanistan, if only a suitable one could be found, is what would best befit the immediate situation. But this

29

30

REF: IOL: MSS EUR F 130 43D.

FOR:

DUFFERIN COLLECTION.

FROM

SIR DONALD MACKENZIE WALLACE, K. C. I. E.,
Private Secretary to the Viceroy.

To

SIR ALFRED LYALL, K. C. B., K. C. I. E.,
Lieut.-Governor, N. W. P. & Oudh.

SIMLA;

June 16th, 1887.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR ALFRED,

With regard to the suggestion of sending you recent papers about Afghanistan, the Viceroy fears that the game would not be worth the candle. You would have to dig your way through mountains of rubbish in order to find a few grains of real information, and at the end of your labours you would probably have to confess that you knew very little more than you did at the beginning. The truth is that our information about the internal condition of Afghanistan is extremely meagre, and it is hardly possible that it could be otherwise. The Amir, for reasons best known to himself, is extremely reticent, and our Envoy at Kabul, though apparently an honest, painstaking man, has neither the brains nor the opportunities to enable him to form a comprehensive and sound judgment on the political situation as a whole. Of our news-writers I need say nothing, for you must have had ample experience of them when you were at the Foreign Office. What they report one day is always liable to be modified or contradicted the next, and their diagnosis are of still less value than their facts. In short, if a big box of Afghan papers were sent to you for perusal, you would have reason to complain that the Viceroy had formed a very low estimate of the value of your time. It is, moreover, quite unnecessary for the purpose which the Viceroy has in view that you should take the trouble of wading through those materials. The point regarding which His Excellency would be glad to have the benefit of your opinion is this:—Supposing the present insurrection against the Amir's authority should prove successful, an entirely new position would of course be created, in presence of which the Government of India would be compelled to adopt some definite line of policy. Now what Lord Dufferin would like to know privately is what line of policy would you in these hypothetical circumstances recommend? When you were at the head of the Foreign Department you must have devoted many anxious hours to considering in all its bearings the difficult problem of dealing with an Amirless Afghanistan, and therefore your opinion regarding the possible recurrence of such a contingency must be of especial value. Since you had to deal practically with the problem, considerable changes have doubtless taken place in the surrounding circumstances, but with these changes you are sufficiently acquainted, and you would of course take them into consideration in examining the question now.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) D. MACKENZIE WALLACE.

105

106

SIMLA;

May 1st, 1887.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD CROSS,

Yesterday we had a very long and interesting discussion on Afghan affairs. We examined the situation from all points of view and took into account every contingency we could think of, and I am happy to say that all my colleagues coincided with the views I have already expressed to you in my letters of the 20th March and 11th April. We agreed:—

Afghanistan.
Future policy
in regard to.

First; that we could do nothing advantageously at the present moment.
Secondly; that it would not be proper to assist the rebels against the Amir.

Thirdly; that if the Amir applied to us for help, we should seize the opportunity to mediate, in a way that would save the tribes from his vengeance and mitigate the excesses of his tyranny, thus placing ourselves in a favourable position towards the people at large.

Fourthly; that it would be impossible to draw up, in view of his death, any cut and dry plan beforehand, as our future action must depend upon so many contingencies of an unknown and uncertain character.

Fifthly; that any premature move to Candahar—and Roberts especially insisted on this—would be on every account most injudicious.

Sixthly; that in the event of the death or overthrow of the Amir, we should give our support to whatever Chief seemed to be most likely to unite the sulfrages of the tribes, as it would be inexpedient to thrust upon them a ruler whom they themselves would not welcome. Neither Roberts, nor the Foreign Secretary, nor any other of my colleagues, are at present prepared to suggest any particular individual possessing the qualities for the post of Amir.

Seventhly; that, if at the time the temper of the tribes favoured such an experiment, it might prove even more advantageous to make with them such arrangements as might result in some form of independent tribal government under our protection.

Eighthly; that we should continue to prosecute our present policy of fortifying our existing frontier, which both Chesney and Roberts emphatically declared could be made inexpugnable, at all events at Pishin and in the south-west.

Ninthly; that it would be most imprudent now to enter into any negotiation with Russia for the future partition of the Amir's dominions.

