

Ireland

ff. 246 With respect to the great numbers to be employed, it may be recollected that it was judged a wise measure, and as it were the happy consummation of a x long and arduous struggle, to prevail on a few wild characters to quit the island of Jamaica. If this end were so desirable for the safety of that place, inference is obvious with regard to Ireland where 60 or 80,000 fierce and disciplined disturbers are ready to break loose and destroy not only the Government of that country, but the empire itself. What is the source of their discontent? Hopeless poverty; and of their readiness for insurrection? Idleness, Send them abroad; give them employment and the hope of property, and they will become honest men and good subjects, leave them as they now are and the duration of the British Empire (in its present safety and splendour at least) will depend on the winds.....

British Museum: Add. MS. 37890. Windham Papers (1782-1810) ff. 3-12 contains sketch of the Negro Code, while ff. 236-248 has a note on means of restoring tranquility to Ireland. The letter of ^{author} the note is James Workman's and his suggestion is the settlement of the Irish in Spanish America, etc.

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(ENGLISH SETTLEMENT IN NORTH AMERICA)

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In this new settlement, women will be wanted. Soldiers are not very nice; our streets might be purged annually of a great number of miserable wretches, ~~xx~~ who are as shocking objects to the eye of humanity, as their behaviour is to the ear of modesty. These might be seen cured of their disorders, which make others as well as themselves useless and burthensome to society, and they might live more comfortably and useful to the community in a township on the Ohio, or one of the lakes, than in a brethel in Drury Lane, or a Magdalene house in the city. The Indian Women have their ears sufficiently open to the solicitations of white men; and no wonder, besides the coldness of their copper-coloured gallants, they are employed and tasked with rigour in all the offices of servile and laborious duty: circumstances not properly suited to the female sex.

The French gave a bounty to encourage intermarriages between their people and the Indian squas, and why may not this policy be adopted by us ?

There are a great many publick spirited women, now in our colonies who would not scruple to live in the forementioned government, and contribute (ff 390 r) towards populating their colony, where they would not fail to gain admirers, where none of their accomplishments would escape, the some little indiscretion, or fewer attractions of beauty than their neighbours possess, had brought upon them some neglects at home.

I must observe our colonies want a coalition, in order to make each serviceable to one and other; at present the different forms of government prevent it, wherefore I would humbly prepose that all the rights of government should be in the crown...

British Museum: Liverpool Papers: Add Ms 38334: Concerning settlements in North America: addressed to Lord Bute dated 17.1.1763 ff 297-301.

Ac. 2689 CE (5) Weinberg, Albert K.
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CHAPTER III

THE DESTINED USE OF THE SOIL

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The acquisition of satisfactory boundaries in the Spanish treaty of 1819 was followed by a movement aiming not at the extension of national boundaries and yet, paradoxically, at the enlargement of domain. The movement was expansionist in the sense that its purpose was the extension of the domain of States. The Indian was still tenant on vast tracts and enjoyed a degree of political autonomy described by Chief Justice Marshall as that of "domestic dependent nations."¹ Before the third decade of the nineteenth century, it had usually been possible to satisfy recurrent need or fancy for lands through curtailing the Indian holdings by treaties — if such a name can be given to agreements so frequently reeking with alcohol and bribery. But after 1821 certain large Indian tribes of the South, having decided that their concessions had already exceeded reason, announced that they would cede no more land.² The resultant prospect of permanent *imperia in imperio* was so repugnant to Southern States that from 1820 to 1840 the acquisition of Indian lands overshadowed every question of national boundaries and was even viewed with the emotion and ideology of expansionism.

Jefferson had written in 1786 that "it may be taken for a certainty that not a foot of land will ever be taken from the Indians without their own consent."³ In spirit if not in letter, the action of Americans of the Jacksonian period belied this optimistic prediction. Three Southern States passed bills declaring Indian laws void and in effect making all organized Indian society impracticable. Of these States, Georgia prepared for forcible dispossession — a course in which it received moral support from President Andrew Jackson, himself no lover of Indians. The climax of this course of imperialism was the passage by Congress of the Indian Removal Bill of 1830. Although providing nominally only the administrative

machinery for Indian removal by treaties, it was actually designed, as everyone recognized, to facilitate the plans of the Southern States willing to exercise constraint. By the end of the next decade, virtually all Indian tribes east of the Mississippi had taken their virtually enforced departure as "the victims of our destiny."⁴ The episode was typical of a phase of American history which has been described even by an American Secretary of the Interior as "in great part a record of broken treaties, of unjust wars, and of cruel spoliation."⁵

Many contemporaries condemned the coercive policy as violative of the Indian's plain legal rights. Condemnation of the so-called "Century of Dishonor" has become even more general now that the completion of expropriation leaves no further temptation. This moral condemnation has directed itself upon motive as well as deed with the effect of influencing the interpretation of the former. It is generally believed that the motives of Indian policy were, if not profoundly villainous, at least not illustrative of the rôle of moral ideology in politics.

But an expansionist society "never admits that it is doing violence to its moral instincts"⁶ and is least disposed to do so when this violence is condemned by others. Thus in a congressional debate of 1830 an advocate of Indian removal contended with apparent sincerity that he had "advanced no principle inconsistent with the most rigid morality."⁷ So little, indeed, had the principles advanced appeared immoral to their exponents that the ultimate authority for them was ascribed to God. The principles centered in a philosophy of the use of the soil. The white race seemed to Senator Benton to have a superior right to land because they "used it according to the intentions of the CREATOR."⁸ The theory that a use of the soil was ordained by God or morality figured not only in the entire history of Indian relations but also in all issues in which Americans found themselves desiring soil occupied by an "inferior" race.

What were the intentions attributed to the Creator with respect to the soil, and why did they seem to favor only one group of his creatures? Here, as in most questions of theology,

there was unfortunately a confusing variety of answers. The history of the idea in question may not illuminate the intentions of the Creator, but it will at least show the logical methods whereby American and other expansionists, irrespective of their own varying intentions regarding territory, have found it possible to expropriate aboriginal peoples with constant self-assurance.

The self-assurance of those favoring expropriation was the greater because the basis of their justificatory doctrine, as Senator Benton's words attest, was religious in character. The doctrine was derived from the American Puritans, who were sure of the Creator's intentions with regard to everything. Though the Puritans were probably not the first interlopers in the New World to justify their trespass by theology, they were the first to leave a record of their ideology for the edification of posterity. Thus John Winthrop of Massachusetts, in his *Conclusions for the Plantation in New England*, wrote as follows:

The whole earth is the lords Garden & he hath given it to the sonnes of men, wth a generall Condiçõn, Gen: 1. 28. Increase & multiply, replenish the earth & subdue it, w^{ch} was againe renewed to Noah, the end is Double morall & naturall that man might enjoy the fruites of the earth & god might have his due glory from the creature, why then should we stand hear striving for places of habitation . . . and in ye mean tyme suffer a whole Continent, as fruitfull & convenient for the use of man to lie waste wthout any improvement.

To this conception there did, indeed, present itself one objection, namely, that the American continent was already the property of certain of "the sonnes of men." But this objection did not seem to Winthrop to be based upon a true conception of property, which he defined from the point of view of the agriculturist:

That w^{ch} lies common & hath never been replenished or subdued is free to any that will possesse and improve it, for god hath given to the sonnes of men a double right to the earth, there is a naturall right & a Civil right . . . And for the Natives in New England they inclose noe land neither have any settled habitation nor any tame cattle to improve the land by, & soe have noe other but a naturall right

to those countries Soe as if wee leave them sufficient for their use wee may lawfully take the rest, there being more than enough for them & us.⁹

While for the most part their practice was more considerate than their theory, the settlers of Massachusetts did at times follow the frugal method suggested by biblical precedent: They "seized and settled" Indian lands "because they were not waving with fields of yellow corn duly fenced in with square-cut hawthorne." In 1633 the biblical principle was used in the decision of the general court to the effect that "what lands any of the Indians have possessed and improved, by subduing the same, they have just right unto, according to that in Genesis, ch. i. 28, and ch. ix. 1."¹⁰ What this primarily meant was that "the Indians having only a natural right to so much land as they had or could improve . . . the rest of the country lay open to any that could and would improve it."¹¹

Such a principle imperilled the Indian's land tenure almost as greatly as did the Papal Bull of Alexander VI, dividing the New World between two Christian nations in presumable accordance with the scriptural decree that the meek shall inherit the earth. To be sure, the idea of most later Americans that North American Indians did not practice agriculture is as much in conflict with the records as is the opinion of Governor Pownall that the white race had been land-workers from the beginning.¹² It is true, however, that Indians gained their subsistence chiefly by the use of the soil in the manner for which the hunter Esau had set the precedent, followed also by Anglo-Saxon huntsmen for purposes of sport. The Indians differed from the whites in their religious philosophy of the use of the soil. The philosophy of the former was revealed by a Pawnee chief who, according to James Buchanan, addressed the President in 1822 as follows:

The Great Spirit made us all—he made my skin red, and yours white; he placed us on this earth and intended that we should live differently from each other.

He made the whites to cultivate the earth, and feed on domestic animals; but he made us, red skins, to rove through the uncultivated woods and plains; to feed on wild animals and to dress with their

skins. He also intended that we should go to war—to take scalps—steal horses from and triumph over our enemies—cultivate peace at home, and promote the happiness of each other.¹³

But this liberal theory of the intentions of the Great Spirit was largely blasphemous in the eyes of those who were certain that the Creator demands uniformity in the morals and habits of his children. To be sure, as Irving's ironical Diedrich Knickerbocker points out in speaking of "the right by cultivation," the savages could have pleaded that "they drew all the benefits from the land which their simple wants required . . . and that as Heaven merely designed the earth to form the abode, and satisfy the wants of man, so long as those purposes were answered, the will of Heaven was accomplished." But Knickerbocker gives the Puritan counter-argument that "this only proves how undeserving they were of the blessings around them—they were so much the more savages, for not having more wants." Knickerbocker concludes that the newcomers "were but taking possession of what, according to the aforesaid doctrine, was their own property—therefore, in opposing them, the savages were invading their just rights, infringing the immutable laws of Nature, and counteracting the will of Heaven."¹⁴

After this pious indictment the heathen Indian's case for his land could rest on only one possibility—that the scriptural passage on which it purported to rest had been misinterpreted. It did indeed seem to Roger Williams that, though the Scriptures command the tilling of the earth, they contain no statement whatever that the agriculturist has the right to expropriate those who do not till it.¹⁵ But exegetical uncertainty did not trouble either the Puritan advocates of dispossession or many of their descendants. The religious argument passed down to later generations; it was said by John Quincy Adams, notwithstanding Henry Clay's laughter, to be "the best argument we had."¹⁶

But for the edification of those who considered references to God's word as "canting," there came into currency in the eighteenth century another type of doctrine, which, while not divorced from religious philosophy, addressed its appeal pri-

marily to "natural reason." This argument for dispossession developed as jurists of the natural law school based the criteria of sovereignty over new lands upon the utilitarian values suggested by the crowded conditions of the Old World. During the American Revolution, as the traveller Johann David Schöpf noted, discussion of the future disposition of Indians' lands was marked by many expressions of the idea exemplified by the following words from the *United States Magazine* of 1779:

The law of nature, where the law of revelation is not known, sufficiently enjoins on every man that he contract his claim of soil to equal bounds, and pursue that manner of life which is most consistent with the general population of the earth, and the encrease of happiness to mankind.¹⁷

Pasturage and hunting, the writer proceeded to explain, required too much soil and did not develop civilization; therefore property claims based upon a nomadic mode of life were not justified by natural law. The law of revelation was also adduced, but was blended with the moral argument through the conception that pasturage and hunting were abhorrent to God because they were incompatible with his design that the soil be used in the interest of civilization. Having discredited the Indian in the eyes of both God and nature, the writer proposed to restrict him to land which he actually cultivated. In 1782 Hugh Brackenridge affirmed that "extermination" would be a more useful fate for "the animals vulgarly called Indians," who, not having made "a better use of the land," had no natural right to it.¹⁸ Benjamin Franklin's *Autobiography* suggested humorously that rum was "the appointed means" of fulfilling "the design of Providence to extirpate these savages in order to make room for the cultivators of the earth."¹⁹

An eighteenth-century exponent of natural law who greatly influenced American thought in the Indian issue was the Swiss jurist Vattel. The following passage from his treatise on the law of nations became classic:

There is another celebrated question, to which the discovery of the New World has principally given rise. It is asked, if a nation may lawfully take possession of a part of a vast country, in which there

are found none but erratic nations, incapable, by the smallness of their numbers, to people the whole. We have already observed in establishing the obligation to cultivate the earth, that these nations cannot exclusively appropriate to themselves more land than they have occasion for, and which they are unable to settle and cultivate. Their removing their habitations through these immense nations cannot be taken for a true and legal possession; and the people of Europe, too closely pent up, finding land of which these nations are in no particular want, and of which they make no actual and constant use, may lawfully possess it and establish colonies there. We have already said that the earth belongs to the human race in general, and was designed to furnish it with subsistence. . . . People have not, then, deviated from the views of nature, in confining the Indians within narrow limits.²⁰

To advance the property rights of Europeans Vattel propounded a doctrine of world ownership which is, curiously enough, tantamount to a kind of international communism. An earlier statement of the same doctrine is found in Sir Thomas More's account of the international morality of the communistic society of Utopia.²¹ Another precedent is offered by one with as great a prejudice in favor of ordinary property rights as Melancthon. To justify the expropriation of the Catholic ecclesiastics he was obliged to affirm that those making bad use of their property had no right to it.²²

Unlike both primitive Christians and modern Communists, bourgeois Protestants could not espouse Vattel's doctrine with much appearance of consistency. For it is somewhat at variance with their institution of private property and their conception of an unqualified right to property. A similar inconsistency was noted in Americans by Lincoln when he said that "the love of property and a consciousness of right and wrong have conflicting places in our organization."²³ In relations with a different race this love of property welcomes reasons for denying to others the property rights claimed by the white race for itself.

It is noteworthy, however, that the American expansionists did not even conform to Vattel's prescriptions. For Vattel makes the right of expropriation contingent upon being "too closely pent up"; he declares that those unable to cultivate all their land have no right to expand. The American people,

as no one denied, had at the time an extent of territory which was beyond their own capacity to cultivate. This consideration, though it must have occurred to the advocates of Indian dispossession, did not seem to trouble them. John Quincy Adams presented a consideration which perhaps represents the typical counter-argument. Defending America's Indian policy against British animadversions after the War of 1812, he argued that American population was growing at so rapid a rate that permanent Indian barriers would deprive *future* generations of their means of subsistence.²⁴ But this argument, as was noted by William Wirt,²⁵ is valid only upon the assumption that the right to provide for posterity does not belong to the red race even when the white race needs no lands for those living. In sum, the utilitarian criterion does not square with the actual circumstances under which Americans applied it.

As if to remedy the logical defect, there arose a type of argument which employed not the criterion of need but a kind of aesthetic consideration. This new ground for the dispossession of Indians first came into prominence during the westward movement of the second decade of the nineteenth century. Its use was facilitated by the fact that, however prosaic the motives of individual pioneers, the abstract conception of the westward tide lent itself to poetic idealization. When this movement broke through the barriers of Indian territory, Governor Harrison of Indiana justified dispossession of the aboriginals as the conquest of the wilderness by civilization. He asked the rhetorical question:

Is one of the fairest portions of the globe to remain in a state of nature, the haunt of a few wretched savages, when it seems destined by the Creator to give support to a large population and to be the seat of civilization, of science, and of true religion?²⁶

The thesis implicit in the foregoing is not that the population is pressed for lands. Rather is it Chevalier de Chastellux's idea that "all that multiplies men in the nation, and harvests on the surface of the earth, is good in itself, is good above all things."²⁷ The same apologetic was employed by Representative Strother in a congressional debate of 1819 on the Seminole War:

Sir . . . the Western frontier is that portion of the world where civilization is making the most rapid and extensive conquest of the wilderness, carrying in its train the Christian religion and all the social virtues. It is the point where the race is most progressive; establish but the principle, that the God of nature has limited your march in that direction—that the Indian is lord paramount of that wide domain, around which justice and religion have drawn a circle which you dare not pass—the progress of mankind is arrested and you condemn one of the most beautiful and fertile tracts of the earth to perpetual sterility as the hunting ground of a few savages.²⁸

This argument for dispossession thus justified the extension of the agriculturist's civilization by the principle that, irrespective of whether Indian lands are immediately needed, the more there is of a good thing the better. Such an argument can scarcely be attacked in the abstract. It is to be noted, however, that pressing into unneeded Indian lands resulted in neglect or careless treatment of the vast fertile land which the pioneers left behind them—in other words, in injury to the very value which Indian dispossession was supposed to forward. Moreover, the unnecessary haste of the march of the pioneers caused Tecumseh and others to offer the organized resistance which made the soil a battle-ground rather than the seat of agricultural development.

A little later came abundant new territory without any war; for the Spanish treaty of 1819 ceded to the United States not only Florida but all Spanish territory as far west as the Rockies. In view of this acquisition of territory the settlement and development of which would require generations, it may appear that the aboriginals might have been left in at least temporary possession of the country which they preserved in its pristine beauty. Actually the acquisition of vast new territory was followed by the first organized movement to remove all Indians from the country east of the Mississippi. The impetus to this movement came not from the Western pioneers but from Eastern States. It did not arise because of any need of lands; the Governor of Georgia and a Georgian Congressman boasted that the State possessed an abundance of cheap land already.²⁹ The movement arose because of the desire of Southern States to remove interruptions to their jurisdiction, the avidity of many

individuals for cheap but valuable lands, and the belief of many in the North as well as in the South that the Indians would be better off in a region where they were spared the evil influences of adjacent white civilization.

Those interested primarily in the welfare of the aboriginals held as did President Monroe that removal should take place only by consent of the Indians themselves. Abstention from coercion seemed plain legal justice. From its very beginning the Government's Indian policy, quite distinct from the policy of the pioneer, had recognized the Indian's legal right of possession. Secretary of War Knox had written to the like-minded President Washington:

The Indians being the prior occupants, possess the right of the soil. It cannot be taken from them unless by their free consent, or by the right of conquest in case of a just war.³⁰

Even had there been no such original right, both European nations and the United States conferred legal right on the Indian through the general practice of entering into treaties of purchase when they wished to acquire Indian lands. Some of the Indian treaties with the United States, like those of the Cherokee nation, contained a guarantee of the remaining lands. The legal status of Indian lands, clear enough from the Government's practice, was definitely stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in 1823. In the case *Johnson v. McIntosh*, Marshall upheld the Indian's right of possession in the following words:

It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of *possession* has never been questioned. The claim of Government extends to the *complete ultimate title*, charged with the *right* of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right.³¹ [Italics mine.]

In other words the Indian's tenure had the one qualification that land could be ceded only to the Government; it was, however (to quote from a later decision of Marshall), the source of an "unquestioned right to the lands they occupy until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our Government."³²

The difficulty of the 'twenties was that the Cherokees and other Indian tribes now exercised their admitted right of refusing to cede their land to the Government. The Georgians, who in 1802 had gained the promise of the Federal Government to extinguish when possible the Cherokee title, were particularly perturbed when the Georgian Cherokees in 1827 set up the framework of a permanent government modelled after that of the United States. Georgia and other Southern States were resolved to prevent permanent or even temporary autonomy. The elements of their project were three: passage of restrictive State laws to make the Indians thoroughly uncomfortable; passage by Congress of a bill providing the Government's financial and administrative assistance in exchanging present Indian holdings for Government lands in the West; and if necessary the use of force to secure removal. But how could the necessary sympathy of the nation be gained in this first attempt to make Indian removal a systematic governmental policy?

In the face of the legal difficulties, one possible course for the advocate of Indian removal was to appeal to "a higher law," as did a writer of 1820 in the *North American Review*. Though admitting that in the abstract the rightful proprietors of the soil were its original incumbents, he went on to observe that the legal right to property rests upon a frail foundation even among civilized nations, who without scruple take away each other's lands in war. But from the standpoint of natural morals, the right of property ought to be even more frail when claimed by those who "held hunting and fishing be a more proper mode of existence than tilling and pasturage." This casuist concluded that to resist the providential movement carrying the Indian away was to preserve barbarity at the expense of industry and thrift.³³

The Southerners who advocated coercive removal were doubtless appreciative of such reasoning. But it seemed better to them to emphasize before Congress and the nation a more conventional type of argument. They therefore elaborated a legal doctrine which denied the Indian's right of possession and declared the aboriginal to be no more than a "tenant at will."³⁴

This disregard of Marshall's ruling reflected the influence of the doctrine of State sovereignty, which long detracted from the prestige of Supreme Court decisions. To be sure, the legal view of the Southerners was presented, no less than Marshall's, as an objective interpretation of the legal doctrine of the past. But in reality their legal interpretation afforded one of the most striking instances in legal history of the extent to which subjective factors can distort history and logic.

To affirm that temporary occupancy was the only privilege bestowed on Indians from the beginning was apparently to fly in the face of all the treaties with Indian peoples. A treaty of purchase would not seem to be legally necessary if the purchaser is dealing only with a tenant at will. But Governor Gilmer of Georgia explained away the treaties in words which relate the legal issue to religious dogma:

Treaties were expedients by which ignorant, intractable, and savage people were induced without bloodshed to yield up what civilized peoples had a right to possess by virtue of that command of the Creator delivered to man upon his formation—be fruitful, multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it.³⁵

The report of a House committee of the Twenty-first Congress stated similarly that the practice of buying Indian titles was but the humanitarian substitute for the sword in arriving at the actual enjoyment of claims derived from discovery and "sanctioned by the natural superiority allowed to the claims of civilized communities over those of savage tribes."³⁶

What historical evidence was adduced in support of this view that treaties were signed with the tongue in the cheek? There existed no documentary evidence except a few colonial laws, disposing arbitrarily of uncultivated Indian lands. But the occasional expropriations by individual colonies do not outweigh the evidence noted by Marshall as characteristic of governmental policies. Explicit assertions of ownership being so few, a legal claim to Indian lands had to be inferred from the European's religio-ethical theory of property. The early discoverers and settlers were said by a House report of 1830 to have based their claim upon the scriptural injunction to till the earth.³⁷ Reference was also made to the theory of property

entertained by philosophers of natural law such as Locke. Thus Representative Wilde declared that all property was "founded on utility," and that land became individually owned only as labor was incorporated with it.³⁸ But the advocates of dispossession made no mention of the numerous eighteenth-century writers on natural law who had affirmed the natural right of the Indian to his lands.³⁹ Nor did these Southerners recognize like Chancellor Kent that even if the white agriculturist had a natural right to Indian lands originally, the Indian acquired rights under subsequent circumstances:

As far as Indian rights and territories were defined and acknowledged by the whites by treaty, there was no question in the case, for the whites were bound by the moral and national obligations of contract and good faith.⁴⁰

The weakness of legal reasoning is often explicable by the fact that a moral conviction makes legal accuracy appear relatively unimportant. Thus it seems that those committing flagrant legal errors in this instance were influenced fundamentally by the three moral arguments for dispossession which had been inherited from the past. Despite the inconsistencies between them, they were all now seen as pointing to the supersession of the huntsman by the agriculturist. The biblical argument of the Puritans was used by Representative Wayne of Georgia in his declaration that the decree which denied the Indian's right to be lord of his uncultivated domain was "the Almighty's command to his creatures to till the earth."⁴¹ Despite the Southerner's notorious waste of land in cotton cultivation, the utilitarian argument of natural law was stated by Representative Wilde of Georgia:

And if it were possible to perpetuate the race of Indians, what would be the consequence? Why, that a hundred or a thousand fold the number of white men would not be born, because the Indians would roam over and possess, without enjoying, the land which must afford the future whites subsistence.⁴²

Lewis Cass, in an article on Indian removal in the *North American Review* of 1830, used the argument stressing the intrinsic value of extending civilization:

There can be no doubt . . . that the Creator intended the earth should be reclaimed from a state of nature and cultivated; that the human race should spread over it, procuring from it the means of comfortable subsistence, and of increase and improvement.⁴³

All three arguments, together with historical experience, underlay the theory of manifest destiny stated by Wilde:

Jacob will forever obtain the inheritance of Esau. We cannot alter the laws of Providence, as we read them in the experience of the ages.⁴⁴

The triune ethico-religious argument was presented by many with all the dogmatism of the Lord's elect who consider the earth their garden. The self-assurance, however, was rather strange. For at one point the factual foundation of the argument was so weak as to jeopardize the entire logical edifice erected during centuries of American-Indian relations. The moral philosophy of dispossession had been founded and developed in a time when the Indians were huntsmen. The great majority of them, indeed, still roamed in the chase. But one of the tribes, the very tribe upon which the controversy of the 'twenties centered, had turned to agriculture as though with a perverse intention of confounding the race desirous of their removal! This was the Cherokee nation of Georgia.

The whole difficulty with the Cherokees, Calhoun observed in a Cabinet meeting, arose from their progress in civilization.⁴⁵ The American commissioners sent to urge removal upon them learned this fact to their consternation. The Cherokees, who had not only farms but printing-presses, schools, and churches, gave as the ground of their refusal to remove to the wilderness the fact that they had "unequivocally determined never again to pursue the chase as heretofore."⁴⁶ Consternation increased when their leaders showed greater dialectic skill than the emissaries of civilization. The commissioners, pointing out that the Cherokees had more land in proportion to their population than the Georgians, argued that the Heavenly Creator had not intended such great inequality between his white and red children.⁴⁷ The Cherokee leaders maliciously responded that, though they did not know the intentions of the Creator, they wondered why, if such was his intention, "the laws of civilized

and enlightened nations allow a man to monopolize more land than he can cultivate, to the exclusion of others." 48

The surprisingly changed complexion which the Indian issue assumed in this situation was described by ex-President Madison in a letter to William Wirt:

The plea with the best aspect for dispossessing Indians of the lands on which they have lived, is that by not incorporating their labour, and associating fixed improvements with the soil, they have not appropriated it to themselves, nor made the destined use of its capacity for increasing the number and the enjoyments of the human race. But this plea, whatever original force be allowed it, is here repelled by the fact that the Indians are making the very use of that capacity which the plea requires . . . 49

The embarrassment of the situation was increased by the fact that even so ardent an advocate of Indian dispossession as John Quincy Adams had previously conceded that cultivated Indian lands would always be respected.⁵⁰

It may seem that, despite the extraordinary talent of *homo sapiens* in justifying his desires by his reason, there must certainly be some few issues in which moral reason is so strongly against him that elementary logical integrity will force him to relinquish his desire, or at least to admit that the gratification of it is without moral justification. Doubtless even the history of expansionism contains such instances; but, contrary to natural expectation, we have not at this point come upon one of them.