After we had settled the above points in the manner I have noted, Roberts entered at my request upon a very interesting disquisition on the military aspects of the situation. He implied, as I already knew was his opinion, that the

24.6.1887

(11)

I also send you a letter from Colonel Bannerman, which evidences in a very unpleasant manner how very acutely the proximity of Russia influences our domestic affairs. It seems to me that the lesson to be derived from this and from every other indication that reaches us is that Russia should be kept where she is almost at any cost, for, mischievous as is even now her distant neighbourhood, she would become an intolerable nuisance when actually seated within our very skirts. Moreover, it must always be remembered that Afghanistan is so poor a country that it would never be able to pay the expenses of a British garrison, or of British occupation. Consequently, if the advance of Russia drives us into the adoption of a forward policy and the practical domination of the whole country between the Indus and the crests of the Hindu Kush, it would only be by imposing fresh taxes on our Indian subjects that we should be able to meet the cost of our extended obligations, so again I say let us do everything we can to maintain the actual *status quo*.

Enclosure No. 8.

I am afraid I have sent you too long a letter and a great number of enclosures, but I really think they are worth your while reading, and as they are all in print, they will not be so troublesome.

Believe me,

MY DEAR LORD CROSS,

yours sincerely,

(Sd.) DUFFERIN.

P. S.—I hope I have not been wrong in ordering the furniture for the new Viceregal Lodge direct from England instead of officially through the Store Department as in the case of other indents. It is only now that the possibility of my being out of order has occurred to me, for the Public Works Department raised no objection. Certainly the Store Department could hardly be entrusted with the choice of the hangings for Lady Dufferin's boudoir. Still if we are not *en règle*, please let me know. Most of the expenditure on the furniture account will be local, but about £5,000 will be spent in England, exclusive of the lighting, but this last matter has not yet been settled.

Furniture for
new Viceregal
Lodge.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE VISCOUNT CROSS, G. C. B.,
India Office.

ENCLOSURE No. 8.

FROM

COLONEL P. W. BANNERMAN,
Offg. Agent to Governor General for Central India.

TO

H. M. DURAND, Esq., c. s. I.,
Secy. to Govt., Foreign Dept.

INDORE RESIDENCY ;

June 13th, 1887.

MY DEAR DURAND,

In reply to your letter of 4th instant, I beg to state that my reasons for thinking that the delay in repaying the Gwalior loan would not affect the willingness of other States to lend money to the Government of India, were based on many conversations which I have had at Gwalior with the late Maharajah and with various Members of the Durbar, and here with the Minister, Raghonath Rao. I would begin by saying that both the late Maharajahs, Scindia and Holkar, were opposed to lending money to Government, and both for the same reason, *viz.*, a feeling of doubt and uncertainty of what the result of our first conflict (which they considered inevitable) with Russia would be. I can personally vouch that both the late Maharajahs entertained this doubt, and both therefore deemed it prudent and advisable to have a large reserve to *meet eventualities*. The late Maharajah Holkar who, I believe, at heart was thoroughly disloyal, was actuated by mixed feelings. Sometimes he imagined that if we were in real difficulties he, with his money and the aid of the mercenaries that money could purchase, would be able to make himself master of a great part of India; and at other times when he considered, that perhaps we should be successful, he thought his money would enable him to do us a good turn—place us under obligations to him, and he would then be in a position to make terms, and get from us privileges and advantages which he had much to heart. During the last year of his life I saw much of Scindia and had many conversations with him when he and I were alone together, and when he spoke more freely to me than he would do to any one else. He, I believe, was at heart quite loyal to us, and often spoke with gratitude of the favours he had received from Government, and was, on the whole, quite content with his position. Although he frequently said that if we made timely and sufficient preparations we should undoubtedly beat the Russians, still he expressed fears of our being caught unprepared, and not having enough European soldiers in the country, and in his heart he thought it would be well to have a large sum of ready cash to meet whatever might turn up, and I am quite sure from his own conversation, and from what I

have heard since his death, that this was the real reason of his hoarding money of late years. This vague uncertainty of what will happen when we meet the Russians in conflict is pretty general throughout all Native States with which I am acquainted, and is shared by the leading educated men as well as by the Chiefs, and there exists a sort of feeling—suppose we lend our money and the English are beaten, where will our money then be ?