The logic of the Georgians in this issue rather supported Benjamin Franklin's generalization: "So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or to make a reason for everything one has a mind to do." As was observed by the amazed William Wirt, the legal defender of the Cherokees, there appeared "the new and strange ground" that the Cherokees "had no right to alter their condition and to become husbandmen."⁵¹ The strange new position may be seen in part in the following lines from a message of Governor Troup to the Georgia Assembly:

. . . with regard to the territory of Georgia . . . this right of use can only be construed to mean, what in all the treaties it did mean, the

right of use for hunting. When, therefore, the United States, by changing the mode of life of the aboriginals upon the soil of Georgia, changed essentially this right, and caused her lands to be separately appropriated for the purpose of tillage, and gave every encouragement to fixed habits of agriculture, they violated the treaties in their letter and spirit, and did wrong to Georgia.⁵²

The foregoing denies, if not the general right of the Cherokees to become husbandmen, at least their legal right to become such within Georgia's boundaries.

Now this position might seem to be in flagrant conflict with the traditional dogma that the soil was destined to be tilled. But the Georgians were quite equal to arguing that there was no conflict at all. In Governor Troup's exposition of "the destiny which is fixed and unchangeable" it was made clear that, though the Georgian soil was destined to be tilled, it was destined to be tilled by the white man and not by the Indian!⁵³

There was more than this to call forth William Wirt's hopeless exclamation over "the omnipotent sophistry of interest and passion."⁵⁴ Justifying the dismissal of a tribe with agricultural aspirations to a soil considered fit generally only for hunting, the Georgians argued somewhat to the effect that the soil was not destined to be tilled by Indians at all. It seemed to them evident from Indian character and habits that it was not the Indian's destiny to cultivate the soil. The advocates of dispossession denied the accuracy of the generally accepted reports ascribing to the Cherokees considerable social progress. They maintained, as in the House report which favored removal, that not more than one-tenth of the population, a portion largely half-breed, was above the condition of the savage.⁵⁵ It was admitted, however, that this estimate was not based upon statistical study. Such a claim, unsupported by any evidence other than hearsay, can scarcely outweigh the evidence to the contrary which was partially admitted by Governor Troup when he attacked Cherokee agriculturists. And while some sentimentalists doubtless exaggerated the civilization of this Indian people, the very admissions of Federal commissioners indicate that the sentimentalists were less far from the truth than the Georgians.⁵⁶

But the advocates of dispossession refused to see what they did not wish to see. Therefore, they could maintain a quasi-scientific thesis asserting that (to quote a Georgian Congressman) "the laws of nature have fixed an insuperable barrier between the moral condition of the savage and the Christian."⁵⁷ To Representative Graham of North Carolina it seemed that one might as well expect the red man to change the color of his skin as his habits and pursuits.⁵⁸ The memorial of the General Assembly of Georgia on the removal of the Cherokees maintained that "a dispersed and wandering people are not in a condition to become the object of the benefits of civilization," whereas their removal would "give to these sons of nature a wilderness congenial to their feelings and appropriate to their wants."⁵⁹ Senator King of Georgia not only shared this view but showed the enthusiasm of a Rousseau over the Indian's return to nature:

It had been urged as a reason why they should remove, that in the woods they would lose their civilization, and become wild. He had seen sufficient to convince him, that the wild Indian of the woods had more nobleness of character than the half-civilized Indian, who, for the most part, contract the vices of the lower class of whites, and become drunken and thievish, and were as unfit for the duties appertaining to civilized life, as they were for that courage and enterprise which distinguished the true Indian.⁶⁰

Passage of the Indian Removal Bill signified abandonment of the hope and ideal of civilization through proximity, cherished by well-disposed individuals like Thomas Jefferson and Jedediah Morse. The hope was abandoned just as the Cherokees gave earnest of its approaching realization. But even the subjection of the Indians to adverse conditions did not prevent, as the Indian *Handbook* of the Bureau of Ethnology testifies, their ultimate adaptation to the occupations of civilization. Of interest is the intelligent comment which the doctrine of the Indian's inevitable extinction evoked in the Cherokee paper, the *New Echota Phoenix*:

Those who assert this doctrine, seem to act towards these unfortunate people in a consistent manner, either in neglecting them entirely, or endeavoring to hasten the period of their extinction. For our part,

we dare not scrutinize the designs of God's providence towards the Cherokees.⁶¹

The removal of all Indians in the 'thirties — under conditions of hardship described lugubriously in a recent work of Grant Foreman⁶² — removed the destiny of this race from the American's view. It was not so with the doctrine of territorial utilization itself. "Manifestly," writes J. G. Wise in his *The Red Man in the New World Drama*, "such a people could not have dealt with a subordinate race . . . without an enduring effect upon their moral point of view."⁶³ The doctrine of territorial utilization was destined not only to figure in many later issues but to undergo an often curious development. Tending always to enlarge its pretensions, it may seem in its later history to confirm the observation of R. H. Tawney that the children of the mind are like the children of the body: "Once born they grow by a law of their own being."

The first stage in the natural growth of the doctrine was its extension to territorial issues other than those involving Indians. This stage quickly arrived with the Oregon issue of the 'forties, involving a territorial dispute between the United States and Great Britain. It was argued by John Quincy Adams and other expansionists that the right of Americans to the territory was greater than that of Englishmen because the former alone could utilize the country in accordance with the scriptural injunction to till the earth.⁶⁴ But the allegation that the British desired Oregon only for hunting furs was as gratuitous as the former generalization about the occupational limitations of Indians.

The next territorial issue was of a different character and brought the principle of utilization into a new phase of development. It concerned the land of the Mexicans, who were tillers of the soil but did not till it efficiently or in more than relatively small part. California was claimed on the ground of the capacity of Americans to develop it more fully; after the outbreak of the Mexican War the territorial claim was enlarged until it embraced all of Mexico. The report of the New York State Democratic Convention of January, 1848, advocated annexation on the ground of a familiar philosophy:

We would hold it, not for our use, but for the use of man . . . Labor was the consecrated means of man's subsistence when he was created. To replenish the earth and subdue it, was his ordained mission and destiny.⁶⁵

About the same time, Sam Houston observed with his delightful ingenuousness that Americans had always cheated Indians, and that since Mexicans are no better than Indians "I see no reason why we should not go on the same course, now, and take their land."⁶⁶ In the following decade Caleb Cushing, affirming annexation of Mexico to be destiny, asked the rhetorical question: "Is not the occupation of any portion of the earth by those competent to hold and till it, a providential law of national life?"⁶⁷ The answer was given by Representative Cox in a general "law of annexation": "That no nation has the right to hold soil, virgin and rich, yet unproducing . . ."⁶⁸ According to the *United States Democratic Review* of 1858, "no race but our own can either cultivate or rule the western hemisphere."⁶⁹ The principle of cultivation, at first applied only to Indians, had been developed by expansionists to a generality contesting the land tenure of all other peoples of the continent.

But the expansionism of the 'fifties introduced still another important stage in the growth of the doctrine. Mexico was desired in this decade less for its agricultural resources than for the reason stated by an expansionist article in the *United States Review* of 1853:

The painful scarcity of silver which at present afflicts the entire trading and agricultural community, can only be removed, as the scarcity of gold was removed, by the application of American enterprise to the mines of Mexico. Silver coin will never be abundant in the United States, until the boundary of the South includes the mineral fields of Central Mexico, now occupied by a people who have no knowledge, or no appreciation of their value.

The writer then justified the claim to silver lands with the doctrine originated by the agriculturist:

The time is not far distant, when the enterprise of the South will direct itself upon those regions, which belong to it . . . by the well-founded and legitimate rights of industry and intelligence; . . . the

same that confirms the title of every free people to the soil upon which they stand.⁷⁰

The same philosophy was affirmed by an editorial on Mexico in the *New York Herald*⁷¹ in 1858, and was intimated in President Buchanan's annual message of 1859 calling for intervention.⁷²

It is even more interesting to observe the changed aspect of the doctrine when the 'seventies brought Indian lands again into focus. Encroachment renewed itself despite the fact that the new home in the West had been guaranteed to the Indians perpetually; indeed, the barriers of Indian Territory were broken through in five years and were never after effective. The contract seemed void when the original assumption that the Middle West was "the Great American Desert" was discovered in the westward movement of the 'forties to be a myth. The finding of unsuspected agricultural resources in the West was followed several decades later by the discovery of rich mineral resources upon Indian reservations. In the 'seventies, for example, gold and silver were found upon the lands of the Colorado Ute Indians. A bill was thereupon introduced in Congress to purchase their reservation and assign them lands in severalty. In the debate of 1880 dispossession of the "thriftless" Indian — he had once been sent to the West to indulge his idleness — was proclaimed to be manifest destiny.⁷³ Representative Belford urged the passage of the bill in the following words:

You give the sanction of the Government to the act of the miner in taking up a claim . . . and you apprise the Indian that he can no longer stand as a breakwater against the constantly swelling tide of civilization. . . . It settles for all time the doctrine which has received illustrations in the past that an idle and thriftless race of savages cannot be permitted to guard the treasure vaults of the nation which hold our gold and silver, but that they shall always be open, to the end that the prospector and miner may enter in and by enriching himself enrich the nation and bless the world by the results of his toil.⁷⁴

There arises the curious question whether this principle of dispossession is consistent with the earlier ground that "the whole earth is destined to feed its inhabitants."⁷⁵ It may seem

at first that to demand another's land for the sake of its precious minerals represents a more grasping spirit than does demanding it for the sake of its grain. So, apparently, thought the Georgians who desired Cherokee lands in the 'twenties; for though gold had been discovered also on these lands, they preferred to base their moral case not upon mining but upon agriculture. Yet after all, gold and silver are not only convertible into food and other necessities, but may aid more in the economic organization of the world's nutrition than does any addition to the extent of arable space. This fact would naturally impress itself less strongly in the agricultural society of the 'twenties than in the later period when the industrial economy was becoming predominant. Considering his economic context, one must concede that Belford was not departing from the spirit of Vattel's agricultural doctrine when he demanded Indian lands which would "bless the world" with gold and silver.

But once the simple agricultural criterion is replaced by a broader one, where will the expansionist stop? The question increases one's interest in following the history of the doctrine further. It was assured of a continuance in history when expansionists of the 'nineties were prompted by America's great industrial development to seek tropical lands as sources of raw materials. John W. Burgess, in his treatise of 1890 on political science, foreshadowed one theory of these expansionists when he denied the moral or legal right of a few thousand savages to reserve for hunting-grounds the lands capable of sustaining millions of civilized men.⁷⁹ Whereas this thesis was traditional, the incorporation and conquest of the Philippines were attended by the broadening of the traditional doctrine to meet new circumstances. One new element in the situation was the fact that the Filipino could scarcely be accused of not tilling his soil to the best of his capacity. And this fact worried certain earnest persons who would have been quite prepared to dispossess Indian huntsmen. For example, a letter to the *Outlook* argued as follows:

The wresting of the North American continent from its aboriginal possessors, and its transference from a vast game preserve into the

granary of the world, seems legitimate, as may in time the culture of cabbage in your Central Park, or the passing of the vast uncultivated estates of the Old World to those entitled to them under the divine right of hunger. But the soil in the Philippines, as in China, is occupied and tilled by their native population. The Anglo-Saxon farmer has no moral right there.⁷⁷

Yet the fact that the Filipinos tilled their soil did not prevent ethical expansionists like Lyman Abbott⁷⁸ from recalling the moral principle of Indian dispossession as a precedent for expansion in this case. The writer in the *Outlook* failed to recognize that this principle had been enlarged to accord not only with a scientific agriculture but also with an industrial economy. Ex-Senator Peffer wrote that "God must have intended that savage life and customs should yield to higher standards of living, or he would have made the earth many times larger."⁷⁹ Captain Mahan related higher standards of living to natural right:

Thus the claim of an indigenous population to retain indefinitely control of territory depends not upon a natural right, but upon political fitness, shown in the political work of governing, administering, and developing, in such manner as to insure the natural right of the world at large that resources should not be left idle, but be utilized for the general good.⁸⁰

Here, then, is a blanket reference which apparently takes in all "resources" — rubber and hemp as well as cabbages.

The Filipinos cultivated cabbages but not the resources needed by an industrialized society. The imperialists envisaged in the Philippines the economic revolution described by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Vanderlip:

They see great development companies formed to cultivate tobacco and sugar by modern methods, others formed to test the richness of the unknown mineral deposits, and still others to develop transportation or to reap the treasures of the forest.⁸¹

Rubber, for example, was a forest product vastly more necessary to the economic scheme of the world than was the increased production of any edible; from this point of view, rubber bore more vitally upon "the divine right of hunger." The offense of tropical people now lay precisely in the fact that in drawing only their food from the soil they neglected the raw

materials of industry. It is thus a curiosity of the history of ideas that the same doctrine originated by the agriculturist to dispossess the huntsman was used ultimately by the industrialist to dispossess the agriculturist. But the jest is entirely on the darker races, the victims of the doctrine first as huntsmen and then as agriculturists.

In the latter instance, however, the doctrine had a consequence different from that in the first. Restrictive action against the Filipinos was not so much seizure of land as deprivation of independence. For there was no desire to send the Anglo-Saxon farmer to a tropical land where life would be inconvenient and unpleasant for him. The new idea, expounded by Kidd in his influential work of 1898 entitled *The Control of the Tropics*, was that the white man should supervise the exploitation of the tropics from his own land, thus making physical labor the colored and not the white man's burden.

Though left to occupy its land, the colored race was threatened by the new doctrine more seriously than ever before in the political sense. For Kidd and others made the principle of political interference much more far-reaching than had Mahan's formula. It would seem from Mahan's principle that some tropical peoples — those who develop their natural resources sufficiently — are to be left in political independence. But in the light of certain assumptions regarding the effect of tropical climate, the question as to what tropical peoples develop their resources adequately may evoke the answer that virtually none can do so. This answer was given by Kidd when he assailed the belief that "the colored races left to themselves possess the qualities necessary to the development of the rich resources of the lands they have inherited." The colored races of the debilitating tropics were and would remain at a childish stage of human evolution. The only solution from the viewpoint of world economic welfare seemed to Kidd that the tropics in general "be administered from the temperate regions."⁸² The premise that all tropical peoples are under an eternal doom of economic incapacity may well seem to be of a more sweeping character than scientific caution would justify. But by 1900, as the works on imperialism by both Reinsch⁸³ and Hobson⁸⁴ attest, Kidd's thesis had become the foremost moral plea of

imperialist powers. The doctrine applied at first solely to Indians had been extended to all races of color in the tropics.

Yet Americans as well as other imperialists were to develop that doctrine still more in their apparent eagerness to inherit the earth. Its non-agricultural as well as agricultural version was enlarged to apply not merely to the dark races, but also to peoples who, though largely white in population, were considered inferior in civilization and economic efficiency. Thus America's perturbed relations with disorderly Mexico gave rise to an expansionist ideology largely confirming the contemporary observation of the *New Republic*: ". . . in popular political philosophy the sole valid title of a nation to natural riches is the title of use."⁸⁵ Interest in annexation was mainly confined to the northern area, to which, Arthur Richard Hinton wrote in the *Independent* in 1914, "Mexico has given . . . no development."⁸⁶ Senator Ashurst, presenting his resolution of 1919 for the purchase of Lower California, affirmed that America could change this wilderness into a garden rich with fruits for civilization.⁸⁷ More numerous than the expansionists were those who favored intervention — the method most convenient for economic imperialists. Their ideology was also characterized by the conception that, as William Ledyard Rodgers wrote in 1927, since "Mexico has products that the world looks to her to provide" she "can not go on making the world wait."⁸⁸

But in the twentieth century the doctrine of territorial utilization has been used chiefly by Americans like Roland Usher⁸⁹ and John Carter,⁹⁰ who advocate frankly peaceful economic penetration. Economic penetration is called financial imperialism when, as during the Taft period of Dollar Diplomacy, it involves governmental control or influence in connection with international investment. "It is desirable," wrote a distinguished American banker as he recalled our Indian policy, "that these investments by the advanced countries shall be made, . . . that the waste places shall be developed, and that the production of those things which minister to the comfort and well-being of mankind shall be increased." Should this commercial extension be obstructed, it is to be borne in mind that "the right to occupy a portion of the earth's surface is . . .

qualified by a proper consideration for the general welfare." ⁹¹ But inasmuch as the loans of international bankers flow largely into enterprises that do not directly increase the productivity of the soil, that is, into public works, improvement of transportation facilities, and the refinancing of public debt, the doctrine of territorial utilization takes on in financial imperialism an extension. It is broadened to a form which advocates the investment of foreign capital, protected by such external political supervision as may be necessary, not merely for the cultivation of natural resources but for all economic activities within the domain of backward countries. Here the expansion of the doctrine finally stops; for any further expansion is apparently impossible.

But just as the doctrine reached its full growth, conditions in the world underwent a change which embarrassed its entire traditional logic. Malthus's prophecy to the contrary notwithstanding, world economy has expanded to the point of disastrous overproduction in all fields; as someone has said, we are stripped bare by the curse of plenty. A doctrine which developed amid fears of underproduction should now, it would seem, be radically amended—at least for the duration of the depression. Unless it is only the perversity of phantasy which prompts us, its amended form should proclaim that Providence has destined virgin soil *not* to be cultivated. However, the ambitions of nations are so little determined by rational economic logic that the anachronistic principle may not be amended at all.

The immediate future of this doctrine in American foreign policy is made unpromising by the morality of our era of abundance, represented by ex-President Hoover's indictment of "economic or other domination of other peoples." ⁹² Future Indian policy is foreshadowed by Indian Commissioner Collier's recent proposal whereby agricultural overproduction—the unexpected retribution for the past policy of excessive dispossession—is relieved by giving submarginal lands to Indian wards. ⁹³ But in the world in general, if one may judge by the attitude of the Japanese toward Manchuria and of some Englishmen toward the African-owned lands recently found to be rich in gold, it is likely that the doctrine justifying the seizure

of Naboth's property will continue to be put periodically to good or bad use.

If the doctrine lives on it will be in part because there is a kernel of truth in it. The bewildering variety of the versions that this concept has assumed does not discredit its essence, which is, as Walter Weyl says of the imperialist economic argument, always the same—"the resources of the world must be unlocked." ⁹⁴ Such a formulation is not essentially different from Vattel's doctrine that the earth must be cultivated because it belongs to the human race in general for its subsistence. In all its forms the doctrine might be designated as "the principle of beneficent territorial utilization." This utilitarian principle may seem to have a logical force far stronger than the ordinary counter-arguments of an emotional anti-imperialism, so often distinguished more by moral earnestness than logical coherence. For it is an application to international relations of an imposing and scarcely debatable law of the supremacy of the general good.

Since the general good has its economic aspect the imperialist is not troubled by the allegation that in supporting economic profit his doctrine is sordid. "Sordid, indeed!" exclaimed Senator Lodge in answer to such an allegation, as he proceeded to observe that the Philippine policy would increase the wages and employment of millions in both the United States and the Orient. ⁹⁵ A twentieth-century expansionist who believed in this country's duty to redeem the waste places in both Americas would "acknowledge no fault requiring apology or subterfuge in advocating for the United States the fullest measure of commercial expansion." ⁹⁶ It is his assumption of an international benefit in commercial expansion which saves the imperialist from any moral perturbation over the national or even individual profit in economic exploitation.

However, the imperialist must also face the objection that economic expansionism conflicts with self-determination. The conflict is indeed sharp, but the anti-imperialist errs greatly in hoping that the imperialist will feel disturbed by the fact. For it seems romantic folly to the imperialist that the desire of benighted peoples to govern or misgovern themselves should be

allowed to prevent the development of resources necessary to world welfare. Like Admiral Mahan he denies an "inalienable right in any community to control the use of a region when it does so to the detriment of the world at large."⁹⁷ Philosophical imperialism, as Dr. Powers declares, is "the assertion of world ownership over local tenancy at will."⁹⁸ Such a philosophy is as threatening to the backward peoples logically as is the imperialist's weapon of force physically.

Yet this principle, however formidable to the backward races, is also the one logical weapon formidable to the imperialist. It is like some boomerang which though thrown at the opponent causes fatality in an unexpected quarter. One has only to extend the imperialist's own logic a little farther to make it return and pierce the intellectual armor of the imperialist himself.

The weak point in that armor is the assumption that his country's economically motivated expansion operates to the fullest advantage of international society. This is true only in so far as the methods of imperialistic exploitation extend to the world at large its needed and proper share of economic products. But no consideration receives so much emphasis from students of the economics of exploitation as the failure of most imperialist enterprises to result in this equitable division. Thus, it is the thesis of C. K. Leith's essay "Exploitation and Progress" that the exploitation of the world's mineral resources shows "the conflict of two powerful opposing forces — on the one hand, world demand for raw materials, which knows no national boundaries and which is forcing coöperation in order that demand may be sufficiently satisfied; on the other, the nationalistic force directed towards partitioning resources for national gain or security."⁹⁹ Similar testimony is offered by Carlton Hayes's indictment of the economic policy of integral nationalism for penalization of the foreigner in every sphere.¹⁰⁰ That imperialist expansion does not serve the common good is also the conclusion of von Engeln in his geographico-economic study, *Inheriting the Earth*.¹⁰¹ It is arguable, indeed, that the expansion of the great powers is not opposed to the common good when national interest is adjusted to world interest by compromise. But despite the recent theoretical introduction of

the mandate system it seems that, as Mr. Leith observes, there has ordinarily been little or no actual application on the part of imperialist powers of those basic principles which "compromise legitimate national aspirations with insistent world pressure."¹⁰²

The pathetic logical suicide overtaking the imperialist through a doctrine cutting in two ways is now clear. The imperialist's weapon is a principle demanding that he subordinate to world interest not merely the claims of the backward people but also the pretensions of his own country. The expansionist is unwittingly using a principle which gives a *coup de grâce* to his country's self-interested expansion.

Moreover, the principle of the paramountcy of international society prescribes a consideration for the welfare of the colored aboriginal, a part of international society even though its "forgotten man." Vattel himself apparently recognized this fact when he approved of "moderation" on the part of civilized peoples in their relations with Indians.¹⁰³ The doctrine of Vattel would permit the expropriation of backward peoples only when their lands are actually and immediately needed for world advantage, not merely for land-hunger. It is also clear that Vattel's doctrine permits infliction of no greater injury upon the aboriginal people than is necessary to world interest, not merely to the pioneer's inordinate haste. "It is perfectly possible," a critic of America's Indian policy has truly written, "to meet all the needs of the growing race in the best and most practical way, and yet to preserve to the individual of the weaker race his rights and opportunities."¹⁰⁴

The inconsistency between the doctrine of beneficent territorial utilization and its largely unbeneficent practice is probably significant of another inconsistency between ideology and motive. The ideology of expropriation is internationalism; its ordinary motive appears in the light of behavior to be nationalism. Stated from a different point of view, the discrepancy is between the nationalist's pretension to interest in the use of territory and his fundamental interest in its possession. It is because of the possessive instinct and not the plough that the soil is destined for the race using the cannon rather than the bow and arrow.

FAILURE IN IRELAND 1784-1785

THE RESUSCITATION of the national economy, requiring a comprehensive expansion of trade, was associated with a problem that did not yield to logic: the settlement of Irish grievances. It was one with which Pitt was already familiar through his connection with the Grenvilles* and his own brief experience as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Nothing in this experience should have given him reason to suppose that the Irish problem was open to a quick solution, but Pitt's natural optimism was even stronger than his growing self-confidence. He was determined to right old wrongs, and believed that in doing so he would heal old wounds. He sadly underrated the ability of the Irish to reopen scars and nourish new abrasions.

There could be no doubt that the Irish had ample cause for complaint. For ninety years after the Revolution of 1688 Ireland had been kept in a political and economic straitjacket, dependent upon England and under harsh regulations imposed by the Westminster parliament. More than three-quarters of all Irish land was owned by English or Anglo-Irish Protestant families, many of them absentee landlords whose rents were remitted to England. Intermittent rebellion had resulted in ever more oppressive and intolerable laws designed to deprive the Catholic population of their already scant rights of citizenship. Catholics, who outnumbered the Protestants by little less than two to one,¹⁹⁷ had been excluded from ownership of freehold property, from parliament, from the professions, and from juries. Ireland's most important product, wool, was permitted to be exported only to England, and the manufacture of woollen goods was forbidden. Irish ships might not be used for trade with British colonies. Ireland's subsistence depended upon the cultivation of the potato, and the export of linens which the English were unable to make. In these unfavourable conditions, and despite mass emigration to America and recurrent famine, the population doubled. Nowhere else in Europe were the people reduced to poverty so abject as that of the Irish.

* Pitt's first cousins, the 2nd Earl Temple and William Wyndham Grenville, had been, respectively, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland and Chief Secretary in the Shelburne administration.

Keilly, Robin: Pitt The Younger 1759-1806
Cassell 1978.

The Dublin parliament, subservient in all but its right of taxation to the parliament at Westminster, was no more than a debating chamber, and the majority of its three hundred members was nominated by Protestant landowners whose allegiance to Britain was purchased by rewards of titles or land. The management of government was in the hands of 'undertakers', a self-seeking and generally corrupt group of men of business who held the real political control and owed loyalty to no one but themselves. They had achieved a satisfying position of power without responsibility, and successive Lord-Lieutenants, English representatives of the King and his government, found any plan to reform the system obstructed and destroyed. The English Viceroys, and thus the parliament in Westminster, were regularly outmanoeuvred. Ireland had come to be governed, in practice, for the benefit of neither the English nor the Irish people, but for the personal profit of a select group of Protestant Irishmen who manipulated disparate factions into occasional and uneasy alliance in order to maintain their own positions of power.

Ireland, bound to England by political and economic regulations designed to deny to the population any hope of prosperity or those few rights enjoyed by the peoples of other western European countries, was itself split into separately dissident factions, differing in their grievances and seldom united in their aims. The country nevertheless presented an impression of general and dangerous unrest which troubled successive British ministries. During the American war, when all available troops were needed for service elsewhere, Ireland's vulnerability to invasion from France led to the formation of the United Volunteers. Organized by Henry Grattan and his patron, James, Earl of Charlemont, the Volunteers declared their undivided loyalty to the King; but they also proclaimed their resolution to obtain freedom of trade and the independence of the Irish parliament. The British government, at war in Europe and floundering in a quagmire of disaster in America, was in no position to resist the demands of eighty thousand trained and armed volunteers drawn from the Protestant governing class but claiming to represent all Ireland. The lesson, from America, that armed rebellion extracted concessions not obtainable by loyalty and reasoned discussion, was well understood in Ireland.

Lord North regarded the problem with sincere anxiety. The shrewdest of politicians, he was also one of the most incurably supine, believing from long experience that the most intricate questions, when ignored, tended either to disappear or to answer themselves. The solution to the Irish problem, as it was presented to him during his last ministry, seemed unlikely to be found either in inaction or in any practicable action he could devise. Any attempt to reform the Dublin parliament was attacked by the undertakers as yet another authoritarian regulation of Irish government; North's efforts in 1778 to remove some of the restrictions on Irish commerce raised a storm of protest from manufacturers and traders in England, who feared competition; and the influential Protestant landowners were united in their alarm at the threat of any concession that might result in the taxation of their Irish rents.

The Opposition made correspondence with Grattan the support of precise claims of the Declaratory Act of 1773 the Westminster parliament situation in America: 'Can England has consented to enable his among which the declaratory declaratory act against Ireland with the British nation, and fears but to your magnanimity corrective for the venality of in the method of nominating following the American example reinforced, in 1779, by non-

The reaction of George III was resolute and unimaginative, 'opening the door encourage liberal-minded Lord-Lieutenant preoccupation with Irish affairs. To the suggestion that there was no man in his senses could count on his sincere conviction, root and branch the Constitution, from which he saw the possibility of a lasting Irish settlement its strength was later to put

The British government in 1779, Irish ships were permitted Ireland was granted freedom of wool and glass. A modest gesture inherit property and to the government finally repealed courts from the jurisdiction of in Ireland as a victory and a peaceful co-operation might further to confound constitutional legislature was freed, but the Lieutenant continued to act both countries. In theory position similar to that of the a proper check against the power very different. In England the acceptable to the House of Commons same ministers must be accepted

The Opposition made the most of North's discomfiture. Fox was in correspondence with Grattan, though he was careful not to commit himself to the support of precise claims. Irish legislative independence required the repeal of the Declaratory Act of 1719, the formal instrument asserting the supremacy of the Westminster parliament. Grattan insisted upon the parallel with the situation in America: 'Can England cede with dignity? I submit she can; for if she has consented to enable his majesty to repeal all the laws respecting America, among which the declaratory act is one, she can with more majesty repeal the declaratory act against Ireland, who has declared her resolution to stand and fall with the British nation, and has stated her own rights by appealing not to your fears but to your magnanimity.'¹⁹⁸ It was a persuasive argument, but it offered no corrective for the venality of the legislature; nor did Grattan suggest any change in the method of nomination of the executive appointed in London. Again following the American example, Irish demands for commercial freedom were reinforced, in 1779, by non-importation agreements.

The reaction of George III to such threatening behaviour was characteristically resolute and unimaginative. He was convinced, as it proved rightly, that 'opening the door encourages a demand for more',¹⁹⁹ and reprimanded his liberal-minded Lord-Lieutenant, John Hobart, Earl of Buckinghamshire, for his preoccupation with Irish affairs and neglect of proper duty to his own country. To the suggestion that the anti-Catholic laws should be repealed, he replied that no man in his senses could consider such a dangerous course of action.²⁰⁰ This was his sincere conviction, rooted in his interpretation of his duty to the British Constitution, from which he never departed. It was the rock against which all possibility of a lasting Irish settlement foundered, and Pitt's failure to appreciate its strength was later to put an end to his effective career.

The British government was nevertheless obliged to make concessions. In 1779, Irish ships were permitted to sail as British, and in the following year Ireland was granted freedom of trade with the colonies and the right to export wool and glass. A modest gesture was made to the Catholics by allowing them to inherit property and to own long leaseholds. In 1782, the Rockingham government finally repealed the Act of 1719 and freed the Irish parliament and courts from the jurisdiction of Westminster. This renunciation of power, greeted in Ireland as a victory and accepted in England as a necessary evil from which peaceful co-operation might blossom into a genuine unity of purpose, served further to confound constitutional issues already sufficiently confused. The legislature was freed, but the executive remained fettered to England. The Lord-Lieutenant continued to act for the King, who was the head of the executive for both countries. In theory the Dublin parliament assumed a constitutional position similar to that of the parliament in Westminster, the legislature acting as a proper check against the power of the executive. In practice the situation was very different. In England the King's choice of ministers was restricted to those acceptable to the House of Commons, but there was no requirement that those same ministers must be acceptable, also, to the Irish parliament. Nor was it likely

that the two parliaments could ever have been brought to agree upon any choice made by the King, even had it occurred to anyone that the Irish should be consulted. The King and his ministers continued to be represented in Ireland by the Lord-Lieutenant and his Chief Secretary, both appointed in London and both responsible to an English government dependent upon the English parliament. The Irish believed that their legislative freedom was largely an illusion, and they were right. To redress the balance and impose the desired check against executive power, Irish politicians adopted the attitude most natural to the national temperament: permanent opposition.

Pitt, understanding that the commercial expansion essential to Britain's recovery depended upon freedom of trade, determined to remove the artificial restrictions that impoverished the Irish population. His policy was un-sentimental: a prosperous Ireland would provide an increasingly valuable outlet for British manufactures; and a settled Ireland would cease to be a magnet to Britain's enemies in any future European war. He was aware that settlement involved more than trade: there could be no peace in Ireland until the Dublin parliament was reformed and the Catholic population relieved of the disabilities which deprived the majority of representation or executive responsibility; but Pitt was not yet ready to advocate such radical measures and neither of the two parliaments was ready to receive them. The freeing of trade was the logical first step, and the unrest reported from Dublin made some conciliatory gesture a matter of urgency.

In February 1784 Pitt sent his friend Charles, 4th Duke of Rutland, to Ireland as Lord-Lieutenant. With him, in the crucial post of Chief Secretary, went one of Shelburne's ablest disciples, Thomas Orde. Five years Pitt's senior, Rutland had been his loyal supporter since he first entered parliament, and had been among those who had accepted office in Pitt's first derided ministry. He was better known for his love of lavish entertainment than for any ministerial capacity, but he applied himself with earnest thoroughness to his complex task and displayed greater intelligence and competence than might have been expected of him. Orde, a barrister, and member of parliament for Aylesbury since 1780, had been Secretary to the Treasury in Shelburne's government. At thirty-six, he had acquired a just reputation for exceptional ability, diligence, and discretion. He could be relied upon to judge from evidence, to report with accuracy, and to negotiate with patience. Shortly after his arrival he was returned, by government influence, as member for Rathcormack, becoming the British government spokesman in the Irish parliament.

Rutland found Ireland in turmoil. The disastrous harvest of 1783, and the self-inflicted wounds caused by non-importation agreements, had aggravated the already intolerable poverty of the mass of the population, embittering relations between Irishmen of different classes, persuasions and faiths, and providing an excuse for explosions of violence. This climate of general unrest was particularly favourable to the Volunteers, who had come to be regarded as representative of the nation. The King was petitioned to dissolve the Irish House of Commons,

which, Rutland admitted *tion*'.²⁰¹ By August he was a 'This city', he wrote, 'is in the mob. Persons are da feathering; the magistrates when one man was seized volunteers in the neighbour. In short, the state of Du interposition of the Govern of the Duke, his friend and Siddons, 'came away in a Pitt a judicious warning: ' and disposed to grant, let t on your mind as . . . indis expectation to feed upon expressed a similar view tw Fitzpatrick, then Chief Se them [the Irish] all that th further demands.'²⁰⁴ It wa British ministers that what Another century passed be altering a demand while months in office, predicted with Great Britain in two

Pitt corresponded regu greater importance to the Orde. The Chief Secretar intelligence were reliable: Pitt that the French were was also he who stated, disorder was being stimul not merely the removal parliament, but also the 'Great Britain', supported often using language that repeat', he wrote on 25 Au to strengthen the sentime consistent with your own s you are nevertheless not t and specially in this count *satisfy* Ireland, and not to

Pitt accepted such lectu

* Fitzpatrick was appointed Sec

which, Rutland admitted, did not 'bear the smallest *resemblance to representation*'.²⁰¹ By August he was also forced to confess that Dublin was in a state of riot. 'This city', he wrote, 'is in a great measure under the dominion and tyranny of the mob. Persons are daily marked out for the operation of tarring and feathering; the magistrates neglect their duty; and none of the rioters—till today, when one man was seized in the fact—have been taken, while the corps of volunteers in the neighbourhood seem as it were to countenance these outrages. In short, the state of Dublin calls loudly for an immediate and vigorous interposition of the Government.'²⁰² Sir Joshua Reynolds declined the invitation of the Duke, his friend and patron, to visit Dublin, and the great actress, Sarah Siddons, 'came away in a terrible fright'. Already, in June, Rutland had given Pitt a judicious warning: 'Whatever advantages Great Britain may be enabled and disposed to grant, let them be declared to be *conclusive*. I must press this idea on your mind as . . . indispensable, for as long as anything indefinite remains for expectation to feed upon this country will never be at peace.'²⁰³ Fox had expressed a similar view two years earlier in a letter to his lifelong friend, Richard Fitzpatrick, then Chief Secretary for Ireland*: 'My opinion is clear for giving them [the Irish] all that they ask, but for giving it to them so as to secure us from further demands.'²⁰⁴ It was the continuing and realistic misgiving haunting all British ministers that whatever might be granted, the Irish would demand more. Another century passed before the British fully understood the Irish capacity for altering a demand while it was being conceded. Rutland, after less than four months in office, predicted that 'Without a *union* Ireland will not be connected with Great Britain in twenty years longer.'²⁰⁵

Pitt corresponded regularly with Rutland, but it is plain that he attached greater importance to the information, opinions and advice he received from Orde. The Chief Secretary was experienced and outspoken, and his sources of intelligence were reliable and well organized. It was Orde who first reported to Pitt that the French were intriguing in Ireland to provoke insurrection, and it was also he who stated, without prevarication, the opinion that widespread disorder was being stimulated to divert attention from a design that embraced not merely the removal of all commercial restrictions and the reform of parliament, but also the 'entire dissolution of the subsisting connection with Great Britain', supported by foreign arms. He expressed his views freely to Pitt, often using language that made his advice read more like instruction. 'I shall repeat', he wrote on 25 August 1784, 'what I have always said—everything tends to strengthen the sentiment: act towards Ireland with the utmost liberality consistent with your own safety; it must in the long run be the wisest policy. But you are nevertheless not to forget that you must not hope to please everybody, and specially in this country. You will have regard only to what in reason *ought to satisfy* Ireland, and not to what will satisfy her.'²⁰⁶

Pitt accepted such lectures with admirable humility. 'No man', as Wilberforce

* Fitzpatrick was appointed Secretary-at-War in the Fox-North coalition formed in April 1783.

RABB, Theodore K: Enterprise and Empire: Merchant and Gentry Investment in the Expansion of England 1575-1630 (Harvard 1967) H-224-410 list of names of investors (8683 cards)

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PATTERNS OF INVESTMENT

Table 5. Relative size of gentry and merchant investments in companies to which both classes contributed (to nearest £100).^a

Company	Total capital	Provided by gentry and other non-merchants	Percent provided by gentry and other non-merchants
Africa	£ 7,100	£ 5,600 ^b	78.9
Baffin	9,000	1,100 ^b	12.5
Bermuda	90,000	33,400 ^b	37.1
Cavendish	20,000	20,000	100.0
Drake	40,000	16,200	40.6 ^d
East India	2,887,000	415,700 ^b	14.4
Frobisher & Fenton	28,000	14,000 ^b	50.0
Gilbert	2,000	1,100 ^b	53.8
Gosnold	1,500	1,200 ^b	80.0
Guiana Company (1627-29)	5,000	4,400 ^b	88.7
Guiana venturers ^c	75,000	67,100 ^b	89.5
Hudson	3,000	1,200 ^b	39.1
Irish (Munster and Londonderry)	100,000	26,500 ^b	26.5
Massachusetts Bay	5,500	1,700 ^b	31.6
Minerals	7,000	3,500 ^b	50.7
Mines	34,000	16,400 ^b	48.2
New England	30,000	28,700 ^b	95.7 ^e
Newfoundland	20,000	5,200 ^b	26.0
New River	18,500	11,900 ^b	64.3 ^f
North-West Passage	12,600	9,000 ^b	71.7
Plymouth	7,000	1,200 ^b	16.7
Privateering	4,400,000 ^h	770,000 ^b	17.5
Providence Island	14,000	11,900 ^b	85.0
Virginia (1606-24)	200,000	94,400 ^b	47.2 ^g
Virginia venturers ^c	50,000	25,000	50.0
Weymouth	1,500	1,500	100.0
Total	£8,067,700	£1,587,900	19.6

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^a The small variations that can be noticed between the figures in this table and those in Table 2 are caused by the inclusion of all non-merchants among gentry in this table.

^b See explanation in paragraph before this table.

^c The venturers who were interested in Guiana and Virginia before the foundation of the principal companies in these areas have been given separate figures. This distinction has been drawn in this table alone because, as is indicated in notes 79 and 81 to this chapter, the relative amounts subscribed by gentry to these ventures must be calculated separately from the larger companies. Had they been combined, different results would have been obtained.

^d See note 91 to this chapter.

^e See note 93.

^f See note 73.

^g See note 79.

^h On the importance of privateering see pp. 79-80.

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Most of the figures in Table 5 are probably a little generous to the gentry for two reasons. First, their numbers were allowed to determine the percentage of their investment, and one's impression from company records is that merchants tended to pay more, per man, than did gentry. But this discrepancy is unverifiable, as the records are so sparse, and there is no way of deciding how to make any adjustments. Second, the percentage of membership was calculated on the basis of the classified members only, but the percentage of investment was applied to the *entire* capital raised by a company. Some 20 percent of the subscribers remained unclassified, and because they were so obscure the probability is that nearly all of them were petty merchants. The gentry undoubtedly benefit, therefore, from the extrapolation of percentages among classified members to the entire membership. But the figures in Table 5 are so very rough anyway that the few percentage points difference a correction such as this might make would not be worthwhile.

Table 5 indicates that, as might be expected, the gentry pro-

rising 7.0 percent in one decade, dropped back, during 1620-1629, to below the 1600-1609 period. See Kerridge, "The Movement of Rent," pp. 28, 34; the more broadly based tables of consumables in E. H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, "Seven Centuries of the Price of Consumables, Compared with Builders' Wage-Rates," *Economica*, new ser., 23 (1956), 296-314, indicate that the 1600-1630 rise was under 13 percent. The five-year average between 1600 and 1604 was 464; between 1626 and 1630 it was 524, an increase of 12.9 percent. By contrast, the five-year average between 1576 and 1580 was 362; hence in the last quarter-century of Elizabeth's reign the rise was 27.8 percent, and over the full 56 years it was 44.7 percent. The largest jump came between the first and second halves of the 1590's—in fact, the 1595-1599 average was the highest in the entire 1575-1630 period: 552. A similar chronology is presented by J. D. Gould, "Y. S. Brenner on Prices: A Comment," *Ec.H.R.*, 2nd ser., 16 (1963), 351-360. He stresses (p. 356) that the great rise came in the 1570's, 1580's, and 1590's, during which time the mean price of grain almost doubled. In the subsequent three decades the rise was slow. The most recent and complete price tables, published after the above was written, give a more detailed picture: Peter Bowden's contribution to *Agrarian History*, ed. Thirsk, pp. 593-695 and 815-863.

Because over 85 percent of the expenditures in Table 5 were made after 1594, there seemed no point in attempting to adjust for the price rise. Only a small proportion of the investments between 1595 and 1630 can be given a fixed date, and even for the previous 20 years considerable variations would have to be introduced, as exact dates of investment are usually impossible to determine. No consistent adjustment could have been made, and therefore any tampering with the figures as they now stand would have introduced more distortion than it would have removed. It might be noted, too, that even if sufficient data for an adjustment had been available, the gentry/merchant proportion would not have changed significantly.

PATTERNS OF INVESTMENT

Table 6. Number of people admitted annually to companies, 1575-1630, by class.^a

Year	Number of people admitted	Percent of 56-year total	Gentry admitted	Percent of 56-year gentry total	Merchants admitted	Percent of 56-year merchant total
1575	42	0.6	17	1.3	24	0.5
1576	10	0.1	2	0.2	5	0.1
1577	383	5.1	31	2.4	336	6.8
1578	42	0.6	29	2.3	9	0.2
1579	59	0.8	-	-	59	1.2
1580 ^b	67 ^c	0.9	7	0.6	59	1.2
1581 ^b	307 ^c	4.1	54	4.2	232	4.7
1582	19	0.3	5	0.4	11	0.2
1583	94	1.3	32	2.5	40	0.8
1584	74 ^d	1.0	39	3.1	3	0.1
1585	32	0.4	3	0.2	26	0.5
1586	4	0.1	3	0.2	1	0.0
1587	26	0.3	14	1.1	12	0.2
1588	19	0.3	-	-	19	0.4
1589	24	0.3	4	0.3	19	0.4
1590	28	0.4	6	0.5	21	0.4
1591 ^e	-	-	-	-	-	-
1592	20	0.3	1	0.1	18	0.4
1593 ^e	-	-	-	-	-	-
1594	1	0.0	-	-	1	0.0
1595-97 ^e	-	-	-	-	-	-
1598	2	0.0	2	0.2	-	-
1599	94	1.3	2	0.2	91	1.8
1600	154	2.1	2	0.2	152	3.1
1601	19	0.3	-	-	19	0.4
1602	4	0.1	2	0.2	2	0.0
1603	1	0.0	1	0.1	-	-
1604	483	6.5	18	1.4	464	9.4
1605	197	2.6	11	0.9	185	3.7
1606	69	0.9	9	0.7	58	1.2
1607	67	0.9	21	1.7	41	0.8
1608	27	0.4	7	0.6	17	0.3
1609	1,111	14.9	196	15.4	707	14.3
1610 ^b	260 ^e	3.5	95	7.5	150	3.0
1611	645	8.6	56	4.4	559	11.3
1612	411	5.5	175	13.8	216	4.4
1613	59	0.8	10	0.8	26	0.5
1614	95	1.3	15	1.2	65	1.3
1615	263	3.5	32	2.5	213	4.3
1616	16	0.2	3	0.2	10	0.2
1617	66	0.9	18	1.4	31	0.6
1618	257	3.4	69	5.4	99	2.0
1619	115	1.5	42	3.3	53	1.1

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Table 6 (continued)

Year	Number of people admitted	Percent of 56-year total	Gentry admitted	Percent of 56-year gentry total	Merchants admitted	Percent of 56-year merchant total
1620 ^b	303 ^e	4.1	52	4.1	180	3.6
1621	60	0.8	16	1.3	17	0.3
1622	111	1.5	13	1.0	40	0.8
1623	82	1.1	18	1.4	33	0.7
1624	142	1.9	10	0.8	113	2.3
1625 ^b	724 ^e	9.7	40	3.1	317	6.4
1626	43	0.6	1	0.1	36	0.7
1627	104	1.4	38	3.0	46	0.9
1628	76	1.0	11	0.9	49	1.0
1629	142	1.9	27	2.1	63	1.3
1630 ^b	18 ^e	0.2	15	1.2	2	0.0
Total	7,471		1,274 (or 17.0% of 7,471)		4,949 (or 66.3% of 7,471)	

^a The total for column 1 is greater than the sum of columns 3 and 5 because the breakdowns do not include unclassified or professional/yeomen investors.

^b See the notes to Tables 6 and 7, following Table 7.

^c Figures are the results of the special coding adopted for certain companies where precise dates of admission are not known — see chapter 3, especially the sections on the Bermuda, Eastland, Muscovy, and Plymouth Companies and privateering, and pp. 105-106, 154-155 and 166.

^d See the note on 1584 at the foot of this page.

^e No admissions were recorded.

ple), but it is just as valid an indicator of fluctuations of interest.

Some of the high points in these figures derive in part from a few specific charters, as is indicated in Figure 1. A few further breakdowns can be given here: 1575 consists mostly of surviving members of the Minerals and Mines Companies, founded a few years earlier; 1579 is made up primarily of founding members of the Eastland Company; 1583 consists very largely of backers of Gilbert; 1584 contains a heavy concentration of the Munster venturers, who were not averaged out because so very little is known about the dates of their interest. (Not until this book was in press, however, did I notice that the date 1584 was the result of a typographical error in the computer program. It should have been 1586, the first year of the undertaking. As will be seen, the long-range annual figures are not significantly affected by the

PATTERNS OF INVESTMENT

Table 7. Total annual admissions to companies, 1575-1630.

Year	Total admissions	After averaging	Percent of all admissions in 56 years	After averaging	Ratio of admissions to people entering companies in this year (column 1 divided by column 1 of Table 6)
1575	65	(69)	0.7	(0.8)	1.55
1576	18	(22)	0.2	(0.2)	1.80
1577	458	(462)	5.0	(5.1)	1.20
1578	51	(55)	0.6	(0.6)	1.22
1579	66	(70)	0.7	(0.8)	1.12
1580 ^b	111 ^a	(15)	1.2	(0.2)	1.66
1581 ^b	399 ^a	(108)	4.4	(1.2)	1.30
1582	29	(47)	0.3	(0.5)	1.53
1583	115	(133)	1.3	(1.5)	1.22
1584	82 ^c	(100)	0.9	(1.1)	1.11
1585	55	(73)	0.6	(0.8)	1.72
1586	5	(23)	0.1	(0.3)	1.25
1587	35	(53)	0.4	(0.6)	1.35
1588	20	(38)	0.2	(0.4)	1.05
1589	41	(59)	0.5	(0.7)	1.71
1590	37	(55)	0.4	(0.6)	1.32
1591	-	(18)	-	(0.2)	-
1592	29	(47)	0.3	(0.5)	1.45
1593	-	(18)	-	(0.2)	-
1594	5	(23)	0.1	(0.3)	5.00
1595	-	(18)	-	(0.2)	-
1596	-	(18)	-	(0.2)	-
1597	-	(18)	-	(0.2)	-
1598	2	(20)	0.0	(0.2)	1.00
1599	141	(159)	1.6	(1.7)	1.50
1600	197	(215)	2.2	(2.4)	1.28
1601	26	(46)	0.3	(0.5)	1.37
1602	6	(26)	0.1	(0.3)	1.50
1603	1	(21)	0.0	(0.2)	1.00
1604	540	(546)	5.9	(6.0)	1.12
1605	256	(262)	2.8	(2.9)	1.30
1606	85	(108)	0.9	(1.2)	1.23
1607	81	(104)	0.9	(1.2)	1.21
1608	29	(52)	0.3	(0.6)	1.07
1609	1,294	(1,317)	14.2	(14.5)	1.16
1610 ^b	301 ^a	(239)	3.3	(2.6)	1.16
1611	794	(800)	8.7	(8.8)	1.23
1612	545	(551)	6.0	(6.1)	1.33

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Table 7 (continued)

Year	Total admissions	After averaging	Percent of all admissions in 56 years	After averaging	Ratio of admissions to people entering companies in this year (column 1 divided by column 1 of Table 6)
1613	69	(75)	0.8	(0.8)	1.17
1614	107	(113)	1.2	(1.2)	1.13
1615	404	(410)	4.4	(4.5)	1.54
1616	54	(64)	0.6	(0.7)	3.38
1617	71	(81)	0.8	(0.9)	1.08
1618	299	(309)	3.3	(3.4)	1.16
1619	143	(153)	1.6	(1.7)	1.24
1620 ^b	375 ^a	(154)	4.1	(1.7)	1.24
1621	66	(85)	0.7	(0.9)	1.10
1622	123	(142)	1.4	(1.6)	1.11
1623	99	(118)	1.1	(1.3)	1.21
1624	161	(180)	1.8	(2.0)	1.13
1625 ^b	792 ^a	(171)	8.7	(1.9)	1.09
1626	46	(165)	0.5	(1.8)	1.07
1627	121	(240)	1.3	(2.6)	1.16
1628	81	(200)	0.9	(2.2)	1.07
1629	155	(270)	1.7	(3.0)	1.09
1630 ^b	20 ^a	(135)	0.2	(1.5)	1.11
Total	9,104				

^a Figures are the results of the special coding adopted for certain companies where precise dates of admission are not known — see chapter 3, especially the sections on the Bermuda, Eastland, Muscovy, and Plymouth Companies and privateering, and pp. 105-106, 154-155 and 166.

^b See the notes to Tables 6 and 7 below.

^c See the note on 1584 on page 73.

Notes to Tables 6 and 7: Averaging

1580 contains all members of the Muscovy Company during the last quarter of the sixteenth century — 100 people, whose figures have been averaged out in Table 7 over the period 1575-1600. A few known to have been active in 1575 were entered at that year in Table 6.

1581 contains all Elizabethan backers of privateering and raids against the Spaniards: 389 people, whose figures have been averaged out in Table 7 over the period 1581-1603. A few known to have become active at a later date were so entered in Table 6.

1610 contains 85 members of the Levant Company who have been averaged out in Table 7 over the period 1606-1610, from which no records have survived.

1620 contains three consolidations: 111 members of the Russia Company, averaged

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Table 8. Percentages, in successive periods, of total admissions to companies, 1575-1630 (based on the averaged figures in Table 7).

Period	Percentage of all admissions between 1575 and 1630	Average annual percentage, in each period, of all admissions between 1575 and 1630
1575-1598	16.5	0.7
1599-1603	9.9	2.0
1604-1608	11.3	2.3
1609-1615	36.5	5.2
1616-1620	8.0	1.6
1621-1630	17.8	1.8

out in Table 7 over the years 1601-1630; 68 members of the Eastland Company, averaged out in Table 7 over the years 1601-1625; 52 members of the Bermuda Company, averaged out in Table 7 over the years 1616-1628.

1625 also contains three consolidations: 664 backers of privateering during the war with France and Spain, averaged out in Table 7 over the years 1625-1630; 42 members of the Eastland Company, averaged out in Table 7 over the years 1601-1630; 45 Plymouth adventurers, averaged out in Table 7 over the years 1621-1625.

1630 contains no consolidations, but requires special mention. The figure is low because the East India and Levant Company admissions for this year were not included in the list.

Although, for the sake of increased accuracy, these figures were averaged out in Table 7 (the columns in parentheses), the results should not be regarded as precise records of annual admissions. Little more than 60 percent of the company entries in the list can be dated exactly, because the only records that can be relied on for this purpose are founding charters and minutes of meetings. The remainder are entered at the date of first mention, which is hardly better than an approximation of the date of admission. And, though the 1,376 admissions that have been averaged out represent only 15 percent of the entire total, the process of averaging them was uncertain at best. Some of the groups (e.g., the Elizabethan privateers) were doubtless subject to large annual fluctuations, and the terminal dates for the Muscovy and Eastland figures were themselves approximations. Moreover, as is indicated in Table 9, there were some Levant, Virginia, and East India Company lists for which a meaningful chronological distribution could not be devised. Even with averaging, therefore, these figures must be used with caution, and are most useful when taken over a period of years, as is done in Table 8 and Figure 1.