Our promises are thoroughly believed, and if we enter into an agreement to repay at a given date they have every reliance on our fulfilling our engagements. So the repayment has not nearly so much to do with their willingness to lend, as the distrust I have mentioned above. Overcome *this*, and the question of repayment (provided a *time for such is fixed*) will not influence them much. Raghonath Rao, Minister at Indore, with whom I have discussed the general question, assures me that I am quite right in thinking that it is this distrust and uncertainty of what may happen which keeps the Chiefs more than anything else from lending to our Government. I may mention here that Promissory Notes for various reasons are not much in favour, and a Durbar would infinitely prefer making an agreement similar to the one with Gwalior to investing in Government Securities. Raghonath Rao says he is unable to give any hope of Holkar's investing in Government paper, and that he personally does not think he will do so to any large extent. I cannot find out on what grounds Sir Lepel Griffin bases his expectation that he will do so.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) P. W. BANNERMAN.

occasion, upon the sole ground that Mr Wilberforce was as regular a suitor at the Treasury for the disposal of offices in the revenue in favour of his friends, as any other ministerial member; and on that account, that they, the ministers, had an equal right to his vote and support. Here was no dispute, no difference of opinion, respecting the fact; on the contrary, you have the admission, from the gravest and highest authorities, that the distribution of this four millions of money, paid for the collection of the taxes, is considered the absolute right of all members of Parliament who support the Government, and to be by them disposed of in favour of their families, friends, and supporters.

'This then (he adds) I consider to be the first and great operating cause by which our representatives are removed from the reach of their constituents: From the very sources of our own miseries they have discovered the means of procuring wealth and emolument: Whilst we, the people, are ground to the earth by the taxes, the families and connexions of our representatives are absolutely supported by the very collection of these taxes.' pp. 4-6.

The next source of influence, and cause of estranging the representative from his constituent, is the East India Company and its patronage, military, civil, judicial and commercial; proportioned to a population of fifty millions of souls, and a revenue of sixteen millions of money. In 1784, by Mr Pitt's famous India Bill, the Company was put under the controul of the Crown; and from that moment, Indian patronage has flowed into the House of Commons in a deep and constant stream. He gives a striking and memorable example, well calculated to show the practical bearings of this head upon the question, and to exhibit the steps by which votes in Parliament are actually gained through the political arrangements of the State. No one doubts the tendency of patronage to promote influence, and affect the proceedings of our representatives; but our author shows at once the very way in which it does so.

'We all remember, or at least every one ought to remember, what happened in the House of Commons in 1809. It then appeared in evidence before Parliament, that Lord Castlereagh, being at the time Minister of the Crown, presiding over the government of India, had actually disposed of one of the Company's appointments, a writership, by way of barter or exchange, for a seat in the House of Commons, which seat was to be filled by Lord Castlereagh's friend, Lord Dunlop, now Earl of Clancarty. And when this case was brought before the House of Commons by Lord Archibald Hamilton, as a grave matter of charge against Lord Castlereagh, and after Lord Castlereagh had fully admitted all and each of the facts of the case to be strictly true, the House of Commons did nevertheless, upon serious debate and division, fully absolve Lord Castlereagh from every kind of blame in this transaction. So here, again, we have a solemnly re-

corded decision of the House of Commons, that Indian patronage, like the collection of the English revenue, is just and lawful prize to members of the House of Commons, and that it is to be used by them for whatever purposes they chuse, whether of private emolument or public corruption, without the slightest attention to the complaints or remonstrances of their constituents. Can any man think of this last mentioned case, and at the same time doubt, that the House of Commons is changed in its nature from what it formerly was; or can he doubt that this enormous Indian patronage, so divided as it now is with the Crown, is one of the many and great causes that has produced this fatal change in the practice of our Constitution?' pp. 7, 8.

We certainly do not mean to diminish the weight of this statement, when we observe, that the existence of the Company, with all the evils and anomalies which it occasions, recommends itself as a benefit in the choice of evils, to every one who regards the freedom and stability of the Constitution. It operates injuriously in a mercantile point of view; and the whole scheme is extremely anomalous in its nature.—But let us only reflect in whose hands the undivided patronage of India must be, were the Company's government subverted, and the territory vested, like Jamaica or Ceylon, or the Cape, in the Crown. At present, the Directors have a large share of the patronage uncontrouled by Government; and Ministers are obliged to rest satisfied with a comparatively moderate proportion. Were the Company abolished, the whole patronage must of necessity vest in them. The arrangement to which our author refers in the passage last cited, had the effect, probably the purpose, of transferring a part of this patronage from the Directors of the Company to the Ministers of the Crown. In this respect, it exactly resembled all the other reforms introduced into the practice of the Constitution by Mr Pitt, and which we described more at large in a former Number (April 1810). It carried the long arm of the Treasury into the subordinate department, and increased, *pro tanto*, the Ministerial patronage. Our author has shown how this may be used in swaying the House of Commons.