In Table 6 it was impossible to average them out over the years they covered, because the consolidations were of admissions, not of people, whereas the latter unit was the one used in Table 6. Naturally, the computer could have made the conversion, but such complexities would have been introduced (for example, should a man appear in two separate years if he had two admissions in a "consolidated" year, when a man who had two "nonconsolidated" entries in a year appeared only once?), that the result would not have been very satisfactory. Moreover, Table 7, in which the averaging was relatively simple, was quite sufficient as an indicator of the rise and fall of rates of investment.

It should be noted that investments of no specified date have been omitted from the figures in these tables.

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


Figure 1. Annual admissions to companies (after averaging), 1575-1630 (based on Table 7)

two-year misplacement of the 76 Munster adventurers.) 1605 consists mainly of Levant and Spanish Company members; 1611 includes the large group of founding members of the French Company; 1612 is made up principally of the founding members of the North West Passage Company, and the new names in the third Virginia Company charter.

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Table 10. Parliamentary data.^a

Session starting	1584	1586	1589	1593	1597	1601	1604	1614	1621	1624	1625	1626	1628
Members	467	465	468	462	459	466	563	404	514	510	485	492	518
New M.P.'s	467	219	238	237	251	234	261	258	274	203	127	124	139
Percent new	100.0	47.1	50.9	51.3	54.7	50.2	46.4	55.6	53.3	39.8	26.1	25.2	26.8
Investors	91	99	103	103	103	135	216	181	188	169	145	153	144
Percent of M.P.'s in session	19.4	21.3	22.0	22.3	22.4	29.0	38.4	39.0	36.6	33.1	30.0	31.2	27.8
Percent supplied by non-merchants	16.5	17.2	17.1	17.5	18.1	24.5	31.8	32.5	28.6	26.1	24.7	23.3	20.7
Percent of all M.P. investors at any time	13.2	14.3	14.9	14.9	14.9	19.5	31.2	26.2	27.2	24.4	21.0	22.1	20.8
First investment													
Before 1600	52	50	54	42	29	23	35	20	18	10	9	10	7
1600-08	8	11	17	20	17	28	38	28	23	17	14	15	11
1609-15	22	29	23	29	43	57	108	90	87	57	56	60	55
1616-20	1	2	3	5	7	16	17	27	31	34	27	21	22
1621-30	1	-	2	1	-	5	7	8	21	35	26	30	35
Investors who were new M.P.'s	91	39	44	43	55	62	92	71	72	43	24	25	31
Percent of new M.P.'s	19.4	17.8	18.5	18.1	21.9	26.5	35.2	27.5	26.3	21.2	18.9	20.2	22.3

^a The year-by-year breakdown does not add up to the same total as the number of investors because unknown dates of admission have not been included. It should be noted that the percent supplied by non-merchants is a percentage of all Members of Parliament, not of M.P. investors or gentry M.P.'s alone. The latter figure, substantially higher, is given in the second paragraph after the table — it was not included in the table because its meaning could be conveyed equally well without graphic representation.

Because no sessions before 1584 have been included, the figures for new M.P.'s are obviously high during the first few Parliaments. However, as can be seen from the "percent new" figures, the discrepancy does not seem to be serious. Already by 1593 there can have been no more than one or two M.P.'s who, though listed here as new, had in fact sat in the House before 1584 but not after.

See also Tables 20 and 21.

propaganda and the new projects were being trumpeted most loudly in London. The figures for the sessions of 1604 and 1614 are particularly noteworthy, straddling as they do the most active years of the expansion. In both sessions almost 40 percent of the M.P.'s in the House invested in trade. This level of interest tapered off only slowly in the 1620's; but the sudden increase be-

Enthusiasm for the expansion among the M.P.'s was clearly at its height during the very period when the (94)

THE PATH TO FAME

tween 1601 and 1604, emphasized by the fact that over a third of the new M.P.'s in 1604 were investors — a proportion far higher than in any other assembly — is a remarkable indication of the sudden surge of interest in commerce. Over 31 percent of all M.P.'s who were interested in trade sat in the House that met between 1604 and 1611; and, although this is not shown in the table, there were 179 gentry investors in that particular House — over 15 percent of all the gentry who invested in companies in this entire period.

The figures for the percentage of gentry M.P.'s who joined a company are equally decisive. Between 1584 and 1597 the proportion remained between 31 percent and 34 percent. In 1601 it was 40 percent; in 1604, 46 percent; in 1614, 45 percent; in 1621, 40 percent; in 1624, 38 percent; and thereafter between 31 percent and 33 percent. Such a very large percentage, particularly in 1604 and 1614, testifies to the tremendous impact that a stay in London must have made on the average gentleman. Nor can it have been without significance that some of the leaders of the House, notably Sandys and Digges, were also at the forefront of the gentry's participation in commerce. Members of Parliament were so deeply concerned with discussions of public welfare that they may well have been particularly vulnerable to propaganda which shrewdly stressed that the national interest was at stake in overseas ventures.

Looking at the figures from the point of view of dates of first investment, the preponderance of the 1609-1615 period fits the pattern already outlined. In every session except the first four, the largest number of M.P.'s first joined a company (where this date can be determined) in these seven years. In the two assemblies that met during the peak period, 1604 and 1614, a clear majority of all first investments was made between 1609 and 1615.

The figures for the numbers of M.P.'s in the various companies are given in the next chapter (see Table 20). Here, however, they have relevance insofar as the date of admission is concerned. Leaving out all companies founded before 1584, and treating only gentry, the following statistics emerge regarding the percentage of gentry M.P.'s in various companies who joined the company at the same time as, or after, they sat in Parliament:

Table 11. Company memberships, by class.

Company	Membership	Unclassified (and percent of total)	Class, with percent of those classified					
			Gentlemen	Knights	Peers	Merchants	Merchant knights	Yeomen/ professionsals
Africa	38	-	10 (26.3)	17 (44.7)	3 (7.9)	7 (18.4)	11 (18.4)	-
Bahia	8	1 (2.1)	1 (2.1)	1 (12.5)	-	2 (25.0)	5 (62.5)	-
Bermuda	47	27 (57.2)	17 (36.0)	-	40 (85.4)	3 (6.3)	12 (25.5)	1 (0.7)
Cavendish	4	-	1 (25.0)	2 (50.0)	1 (25.0)	82 (54.3)	12 (7.9)	-
Drake	21	-	5 (4.6)	1 (4.6)	34 (2.9)	11 (66.7)	58 (5.0)	22 (1.9)
East India	1,317	156 (11.8)	4 (0.7)	8 (1.5)	4 (0.7)	937 (83.6)	18 (3.3)	1 (1.0)
Eastland	548	24 (9.8)	8 (8.2)	19 (19.6)	20 (20.6)	184 (83.8)	18 (3.3)	1 (1.0)
Frobisher & Fenton	121	12 (8.2)	45 (33.6)	21 (15.7)	6 (4.5)	39 (40.2)	10 (10.3)	12 (9.0)
Gilbert	146	2 (0.4)	2 (40.0)	37 (35.9)	32 (43.0)	7 (27.0)	1 (0.7)	-
Guiana	105	13 (12.4)	12 (13.0)	3 (12.5)	6 (23.0)	6 (25.0)	9 (37.5)	4 (4.3)
Hudson	122	82 (10.8)	82 (12.1)	75 (11.0)	23 (3.4)	477 (70.1)	23 (3.4)	1 (0.2)
Irish	762	7 (1.2)	3 (0.5)	4 (0.7)	2 (0.4)	520 (92.1)	35 (6.2)	3 (3.7)
Massachusetts Bay	122	40 (32.8)	20 (24.4)	5 (6.1)	1 (0.4)	52 (63.4)	1 (1.2)	-
Merchant Adventurer	259	2 (2.6)	1 (0.5)	1 (1.8)	1 (1.8)	245 (93.0)	2 (0.9)	2 (2.7)
Minerals	77	2 (2.6)	1 (1.8)	1 (1.8)	1 (1.8)	74 (96.1)	4 (7.1)	1 (1.8)
Muscovy	217	7 (2.9)	7 (10.3)	35 (51.5)	15 (22.1)	166 (78.7)	2 (2.9)	2 (2.9)
New England	57	2 (2.9)	6 (12.0)	5 (10.0)	2 (4.0)	85 (70.0)	2 (4.0)	3 (1.0)
New Merchant Adventurer	257	1 (0.4)	1 (3.2)	7 (22.6)	3 (9.7)	249 (97.3)	5 (2.0)	-
New River	31	4 (1.3)	10 (5.2)	32 (10.4)	31 (5.0)	232 (74.8)	2 (0.8)	-
Plymouth	311	33 (8.3)	43 (6.1)	52 (7.4)	28 (3.7)	549 (78.4)	20 (4.1)	1 (0.1)
Privateering	1,051	344 (33.3)	6 (30.0)	6 (30.0)	2 (9.1)	20 (90.9)	46 (4.2)	1 (5.0)
Providence Island	20	-	2 (0.2)	9 (0.8)	-	1033 (94.2)	27 (7.9)	-
Spanish	1,096	1 (7.1)	209 (16.7)	293 (21.0)	88 (7.0)	609 (48.6)	52 (4.2)	31 (2.5)
Staple Merchants	18	432 (25.7)	15 (4.4)	73 (21.5)	55 (16.2)	165 (48.5)	27 (7.9)	5 (1.5)
Venice	1,085	12 (3.4)	596 (6.0)	779 (7.9)	419 (4.2)	6,319 (61.0)	454 (4.6)	91 (0.9)
Weymouth	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other ventures	352	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	9,807*	1,209 (12.3)	596 (6.0)	779 (7.9)	419 (4.2)	6,319 (61.0)	454 (4.6)	91 (0.9)

* To the total of 9,807 should be added the 191 "other ventures" investments made by people who are entered only once in the "other ventures" category but who were interested in more than one of these undertakings. See Companies in the key to the List in the Appendix for further explanation.

cause the evidence is so limited these figures cannot be used as indications of fluctuations of interest within a company, as was done in Table 9. Their importance lies in their contribution to the overall figures presented in Tables 6 and 7.

In the *Bermuda Company*, 21 (11.8 percent) joined in 1612; 104 (58.4 percent) in 1615; and 52 (29.2 percent) subsequently.

In the *Eastland Company*, 66 (33.5 percent) joined in 1579; 42 (21.3 percent) between 1601 (?) and 1625; 68 (34.5 percent) between 1601 (?) and 1630; and 21 (10.7 percent) at an unknown date.

In the *French Company*, 539 (98.4 percent) joined in 1611; and nine (1.6 percent) at an unknown date.

Of the backers of *Frobisher and Fenton*, one (0.8 percent) subscribed only to Frobisher's first voyage; 36 (29.8 percent) only to the second voyage; six (five percent) only to the third voyage; and 24 (19.8 percent) only to Fenton's expedition. The remainder were interested in more than one of the voyages: 24 (19.8 percent) in Frobisher's second and third ventures; 12 (9.9 percent) in all three of Frobisher's ventures; seven (5.8 percent) in his last two ventures and also Fenton's; five (4.1 percent) in all four voyages; and six (five percent) in Frobisher's second voyage and Fenton's expedition.

Of the backers of *Gilbert*, 45 (30.8 percent) became interested in 1578, and 101 (69.2 percent) in 1583.

Among the *Guiana* venturers, five (4.8 percent) became interested in the 1590's, three (2.9 percent) in 1604, five (4.8 percent) in 1609, two (1.9 percent) in 1613, two (1.9 percent) in 1618, 22 (21 percent) in 1619, 50 (47.5 percent) with the foundation of the *Guiana Company* in 1627, and 16 (15.2 percent) more by 1629.

Among the *Irish* venturers, there were 78 (10.2 percent) undertakers in the *Munster Plantation* of the 1580's; when the *Ulster Plantation* was organized, a further seven (0.9 percent) became interested in 1608, 395 (51.8 percent) in 1609, 148 (19.4 percent) in 1611, 54 (7.1 percent) in 1613, 23 (three percent) by 1618, and 57 (7.5 percent) at an unknown date.

In the *Massachusetts Bay Company*, 39 (32 percent) were interested by 1628, and 83 more (68 percent) joined in 1629.

In the *Minerals Company*, 41 (53.3 percent) joined by 1575,

The 18 Companies whose dates of admission came from one source (see Appendix) can be broken down into groups according to the year memberships were first recorded. See (105)

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R-I/6

Alfred T. Mahan, a naval officer, was proclaiming by 1890, that the time had come for the United States to break its confining isolationist bonds. The historic requisite for national greatness, Mahan endlessly asserted, was sea power. This was what had made a small nation like England so mighty throughout the world. To obtain sea power, a country must build a strong navy, obtain colonies at strategic points, and be able to control the sea lanes in time of war. In this comparatively early article, Mahan traced many of the considerations that came to figure prominently in the expansionist ideology.

ALFRED T. MAHAN: THE UNITED STATES LOOKING OUTWARD*

Indications are not wanting of an approaching change in the thoughts and policy of Americans as to their relations with the world outside their own borders. For the past quarter of a century, the predominant idea, which has successfully asserted itself at the polls and shaped the course of the government, has been to preserve the home market for the home industries. The employer and the workman have alike been taught to look at the various economical measures proposed from this point of view, to regard with hostility any step favoring the intrusion of the foreign producer upon their own domain, and rather to demand increasingly rigorous measures of exclusion than to acquiesce in any loosening of the chain that binds the consumer to them. The inevitable consequence has followed, as in all cases when the mind or the eye is exclusively fixed in one direction, that the danger of loss or the prospect of advantage in another quarter has been overlooked; and although the abounding resources of the country have maintained the exports at a high figure, this flattering result has been due more to the super-abundant bounty of Nature than to the demand of other nations for our protected manufactures.

For nearly the lifetime of a generation, therefore, American industries have been thus protected, until the practice has assumed the force of a tradition, and is clothed in the mail of conservatism. In their mutual relations, these industries resemble the activities of a modern ironclad that has heavy armor, but an inferior engine and no guns; mighty for defense, weak for offense. Within, the home market is secured; but outside, beyond the broad seas, there are the markets of the world, that can be entered and controlled only by a vigorous contest, to which the habit of trusting to protection by statute does not conduce.

At bottom, however, the temperament of the American people is essentially alien to such a sluggish attitude. Independently of all bias for or against protection, it is safe to predict that, when

* Reprinted from Alfred T. Mahan, "The United States Looking Outward," Atlantic Monthly, LXVI (December, 1890), 816-24.

the opportunities for gain abroad are understood, the course of American enterprise will cleave a channel by which to reach them. Viewed broadly, it is a most welcome as well as significant fact that a prominent and influential advocate of protection, a leader of the party committed to its support, a keen reader of the signs of the times and of the drift of opinion, has identified himself with a line of policy which looks to nothing less than such modifications of the tariff as may expand the commerce of the United States to all quarters of the globe. Men of all parties can unite on the words of Mr. Blaine, as reported in a recent speech: "It is not an ambitious destiny for so great a country as ours to manufacture only what we can consume, or produce only what we can eat." In face of this utterance of so shrewd and able a public man, even the extreme character of the recent tariff legislation seems but a sign of the coming change, and brings to mind that famous Continental System, of which our own is the analogue, to support which Napoleon added legion to legion and enterprise to enterprise, till the fabric of the Empire itself crashed beneath the weight.

The interesting and significant feature of this changing attitude is the turning of the eyes outward, instead of inward only, to seek the welfare of the country. To affirm the importance of distant markets, and the relation to them of our own immense powers of production, implies logically the recognition of the link that joins the products and the markets,—that is, the carrying trade; the three together constituting that chain of maritime power to which Great Britain owes her wealth and greatness. Further, is it too much to say that, as two of these links, the shipping and the markets, are exterior to our own borders, the acknowledgement of them carries with it a view of the relations of the United States to the world radically distinct from the simple idea of self-sufficingness? We shall not follow far the line of thought before there will dawn the realization of America's unique position, facing the older worlds of the East and West, her shores lapped by the oceans which touch the one or the other, but which are common to her alone.

Coincident with these signs of change in our own policy there is a restlessness in the world at large which is deeply significant, if not ominous. It is beside our purpose to dwell upon the internal state of Europe, whence, if disturbances arise, the effect upon us may be but partial and indirect. But the great seaboard powers there do not only stand on guard against their continental rivals; they cherish also aspirations for commercial extension, for colonies, and for influence in distant regions, which may bring, and, even under our present contracted policy, have already brought them into collision with ourselves. The affair of the Samoa Islands, trivial apparently, was nevertheless eminently suggestive of European ambitions. America then roused from sleep as to interests closely concerning her future. At this moment internal troubles are imminent in the Sandwich Islands, where it should be our fixed determination to allow no foreign influence to equal our own. All over the world German commercial and colonial push is coming into collision with other nations: witness the affair of the Caroline Islands with Spain; the partition of New Guinea with England; the yet more recent negotiation between these two powers concerning their share in Africa, viewed with deep distrust and jealousy by France; the Samoa affair; the conflict between German control and American interests in the islands of the western Pacific; and the alleged progress of German influence in Central and South America. It is noteworthy that, while these various contentions are sustained with the aggressive military spirit characteristic of the German Empire, they are credibly said to arise from the national temper more than from the deliberate policy of the government, which in this matter does not lead, but follows, the feeling of the people, a condition much more formidable.

There is no sound reason for believing that the world has passed into a period of assured peace outside the limits of Europe. Unsettled political conditions, such as exist in Hayti, Central America, and many of the Pacific islands, especially the Hawaiian group, when combined with great military or commercial importance, as is the case with most of these positions, involve, now as always, dangerous germs of quarrel, against which it is at least prudent to be prepared. Undoubtedly, the general temper of nations is more averse from war than it was of old. If no less selfish and grasping than our predecessors, we feel more dislike to the discomforts and sufferings attendant upon a breach of peace; but to retain that highly valued repose and the undisturbed enjoyment of the returns of commerce, it is necessary to argue upon somewhat equal terms of strength with an adversary. It is the preparedness of the enemy, and not acquiescence in the existing state of things, that now holds back the armies of Europe.

On the other hand, neither the sanctions of international law nor the justice of a cause can be

depended upon for a fair settlement of differences, when they come into conflict with a strong political necessity on the one side opposed to comparative weakness on the other. In our still-pending dispute over the seal-fishing of Bering Sea, whatever may be thought of the strength of our argument, in view of generally admitted principles of international law, it is beyond doubt that our contention is reasonable, just, and in the interest of the world generally. But in the attempt to enforce it we have come into collision not only with national susceptibilities as to the honor of the flag, which we ourselves very strongly share, but also with a state governed by a powerful necessity, and exceedingly strong where we are particularly weak and exposed. Not only has Great Britain a mighty navy and we a long, defenseless seacoast, but it is a great commercial and political advantage to her that her larger colonies, and above all Canada, should feel that the power of the mother country is something which they need, and upon which they can count. The dispute is between the United States and Canada, not the United States and England; but it has been ably used by the latter to promote the solidarity of sympathy between herself and her colony. With the mother country alone an equitable arrangement, conducive to well-understood mutual interests, could readily be reached; but the purely local and peculiarly selfish wishes of Canadian fishermen dictate the policy of Great Britain, because Canada is the most important link uniting her to her colonies and maritime interests in the Pacific. In case of a European war, it is probable that the British navy will not be able to hold open the route through the Mediterranean to the East; but having a strong naval station at Halifax, and another at Esquimalt, on the Pacific, the two connected by the Canadian Pacific Railroad, England possesses an alternate line of communication far less exposed to maritime aggression than the former, or than the third route by the Cape of Good Hope, as well as two bases essential to the service of her commerce, or other naval operations, in the North Atlantic and the Pacific. Whatever arrangement of this question is finally reached, the fruit of Lord Salisbury's attitude can hardly fail to be a strengthening of the sentiments of attachment to, and reliance upon, the mother country, not only in Canada, but in the other great colonies. Such feelings of attachment and mutual dependence supply the living spirit, without which the nascent schemes for Imperial Federation are but dead mechanical contrivances; nor are they without influence upon such generally unsentimental considerations as those of buying and selling, and the course of trade.

This dispute, seemingly paltry, yet really serious, sudden in its appearance, and dependent for its issue upon other considerations than its own merits, may serve to convince us of many latent and yet unforeseen dangers to the peace of the western hemisphere, attendant upon the open-

ing of a canal through the Central American Isthmus. In a general way, it is evident enough that this canal, by modifying the direction of trade routes, will induce a great increase of commercial activity and carrying trade throughout the Caribbean Sea; and that this now comparatively deserted nook of the ocean will, like the Red Sea, become a great thoroughfare of shipping, and attract, as never before in our day, the interest and ambition of maritime nations. Every position in that sea will have enhanced commercial and military value, and the canal itself will become a strategic centre of the most vital importance. Like the Canadian Pacific Railroad, it will be a link between the two oceans; but, unlike it, the use, unless most carefully guarded by treaties, will belong wholly to the belligerent which controls the sea by its naval power. In case of war, the United States will unquestionably command the Canadian Railroad, despite the deterrent force of operations by the hostile navy upon our seaboard; but no less unquestionably will she be impotent, as against any of the great maritime powers, to control the Central American canal. Militarily speaking, the piercing of the Isthmus is nothing but a disaster to the United States, in the present state of her military and naval preparation. It is especially dangerous to the Pacific coast; but the increased exposure of one part of our seaboard reacts unfavorably upon the whole military situation. Despite a certain great original superiority conferred by our geographical nearness and immense resources,—due, in other words, to our natural advantages, and not to our intelligent preparations,—the United States is woefully unready, not only in fact, but in purpose, to assert in the Caribbean and Central America a weight of influence proportioned to the extent of her interests. We have not the navy, and, what is worse, we are not willing to have the navy, that will weigh seriously in any disputes with those nations whose interests will there conflict with our own. We have not, and we are not anxious to provide, the defense of the seaboard which will leave the navy free for its work at sea. We have not, but many other powers have, positions, either within or on the borders of the Caribbean, which not only possess great natural advantages for the control of that sea, but have received and are receiving that artificial strength of fortification and armament which will make them practically inexpugnable. On the contrary, we have not on the Gulf of Mexico even the beginning of a navy yard which could serve as the base of our operations. Let me not be misunderstood. I am not regretting that we have not the means to meet on terms of equality the great navies of the Old World. I recognize, what few at least say, that, despite its great surplus revenue, this country is poor in proportion to its length of seaboard and its exposed points. That which I deplore, and which is a sober, just, and reasonable cause of deep national concern, is that the nation neither has nor cares to have its sea frontier so defended,

and its navy of such power, as shall suffice, with the advantages of our position, to weigh seriously when inevitable discussions arise,—such as we have recently had about Samoa and Bering Sea, and which may at any moment come up about the Caribbean Sea or the canal. Is the United States, for instance, prepared to allow Germany to acquire the Dutch stronghold of Curaçoa, fronting the Atlantic outlet of both the proposed canals of Panama and Nicaragua? Is she prepared to acquiesce in any foreign power purchasing from Hayti a naval station on the Windward Passage, through which pass our steamer routes to the Isthmus? Would she acquiesce in a foreign protectorate over the Sandwich Islands, that great central station of the Pacific, equidistant from San Francisco, Samoa, and the Marquesas, and an important post on our lines of communication with both Australia and China? Or will it be maintained that any one of these questions, supposing it to arise, is so exclusively one-sided, the arguments of policy and right so exclusively with us, that the other party will at once yield his eager wish, and gracefully withdraw? Was it so at Samoa? Is it so as regards Bering Sea? The motto seen on so many ancient cannon, *Ultima ratio regum*, is not without its message to republics.

It is perfectly reasonable and legitimate, in estimating our needs of military preparation, to take into account the remoteness of the chief naval and military nations from our shores, and the consequent difficulty of maintaining operations at such a distance. It is equally proper, in framing our policy, to consider the jealousies of the European family of states, and their consequent unwillingness to incur the enmity of a people so strong as ourselves; their dread of our revenge in the future, as well as their inability to detach more than a certain part of their forces to our shores without losing much of their own weight in the councils of Europe. In truth, a careful determination of the force that Great Britain or France could probably spare for operations against our coasts, if the latter were suitably defended, without weakening their European position or unduly exposing their colonies and commerce, is the starting-point from which to calculate the strength of our own navy. If the latter be superior to the force that can thus be sent against it, and the coast be so defended as to leave the navy free to strike where it will, we can maintain our rights; not merely the rights which international law concedes, and which the moral sense of nations now supports, but also those equally real rights which, though not conferred by law, depend upon a clear preponderance of interest, upon obviously necessary policy, upon self-preservation, either total or partial. Were we now so situated in respect of military strength, we could secure our perfectly just claim as to the seal fisheries; not by seizing foreign ships on the open sea, but by the evident fact that, our cities being protected from maritime attack, our posi-

tion and superior population lay open the Canadian Pacific, as well as the frontier of the Dominion, to do with as we please. Diplomats do not flourish such disagreeable truths in each other's faces; they look for a *modus vivendi*, and find it.

While, therefore, the advantages of our own position in the western hemisphere, and the disadvantages under which the operations of a European state would labor, are undeniable and just elements in the calculations of the statesman, it is folly to look upon them as sufficient for our security. Much more needs to be cast into the scale that it may incline in favor of our strength. They are mere defensive factors, and partial at that. Though distant, our shores can be reached; being defenseless, they can detain but a short time a force sent against them. With a probability of three months' peace in Europe, no maritime power would now fear to support its demands by a number of ships with which it would be loath indeed to part for a year.

Yet, were our sea frontier as strong as it now is weak, passive self-defense, whether in trade or war, would be but a poor policy, so long as this world continues to be one of struggle and vicissitude. All around us now is strife; "the struggle of life," "the race of life," are phrases so familiar that we do not feel their significance till we stop to think about them. Everywhere nation is arrayed against nation; our own no less than others. What is our protective system but an organized warfare? In carrying it on, it is true, we have only to use certain procedures which all states now concede to be a legal exercise of the national power, even though injurious to themselves. It is lawful, they say, to do what we will with our own. Are our people, however, so unaggressive that they are likely not to want their own way in matters where their interests turn on points of disputed right, or so little sensitive as to submit quietly to encroachment by others, in quarters where they have long considered their own influence should prevail?