He next proceeds to the list of places held under the Crown by members of Parliament; and it appears from the Third Report of the Finance Committee, a body selected by the Ministers themselves, though nominally voted by the House of Commons, that *seventy-six* members hold places, the salaries of which are 156,606*l.* a year.

'Under these circumstances,' he asks 'who can wonder at the separation in interest which we so evidently perceive between our representatives and ourselves? Fancy to yourselves the ordinary occupa-

PP 6199h
Vol 47

capital of the country, had just terminated: Commercial distress had never attained so great a height in India; and a wretched state of the law between debtor and creditor, unknown to any other portion of our dominions, and giving, in its consequences, especial umbrage to the native inhabitants, had shaken European credit from one extremity of the peninsula to the other. Such was the moment selected for inflicting a new tax, complex in its provisions, vexatious in its operation, heavy as regarded the subject, and unproductive as regarded the government.

The following epitome of the history of stamp-duties in India, points out, in a striking way, the impolicy of their recent extension to British-born subjects.

Stamps were first introduced in that country, for a special purpose, about thirty years ago, under the administration of the present Lord Teignmouth; and but four short years after Lord Cornwallis had made the perpetual settlement of the land revenue, and proclaimed that he had emancipated the Hindus from all other taxes. Any other, indeed, must always have been peculiarly distressing to that simple race, and accordingly had never been ventured on by any of the native governments. The immediate object of the experiment, too, was one which has deservedly brought the greatest odium on the government of the Company. The courts of law recently instituted by Lord Cornwallis, had already proved wholly inadequate to the administration of justice. In four years there was a prodigious arrear of causes. The number of the courts was not increased; their complex forms were not simplified; but the Company undertook to remedy the consequent discontent by a more simple and profitable plan. They announced that the people of these regions were by nature litigious, and they imposed Stamp duties on all Law proceedings, the more completely to obstruct that justice which was already too difficult of attainment.

No attempt at imposing general Stamp-duties was made until the year 1824, just as we had commenced the Burman war. Our twenty-two millions of yearly revenue were not then thought sufficient, and the boasted surplus had for some time ceased to be spoken of. The public functionaries, accordingly, set their wits to work to raise 'ways and means;' and a Stamp regulation, the exact counterpart of that recently promulgated for Calcutta, was imposed on the Provinces. The fate of this law affords a curious view of the inward structure of Asiatic society. At the end of two years, it was found completely inoperative. The native merchants and bankers quietly, but obstinately, refused to purchase stamps, and carried on their transactions without them; while the government durst not enforce

FL: CIVIL

their own rash regulation. This was mortifying enough to so great and infallible a power; but it could not be helped. It was not the first time that the natives had resisted the arbitrary and impolitic attempts of our government to impose novel taxes. In 1810 the government attempted to levy a House Tax in the wealthy and crowded city of Benares. But the natives immediately suspended all business, *quitted their houses*, and betook themselves to the fields, where, they declared, they would continue until the tax was abrogated. A similar attempt among the warlike population of Rohilcund, in 1816, occasioned a formidable insurrection of nearly the whole province, and the loss of many lives. In these cases the government had the prudence to revoke its injudicious edicts. This impatience of novel modes of taxation with the Hindus, can scarcely be considered as a very extraordinary phenomenon in a country, where the treasury already absorbs so enormous a proportion of the produce of land, labour, and profits.

The Honourable Company now took up an opinion, that the experiment of coercion might be tried with more safety among the better disciplined inhabitants of Calcutta, and that the example of submission in the British merchants of the capital would not fail to have a wholesome influence on the refractory inhabitants of the provinces. They declared, therefore, that Calcutta enjoyed 'an unjust exemption,' and they resolved to deprive it of this immunity. They fancied there were grounds for the exercise of such an authority, in two dubious and obsolete sections of an Act of Parliament, and they proceeded to make the experiment.