Our self-imposed isolation in the matter of markets, and the decline of our shipping interest in the last thirty years, have coincided singularly with an actual remoteness of this continent from the life of the rest of the world. The writer has before him a map of the North and South Atlantic oceans, showing the direction of the principal trade routes and the proportion of tonnage passing over each; and it is curious to note what deserted regions, comparatively, are the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, and the adjoining countries and islands. A broad band stretches from our northern Atlantic coast to the English Channel; another as broad from the British Islands to the East, through the Mediterranean and Red Sea, overflowing the borders of the latter in order to express the volume of trade. Around either cape—Good Hope and Horn—pass strips of about one fourth this width, joining near the equator, midway between Africa and South Amer-

ica. From the West Indies issues a thread indicating the present commerce of Great Britain with a region which once, in the Napoleonic wars, embraced one fourth of the whole trade of the Empire. The significance is unmistakable: Europe has now little interest in the Caribbean Sea.

When the Isthmus is pierced this isolation will pass away, and with it the indifference of foreign nations. From wheresoever they come and whithersoever they afterward go, all ships that use the canal will pass through the Caribbean. Whatever the effect produced upon the prosperity of the adjacent continent and islands by the thousand wants attendant upon maritime activity, around such a focus of trade will centre large commercial and political interests. To protect and develop its own, each nation will seek points of support and means of influence in a quarter where the United States has always been jealously sensitive to the intrusion of European powers. The precise value of the Monroe doctrine is very loosely understood by most Americans, but the effect of the familiar phrase has been to develop a national sensitiveness, which is a more frequent cause of war than material interests; and over disputes caused by such feelings there will preside none of the calming influence due to the moral authority of international law, with its recognized principles, for the points in dispute will be of policy, of interest, not of conceded right. Already France and England are giving to ports held by them a degree of artificial strength uncalled for by their present importance. They look to the near future. Among the islands and on the mainland there are many positions of great importance, held now by weak or unstable states. Is the United States willing to see them sold to a powerful rival? But what right will she invoke against the transfer? She can allege but one,—that of her reasonable policy supported by her might.

Whether they will or no, Americans must now begin to look outward. The growing production of the country demands it. An increasing volume of public sentiment demands it. The position of the United States, between the two Old Worlds and the two great oceans, makes the same claim, which will soon be strengthened by the creation of the new link joining the Atlantic and Pacific. The tendency will be maintained and increased by the growth of the European colonies in the Pacific, by the advancing civilization of Japan, and by the rapid peopling of our Pacific States with men who have all the aggressive spirit of the advanced line of national progress. Nowhere does a vigorous foreign policy find more favor than among the people west of the Rocky Mountains.

It has been said that, in our present state of unpreparedness, a trans-isthmian canal will be a military disaster to the United States, and especially to the Pacific coast. When the canal is finished the Atlantic seaboard will be neither more nor less exposed than it now is; it will merely share with the country at large the increased danger of foreign complications with inadequate

means to meet them. The danger of the Pacific coast will be greater by so much as the way between it and Europe is shortened through a passage which the stronger maritime power can control. The danger lies not merely in the greater facility for dispatching a hostile squadron from Europe, but also in the fact that a more powerful fleet than formerly can be maintained on that coast by a European power, because it can be so much more promptly called home in case of need. The greatest weakness of the Pacific ports, however, if wisely met by our government, will go far to insure our naval superiority there. The two chief centres, San Francisco and Puget Sound, owing to the width and the great depth of the entrances, cannot be effectively protected by torpedoed; and consequently, as fleets can always pass batteries through an unobstructed channel, they cannot obtain perfect security by means of fortifications only. Valuable as such works will be to them, they must be further garrisoned by coast-defense ships, whose part in repelling an enemy will be coordinated with that of the batteries. The sphere of action of such ships should not be permitted to extend far beyond the port to which they are allotted, and of whose defense they form an essential part; but within that sweep they will always be a powerful reinforcement to the sea-going navy, when the strategic conditions of a war cause hostilities to centre around their port. By sacrificing power to go long distances, the coast-defense ships gains proportionate weight of armor and guns; that is, of defensive and offensive strength. It therefore adds an element of unique value to the fleet with which it for a time acts. No foreign states, except Great Britain, have ports so near our Pacific coast as to bring it within the radius of action of their coast-defense ships; and it is very doubtful whether even Great Britain will put such ships at Vancouver Island, the chief value of which will be lost to her when the Canadian Pacific is severed,—a blow always in the power of this country. It is upon our Atlantic seaboard that the mistress of Halifax, of Bermuda, and of Jamaica will now defend Vancouver and the Canadian Pacific. In the present state of our seaboard defense she can do so absolutely. What is all Canada compared with our exposed great cities? Even were the coast fortified, she could still do so, if our navy be no stronger than is as yet designed. What harm can we do Canada proportionate to the injury we should suffer by the interruption of our coasting trade, and by a blockade of Boston, New York, Delaware, and the Chesapeake? Such a blockade Great Britain certainly could make technically efficient, under the somewhat loose definitions of international law. Neutrals would accept it as such.

The military needs of the Pacific States, as

well as their supreme importance to the whole country, are yet a matter of the future, but of a future so near that provision should immediately begin. To weigh their importance, consider what influence in the Pacific would be attributed to a nation comprising only the States of Washington, Oregon, and California, when filled with such men as now people them and are still pouring in, and controlling such maritime centres as San Francisco, Puget Sound, and the Columbia River. Can it be counted less because they are bound by the ties of blood and close political union to the great communities of the East? But such influence, to work without jar and friction, requires underlying military readiness, like the proverbial iron hand under the velvet glove. To provide this, three things are needful: First, protection of the chief harbors by fortifications and coast-defense ships, which gives defensive strength, provides security to the community within, and supplies the bases necessary to all military operations. Secondly, naval force, the arm of offensive power, which alone enables a country to extend its influence outward. Thirdly, it should be an inviolable resolution of our national policy that no European state should henceforth acquire a coaling position within three thousand miles of San Francisco,—a distance which includes the Sandwich and Galapagos islands and the coast of Central America. For fuel is the life of modern naval war; it is the food of the ship; without it the modern monsters of the deep die of inanition. Around it, therefore, cluster some of the most important considerations of naval strategy. In the Caribbean and the Atlantic we are confronted with many a foreign coal depot, and perhaps it is not an unmitigated misfortune that we, like Rome, find Carthage at our gates bidding us stand to our arms; but let us not acquiesce in an addition to our dangers, a further diversion of our strength, by being forestalled in the North Pacific.

In conclusion, while Great Britain is undoubtedly the most formidable of our possible enemies, both by her great navy and the strong positions she holds near our coasts, it must be added that a cordial understanding with that country is one of the first of our external interests. Both nations, doubtless, and properly, seek their own advantage; but both, also, are controlled by a sense of law and justice drawn from the same sources, and deep-rooted in their instincts. Whatever temporary aberration may occur, a return to mutual standards of right will certainly follow. Formal alliance between the two is out of the question, but a cordial recognition of the similarity of character and ideas will give birth to sympathy, which in turn will facilitate a cooperation beneficial to both; for, if sentimentality is weak, sentiment is strong.

An editorial in the *Independent*, typical of the popular expansionist writings in the wake of the Spanish American War, took issue with the charge that proponents of colonies were necessarily jingoistic.

INDEPENDENT: THE DULL LEXICON OF SENILITY*

If in the lexicon of youth, which fate reserves for a bright manhood, there is no such word as *fail*, it must be a very different lexicon which some timorous souls are opening before the country. Its pages seem to contain no words but "corruption," "bosses," "unfitted," "impossible," "failure." The *Springfield Republican* uses the same dictionary when it says that *THE INDEPENDENT* and *The Outlook* illustrate the "delirium" of jingoism which has seized the religious press.

Now, just what is the reason for supposing that the United States cannot govern new territories? It is said that a self-governing people are unfitted to exercise paternal functions; but the greatest example of paternal government of colonies in the world is Great Britain, which is self-governing. Of all peoples, those that have learned first to govern themselves can best govern others, as the history of the world shows.

But the corruption of our cities. How can we govern other people till we have first learned to create good government at home? Well, if we wait till we get everything perfect we shall never do anything. And who says our government at home is bad? Is Spain's government of Havana better than ours of New York? Is not Philadelphia or Chicago better governed than Manila? We declare that the misgovernment of New York under Tammany is better than the tyranny of the government of Berlin. A citizen is in better condition in Quay's Pennsylvania than in William II's Germany, freer and less taxed.

If we have to govern Porto Rico and the Philippines by military power, wherein lies the impossibility? Have we not military and naval officers enough, men trained and honest, who can do the task? But why should we govern them entirely ourselves, and not let them govern themselves? Our Territories are self-governed, and we

doubt not Porto Rico and Luzon will also be self-governed.

There is no delirium, no jingoism, in the acceptance by our religious people of the responsibilities put upon us by the war. It was noticeable that at the meeting of the American Board at Grand Rapids the universal feeling was one of gratification that the area of freedom was thus spreading. It was not that they wished to hurry in and seize the islands for their missionaries, for they had no missionaries to send and asked for none. But the spirit of philanthropy controlled, not of greed. They thanked God not for themselves but for the Cubans. They were not afraid of the responsibilities; they believed we were better equal to them than are the Spaniards, and that we will give a better government, which is saying very little.

The spirit which animates us is very different from that which paralyzes our timorous croakers. We see a chance to do good to others; they see task and danger for ourselves. We are inspired by the faith and courage of altruism; they are depressed by the fear and despair of self-concern. We believe that Dr. Johnson once said that any dictionary is better than no dictionary; but if we were compelled to give up the lexicon of youth we should rather have no dictionary at all than that over which paralysis stoops to read and repeat and gibber the chill vocabulary of impotence. Pardon the figure, for those who thus shiver may be those who have been full of youthful courage in other days, even once revolutionists of '48 or heroes of Abolition, but who now "starve in ice their soft ethereal warmth." But the great Christian heart of the country keeps warm and full of courage, and accepts responsibility, and prays God to be delivered from evil, but never from opportunity to do good.

* Reprinted from *Independent*, L (October 20, 1898), 1137.

Upon his return from the Philippines, where American troops were fighting Filipino insurrectionaries, Albert J. Beveridge spoke on the Senate floor in January, 1900. Defending America's role, he justified expansion in a curious mixture of racist, humanitarian, economic, and military terms.

ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE: RACIAL EXPANSION*

I address the Senate at this time because Senators and Members of the House on both sides have asked that I give to Congress and the country my observations in the Philippines and the far East, and the conclusions which those observations compel; and because of hurtful resolutions introduced and utterances made in the Senate, every word of which will cost and is costing the lives of American soldiers.

Mr. President, the times call for candor. The Philippines are ours forever, "territory belonging to the United States," as the Constitution calls them. And just beyond the Philippines are China's illimitable markets. We will not retreat from either. We will not repudiate our duty in the archipelago. We will not abandon our opportunity in the Orient. We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustee, under God, of the civilization of the world. And we will move forward to our work, not howling out regrets like slaves whipped to their burdens, but with gratitude for a task worthy of our strength, and thanksgiving to Almighty God that He has marked us as His chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the world.

PHILIPPINES COMMAND THE PACIFIC

This island empire is the last land left in all the oceans. If it should prove a mistake to abandon it, the blunder once made would be irretrievable. If it proves a mistake to hold it, the error can be corrected when we will. Every other progressive nation stands ready to relieve us.

But to hold it will be no mistake. Our largest trade henceforth must be with Asia. The Pacific is our ocean. More and more Europe will manufacture the most it needs, secure from its colonies the most it consumes. Where shall we turn for consumers of our surplus? Geography answers the question. China is our natural customer. She is nearer to us than to England, Germany, or Russia, the commercial powers of the present and the future. They have moved nearer to China by securing permanent bases on her borders. The Philippines give us a base at the door of all the East.

* Reprinted from *Congressional Record*, 56th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: 1900), pp. 704-5, 708-9, 711-12.

Lines of navigation from our ports to the Orient and Australia; from the Isthmian Canal to Asia; from all Oriental ports to Australia, converge at and separate from the Philippines. They are a self-supporting, dividend-paying fleet, permanently anchored at a spot selected by the strategy of Providence, commanding the Pacific. And the Pacific is the ocean of the commerce of the future. Most future wars will be conflicts for commerce. The power that rules the Pacific, therefore, is the power that rules the world. And, with the Philippines, that power is and will forever be the American Republic.

VALUE OF CHINA'S TRADE

China's trade is the mightiest commercial fact in our future. Her foreign commerce was \$285,738,300 in 1897, of which we, her neighbor, had less than 9 per cent, of which only a little more than half was merchandise sold to China by us. We ought to have 50 per cent, and we will. And China's foreign commerce is only beginning. Her resources, her possibilities, her wants, all are undeveloped. She has only 340 miles of railway. I have seen trains loaded with natives and all the activities of modern life already appearing along the line. But she needs, and in fifty years will have, 20,000 miles of railway.

Who can estimate her commerce, then? That statesman commits a crime against American trade—against the American grower of cotton and wheat and tobacco, the American manufacturer of machinery and clothing—who fails to put America where she may command that trade. Germany's Chinese trade is increasing like magic. She has established ship lines and secured a tangible foothold on China's very soil. Russia's Chinese trade is growing beyond belief. She is spending the revenues of the Empire to finish her railroad into Peking itself, and she is in physical possession of the imperial province of Manchuria. Japan's Chinese trade is multiplying in volume and value. She is bending her energy to her merchant marine, and is located along China's very coast; but Manila is nearer China than Yokohama is. The Philippines command the commercial situation of the entire East. Can America best trade with China from San Francisco or New York? From San Francisco, of course. But if San Francisco were closer to China than New York is to Pittsburg, what then? And Manila is nearer Hong-

kong than Habana is to Washington. And yet American statesmen plan to surrender this commercial throne of the Orient where Providence and our soldiers' lives have placed us. When history comes to write the story of that suggested treason to American supremacy and therefore to the spread of American civilization, let her in mercy write that those who so proposed were merely blind and nothing more.

RESOURCES AND IMMENSE SIZE OF THE ISLANDS

But if they did not command China, India, the Orient, the whole Pacific for purposes of offense, defense, and trade, the Philippines are so valuable in themselves that we should hold them. I have cruised more than 2,000 miles through the archipelago, every moment a surprise at its loveliness and wealth. I have ridden hundreds of miles on the islands, every foot of the way a revelation of vegetable and mineral riches. . . .

THE FILIPINOS ARE CHILDREN, UTTERLY INCAPABLE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT

But, Senators, it would be better to abandon this combined garden and Gibraltar of the Pacific, and count our blood and treasure already spent a profitable loss, than to apply any academic arrangement of self-government to these children. They are not capable of self-government. How could they be? They are not of a self-governing race. They are Orientals, Malays, instructed by Spaniards in the latter's worst estate.

They know nothing of practical government except as they have witnessed the weak, corrupt, cruel, and capricious rule of Spain. What magic will anyone employ to dissolve in their minds and characters those impressions of governors and governed which three centuries of misrule has created? What alchemy will change the oriental quality of their blood and set the self-governing currents of the American pouring through their Malay veins? How shall they, in the twinkling of an eye, be exalted to the heights of self-governing peoples which required a thousand years for us to reach, Anglo-Saxon though we are?

Let men beware how they employ the term "self-government." It is a sacred term. It is the watchword at the door of the inner temple of liberty, for liberty does not always mean self-government. Self-government is a method of liberty—the highest, simplest, best—and it is acquired only after centuries of study and struggle and experiment and instruction and all the elements of the progress of man. Self-government is no base and common thing, to be bestowed on the merely audacious. It is the degree which crowns the graduate of liberty, not the name of liberty's infant class, who have not yet mastered the alphabet of freedom. Savage blood, oriental blood, Malay blood, Spanish example—are these the elements of self-government?

We must act on the situation as it exists, not as we would wish it. I have talked with hundreds of these people, getting their views as to the practical workings of self-government. The great majority simply do not understand any participation in any government whatever. The most enlightened among them declare that self-government will succeed because the employers of labor will compel their employees to vote as their employer wills and that this will insure intelligent voting. I was assured that we could depend upon good men always being in office because the officials who constitute the government will nominate their successors, choose those among the people who will do the voting, and determine how and where elections will be held.

The most ardent advocate of self-government that I met was anxious that I should know that such a government would be tranquil because, as he said, if anyone criticised it, the government would shoot the offender. A few of them have a sort of verbal understanding of the democratic theory, but the above are the examples of the ideas of the practical workings of self-government entertained by the aristocracy, the rich planters and traders, and heavy employers of labor, the men who would run the government.

PEOPLE INDOLENT— NO COMPETITION WITH OUR LABOR

Example for decades will be necessary to instruct them in American ideas and methods of administration. Example, example; always example—this alone will teach them. As a race, their general ability is not excellent. Educators, both men and women, to whom I have talked in Cebu and Luzon, were unanimous in the opinion that in all solid and useful education they are, as a people, dull and stupid. In showy things, like carving and painting or embroidery or music, they have apparent aptitude, but even this is superficial and never thorough. They have facility of speech, too.

The three best educators on the island at different times made to me the same comparison, that the common people in their stupidity are like their caribou bulls. They are not even good agriculturists. Their waste of cane is inexcusable. Their destruction of hemp fiber is childish. They are incurably indolent. They have no continuity or thoroughness of industry. They will quit work without notice and amuse themselves until the money they have earned is spent. They are like children playing at men's work.

No one need fear their competition with our labor. No reward could beguile, no force compel, these children of indolence to leave their trifling lives for the fierce and fervid industry of high-wrought America. The very reverse is the fact. One great problem is the necessary labor to develop these islands—to build the roads, open the mines, clear the wilderness, drain the swamps, dredge the harbors. The natives will not supply it.

A lingering prejudice against the Chinese may prevent us from letting them supply it. Ultimately, when the real truth of the climate and human conditions is known, it is barely possible that our labor will go there. Even now young men with the right moral fiber and a little capital can make fortunes there as planters. . . .

THE WHOLE QUESTION ELEMENTAL

Mr. President, this question is deeper than any question of party politics; deeper than any question of the isolated policy of our country even; deeper even than any question of constitutional power. It is elemental. It is racial. God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. No! He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples. Were it not for such a force as this the world would relapse into barbarism and night. And of all our race He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission of America and it holds for us all the profit, all the glory, all the happiness possible to man. We are trustees of the world's progress, guardians of its righteous peace. The judgment of the Master is upon us: "Ye have been faithful over a few things; I will make you ruler over many things."

What shall history say of us? Shall it say that we renounced that holy trust, left the savage to his base condition, the wilderness to the reign of waste, deserted duty, abandoned glory, forget our sordid profit even, because we feared our strength and read the charter of our powers with the doubter's eye and the quibbler's mind? Shall it say that, called by events to captain and command the proudest, ablest, purest race of history in history's noblest work, we declined that great commission? Our fathers would not have had it so. No! They founded no paralytic government, incapable of the simplest acts of administration. They planted no sluggard people, passive while the world's work calls them. They established no reactionary nation. They unfurled no retreating flag.

GOD'S HAND IN ALL

That flag has never paused in its onward march. Who dares halt it now—now, when history's largest events are carrying it forward; now, when we are at last one people, strong enough for any task, great enough for any glory destiny can bestow? How comes it that our first century closes with the process of consolidating the American people into a unit just accomplished, and quick

upon the stroke of that great hour presses upon us our world opportunity, world duty, and world glory, which none but a people welded into an indivisible nation can achieve or perform?

Blind indeed is he who sees not the hand of God in events so vast, so harmonious, so benign. Reactionary indeed is the mind that perceives not that this vital people is the strongest of the saving forces of the world; that our place, therefore, is at the head of the constructing and redeeming nations of the earth; and that to stand aside while events march on is a surrender of our interests, a betrayal of our duty as blind as it is base. Craven indeed is the heart that fears to perform a work so golden and so noble; that dares not win a glory so immortal.

Do you tell me that it will cost us money? When did Americans ever measure duty by financial standards? Do you tell me of the tremendous toil required to overcome the vast difficulties of our task? What mighty work for the world, for humanity, even for ourselves, has ever been done with ease? Even our bread must we eat by the sweat of our faces. Why are we charged with power such as no people ever knew, if we are not to use it in a work such as no people ever wrought? Who will dispute the divine meaning of the fable of the talents?

Do you remind me of the precious blood that must be shed, the lives that must be given, the broken hearts of loved ones for their slain? And this is indeed a heavier price than all combined. And yet as a nation every historic duty we have done, every achievement we have accomplished, has been by the sacrifice of our noblest sons. Every holy memory that glorifies the flag is of those heroes who have died that its onward march might not be stayed. It is the nation's dearest lives yielded for the flag that makes it dear to us; it is the nation's most precious blood poured out for it that makes it precious to us. That flag is woven of heroism and grief, of the bravery of men and women's tears, of righteousness and battle, of sacrifice and anguish, of triumph and of glory. It is these which make our flag a holy thing. Who would tear from that sacred banner the glorious legends of a single battle where it has waved on land or sea? What son of a soldier of the flag whose father fell beneath it on any field would surrender that proud record for the heraldry of a king? In the cause of civilization, in the service of the Republic anywhere on earth, Americans consider wounds the noblest decorations man can win, and count the giving of their lives a glad and precious duty.

Pray God that spirit never fails. Pray God the time may never come when Mammon and the love of ease shall so debase our blood that we will fear to shed it for the flag and its imperial destiny. Pray God the time may never come when American heroism is but a legend like the story of the Cid, American faith in our mission and our might a dream dissolved, and the glory of our mighty race departed.

And that time will never come. We will renew our youth at the fountain of new and glorious deeds. We will exalt our reverence for the flag by carrying it to a noble future as well as by remembering its ineffable past. Its immortality will not pass, because everywhere and always we will

acknowledge and discharge the solemn responsibilities our sacred flag, in its deepest meaning, puts upon us. And so, Senators, with reverent hearts, where dwells the fear of God, the American people move forward to the future of their hope and the doing of His work.

Meeting in October, 1899, the American Anti-Imperialist League expressed in its platform the common ground shared by various groups of social reformers and opponents of expansion.

AMERICAN ANTI-IMPERIALIST LEAGUE PLATFORM*

We hold that the policy known as imperialism is hostile to liberty and tends toward militarism, an evil from which it has been our glory to be free. We regret that it has become necessary in the land of Washington and Lincoln to reaffirm that all men, of whatever race or color, are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We maintain that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. We insist that the subjugation of any people is "criminal aggression" and open disloyalty to the distinctive principles of our Government.

We earnestly condemn the policy of the present National Administration in the Philippines. It seeks to extinguish the spirit of 1776 in those islands. We deplore the sacrifice of our soldiers and sailors, whose bravery deserves admiration even in an unjust war. We denounce the slaughter of the Filipinos as a needless horror. We protest against the extension of American sovereignty by Spanish methods.

We demand the immediate cessation of the war against liberty, begun by Spain and continued by us. We urge that Congress be promptly convened to announce to the Filipinos our purpose to concede to them the independence for which they have so long fought and which of right is theirs.

The United States have always protested against the doctrine of international law which permits the subjugation of the weak by the strong. A self-governing state cannot accept sovereignty over an unwilling people. The United States cannot act upon the ancient heresy that might makes right.

Imperialists assume that with the destruction of self-government in the Philippines by American hands, all opposition here will cease. This is a grievous error. Much as we abhor the war of

"criminal aggression" in the Philippines, greatly as we regret that the blood of the Filipinos is on American hands, we more deeply resent the betrayal of American institutions at home. The real firing line is not in the suburbs of Manila. The foe is of our own household. The attempt of 1861 was to divide the country. That of 1899 is to destroy its fundamental principles and noblest ideals.

Whether the ruthless slaughter of the Filipinos shall end next month or next year is but an incident in a contest that must go on until the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States are rescued from the hands of their betrayers. Those who dispute about standards of value while the Republic is undermined will be listened to as little as those who would wrangle about the small economies of the household while the house is on fire. The training of a great people for a century, the aspiration for liberty of a vast immigration are forces that will hurl aside those who in the delirium of conquest seek to destroy the character of our institutions.

We deny that the obligation of all citizens to support their Government in times of grave National peril applies to the present situation. If an Administration may with impunity ignore the issues upon which it was chosen, deliberately create a condition of war anywhere on the face of the globe, debauch the civil service for spoils to promote the adventure, organize a truth-suppressing censorship and demand of all citizens a suspension of judgement and their unanimous support while it chooses to continue the fighting, representative government itself is imperiled.

We propose to contribute to the defeat of any person or party that stands for the forcible subjugation of any people. We shall oppose for reflection all who in the White House or in Congress betray American liberty in pursuit of un-American gains. We still hope that both of our great political parties will support and defend the Declaration of Independence in the closing campaign of the century.

We hold, with Abraham Lincoln, that "no

* Reprinted from Carl Schurz, *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), VI, 77-79 by permission. Copyright, 1913, by G. P. Putnam's Sons.

marized Freudism briefly, and stressed the contributions of Freud to knowledge about ourselves. This was followed by Aldous Huxley's *Our Contemporary Hocus-Pocus*, a bitter, scathing denunciation of Freud in which he analyzed psychoanalysis to show that it has all the qualifications of a pseudo-science ("one of the finest specimens ever devised"). He attributed its popularity to the fact that it required no special education, no remarkable intellect, and called Freud's interpretations of dreams 'obscene'—a denunciation rather difficult to explain when one considers Huxley's novels!

With the popularization of knowledge came vehement protests from the Church and particularly from the Catholic Church. *The Catholic World* in 1923 ran several articles sharply criticizing Freudian doctrine for the application to

normal minds of a method suitable only for the diseased and disordered, and even more strenuously objected to the usurpation by the psychoanalyst of the office of physician of the soul—an office reserved for the priest.¹⁸ Another author pointed out the dangers to our morals from strict application of Freudism, and expressed his opinion that America suffered not from too much repression, but from too much self-indulgence.

The battle, however, was won. By 1925, although his concepts continued to be refined and modified, Freud had achieved a definite standing in professional circles. He was making his influence felt not only in medicine, psychology, education, literature, the drama and the arts, but such terms as 'repressed desires,' 'complexes' and 'inhibitions' had been added to the vocabulary of the average American.

How did the twenties affect most American people? A pair of sociologists, Robert S. and Helen Merrell Lynd, visited what seemed an average American city, Muncie, Indiana, spent months gathering data, and produced a vivid account, *Middletown*. It is like a doorway opening back into the New Era. The two sections that follow deal with two areas in which life had sharply changed for most people of "Middletown."

R. S. AND H. M. LYND: THE NEW ERA IN MIDDLETOWN*

GETTING A LIVING

For both working and business class no other accompaniment of getting a living approaches in importance the money received for their work. It is more this future, instrumental aspect of work, rather than the intrinsic satisfactions involved, that keeps Middletown working so hard as more and more of the activities of living are coming to be strained through the bars of the dollar sign. Among the business group, such things as one's circle of friends, the kind of car one drives, playing golf, joining Rotary, the church to which one belongs, one's political principles, the social position of one's wife apparently tend to be scrutinized somewhat more than formerly in Middletown for their instrumental bearing upon the main business of getting a living, while, conversely, one's status in these various other activities tends to be much influenced by one's financial position. As vicinage has decreased in its influence upon the ordinary social contacts of this group, there

¹⁸ Huxley, Aldous, *Our Contemporary Hocus-Pocus*.

* Reprinted from *Middletown* by Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, copyright, 1929, by Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.; renewed, 1957, by Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

appears to be a constantly closer relation between the solitary factor of financial status and one's social status. A leading citizen presented this matter in a nutshell to a member of the research staff in discussing the almost universal local custom of "placing" newcomers in terms of where they live, how they live, the kind of car they drive, and similar externals: "It's perfectly natural. You see, they know money, and they don't know you."

This dominance of the dollar appears in the apparently growing tendency among younger working class men to swap a problematic future for immediate "big money." Foremen complain that Middletown boys entering the shops today are increasingly less interested in being moved from job to job until they have become all-round skilled workers, but want to stay on one machine and run up their production so that they may quickly reach a maximum wage scale.

The rise of large-scale advertising, popular magazines, movies, radio, and other channels of increased cultural diffusion from without are rapidly changing habits of thought as to what things are essential to living and multiplying optional occasions for spending money. Install-

¹⁹ Bruckl, Charles, "Psychoanalysis," *The Catholic World*, Feb. 1923, p. 577.

ment buying, which turns wishes into horses overnight, and the heavy increase in the number of children receiving higher education, with its occasions for breaking with home traditions, are facilitating this rise to new standards of living. In 1890 Middletown appears to have lived on a series of plateaus as regards standard of living; old citizens say there was more contentment with relative arrival; it was a common thing to hear a remark that so and so "is pretty good for people in our circumstances." Today the edges of the plateaus have been shaved off, and every one lives on a slope from any point of which desirable things belonging to people all the way to the top are in view.

This diffusion of new urgent occasions for spending money in every sector of living is exhibited by such new tools and services commonly used in Middletown today, but either unknown or little used in the nineties, as the following:

IN THE HOME furnace, running hot and cold water, modern sanitation, electric appliances ranging from toasters to washing machines, telephone, refrigeration, green vegetables and fresh fruit all the year round, greater variety of clothing, silk hose and underwear, commercial pressing and cleaning of clothes, commercial laundering or use of expensive electrical equipment in the home, cosmetics, manicuring, and commercial hair-dressing.

IN SPENDING LEISURE TIME movies (attendance far more frequent than at earlier occasional "shows"), automobile (gas, tires, depreciation, cost of trips), phonograph, radio, more elaborate children's playthings, more club dues for more members of the family, Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., more formal dances and banquets, including a highly competitive series of "smartly appointed affairs" by high school clubs; cigarette smoking and expensive cigars.

IN EDUCATION high school and college (involving longer dependence of children), many new incidental costs such as entrance to constant school athletic contests.

In the face of these rapidly multiplying accessories to living, the "social problem" of "the high cost of living" is apparently envisaged by most people in Middletown as soluble if they can only inch themselves up a notch higher in the amount of money received for their work. Under these circumstances, why shouldn't money be important to people in Middletown? "The Bible never spoke a truer word," says the local paper in an editorial headed "Your Bank Account Your Best Friend," "than when it said: 'But money answereth all things.' . . . If it doesn't answer all things, it at least answers more than 50 per cent. of them." And again, "Of our happy position in world affairs there need be no . . . further proof than the stability of our money system." One leading Middletown business man summed up this trend toward a monetary approach to the satisfactions of life in addressing a local civic club when he said, "Next to the doctor we think of the banker

to help us and to guide us in our wants and worries today."

Money being, then, so crucial, how much money do Middletown people actually receive? The minimum cost of living for a "standard family of five" in Middletown in 1924 was \$1,920.87. A complete distribution of the earnings of Middletown is not available. Twelve to 15 per cent. of those getting the city's living reported a large enough income for 1923 to make the filing of a Federal income tax return necessary. Of the 16,000-17,000 people gainfully employed in 1923—including, however, somewhere in the neighborhood of a thousand married women, some of whom undoubtedly made joint returns with their husbands—210 reported net incomes (i.e., minus interest, contributions, etc.) of \$5,000 or over, 999 more net incomes less than \$5,000 but large enough to be taxable after subtracting allowed exemptions (\$1,000 if single, \$2,500 if married, and \$400 per dependent), while 1,036 more filed returns but were not taxable after subtracting allowed deductions and exemptions. The other 85-88 per cent. of those earning the city's living presumably received either less than \$1,000 if single or less than \$2,000 if married, or failed to make income tax returns. . . .

Thus this crucial activity of spending one's best energies year in and year out in doing things remote from the immediate concerns of living eventuates apparently in the ability to buy somewhat more than formerly, but both business men and working men seem to be running for dear life in this business of making the money they earn keep pace with the even more rapid growth of their subjective wants. A Rip Van Winkle who fell asleep in the Middletown of 1885 to awake today would marvel at the change as did the French economist Say when he revisited England at the close of the Napoleonic Wars; every one seemed to run intent upon his own business as though fearing to stop lest those behind trample him down. In the quiet county-seat of the middle eighties men lived relatively close to the earth and its products. In less than four decades, business class and working class, bosses and bossed, have been caught up by Industry, this new trait in the city's culture that is shaping the pattern of the whole of living. According to its needs, large numbers of people anxious to get their living are periodically stopped by the recurrent phenomenon of "bad times" when the machines stop running, workers are "laid off" by the hundreds, salesmen sell less, bankers call in loans, "credit freezes," and many Middletown families may take their children from school, move into cheaper homes, cut down on food, and do without many of the countless things they desire.

The working class is mystified by the whole fateful business. Many of them say, for instance, that they went to the polls and voted for Coolidge in November, 1924, after being assured daily by the local papers that "A vote for Coolidge is a

vote for prosperity and your job"; puzzled as to why "times" did not improve after the overwhelming victory of Coolidge, a number of them asked the interviewers if the latter thought times would be better "after the first of the year"; the first of the year having come and gone, their question was changed to "Will business pick up in the spring?"

The attitude of the business men, as fairly reflected by the editorial pages of the press which today echo the sentiments heard at Rotary and the Chamber of Commerce, is more confident but confusing. Within a year the leading paper offered the following prescriptions for local prosperity: "The first duty of a citizen is to produce"; and later, "The American citizen's first importance to his country is no longer that of citizen but that of consumer. Consumption is a new necessity." "The way to make business boom is to buy." At the same time that the citizen is told to "consume" he is told, "Better start saving late than never. If you haven't opened your weekly savings account with some local bank, trust company, or building and loan, today's the day." Still within the same year the people of Middletown are told: "The only true prosperity is that for which can be assigned natural reasons such as good crops, a demand for building materials, . . . increased need for transportation," and ". . . advancing prices are due to natural causes which are always responsible for prices. . . . As all wealth comes from the soil, so does all prosperity, which is only another way of saying so does all business." But again, "natural causes" are apparently not the chief essential: "There can be no greater single contribution to the welfare of the nation than the spirit of hopefulness. . . . [This] will be a banner year because the people believe it will be, which amounts to the determination that it shall be. . . ." Still another solution for securing "good times" appears: "The most prosperous town is that in which the citizens are bound most closely together. . . . Loyalty to the home town . . . is intensely practical. . . . The thing we must get into our heads about this out-of-town buying business is that it hurts the individual who does it and his friends who live here. Spending your money at home in the long run amounts practically to spending it upon yourself, and buying away from home means buying the comforts and luxuries for the other fellow." "A dollar that is spent out of town never returns." One looking on at this procedure may begin to wonder if the business men, too, are not somewhat bewildered.

Although neither business men nor working men like the recurring "hard times," members of both groups urge the maintenance of the present industrial system. The former laud the group leaders who urge "normalcy" and "more business in government and less government in business," while the following sentences from an address by a leading worker, the president of the Trades Council, during the 1924 political campaign, sets forth the same faith in "free competition" on the

part of the working class: "The important issue is the economic issue. We can all unite on that. We want a return to active free competition, so that prices will be lower and a man can buy enough for himself and his family with the money he makes." Both groups, as they order a lay-off, cut wages to meet outside competition, or, on the other hand, vote for La Follette in the hope of his being able to "do something to help the working man," appear to be fumbling earnestly to make their appropriate moves in the situation according to the rules of the game as far as they see them; but both appear to be bound on the wheel of this modern game of corner-clipping production. The puzzled observer may wonder how far any of them realizes the relation of his particular move to the whole function of getting a living. . . .

INVENTIONS RE-MAKING LEISURE

Although lectures, reading, music, and art are strongly entrenched in Middletown's traditions, it is none of these that would first attract the attention of a newcomer watching Middletown at play.

"Why on earth do you need to study what's changing this country?" said a lifelong resident and shrewd observer of the Middle West. "I can tell you what's happening in just four letters: A-U-T-O!"

In 1890 the possession of a pony was the wildest flight of a Middletown boy's dreams. In 1924 a Bible class teacher in a Middletown school concluded her teaching of the Creation: "And now, children, is there any of these animals that God created that man could have got along without?" One after another of the animals from goat to mosquito was mentioned and for some reason rejected; finally, "The horse!" said one boy triumphantly, and the rest of the class agreed. Ten or twelve years ago a new horse fountain was installed at the corner of the Courthouse square; now it remains dry during most of the blazing heat of a Mid-Western summer, and no one cares. The "horse culture" of Middletown has almost disappeared. . . .

The first real automobile appeared in Middletown in 1900. About 1906 it was estimated that "there are probably 200 in the city and county." At the close of 1923 there were 6,221 passenger cars in the city, one for every 6.1 persons, or roughly two for every three families. Of these 6,221 cars, 41 per cent. were Fords; 54 per cent. of the total were cars of models of 1920 or later, and 17 per cent. models earlier than 1917. These cars average a bit over 5,000 miles a year. For some of the workers and some of the business class, use of the automobile is a seasonal matter, but the increase in surfaced roads and in closed cars is rapidly making the car a year-round tool for leisure-time as well as getting-a-living activities. As, at the turn of the century, business class people began to feel apologetic if they did not have a telephone, so ownership of an automobile

has now reached the point of being an accepted essential of normal living.

Into the equilibrium of habits which constitutes for each individual some integration in living has come this new habit, upsetting old adjustments, and blasting its way through such accustomed and unquestioned dicta as "Rain or shine, I never miss a Sunday morning at church"; "A high school boy does not need much spending money"; "I don't need exercise, walking to the office keeps me fit"; "I wouldn't think of moving out of town and being so far from my friends"; "Parents ought always to know where their children are." The newcomer is most quickly and amicably incorporated into those regions of behavior in which men are engaged in doing impersonal, matter-of-fact things; much more contested is its advent where emotionally charged sanctions and taboos are concerned. No one questions the use of the auto for transporting groceries, getting to one's place of work or to the golf course, or in place of the porch for "cooling off after supper" on a hot summer evening; however much the activities concerned with getting a living may be altered by the fact that a factory can draw from workmen within a radius of forty-five miles, or however much old labor union men resent the intrusion of this new, alternate way of spending an evening, these things are hardly major issues. But when auto riding tends to replace the traditional call in the family parlor as a way of approach between the unmarried, "the home is endangered," and all-day Sunday motor trips are a "threat against the church"; it is in the activities concerned with the home and religion that the automobile occasions the greatest emotional conflicts. . . .

Today a few plants close for one or two weeks each summer, allowing their workers an annual "vacation" without pay. Others do not close down, but workers "can usually take not over two weeks off without pay and have their jobs back when they return." Foremen in many plants get one or two weeks with pay. Of the 122 working class families giving information on this point, five families took one week off in 1923 and again in 1924, seven others took something over a week in each year, twelve took a week or more in only one of the two years. No others had as extensive vacations as these twenty-four, although other entire families took less than a week in one or both years, and in other cases some members of the families took vacations of varying lengths. Of the 100 families for whom income distribution was secured, thirty-four reported money spent on vacations; the amounts ranged from \$1.49 to \$175.00, averaging \$24.12.

But even short trips are still beyond the horizon of many workers' families, as such comments as the following show: "We haven't had a vacation in five years. He got a day off to paint the house, and another year they gave him two days to get the deed to the house signed." "Never had a vacation in my life, honey!" "Can't

afford one this year because we're repairing the house." "I don't know what a vacation is—I haven't had one for so long." "We like to get out in the car each week for half a day but can't afford a longer vacation."

But the automobile is extending the radius of those who are allowed vacations with pay and is putting short trips within the reach of some for whom such vacations are still "not in the dictionary." "The only vacation we've had in twenty years was three days we took off last year to go to Benton Harbor with my brother-in-law," said one woman, proudly recounting her trip. "We had two Fords. The women slept in the cars, the men on boards between the two running boards. Here's a picture of the two cars, taken just as the sun was coming up. See the shadows? And there's a hill back of them."

Like the automobile, the motion picture is more to Middletown than simply a new way of doing an old thing; it has added new dimensions to the city's leisure. To be sure, the spectacle-watching habit was strong upon Middletown in the nineties. Whenever they had a chance people turned out to a "show," but chances were relatively fewer. Fourteen times during January, 1890, for instance, the Opera House was opened for performances ranging from *Uncle Tom's Cabin* to *The Black Crook*, before the paper announced that "there will not be any more attractions at the Opera House for nearly two weeks." In July there were no "attractions"; a half dozen were scattered through August and September; there were twelve in October.

Today nine motion picture theaters operate from 1 to 11 p.m. seven days a week summer and winter; four of the nine give three different programs a week, the other five having two a week; thus twenty-two different programs with a total of over 300 performances are available to Middletown every week in the year. In addition, during January, 1923, there were three plays in Middletown and four motion pictures in other places than the regular theaters, in July three plays and one additional movie, in October two plays and one movie. . . .

The program of the five cheaper houses is usually a "Wild West" feature, and a comedy; of the four better houses, one feature film, usually a "society" film but frequently Wild West or comedy, one short comedy, or if the feature is a comedy, an educational film (e.g., *Laying an Ocean Cable* or *Making a Telephone*), and a news film. In general, people do not go to the movies to be instructed; the Yale Press series of historical films, as noted earlier, were a flat failure and the local exhibitor discontinued them after the second picture. As in the case of the books it reads, comedy, heart interest, and adventure compose the great bulk of what Middletown enjoys in the movies. Its heroes, according to the manager of the leading theater, are, in the order named, Harold Lloyd, comedian; Gloria Swanson, heroine in modern society films; Thomas

Meighan, hero in modern society films; Colleen Moore, ingénue; Douglas Fairbanks, comedian and adventurer; Mary Pickford, ingénue; and Norma Talmadge, heroine in modern society films. Harold Lloyd comedies draw the largest crowds. "Middletown is amusement hungry," says the opening sentence in a local editorial; at the comedies Middletown lives for an hour in a happy sophisticated make-believe world that leaves it, according to the advertisement of one film, "happily convinced that Life is very well worth living."

Next largest are the crowds which come to see the sensational society films. The kind of vicarious living brought to Middletown by these films may be inferred from such titles as: "*Alimony*—brilliant men, beautiful jazz babies, champagne baths, midnight revels, petting parties in the purple dawn, all ending in one terrific smashing climax that makes you gasp!"; "*Married Flirts—Husbands*: Do you flirt? Does your wife always know where you are? Are you faithful to your vows? *Wives*: What's your hubby doing? Do you know? Do you worry? Watch out for *Married Flirts*." So fast do these flow across the silver screen that, e.g., at one time *The Daring Years*, *Sinners in Silk*, *Women Who Give*, and *The Price She Paid* were all running synchronously, and at another "*Name the Man*—a story of betrayed womanhood," *Rouged Lips*, and *The Queen of Sin*. While Western "action" films and a million-dollar spectacle like *The Covered Wagon* or *The Hunchback of Notre Dame* draw heavy houses, and while managers lament that there are too few of the popular comedy films, it is the film with burning "heart interest," that packs Middletown's motion picture houses week after week. Young Middletown enters eagerly into the vivid experience of *Flaming Youth*: "neckers, petters, white kisses, red kisses, pleasure-mad daughters, sensation-craving mothers, by an author who didn't dare sign his name; the truth bold, naked, sensational"—so ran the press advertisement—under the spell of the powerful conditioning medium of pictures presented with music and all possible heightening of the emotional content, and the added factor of sharing this experience with a "date" in a darkened room. Meanwhile, *Down to the Sea in Ships*, a costly spectacle of whaling adventure, failed at the leading theater "because," the exhibitor explained, "the whale is really the hero in the film and there wasn't enough 'heart interest' for the women."

Over against these spectacles which Middletown watches today stand the pale "sensations" of the nineties, when *Sappho* was the apogee of daring at the Opera House: "*The Telephone Girl*—Hurricane hits, breezy dialogue, gorgeous stage setting, dazzling dancing, spirited repartee, superb music, opulent costumes," *Over the Garden Wall*, *Edith's Burglar*, *East Lynne*, *La Bella Maria*, or *Women's Revenge*, *The Convict's Daughter*, *Joe, a Mountain Fairy*, *The Vagabond Heroine*, *Guilty Without Crime*, *The World Against Her* (which the baker pronounced in his diary, "good, but too solemn"), *Love Will Find a Way*, *Si Plankard*.

These, it must be recalled, were the great days when *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, with "fifty men, women, and children, a pack of genuine bloodhounds, grandest street parade ever given, and two bands," packed the Opera House to capacity.

Actual changes of habits resulting from the week-after-week witnessing of these films can only be inferred. Young Middletown is finding discussion of problems of mating in this new agency that boasts in large illustrated advertisements, "Girls! You will learn how to handle 'em!" and "Is it true that marriage kills love? If you want to know what love really means, its exquisite torture, its overwhelming raptures, see ———." "Sheiks and their 'shebas,'" according to the press account of the Sunday opening of one film, "... sat without a movement or a whisper through the presentation. . . . It was a real exhibition of love-making and the youths and maidens of [Middletown] who thought that they knew something about the art found that they still had a great deal to learn." Some high school teachers are convinced that the movies are a powerful factor in bringing about the "early sophistication" of the young and the relaxing of social taboos. One working class mother frankly welcomes the movies as an aid in childrearing, saying, "I sent my daughter because a girl has to learn the ways of the world somehow and the movies are a good safe way." The judge of the juvenile court lists the movies as one of the "big four" causes of local juvenile delinquency, believing that the disregard of group mores by the young is definitely related to the witnessing week after week of fictitious behavior sequences that habitually link the taking of long chances and the happy ending. While the community attempts to safeguard its schools from commercially intent private hands, this powerful new educational instrument, which has taken Middletown unawares, remains in the hands of a group of men—an ex-peanut-stand proprietor, an ex-bicycle racer and race promoter, and so on—whose primary concern is making money. . . .

Though less widely diffused as yet than automobile owning or movie attendance, the radio nevertheless is rapidly crowding its way in among the necessities in the family standard of living. Not the least remarkable feature of this new invention is its accessibility. Here skill and ingenuity can in part offset money as an open sesame to swift sharing of the enjoyments of the wealthy. With but little equipment one can call the life of the rest of the world from the air, and this equipment can be purchased piecemeal at the ten-cent store. Far from being simply one more means of passive enjoyment, the radio has given rise to much ingenious manipulative activity. In a count of representative sections of Middletown, it was found that, of 303 homes in twenty-eight blocks in the "best section" of town, inhabited almost entirely by the business class, 12 per cent. had radios; of 518 workers' homes in sixty-four blocks, 6 per cent. had radios.

As this new tool is rolling back the horizons of Middletown for the bank clerk or the mechanic

sitting at home and listening to a Philharmonic concert or a sermon by Dr. Fosdick, or to President Coolidge bidding his father good night on the eve of election, and as it is wedging its way with the movie, the automobile, and other new tools into the twisted mass of habits that are living for the 38,000 people of Middletown, readjustments necessarily occur. Such comments as the following suggest their nature:

"I use time evenings listening in that I used to spend in reading."

"The radio is hurting movie going, especially Sunday evening." (From a leading movie exhibitor.)

"I don't use my car so much any more. The heavy traffic makes it less fun. But I spend seven nights a week on my radio. We hear fine music from Boston." (From a shabby man of fifty.)

"Sundays I take the boy to Sunday School and come straight home and tune in. I get first an eastern service, then a Cincinnati one. Then there's nothing doing till about two-thirty, when I pick up an eastern service again and follow 'em across the country till I wind up with California about ten-thirty. Last night I heard a ripping sermon from Westminster Church somewhere in California. We've no preachers here that can compare with any of them."

"One of the bad features of radio," according to a teacher, "is that children stay up late at night and are not fit for school next day."

"We've spent close on to \$100 on our radio, and we built it ourselves at that," commented one of the worker's wives. "Where'd we get the money? Oh, out of our savings, like everybody else."

In the flux of competing habits that are oscillating the members of the family now towards and now away from the home, radio occupies an inter-

mediate position. Twenty-five per cent. of 337 high school boys and 22 per cent. of 423 high school girls said that they listen more often to the radio with their parents than without them, and, as pointed out above, 20 per cent. of 274 boys in the three upper years of the high school answered "radio" to the question, "In what thing that you are doing at home this fall are you most interested?"—more than gave any other answer. More than one mother said that her family used to scatter in the evening—"but now we all sit around and listen to the radio."

Likewise the place of the radio in relation to Middletown's other leisure habits is not wholly clear. As it becomes more perfected, cheaper, and a more accepted part of life, it may cease to call forth so much active, constructive ingenuity and become one more form of passive enjoyment. Doubtless it will continue to play a mighty rôle in lifting Middletown out of the humdrum of every day; it is beginning to take over that function of the great political rallies or the trips by the trainload to the state capital to hear a noted speaker or to see a monument dedicated that a generation ago helped to set the average man in a wide place. But it seems not unlikely that, while furnishing a new means of diversified enjoyment, it will at the same time operate, with national advertising, syndicated newspapers, and other means of large-scale diffusion, as yet another means of standardizing many of Middletown's habits. Indeed, at no point is one brought up more sharply against the impossibility of studying Middletown as a self-contained, self-starting community than when one watches these space-binding leisure-time inventions imported from without—automobile, motion picture, and radio—reshaping the city.

The America of the twenties that is nostalgically remembered a generation later is less that of conventional, quiet Middletown than of the rambunctious, irreverent *American Mercury*. Its tart, iconoclastic editor, Henry L. Mencken, abetted by his co-editor, the critic George Jean Nathan, viewed the American scene with astringent wit that made mockery of the generally accepted conventions. In volume one, number one of the *American Mercury*, the editors set forth their policies and their prejudices.

H. L. MENCKEN AND G. J. NATHAN: THE AIM OF THE AMERICAN MERCURY*

The aim of THE AMERICAN MERCURY is precisely that of every other monthly review the world has ever seen: to ascertain and tell the

* Reprinted from H. L. Mencken and G. J. Nathan, "The Aim of the *American Mercury*," *American Mercury*, I (1924), 27-30 by permission.

truth. So far, nothing new. But the Editors cherish the hope that it may be possible, after all, to introduce some element of novelty into the execution of an enterprise so old, and upon that hope they found the magazine. It comes into being with at least one advantage over all its predecessors in the field of public affairs: it is entirely devoid of messianic passion. The Editors have heard no

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**"AND THE STRIFE NEVER ENDS":
INDIAN-WHITE HOSTILITY AS SEEN BY
EUROPEAN TRAVELERS IN AMERICA, 1800-1860**

by

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ABSTRACT

Numerous European travelers to America from 1800-1860 observed and discussed the conflicts between Indians and whites in the United States. Generally they wrote about the causes of these conflicts within the context of life in America. Some displayed sympathy for the Indians, others saw him as a hopeless savage, and nearly all predicted his rapid disappearance.

Histories of Indian-white contact in North America are often concerned with the bloody conflicts arising from the confrontation of the two races. Certainly in the colonial period the necessity of achieving a foothold and later maintaining control over the eastern section of America occasioned frequent warfare as the Indian was forced toward the interior of the continent. After the United States had severed itself from the British Empire, Indian troubles continued as Americans pushed their way west.

These Indian wars may have had long-range beneficial effects for white Americans. Rightly or wrongly, they opened the way for American expansion; the United States Army, stationed on the American frontier to preserve peace with the Indians and to protect frontier settlements, served as an agent of empire in pushing back the frontier; and Frederick Jackson Turner has written that the "Indian frontier" was both a military training school and a consolidating agent among frontiersmen who were forced to cooperate to resist a common enemy (1894:210-11).

Numerous accounts of the Indian wars are available for study: there are personal reminiscences of military and political figures, as well as literate frontiersmen; newspaper accounts; and government records. These have all been used to piece together the events and individuals involved in conflicts between Americans and Indians.

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There is, however, another type of source for the study of Indian-white confrontation which has not been widely considered. Throughout America's history European travelers have visited the United States and recorded their observations of the New World. A significant portion of their journals, diaries, and letters were devoted to discussions of the American Indian – Indian cultures, art, history, and, perhaps most important of all, the relations between the Indian tribes and the United States government. Certainly the color and excitement of Indian-American conflicts would not miss their attention.

This study is concerned with the views of Europeans who visited America between 1800 and 1860. There are a number of reasons why this time period has been preferred. First, this period saw a general influx of visitors from all over Europe who wished to observe the inner workings of America. The young republic was a showpiece to the world, and all elements of European society were drawn to visit and record what they observed. Following 1860, with the advent of the American Civil War, Europeans became more interested in the forces within American society which had caused that conflict.

A second reason for the choice of the 1800-1860 period has to do with federal Indian policy and the Indian wars themselves. European colonial powers had coped with the Indian problem and had fought Indians; these colonists, however, did not have a well-defined, coordinated Indian policy. By 1800 the federal government had developed a definite Indian policy to deal with the tribes living within the confines and on the borders of the United States. It was a problem of internal administration, a problem which grew larger as the United States acquired new territories. From the standpoint of the United States government, therefore, Indian hostilities between 1800 and 1860 can be considered two types of conflict. First, and perhaps foremost, they removed an obstacle and possible danger to frontier settlement. Secondly, they served as a test of the government's efficiency in quelling internal disturbances, a test which Europeans observed curiously and eagerly.