The inhabitants of Calcutta could not be legally taxed in any form by the local government, without the consent of the Indian authorities in England; and the Stamp regulation was therefore sent home for their approval. A secretary to the government, returning to England, undertook to be its dry nurse; and having passed it through the necessary forms, brought it out in due course, when it was promulgated as already mentioned. All this was effected with a secrecy worthy of the Inquisition, so that the tax-payers had not the slightest hint of what was meditated against them, until the blow was struck.

The measure produced, as might have been foreseen, the most serious alarm among the English inhabitants, and aggravated the commercial distress, already sufficiently great. The native merchants and bankers held meetings, and were on the point of taking steps to defeat the tax, in their way, by shutting up their shops and offices, and quitting the town until the duty was rescinded. They were persuaded, however, by the Europeans, to

renounce this mischievous scheme, which must have produced great inconvenience not only to the government, but to the whole commercial interests of India, and induced to join in a respectful petition to the government for the abolition of the tax. Such a petition was accordingly presented, signed by the principal inhabitants of Calcutta, praying for the abolition of the tax, on the score of its illegality, and the inconvenience and actual distress which would follow its enforcement. They informed the government that the native bankers contemplated abandoning their occupation, which they could not pursue without ruin, under the provisions of this new edict. They insisted upon its obvious impolicy in such a state of society as that of India: they avowed, that should the regulation be carried into effect, all commercial dealings would be impeded to a degree affecting public credit, and that money transactions would be wholly suspended. And they, finally, declared their persuasion, that no measure of the government had ever excited such general alarm and dissatisfaction.

The government, safe in the European colony of Calcutta from the danger of insurrection, which in the provincial cities would have brought it immediately to its senses, turned a deaf ear to these remonstrances; and in a long and laboured answer to the petitioners, endeavoured to reply to their arguments. It is always dangerous for a despotic government to give reasons for its proceedings; and on this occasion so many inconsistencies and extravagancies were hazarded, as brought on the government a large share of ridicule, and some indignation. The answerer openly maintained that the inhabitants of Calcutta ought to be put on a perfect equality with those of the provinces; meaning, not that the privileges of the former should be extended to the latter, but that the latter, although governed by English laws, and entitled to British rights for 150 years, should be disfranchised, and reduced to the condition of the conquered inhabitants of the interior; or, in other words, should be subjected to arbitrary and unlimited taxation for the benefit of the East India Company, whenever the Directors of that corporation should see meet, and be able to persuade the President of the India Board to sanction the attempt. He admitted that the power on which the local government had acted, had been allowed to sleep for thirteen years; but this he ascribed to 'fiscal prosperity' and 'fiscal moderation.' Thus virtually acknowledging, that the prosperity was no more, and that the day of moderation was gone by. But although the government allowed that the Act of Parliament had lain dormant for thirteen

file. civil

years, as far as related to Calcutta, they insisted that it had been acted upon at the other presidencies, particularly at Bombay, and alleged instances were, indiscreetly, quoted. It unfortunately turned out, however, that these were taxes imposed for purposes purely municipal, and *before* the date of the statute which was referred to, and confessedly illegal, as without the sanction of any statute whatever.

But the argument on which the local government mainly relied, was, that the inhabitants of Calcutta contributed little or nothing towards the public revenue. It could not indeed be denied, that they did pay Customs to the amount of between two and three hundred thousand pounds sterling. But the Stamp advocate makes nothing of this; and illuminates the ignorance of his mercantile fellow subjects by informing them, that 'Customs, though paid in the first instance by the general merchant, fall ultimately on the consumers;' and sagely follows this up by adding, that 'the banker, the money lender, and the capitalist of Calcutta contribute *nothing* in return for the 'investible benefits' of the East India Company's government!— From which we are left, of course, to infer, that the three hundred thousand inhabitants of Calcutta were *not consumers* at all; and that the capital and enterprise of her merchants contributed in no respect to create and maintain the trade which afforded this large revenue to the Customs.