While Americans were winning a continent, they pushed the Indians out of their path: from the Southeast and Midwest; from California, the Oregon Territory, and the Southwest; and when they encountered the Indians of the plains. Whenever conflicts arose, Europeans on the scene – or more often those who read of these confrontations in the national press, noted their opinions on the causes of such warfare, the bravery and treachery of both combatants, and speculated on the future of both Americans and Indians in the wake of such bloody contests.

But these aspects of Indian-white confrontations are not the most significant elements of Europeans' observations. Primarily, European accounts provide an additional perspective to the study of Indian-white

antagonism. At a period when Americans considered Indian warfare either an imminent danger or a spectacular nuisance, Europeans went beyond a mere reporting of military campaigns. Their opinions on the apparent inherent enmity between the Indians and the Americans – enmity that was the cause of the military engagements between the two races – are speculations on the future of both Indian and American societies, and are therefore more noteworthy than mere descriptions of the battles that raged on the frontier.

Europeans often echoed the common belief that the Indians' inherent savagery caused the deep hatred which Americans felt toward the Indians, and was the cause of much of the warfare between the two races. Thomas Nuttall, an Englishman traveling through the Southeast in 1819, wrote that the American Indian, "a stranger to our ideas of honour . . . destroys his enemies by the meanest stratagems, and levels, in his revenge, all distinctions of age and sex" (1905:245-46). Another Englishman, Charles J. Latrobe, traveling west of St. Louis between 1832 and 1833, agreed; the ruthless manner of Indian warfare demanded that "from whatever side the first provocation may have come, they [the Indians] must be put down" (1835:II:259).

Not all Europeans, however, were convinced that the Indians were more inherently savage in their conduct than white Americans. Another Englishman, Edward Coke, during a short visit to America in 1832, observed that as the Indians had been "goaded . . . to desperation, it is no wonder that their treatment of the white prisoners who fall into their hands should be barbarous" (1833:256). And in answer to those who wrote that the ruthless warfare of the Indians should be met with complete suppression, Balduin Möllhausen, German naturalist and topographer on the 1853 Pacific Railroad Survey, wrote that the Indians' form of warfare could not be judged on European standards: "Those who punish savages according to the laws of civilization have no claim to be ranked among the civilized" (1858:I:241).

Inherent savagery in warfare, on the part of either Indians or Americans, was only a minor part of European views on Indian-white relations. A much more important aspect was the continuous hostility evinced by the Indians toward the whites. Europeans, observing this hostility in all parts of the United States, discussed its causes at great length, especially as many of these travelers found themselves in danger from hostile tribes. Francois André Michaux, a Frenchman traveling through Cherokee territory in 1802, wrote that while relations between that tribe and the Americans seemed harmonious, it was "always more prudent to travel five or six in a party," as the Indians could be expected to show hostile intentions at any moment (1904:261). And Prince Maximilian of Wied-Neuwied, on an expedition into the western territories of the United States between 1832 and 1834, noted that the Arikara and Blackfeet were both known to be extremely

inimical to Americans who traveled in their country, and kept up a constant attack upon white hunters; as a naturalist, Prince Maximilian was disappointed at this situation because "if you happen to meet with them you must fight them, and, therefore, cannot become well acquainted with them" (1906:XXII:335-36, XXIII:96, 224).

Missionaries to various Indian tribes also discussed the Indians' animosity toward Americans. The French Abbé Emmanuel Domenech noted in the late 1850's that the United States government found it difficult to exercise control over hostile Apaches in the Southwest (1860:II:4), and the Belgian-born Jesuit, Pierre-Jean DeSmet, reported that following the Oregon war of 1858 he was forced to go among the tribes to ease their constant prejudices in order to avert the possibility of renewed warfare (Chittenden & Richardson 1905:II:743).

Europeans found, however, that the Indian tribes had good reason for their hostility toward the United States government and American settlers. Unrestricted white encroachment on Indian lands, unjust treatment of the Indians by government and military officials, and a number of other provocations were so obvious that Europeans generally agreed that the Indians were least to blame in most of their conflicts with the Americans.

As early as 1802, Francois Michaux wrote that the "illiberal proceedings" of white frontiersmen in Tennessee frequently caused the Cherokee living in the area to go to war. The frontier settlers deliberately incited these conflicts to gain the Indians' possessions, and they were frequently successful, as the Indians generally fell the victims in the conflict (1904:192, 262).

Almost twenty years later an Englishman, Henry Fearon, noted in reference to the Creek War that continued encroachments onto Indian territory produced conflicts which were nothing but "disguised aggressions, and aggravating insults on the part of the People of the United States" (1818:379). Thomas Nuttall, further west in the territory of the Osage, noted that although this tribe was hostile to American hunters and trappers, these Americans "have surely no just reason to expect from the Indians an unstipulated licence to rob their country" (1905:238).

Comments of European travelers continued in the same vein in the 1830's. Even Charles Latrobe, who thought the ruthless barbarity of the Indians must be met with like measures on the part of the whites, admitted that in Indian-white conflicts "the first aggression is generally on the side of the whites" (1835:II:259). And the English novelist Frederick Marryat, visiting Fort Snelling in 1837, commented that the Sioux were inimical to the Americans, although "not without just grounds" (1839-40:I:157). But it was perhaps John Bemrose, an Englishman who served with the United States Army during part of the Second Seminole War, who stated this opinion best, as he wrote in his journal what he considered to be the causes of the war:

My reader will be ready to ask why all this strife and bloodshed between the mercenaries of a great nation and one small tribe of Indians located in a wilderness so inaccessible to white men. All I can answer is that it is the natural heart of [the] white man filled with sin and craving for more than is good for him. The government of the United States is not so much to blame as at first sight appears, but the citizens and squatters are generally the fist intermeddlers and it is they which incite the government to take the matter in hand (1966:53).

In discussing the Oregon war of 1858, during which he had been a chaplain with the United States Army, Father DeSmet numbered the encroachments of whites onto Indian lands among the causes of the war. Not only actual invasion of Indian territory had been involved, but false reports had been circulated among the tribes that settlers would steal their possessions. The Jesuit added that "a good many Americans looked on war as a good thing for the country, and a means to make money plentiful" (Chittenden & Richardson 1905:II:730-731, 748, 749, IV:1277). And Ivan Golovin, a Russian traveler in America between 1855 and 1856, remarked that wars were often provoked with the tribes merely "to afford a chance of distinction and promotion to the young officers of the army" (1856:62-63, 66-67). But the most vehement in his denunciations of the provocations which caused the Indian wars was the German naturalist Balduin Möllhausen, who noted: "The native, who seeing himself trampled upon, revolts against the white race, is then at once treated like a noxious animal, and the strife never ends till the last free inhabitant of the wilderness has fallen" (1858:II:248-49).

Along with American encroachments on Indian lands, Europeans included the treachery of the whites as one of the greatest causes of hostility. In 1823 Adam Hodgson philosophically "reflected on the miseries which we have at different periods introduced into the very centre of America and Africa, by exciting the Indian warrior and Negro king to precipitate their nations into the horrors of war" (1823:146). Charles Henry Wilson similarly lamented that "if the Christian despoilers cannot betray and juggle their [the Indians'] ignorance and innocence by *toys*, or prematurely dispatch them by the deleterious poison of unwholesome ardent spirits – insult and injury provoke revenge; that object being promoted and attained, sanctions the *bayonet*" (1822:80).

Few Europeans mentioned the fact that some of their own governments often aided in promoting hostilities between the Indian tribes and the Americans. During his visit to the United States in 1823 the Italian, Giacomo Beltrami, wrote of the Creek, who had been aided by the Spanish in the War of 1812, and commented: "They are now almost entirely destroyed – the natural fate of those who suffer themselves, like despicable satellites, to be basely worked upon by venality and intrigues" (1828:II:534-35).

Frederick Marryat noted that the tribes which were hostile to the United States government had no real opportunity to exact their revenge "unless America is plunged into war with France or this country [Great Britain], and then I am pretty confident that there will be a general rising of the Indians; when . . . they will give the Americans more occupation than will be agreeable." Marryat does not seem to have been averse to promoting this possibility himself. Visiting the Sioux at Fort Snelling, he addressed a number of the tribe's leaders: "We have buried the hatchet now; but should the tomahawk be raised again between the Americans and the English, you must not take part with the Americans" (1839-40:I:157, II:277).

The encroachment upon Indian land and the treachery that often accompanied it were certainly evident to Europeans who observed Indian hostility during their travels through America. When these activities of frontier settlers led the government to adopt a well-formulated policy to remove the tribes from their original homes to territory in the interior of America, Europeans noted the increasing hostility of the Indians and the dangers removal posed for both white settlers and the Indians themselves.

Europeans felt the concentration of Indian tribes on the borders of the United States was a serious mistake on the part of the American government's removal policy, as these tribes would be a serious threat to frontier settlements. As early as 1819 Thomas Nuttall had predicted the danger these tribes would constitute, and suggested that a more prudent policy would have been to leave the Indians in their original territories, surrounded by white communities which would have prevented them from committing depredations and forced them to adopt civilized habits (1905:222). By the late 1850's Abbé Domenech was writing that removed tribes would "roam about the prairies in immense bands, revenging themselves on the whites for having caused their forced exile, and living by murder, rapine, and pillage" (1860:I:295).

Two of the most outspoken Europeans on the Indian menace to frontier settlements resulting from removal were the French refugee from the Napoleonic wars, Achille Murat, and the English novelist Frederick Marryat. Murat, writing in 1832, felt that the Indians, if they united, could easily rush upon American settlements before a large force of United States troops gathered to stop them; a well-conducted Indian attack might possibly force its way as far east as Washington (1833:294). Only the lack of unity, and ignorance of their own strength restrained the Indians from such an attack, but Murat felt that once the more civilized tribes of the Southeast were removed they would inform their western compatriots of the power they possessed; then, led by an enterprising leader – such as Murat saw in the Cherokee, John Ross – "you will soon see new swarms of Huns, guided by another Attila, come thundering over western civilization." This force of

Indians would be strong enough to oblige the United States government to raise large armies, and would "retard the progress of civilization towards the west, cover its frontier with pillage, conflagration, and massacre, and only terminate in the extermination of one of the two races" (1833:296).

Frederick Marryat, although writing that the government "could not well have acted otherwise," thought it an oversight to place such a great number of tribes on the western frontier, as the threat of starvation might force the Indians to unify and "sweep away the whole white population west of the Mississippi." Of course, Marryat was also aware that this could occur only if the Indians could unite effectively and if they found efficient leadership. Yet Marryat came to the conclusion, as Murat had, that the Cherokee, whose removal was "the most hazardous part of their [the government's] proceeding, as they are a very superior people," might provide the formidable leadership that an Indian alliance would require. Marryat recognized as an additional danger the fact that the Indians relocated on the western prairies "have become Horse Indians . . . and they have a vast country behind them to retreat to in case of necessity." Marryat went further than other Europeans, however, in speculating on another possibility which would strengthen the tribes in their struggle against the Americans: "The greatest misfortune which could happen to the United States would be a union . . . of the negroes with the Indian tribes. If this were to take place, the [Indian] population would . . . rapidly increase, instead of falling away as it now does; as then the negro population would till the ground sufficiently for the support of themselves and the Indians," leaving bands of Indians along the frontier free to attack white settlements (1839-40:II:277, 286).

It was for these reasons that Marryat, always one to predict dire consequences resulting from the government's inability to formulate a rational policy toward the Indians, noted that "the Florida war ought to be a lesson to the Americans, and may, as a precedent to the other Indians, prove of great importance." The western tribes he visited, he continued, "are not ignorant of what is going on" in Florida, "and the moral effect arising from the protracted defence of the Seminole may eventually prove most serious, and be attended with enormous expense to the United States," if those tribes were also to rise up against the government (1839-40:II:283, 286).

While some Europeans considered the possibility of formidable hostility from the Indian tribes removed to the western frontiers of the United States, most observers recognized that this was, at best, remote. They felt that the Indians could never effectively acquire the organization necessary for concerted action. Europeans felt this especially true as it seemed to them that a large part of the United States government's Indian policy was to keep the tribes constantly hostile to each other. The practice of abetting intertribal hostilities would preclude all possibilities of combination.

Between 1817 and 1819 a group of 6,000 Cherokee were induced by the United States government to abandon their eastern land claims and emigrate to lands west of the Mississippi – lands which bordered on territory claimed by the Osage. Thomas Nuttall, traveling in the area, declared this policy of moving one Indian tribe into close association with another both “imprudent and visionary,” as it only led to war between the Cherokee and Osage. The effect on the Osage, the original inhabitants of the territory, was devastating: the Osage “lives in insecurity, and in implacable enmity with those of his own race” (1905:238, 245-46, 279). James Flint, another Englishman in America at the time of this early Cherokee immigration to Osage territory, noted that Osage chiefs in Washington told government agents that they were unwilling to go to war against the encroaching Cherokee, although Flint observed that “a migration [of one tribe onto another’s territory] cannot be tolerated to any great extent, where people depend on hunting and fishing for their subsistence. Hence, the object of Indian [intertribal] warfare has been extirpation” (1904:249).

Commenting on the migration of Indians from the East to the western portions of the United States, the Frenchman Francois de Barbé-Marbois noted that the eastern Indians, although fewer in number, were most often successful in their conflicts with the western tribes, as the Americans frequently “furnish them with arms, and sometimes join with them” (1830:78). Simon Ferrall, and Englishman writing in 1832 of the Cherokee removal into the territory of more warlike tribes, indicated that the tribe would be “regarded as common intruders, and subject to the united attacks of these [western] people.” It seemed to Ferrall that the removal policy was being carried out “to get the Indians to exterminate each other” (1832:265, 267), and the Italian traveler Giacomo Beltrami observed that while during the early European conquest of America it was the policy “to slaughter the savages in a mass . . . it is now sufficient to look on and let them destroy one another” (1828:II:215). Sir Edward Sullivan went further; “the only way the Americans have been able to succeed in Indian warfare hitherto,” he wrote, “has been by fostering the hereditary enmities, and raising the hopes of revenge in one tribe against another.” He described the Black Hawk War of 1831-1832 as the most iniquitous example of this policy:

After the Americans found their dragoons had no chance against Indians . . . and were harassed to death in their attempts to catch them, the whole Sioux nation were let loose upon the Saxons and Foxes, and the whole tribe decimated, the remainder being driven across the Missouri, where they are getting gradually exterminated by the Sioux and Pawnees (1852:113).

According to European observers, the Indians themselves realized the danger in the policy followed by the government, and expressed their fears of

moving to territory already occupied by other tribes. Edouard de Montulé observed that the Seneca he visited in 1816-1817, although encroached upon by American settlers, feared moving west among nations that were “all at war with each other,” as they would be driven out by these contending tribes (1950:161). Thomas Nuttall noted that the Osage were not averse to selling more of their territory to the United States, if the government promised not to settle it with other Indian tribes, whom the Osage “have now much greater reason to fear than the whites” (1905:236). Sir Edward Sullivan wrote that the Cherokee and Choctaw were forced to continue the agricultural life they had learned in the East, as they were prevented from hunting by more powerful tribes (1852:136), while Balduin Möllhausen noted that the Delaware, before they could obtain food and clothing in their western home, “had first to use their weapons in self-defense against powerful enemies” (1858:I:90-91). And Francesco Arese, an Italian traveling in America in 1837, observed that the choice left to the Indians upon their removal was, in effect, a choice “between hunger, violence, the white men, and war – war to the death in case they go forward” (1934:157-58).

Europeans observed America’s solutions to the problem of intertribal warfare or, more often, they proposed solutions of their own. Thomas Nuttall even observed that an Osage chief, in an effort to ameliorate the difficulties between his tribe and the Cherokee, suggested that a boundary be set between the hunting lands of the two tribes “so that either side might be punished, by robbery and plunder (a confiscation as we term it), who should be found transgressing the limits assigned” (1905:246-247). The English feminist and utopian socialist Frances Wright on her first visit to America in 1818, and the Swedish traveler Fredrika Bremer, in 1853, both observed that the United States government attempted to quiet intertribal conflict through treaty negotiations, although Bremer, visiting a conference at Fort Snelling, noted that these councils were not often successful (Wright 1963:108; Bremer 1968:II:19, 34). The Swiss artist and traveler Rudolf Friedrich Kurz, however, suggested a method to induce the Indians to live peacefully with one another:

White men must prove to the savages that by living in harmony with one another they will have a happier life, that they can live in peace and yet never suffer want, never be bored with the dull monotony of their existence; that, on the contrary, they will find better means of winning distinctions by employing themselves in other activities. And, furthermore, white races must stop waging war on their own part (1969:297).

One of the major efforts of the United States government to counter Indian raids, patrol the frontier, make peace between the Indian tribes, and fulfill treaty obligations, involved the establishment of military posts along the Indian frontier (Prucha 1962:60-62). Europeans traveling in the interior

of America invariably stopped at these outposts, and their writings on this subject range from simple descriptions of the posts' structure to lengthy commentaries on their utility and shortcomings.

One of the major purposes these forts were to serve was the protection of white settlements from Indian attack. Giacomo Beltrami noted that the relative peace which fell on the Ohio River country after the War of 1812 was a result of the forts built in the area. Visiting St. Louis, Beltrami wrote that the city was protected from Indian raids both by its large white population and "by several distant forts, built on the principal rivers which flow through their tribes." And he described Fort Snelling as "a very important post; chiefly as a means of preventing the English from gaining any fresh influence over their [the Indians'] commerce or their minds" (1828:II:87-88, 121, 191, 201).

Frontier settlements were not alone in requiring military protection. Europeans also commented that the military posts were erected to protect the Indians from the Americans. Francois Michaux noted in 1802 that a United States military detachment in Tennessee, while commanding the respect of the Indians, was "at the same time to protect them against the inhabitants of the frontiers . . . [who] excite them frequently to war" (1904:282). And Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar Eisenach wrote in 1825-1826 that a company of American troops was stationed at Fort Mitchell in Georgia to protect the Creek from the encroachments of the state (1828:II:26).

Not all Europeans looked favorably upon these military establishments. At Fort Winnebago in 1835, the Englishman George Featherstonhaugh observed that the post and garrison were an unnecessary expense to the government, as only an insignificant Indian population inhabited the area. At Fort Snelling, Featherstonhaugh found that Sioux distrust of the Americans was based on the conduct of the troops, "who often took the canoes of the poor Indians without their consent . . . Indeed, I was sorry to learn from the serjeant that they were not famous for keeping their word with the natives at all" (1847:I:192, 254).

More often, Europeans criticized the posts for their inability to protect the frontier settlers. Thomas Nuttall wrote that it did not seem, from the continued depredations of the Osage and Cherokee on the frontier, "that the expensive forts, now [1819] established and still extending, possess any beneficial influence over the savages." He felt the Indians should be given just compensation for wrongs committed by the settlers, "but could not even this be better executed by the governor and the militia of the territory, than by the arbitrary commander and the soldiers of a garrison" (1905:222, 254)? And twenty years later Frederick Marryat wrote that despite the plans put forward by military officials to curtail the hostile tribes, "the present regular Army of the United States [stationed on the frontier] will not be sufficient for the purpose" (1839-40:II:277-78).

Surprisingly, Europeans devoted comparatively little space to the discussion of the strategies used in Indian warfare. Some noted the supposed savagery of the Indians in their "cruel pilfering and castigation" (Nuttall 1905:254). Others were more lenient in their appraisal of Indian ability, although usually limiting themselves to the amount of damage the tribes could inflict (Beltrami 1828:II:191; Sullivan 1852:112-13; Chittenden & Richardson 1905:II:731), or the difficulty of reaching the Indians on their home territory (Möllhausen 1858:I:219; Marryat 1839-40:II:277; Chittenden & Richardson 1905:I:208-9).

Comments on the ability of the Americans in their struggles with the Indians were somewhat different. The German traveler Francis Grund considered the Indians too "unskilled in military tactics and not sufficiently strong, on any point" to occasion any serious difficulty; Indian wars – really only a "succession of skirmishes" – occurred merely because Indian raids were "deemed too insignificant to warrant a general armament on the part of the United States" (1968:227-28). Another German traveler, Friedrich von Raumer, remarked that the removal of the tribes, instead of causing hostility on the frontier, would assure that the Indians "would be more easily and speedily overcome than before [in the East], when they were scattered about and more difficult to find" (1846:367).

Europeans considered one factor favorable for American retaliation to Indian hostilities – the apparent fear the Indians had for the power of the United States government. Thomas Nuttall wrote that "the power and wealth of the whites . . . had a salutary tendency to restrain their [Osage] pretensions" (1905:238), and William Faux, another Englishman, recorded the observations of a Cherokee Indian who had visited eastern cities:

"Oh," said he, on his return, "we must not war; I have seen more white men in one town than would be sufficient to eat all the Indians, if made into a pie." They have never since thought of war, but what few remain, are friendly and civilized, and fight for *Uncle Sam* (1905:XI:247).

Fear, however, was not only exhibited by the Indians. Charles Latrobe, writing of the Black Hawk War, noted that the "cruelty of many of the militia towards the poor Indians when once in their power, was only to be matched by the fear which they showed at meeting their enemy" (1835:II:258).

While Francis Grund seemed to disregard all contrary evidence in his assertion that while "one nation must perish to make room for another . . . it is the peculiar good fortune of America that she can suffer these revolutions to go on without a feverish excitement of her vitals or hurrying the succession of events by the horror and bloodshed of war" (1968:228), most Europeans came to an overwhelming conclusion as to the eventual outcome of continued hostility between the Americans and the Indians – the complete destruction

of the Indian tribes. Achille Murat noted in 1833 that the pageant of Indian war, followed by treaties and cessions of land, with renewed contact between the races leading to further war, would continue "until the tide of civilization reaches the Pacific Ocean, and the Indian race is extinguished. Nothing can save it" (1833:279-80). Sir Charles Lyell and Thomas Cather both noted that the Seminole War was carried out as a war of extermination (Lyell 1845:I:136; Cather 1955:42-43). And Charles Preuss, German cartographer on Fremont's expeditions, overhearing an American lieutenant boast of fighting the Pawnee, felt he knew the prevailing attitude of Americans toward Indian warfare: "To kill them all — kill, kill, nothing less . . . With a hundred good riflemen he would exterminate all the Indians in the world" (1958:63).

According to European travelers, Indian-white conflicts in America were destined to end in Indian annihilation. Perhaps the animosity Europeans observed between the two peoples could have no other result — Indian retaliations against American outrages seemed nothing more than ineffective, although costly, nuisances, while the Americans waged relentless wars of expulsion and extermination against the tribes.

Europeans based their discussion of the Indian wars on Indian-American enmity because they recognized that this seemingly instinctive, eternal, and bitter antagonism was the cause behind the armed conflicts which intermittently convulsed the frontier. While this hostility often seemed more prominent in the Indians, Europeans generally concluded that American settlers encroaching upon Indian lands caused Indian animosity to flare into war. Government attempts to alleviate the difficulties were ineffectual — half-hearted efforts to protect Indian rights in the face of an expanding American population, and an inability to curb the intertribal conflicts which decimated the native population. Stronger government action, whether Indian removal or the establishment of military posts, usually increased Indian animosity and conditions deteriorated into further warfare.

Europeans, however, were often wrong in their assessments of government attitudes and attempts to end Indian wars. Some Americans did consider white encroachment on Indian lands a major cause of hostility, and attempts were made to regulate the advance of the American frontier, although usually to little avail (Prucha 1962:156). Some American legislators also spoke of the danger to frontier settlements posed by the removal of the tribes, usually in arguments for an increase in the size of the regular army (Prucha 1969:333-34). And few Europeans commented on the policy of the federal government, adopted by 1834, to terminate and prevent intertribal conflicts (Prucha 1962:266-67). Yet these omissions in European travel literature can be accounted for by recognizing that Europeans generally wrote for a specific purpose — to inform their European readers of the reality of American egalitarian life and American republican institutions. It is for this

reason that the causes of the Indian wars, rather than the conflicts themselves, were of major interest to these travelers.

Europeans realized that the causes of Indian wars would have a more enduring effect on, and pose a more enduring problem for, future government Indian policy. If the Indians were to survive, and if America were to comply with its own boasted principles of freedom and human dignity, Europeans felt that the basic inimicability between the Indians and the Americans would have to be broken, perhaps by the "civilization" or gradual assimilation of the Indian tribes, but certainly not by the bullets of the Americans.

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
program, after an interval of some 150 years, somewhat resembled in its methods that of the Jesuits. It was focused again on building a type of community organization, although the values around which the community was to center were those of economic progress and national organization rather than the Kingdom of God.

The Mexican program had thus passed through one phase and entered another by 1960. It had proceeded from forcible imposition of democratic individualism to persuasive presentation of democratic community responsibility through educational techniques. For more than a century not considered a legitimate governmental problem, Indian adjustment had come to be recognized as a special problem calling for special techniques of solution based on the existing forms of Indian culture and social organization.



R-I/8

The Anglo-American Program



WHEN ANGLO-AMERICANS first came in contact with the Indians of New Mexico Territory in the 1840's they had had some two hundred years' experience with Indians. This experience strongly influenced their attitudes and their objectives as they tried to develop working relations with the Pueblos, Navajos, Apaches, Pimans, and Yumans. What had most strongly influenced them was, in the first place, the nature of the Indians with whom they had come into contact heretofore, and, in the second place, the Indian policy which they had inherited from Great Britain. The Indians whom they knew were those of the Great Lakes region, the southeastern United States, and the Great Plains region. They were all Indians who placed very considerable reliance on hunting and gathering of wild foods, although the eastern Indians were also farmers. Nevertheless, their farming was not carried on from permanently established villages with lasting house construction, as among the Pueblos. The Plains Indians had largely abandoned farming for hunting bison and raiding neighboring tribes by the time the Anglos encountered them. A stereotype of Indians as more or less wandering groups addicted to warfare existed in the minds of the Anglos as a result of these contacts and they were inclined to apply it when they came into the Southwest. The completely sedentary Pueblo Indians were something of a surprise to them and they were at first regarded by the Anglos as "civilized" people. The Gila Pimas also struck some Anglos as "the most civilized Indians in the United States." Accordingly, the first attempts to develop working relations were characterized by a distinction between "civilized" and "wild" Indians. The simple classification for all Indians with which the Spaniards had begun, based largely on religious behavior and belief, namely, that of "barbarians," was reserved for those who as time went on vigorously opposed the Anglo invasion, such as the various Apache tribes, the Navajos, and the Yavapais.