These absurdities it was no difficult matter to refute and expose; and even the shackled press of Calcutta stepped in to enlighten government, until its voice was silenced by the suppression of one of the ablest of the journals. In that ardour of argument, which is so apt to bias the judgment and impair the memory of a disputant, it escaped the organ of the government, that the true state of things was the very reverse of what he imagined, and that the inhabitants of Calcutta in reality contributed to the public revenue in a far larger degree than the poor, ill-governed, and therefore incapable inhabitants of the provinces. According to Mr Tucker, now a Director of the East India Company, the natives of India pay overhead about 5s. each in taxes; only about a twelfth part indeed of what is paid by those of Great Britain, but yet, according to Mr Tucker, a heavier assessment, in reference to their condition, than that which is levied at home. Now it is easy to show that the inhabitants of Calcutta pay very far indeed above this average. For their municipal administration, they pay a tax of five per cent on the rents of all houses, a tax which has no existence in the provinces. They pay an excise on spirits and drugs; they pay

secured in the enjoyment of their former rights and privileges. St Helena was granted, with an equally guarded reservation of the right of sovereignty. The right of sovereignty over their very warehouses and factories, was reserved in the charter of King William, dated in 1698, in these distinct terms:—'The Sovereign right, power, and dominion over all the said forts, places, and plantations, to us, our heirs and successors, being always reserved.' On the very first occasion in which Parliament legislated for the territorial acquisitions of the Company, in directing how they are to be governed, this reservation is expressly made,—'During such time as the territorial acquisitions and revenues shall remain in possession of the said Company.' In the act of 1793, when the Company was in the plenitude of its power, under the protection of the late Lord Melville, the territorial acquisitions are included, as well as the monopoly of trade in the limited lease of twenty years. Nay, there is an express provision in the act, that nothing therein shall prejudice the rights of the public to the acquisitions and revenues of India.

Notwithstanding all this, the East India Company persisted in their senseless claim down to the year 1813, when the legislature at length put an end to it for ever, by declaring that the 'Undoubted' Sovereignty 'of the Indian territorial acquisitions belonged to the Crown of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.' Not satisfied with this declaration in the preamble of the act, an express section is set apart for the reservation of the sovereignty to the crown, in the body of the statute itself.

What was virtually, and even technically, true before, therefore, is now made doubly sure, by a solemn and unqualified declaration of the legislature. Our Indian possessions are the *property of the State*; and the East India Company are but the mere administrators, for a limited period, of acquisitions truly made with the blood and treasure of the people of this kingdom. As possessions of the crown, therefore, Englishmen residing in them are vested with all the franchises and privileges which the peculiarity of their situation can admit, and which are not taken away by express statute.

Those that have been taken away by parliament on the representations (or misrepresentations) of the East India Company, are indeed too many. The bare enumeration of them, which we are now about to make, will, we are convinced, satisfy our readers that nothing but the utmost hardihood of rapacity could have induced the Company, as they now do, to claim the right of unconstitutional taxation over a class of their countrymen,

already placed by their own intrigues under such painful and impolitic disabilities.

1. An Englishman cannot resort to India,—to that country, the acquisition of which has, of all our possessions, cost Englishmen the greatest share of blood and treasure,—without license from the East India Company. This license, too, is granted with difficulty, that it may be made an object of patronage. When given, it is clogged with fees, forms, and illegal indentures, by which the applicant is called upon for unlimited submission to the by-laws of the East India Company.

2. When arrived in India, his license is liable, at any moment, to be withdrawn by the servants of the Company, and his person may be transported to England, without any cause assigned.

3. An Englishman cannot go beyond ten miles of the seats of government, without a special license,—and such license may be recalled without any cause assigned.

4. An Englishman, residing ten miles beyond a *principal settlement*, which means the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, must file a copy of his license in the civil court of the district. Failing the production of an attested copy of such license, he cannot 'have or maintain any civil action or proceeding (other than in the nature of appeal) against any person whomsoever, in any court of civil jurisdiction within the British territories in India;' and proof being given to the court that such license does not exist, or is defective, 'such British subject shall thereupon be nonsuited.'

5. Such license must be for a particular place named; nor must your 'free-born Englishman' move from such place, even into an adjoining district, without further leave.

6. An Englishman found beyond ten miles of a principal settlement, without license, may be seized, imprisoned, and sent within his bounds by the meanest retainer of the government.

7. An Englishman is prohibited from being concerned, directly or indirectly, in the great *inland trade* in salt, betel-nut, tobacco, and rice, on pain of forfeiting the goods he is thus said to be illegally dealing in, and 'treble the value thereof.' The origin of this silly and mischievous law is curious enough. The Company's own servants, shortly after their conquest of Bengal, had monopolized the articles in question; and the injustice and extortion practised by them of course ruined the trade of the country. For this good and sufficient reason, Englishmen not in the service of the Company, and therefore without the power of committing such abuses, are excluded from dealing in them for ever after!

8. An Englishman may not manufacture opium nor salt, two of the staple products of India. With respect to the latter, he is not allowed to deal in it directly, even within the limits of the jurisdiction of the king's courts.

9. 'An Englishman,' to use the words of the author of the Appeal, 'may not settle, colonize, invest his fate or his fortune in the soil of India. He must not hold or farm lands without the limits of the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. This is the great and standing law of the land, enacted in 1793, and confirmed again and again by the Company, who regard this and the power of summary deportation as the corner-stones of their existence.'

10. Englishmen in India are forbid from meeting in public bodies, without leave of the Company's servants, and unless the object of the meeting be agreeable to the servants in question.

11. Englishmen in India are deprived of jury trial in all civil cases whatsoever.

12. Englishmen in India are deprived of the liberty of the press. No man in Bengal can print or publish, or cause to be published, periodically, any paper whatsoever, in any language or character whatsoever, containing, or purporting to contain, public news and intelligence, or strictures on the measures and proceedings of government, or any political events or transactions, without license. Such license may be recalled without any cause assigned. If any person shall print as above without license, he shall be liable for such offence to a penalty of L.40, at the discretion of two stipendiary magistrates appointed by the Company, and removable by them at pleasure. If he cannot pay the forfeiture and reasonable costs, he shall be sent to the common jail, there to remain for a period not exceeding four months. 'If any person shall knowingly and wilfully, either as a proprietor, or as agent, or servant of such proprietor, or otherwise, sell, vend, or deliver out, distribute, or dispose of; or if any bookseller, or proprietor, or keeper of any reading-room, library, shop, or place of public resort, shall knowingly and wilfully receive, lend, give, or supply, for the purpose of perusal, or otherwise, to any person whatsoever, any political paper published without license, or after the recall of a license, such offender is to be fined to the same amount, and by the same authority.'

13. An Englishman residing in India has not the slightest share in, or the remotest influence upon, the government, to the maintenance of which he so mainly contributes with his money, labour, and enterprise. He has not so much even as a voice in the nomination of a scavenger in the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, although strictly colonial possessions of the crown.

Contrary to the spirit and example of all British institutions, and to the principles of all good government everywhere, the East India Company rapaciously seizes the municipal revenues and the municipal appointments, and makes a job of both.

14. If an Englishman, on his return home, shall bring any suit or action against the East India Company, or any of their servants, 'for the recovery of any costs or damages, for the unlawful taking, arresting, seizing, imprisoning, sending, or bringing him into the United Kingdom, the defendants may plead the general issue, and proof shall lie on the plaintiff to show that he was lawfully in India.' In failure of such proof, the free-born Englishman shall be non-suited, and pay 'treble costs, any law, statute, or provision to the contrary notwithstanding.*' The very law of this land is here expressly set aside, to protect the East India Company in their evil-doing!

Such is a brief detail of the disabilities of those persons whom the East India Company now desires further to humiliate and oppress, by subjecting them to the same system of capricious taxation to which they have subjected their Indian hewers of wood and carriers of water.

The Company, indeed, solemnly assures us, that such restraints as we have now described, are indispensably necessary to the 'maintenance of good order'—the protection of the government from 'hatred and contempt'—the maintenance of 'respect for the European character,' (in the very moment that their whole influence and power is employed in degrading it,) and the very 'safety of our Indian Empire.' They are extremely useful, in our opinion, in maintaining the East India Company's monopoly of power and patronage; and for every other purpose they are pernicious and hateful. They are, in fact, a disgrace to British legislation, and a dishonour to the statute-book; and, if only for their evil example to other portions of our dominions, so foul a blot on the constitution should not be permitted to exist in the remotest or most insignificant dependency of the Empire.

Our readers will naturally conclude, that enactments so highly penal, extravagant, and impolitic, cannot, with any regard to common decency, although frequently converted into instruments of oppression, be very rigidly enforced. And such, in a good measure, is the case—in Bengal, at least, the most opulent and prosperous portion of our Indian dominions. More than one-half of the British inhabitants of the Bengal provinces, unconnected with the service of his Majesty, or the East India Company, are,

* 53 Geo. III. cap. 54, sect. 123.