Another difference between the Anglos and the Spaniards at first consisted in the weak development among Anglos of a sense of mission to civilize the Indians. Spanish policy was based from the start on the conception of a duty to change the Indians from heathen barbarians to good Christians. Lacking this religious focus, the Anglos of the frontier conceived their civilizing mission, insofar as they conceived it at all, in terms of technological improvement of Indian farming and way

of life. But even this sense of mission developed only slowly. For the most part the Anglo approach was dominated by the idea of pushing the Indians out of their way and keeping them apart from themselves. In general, the settlers thought in terms of extermination or forcible isolation, rather than Christian conversion.

HISTORICAL BASES OF ANGLO POLICY

Following the lead of England in her approach to Indian tribes during the days of American colonization, the United States government in the 1840's had no settled policy for "civilizing" the Indians. In contrast with Spain, England had conceived of the Indians of North America as continuing to exist as separate nations outside the political organization of Britain. The British government organized no campaign for conversion of the Indians to Christianity. It proposed to acquire land for colonization by purchase, by simple appropriation of unoccupied or sparsely settled areas, or by conquest and treaty where necessary. The basic approach was that of dealing with tribes as separate nations with whom treaties for coexistence were to be made. Even though the English settlers, as their desire for increasingly large amounts of land led them to disregard treaties made by the government, continually expanded and maintained a constant hostile frontier with the various Indian tribes, the British government persisted in trying to establish stable relations by negotiating treaties which guaranteed certain areas to the tribes. Throughout the period preceding the formation of the United States, the British failed to conceive of an empire which should include the Indians as an integral part of its citizenship. As the settlers pushed westward, the result was the growth of a territory inhabited almost entirely by Europeans with few persisting Indian communities. To be sure, some individuals and groups of Indians remained as a backwash of conquest within the borders of the British colonies, but where they existed there was no recognition of their land rights or local government and no systematic efforts were made to incorporate them as citizens. They existed merely as objects of charity with doubtful human status. At the shifting boundaries of European expansion the British government continued to try to settle the border warfare by negotiating new treaties and dealing with the tribes as foreign nations.

This approach was adopted by the United States in 1776. The basis was a concept of a wholly non-Indian nation which might grow by pushing Indians westward where they would be free to live in whatever way they cared to, providing they remained peaceful with the Whites settled at the borders of their territory. Eventually, however, in the early part of the 1800's it became apparent that the Anglo advance was outstripping the westward movement of the Indians, despite the fact that thousands of Indians had moved beyond the Appalachian Mountains. Certain large tribes, like the Iroquois and the Cherokee, had refused to move from their homelands, and others in the Great Lakes region were offering resistance. In the 1830's the concept appeared of enclaves of Indians within the American nation, or as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court John Marshall phrased it, of "dependent domestic nations." The Iroquois and the Cherokee were legally defined in these

terms. Anglo settlement had expanded around these tribes, yet they remained not as disorganized individuals, but as politically organized communities, the Cherokees even having formulated and adopted a constitution of their own with a political capital and a form of representative government. As "dependent domestic nations" they were now regarded as having legal right to land which they occupied, but they were not political units formally integrated with the United States. There was no set of liaison officers linking them with the Whites, as in the Spanish *alcalde* system. The laws of the United States did not apply within their territories, and there was no government-sponsored program for systematically changing their beliefs or their customs. The missionaries among them worked as private citizens with no support, military or otherwise, from the United States government. Moreover, even officers of the government did not fully accept the "domestic nation" arrangement. President Jackson, for example, in the 1830's worked constantly in terms of the older idea of forcing the Indians out of White territory completely and turning their land over to settlers.

The proposal was made in 1832 to create an area west of the Mississippi River, the Indian Territory, to which all tribes which were being enclaved by the Whites should be sent. There it was expected that they could continue to live as Indians on the land set aside for them by the bounty of the Whites. Thousands of Indians were transported there, either with or without their consent, and proceeded to set up their own forms of local government without Anglo participation or interference. The concept underlying this approach to problems of Indian affairs was that the solution to conflicts over land and way of life lay in isolating the Indians as completely as possible from the Whites and letting them go their own way. The whole idea of incorporating Indians as citizens into the American nation, as the Spaniards and Mexicans had conceived it, seemed to be foreign to the Anglo viewpoint. It was this viewpoint which led to the reservation policy as the advancing Anglos encountered more and more Indians west of the Mississippi River and it became increasingly apparent that the Indian Territory could serve for only a small fraction of the tribes.

THE CONTENT OF ANGLO POLICY

It was the concept of the reservation (which had slowly developed out of the policy of isolation) that dominated Anglo thought about Indians at the time when the United States acquired by conquest and purchase from the Mexicans the vast Indian-inhabited area which included modern New Mexico and Arizona. In 1846 the first moves of General Kearny and the Indian agent Calhoun for New Mexico Territory were to negotiate treaties with all the Indians they could reach. The treaties were regarded as insuring peace for Anglo expansion and, less clearly at this early date, setting territorial limits within which the Indians were to remain. It was quite apparent that the content of policy at this point was extremely simple. Treaties made with the Navajos, with the Eastern Pueblos, and a little later with the Apaches were nothing more than agreements to remain at peace. They did

not at first involve any definite statements in regard to territorial boundaries. They contained no promises even that the Whites would not settle in areas claimed by Indians. On the contrary, the assumption was that the United States had acquired the whole territory and that Anglos were free to settle where they wished and to pass through the territory, and hence that Indian land rights were not recognized. This curious paradox — recognition by the Anglos of the Indians as a political unit capable of making binding treaties but without rights in the land where they lived — provided no basis whatever for mutual adjustment of interests; it constituted a sort of reversal of the Spanish policy which recognized the land rights of the Indians but not their political independence of Spain.

It was true also, however, that there was indication of a growing conception among Anglo officials of some sort of plan for "civilizing the Indians." The management of Indian affairs was transferred in 1849 from the War Department to the Department of the Interior. Policy called for civilian officials known as Indian agents whose function was to promote peaceful relations between Indians and settlers. At this time the means for carrying out this function was not very clearly seen by those in charge of Indian affairs. Calhoun, the first agent for the Territory of New Mexico, wrote of the need for aid to the Pueblo Indians in their pursuit of agriculture. Agricultural and other tools were given out to the Pimas in the 1850's. Thus, it is apparent that there was some conception of technical assistance and hence of economic development with which the government proposed to aid the Indians in a peaceful life.

Events between 1850 and 1875 rapidly shaped Anglo policy into something more closely resembling the considered programs of the Spaniards and Mexicans. Characteristically, it was fast-moving events rather than theoretical principles which gave form to the Anglo program. The policy which did emerge maintained its base in the tradition of "dependent nation" which the controversy over Cherokee removal to Indian Territory had crystallized. Expansion into the territory west of the Mississippi River brought Anglos into immediate and sharp conflict with the various bison-hunting tribes. The conquest of those tribes required intensive military action. Although it was possible after conquest to transport a few of them to the Indian Territory, the majority could not be contained there, and so the reservation policy developed. This was an application of the peace-through-isolation program and consisted of forcing conquered Indians into those parts of their territory least desirable to White settlers and keeping them there through force. The basis for the concentration of the various Plains tribes was a treaty made with each one in which peace was agreed to by the Indians within the assigned territory; in turn, the Anglos promised protection from encroaching settlers and agreed to certain cash payments or payments in food, clothing, and other necessities. That is to say, the Indians were made dependent on land which usually could not support them on the basis of their hunting and gathering habits of life. The United States government undertook therefore to support them on a ration basis for agreed-on lengths of time. It steadily became clear that if the Indians were to become self-supporting after that, vigorous steps would have to be taken to set them up as cattle raisers or as farmers, and this also required government aid in the development of what

natural resources existed. This meant that the officials of the Department of the Interior were forced to undertake measures for economic and educational development of the Indians forcibly assigned to the reservations. One after another, the tribes of the Plains were conquered by the United States Cavalry and placed on reservations scattered widely over the west, and slowly the Indian Bureau worked out a "program for civilization."

It was this policy of isolation on reservations applied to the Plains tribes which guided government action in the Territories of New Mexico and Arizona. Before 1880 the Navajos, the Mescalero and Jicarilla Apaches, the Pimas, the Yumas, Mohaves, and other Yumans were dealt with in this manner. Nominally, the Eastern and Western Pueblos were also similarly dealt with, but actually the Eastern Pueblos and Zunis were in a somewhat different situation since the United States had been forced to recognize their land rights by virtue of the old Spanish land grants, as a result of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. In 1872, recognizing the anomalous situation of dealing with Indians as independent nations after conquest, the United States Congress prohibited the further making of treaties with any Indian tribes. This was a move in the direction of an explicit recognition of a problem involved in the political, economic, and social incorporation of the Indians into the American nation. The United States was slowly, by force of circumstance, moving to a position in which it was taking cognizance of the fact of envelopment of the Indians, and of the necessity for some sort of program for their integration into the nation. The program of isolating the Indians had proven to be shortsighted. Even the remote White Mountain Apache area was being sought by Mormon settlers and miners. No spot in the United States could any longer be thought of as a permanently isolated area. Isolation being patently impossible, there was nothing to do but consider ways and means of integration. During the 1880's, spurred by the Apache troubles and then by the Ghost Dance movement, citizens and officials steadily evolved a program of "civilization" which seemed logical and workable to nearly all who knew anything about Indian affairs.

Crystallized finally in the Dawes Act of 1887, many different interests in Anglo-American culture influenced the program of the Indian Bureau. Chief among these were the Protestant churches which had been engaged in missionary work among the Indians, organizations of United States citizens such as the Indian Rights Association who had been roused to advocate elementary human rights for Indians in the manner of Bartolomé de las Casas three hundred years before, and the liberal wing of the Republican Party under the leadership of such men as Carl Schurz. Indians themselves were not in a position at this time to take part in the policy formation, since no system whatever for representation in the government of the United States had been encouraged and Indians were not citizens.

The Anglos who conceived the policy which began to be put in operation came up with one major element of program which Mexicans had been attempting to apply since 1824. This was the idea of allotting land in individual assignments to Indian families. In the thinking that lay behind the policy this held the central place. It was thought that the Indians needed to be civilized and that the basis of civilization consisted in knowing how to handle individual property. Out of such

give some rare insights into Apache-White relations, and even here and there Apache viewpoints. For the most part, however, the nontechnical writings on Apaches tell more about the colorful personalities of American military men and Indian agents than they do about the Apaches. There simply is no book which tells the story of the changing Apache life during the past hundred years. Even less is there represented in the literature anything which relates the facts about the crystallization of the Apache raiding complex during Spanish times to the strange sequence of later events.

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CHAPTER TEN

This brief sketch of the history of Yuman peoples is obviously inadequate. It is only within the last few years that basic facts essential for an understanding of the Yumans have begun to be published, and much excellent research, notably that of Dobyns, Euler, and Schroeder is still in process of publication. The adequate telling of the Yuman story is still a matter for the future.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

The sketch of basic features of what the Spaniards sought to change in Indian life rests on a wide variety of sources. The conception of a "culture of the conquest" is taken directly from the writings of George Foster, who has done a great service in pointing out the relationships between the culture of the Spaniards in old and in New Spain. For the very sketchy and highly selected material on "bearers of Spanish culture" I have relied on all too few sources; nevertheless, I believe that in each case the reality of a particular contact situation is well reported. The material on Father Neumann is taken largely from Dunne's *Early Jesuit Missions in Tarahumara*, Chapters XVII-XXI, pp. 137-197. The quotations regarding Adam Gilg among the Seris are taken from his letter of 1692 reporting his early impressions of the Indians. The sketch of aspects of Father Kino's relations with the Upper Pimas and Yumans utilizes quotations from Bolton's *Rim of Christendom*, from sections LXXI-CXXV-III, pp. 249-487. While I have attributed the material in *Rudo Ensayo* to Father Juan Nentuig, the authorship of this volume is still in some doubt; it of course makes no difference for our purposes precisely who the missionary was who wrote this volume. It is the type of contact that is important, and the *Rudo Ensayo* is one of the most revealing of such accounts. The quotations are taken from Chapters V and VI, pp. 53-91. I feel that I have, especially in the section of the chapter dealing with bearers of Spanish culture, merely suggested the possibilities for interpretation of well-known and much used documents from a point of view growing out of the question: How much mutual understanding of each other's ways of life really grew out of the contacts between Europeans and Indians? I am indeed hesitant to present these sketches, but if they are understood not as purporting to give the range of, but rather some preliminary insights into, contacts which had profound influence on the future of various Indian groups, my purpose will have been realized.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

Adequate materials for understanding the latest phase of Indian policy in Mexico became available only during the writing of this chapter, notably the National Indian Institute's various publications since 1954. It seemed better to offer the present brief introduction rather than to attempt a hurried analysis of a complicated subject, still by no means fully reported. Objective analysis based on adequate information of Mexican Indian policy is only in its beginning stages. Certainly the best introduction to the subject at present is *Methods and Results of Indian Policy in Mexico*, published by the National Indian Institute in 1954.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The subject of Indian policy in the United States appears to be so complicated

and so entangled—quite justifiably, certainly—in the emotions of the people of the United States that there is no standard (that is, generally acceptable) single historical analysis in print. This is in itself a highly significant fact and makes it unnecessary to offer any kind of apology for the particular interpretation presented here. The section of this chapter dealing with "bearers of Anglo culture" is even less adequate than the corresponding section of the chapter on the Spanish program. The few selections are weighted on the side of the reservation superintendents, just as those dealing with Spaniards were weighted on the side of the missionaries. This is indicative of my view that these were key roles during initial highly significant periods of contact, albeit roles which operated in completely different institutional frameworks. The quotations in the sketch of Leo Crane are taken from pp. 37, 136, and 204-05 of his *Desert Drums*. I feel that a much longer account of Crane would have been justified because he represented a most influential type of superintendent, but perhaps this introduction will lead the reader to look at both his books from the point of view adopted here. The quotations from the less articulate, but equally representative superintendent, Kneale, are taken from his autobiography, *Indian Agent*, pp. 329, 332, 333-34, 362-63, and 422. The quotations in the account of the Dutch Reformed missionary at Zuni are taken from that most sincere and revealing little book by Cornelius Kuipers, *Zuni Also Prays*, pp. 51-3, and 150-51.

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Commander in Chief of colonial troops, spurred the British to further efforts to bring order and responsibility in Indian affairs. Even more disturbing to the British ministers was Pontiac's success in achieving an alliance of the tribes in the Great Lakes-Ohio River Valley and the capture of the line of forts leading into the Northwest.

The growing crisis resulted in the issuance of the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763. The proclamation dealt with a number of questions, but of chief interest are its declarations on the relations of Europeans and Indians in the New World. These may be summarized as: (1) The Indians have a right to be protected in the peaceful possession of their lands, (2) Definite boundaries should be established and recognized, beyond which no settlement should occur except by mutual consent of the Indians and the King's representatives, and (3) Persons settled upon Indian lands the title to which had not been ceded by the Indians were ordered to be removed.

Even before the issuance of the proclamation negotiations with the Indians south of the Ohio River had established a boundary line between Indian holdings and the colonial settlements; negotiations were now entered into with the northern tribes, and by October 1768 a line had been agreed upon running from the eastern end of Lake Ontario all the way to the Gulf of Mexico in northwest Florida. This boundary, by agreement with all the tribes affected (some twenty-five or thirty in number) and representatives of the several colonies, was offered as a barrier against any further settlement westward except as the tribes might consent.

FAILURE OF PLAN

What the British did not succeed in achieving was the means of enforcing these agreements. Having failed to es-

tablish centralized control over Indian affairs and having no funds to pay the costs of such a centralized agency, the government had to fall back upon the several colonies to provide police power. By December 1773 it was reported that not less than sixty thousand people had settled between Pittsburgh and the mouth of the Ohio River, and the Iroquois complained bitterly that "the provinces have done nothing and the trade has been thrown into utter confusion by the traders being left to their own will and pleasure and pursuit of gain, following our people to their hunting grounds with goods and liquor."¹¹

TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITIES

United States policy in its beginnings had the same problems to meet as those which the British had faced and failed to solve. Generally, these were problems of understanding, or the lack of it; they stemmed from the inflexible habit of expecting Indians to act like Europeans.

The moral law, or natural law, which Europeans cited as the basis of Indian rights in the land, was itself the creation of European minds. The formal procedure of negotiated purchase had a legal meaning for Europeans which had no counterpart in Indian society. Land was not merchantable, in the European sense, among any of the North American tribes. Individual right of occupancy and use was recognized and protected, and under given conditions trespass could be punished; boundary lines

¹¹"The Genesis of the Proclamation of 1763," *Historical Collections, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society*, Vol. XXXVI (Lansing: Wyncoop Hallenbeck Crawford Company, 1908), pp. 20-52; George Lewis Beer, *British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1907); Walter H. Mohr, *Federal Indian Relations, 1774-1788* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1933); and Helen Louise Shaw, "British Administration of the Southern Indians, 1756-1783," a dissertation presented to the faculty of Bryn Mawr College, 1931.

were respected, as between tribes, and between clans or other groupings within a tribe.¹² Such concepts were the cultural results of experiences which differed from the experiences of European men, concepts that were designed to serve a different kind of social purpose. They explain why it was that, in effort after effort, the early Indians tried to drive the settlers off land which previously they had "sold"; why tribes sometimes turned upon certain of their own headmen and destroyed them for giving away what belonged to the whole group; and they explain what lay behind the appeal of the Ohio River tribes, writing to the government at Washington in the winter of 1786: "Brothers: We are still of the opinion . . . that all treaties carried on with the United States, on our parts, should be with the general voice of the whole Confederacy (of tribes). . . . Any cession of our lands should be made in the most public manner, and by the united voice of the Confederacy. . . . Brothers: Let us pursue reasonable steps; let us meet halfway . . . we beg that you will prevent your surveyors and other people from coming upon our side of the Ohio River."¹³

THE INDIAN POSITION

If the Indians were to maintain their cultural integrity, and that was what they were demanding (the British had promised to protect this right on the eve of the Revolutionary War, and as a result of that promise Joseph Brant led his Mohawk people to the side of the British), it was essential that a boundary line be maintained. The At-

¹²Indian practices regarding land use and ownership are presented in numerous ethnological studies, particularly those of John M. Cooper, Loren C. Eiseley, Eleanor Leacock, Julius Lips, and Frank G. Speck.

¹³*American State Papers*, Class II, Indian Affairs, Vol. I (Washington: Gayles and Seaton, 1831), pp. 8-9.

lantic coast had been such a boundary, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, between Europe and the Indian world. That barrier had been breached in a series of transactions which held certain meanings and served certain purposes for the European settlers; the same transactions carried quite different meanings for the Indian people and, for them, served no useful purposes. The result, after seven generations, was that the Indians found themselves in a position where they had to insist on fending off the incoming white man. Their continued existence, they thought, depended on it.

THE NEW MASTER

At the outset, the United States government tried with some firmness to adhere to the policy promulgated by the British government: a policy of recognizing Indian boundaries and providing legal machinery for the peaceful liquidation of those boundaries. Henry Knox, first Secretary of War under the Constitution and the first federal official in charge of Indian affairs, stated the position on June 15, 1789: "By having recourse to the several Indian treaties, made by the authority of Congress, since the conclusion of the war with Great Britain, it would appear that Congress were of the opinion, that the treaty of peace of 1783 absolutely invested them with the fee of all the Indian lands within the limits of the United States; that they had the right to assign, or retain such portions as they should judge proper.

"But it is manifest, from the representations of the confederated Indians at the Huron Village, in December 1786, that they entertained a different opinion, and that they were the only rightful proprietors of the soil; and it appears by the Resolve of the second of July 1788, that Congress so far conformed to the idea, as to appropriate a

sum of money solely to the purpose of extinguishing the Indian claims to lands they had ceded to the United States, and for obtaining regular conveyances of same. . . .

"The principle of the Indian rights to the lands they possess being thus conceded, the dignity and interest of the nation will be advanced by making it the basis of the future administration of justice towards the Indian tribes."¹⁴

A CHANGING WORLD

In the colonial period, it had been taken for granted that Indians would accept European ways and incorporate them into their own lives. They needed only the opportunity; and missionaries, educators, and statesmen labored mightily to make this opportunity clear and visible to the Indian people. Many strong souls, rapt in their vision of the beatitude of European institutions, accepted martyrdom at the hands of what seemed callous and unworthy savages (actually, men who valued life in their own way, who pursued quite different objectives) to bring Europe into the New World. As the colonial period closed, the mood changed. Possibly there were still as many men who believed Indians could be educated—that is, civilized—but their numbers were swallowed up in the waves of population that rolled westward after independence had been won. Moving westward, meant progress, growth, greatness.

A recent writer summarizes the changing situation: "The American solution [to the problem of the savage] was worked out as an element in an idea of progress, American progress. Cultures are good . . . as they allow for full realization of man's essential and absolute moral nature; and man realizes this nature as he progresses historically from a lesser to a greater good, from the sim-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-14.

ple to the complex, from savagism to civilization. . . . The Indian was the remnant of a savage past away from which civilized men had struggled to grow. To study him was to study the past. To civilize him was to triumph over the past. To kill him was to kill the past."¹⁵

Evidence for the manner in which these ideas came into American thinking will be found, for example, in the oration of John Quincy Adams before the Sons of the Pilgrims, December 12, 1802: "There are moralists who have questioned the right of the Europeans to intrude upon the possessions of the aborigines in any case and under any limitations whatsoever. But have they maturely considered the whole subject? The Indian right of possession itself stands, with regard to the greatest part of the country, upon a questionable foundation. Their cultivated fields, their constructed habitations, a space of ample sufficiency for their subsistence, and whatever they had annexed to themselves by personal labor, was undoubtedly by the law of nature theirs. But what is the right of a huntsman to the forest of a thousand miles over which he has accidentally ranged in quest of prey? Shall the liberal bounties of Providence to the race of man be monopolized by one of ten thousand for whom they were created? . . . Shall the lordly savage not only disdain the virtues and enjoyments of civilization himself, but shall he control the civilization of a world? . . . No, generous philanthropist!"¹⁶

METHODS AND DEVICES

In the forty-odd years between the enactment of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and Andrew Jackson's Second Annual Message, delivered December

¹⁵ Pearce, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 48-49.

¹⁶ Royce, *op. cit.* (note 10 *supra*), p. 536.

6th, 1830, the United States moved away from the potential which was inherent in colonial attitudes, of allowing the Indian people a chance to maintain their integrity as a people. Boundaries could be in the minds of a people; they might not hold the Appalachian watershed, but they could still hold to a system of values they understood. They did not ask to remain static, but to grow into new conditions, as they became ready, while retaining their dignity in their own eyes. From the latter date onward, it became a question of how soon, and by what devices, the extinguishment of the Indian past would be effected.

In its Indian provisions, the Northwest Ordinance read: "Article III. . . . The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them and for preserving peace and friendship with them."

Here, once again, was the promise of fair dealing which Europeans since Francisco de Vitoria had urged as policy, which the British actually adopted but could not enforce; and now the United States had accepted it, and in its turn would discover that it had not the means of carrying it into force. The reasons it could not carry it into force are the real subject matter of President Jackson's Second Annual Message, though he appears to talk about other considerations. He said: "Humanity has often wept over the fate of the aborigines of this country, and Philanthropy has been long busily employed in devising means to avert it, but its progress has never for a moment been arrested, and one by

one have many powerful tribes disappeared from the earth. . . . But true Philanthropy could not wish to see this continent restored to the condition in which it was found by our forefathers. What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms, embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than twelve million happy people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, civilization, and religion?"¹⁷

Some months previously (May 28, 1830), President Jackson had signed the Indian Removal Act, which placed in the hands of the President authority to remove all Indians west of the Mississippi River. The proposal had been under discussion and indeed had been hotly debated for several years. Passage of the measure was precipitated finally by actions taken by the state of Georgia.

The state had insisted since its establishment that the United States purchase the lands occupied by Indian tribes (Creeks and Cherokees) within her borders. Some purchases had been made, but the time came when these Indians refused to sell any more of their land, on the grounds that they needed it for their own existence. Georgia retaliated against the Cherokees by enacting legislation which extended her laws over the Cherokee nation. The Cherokees challenged the right of Georgia to assume such jurisdiction, and in two famous cases (*Cherokee Nation vs. Georgia* and *Worcester vs. Georgia*) tested the ability and the willingness of the United States to protect an Indian tribe in its efforts at self-determination.

¹⁷ James D. Richardson (Ed.), *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897*, Vol. 2 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office), pp. 520-21.

The Cherokees lost, not because their cause was wrong, but because of a defect in the American system of government. The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Marshall writing the opinion, held that the State of Georgia had no authority to extend its law over the Cherokees and therefore its action was a nullity. Georgia chose not to recognize the opinion, and the President of the United States refused to be disturbed by Georgia's position.¹⁸

The Removal Act of 1830 was a discretionary act, authorizing the president (not directing him) to negotiate treaties with the eastern Indians, the treaties to provide the following: lands would be offered west of the Mississippi; payment would be made for lands and improvements relinquished in the east; title to the new lands would be guaranteed in perpetuity, or so long as the tribe should exist; the right of self-government would be respected. The removal was to be based on agreement, but when the Cherokees and the Seminoles attempted to exercise the choice of remaining, they were answered with the United States Army; forced removal followed.

After 1830, Indian tribes continued to be moved, some of them three or four times, like inanimate pieces on the checkerboard of the nation's destiny. A writer has observed: "For a time the scheme of moving the Indians to lands west of the Mississippi seemed to offer a practical solution to their problem. Jedidiah Morse believed that the Indians possessed the capacity for making progress in the arts of civilized life if only they were given government aid and an education. . . . However, in most of the arguments for the removal

¹⁸ The events in Georgia are carefully detailed in U. B. Phillips, "Georgia and State Rights," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1901, Vol. 2 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office).

of the Indian tribes . . . the emphasis was placed on the advantages to the white man which would result from the displacement of the noble savage, and the idea of progress was invoked . . . to give a rationalization of inevitable justice to the forced migration."¹⁹

The decision by Congress in 1871, in the form of a rider to an appropriation act, that "Hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent tribe or power with whom the United States may contract by trading," followed logically on the events that have been reviewed here. It was the recognition of a reality, that Indian friendship and support were no longer needed by the nation.

THE UNKINDEST CUT

It is fitting to close this brief review with mention of the General Allotment Act, also called the Dawes Act, of February 8, 1887. Here, again, was permissive legislation authorizing the President of the United States, in his discretion, to divide an Indian reservation into individual holdings, assign a parcel of land to each man, woman and child, and declare all remaining land surplus to the needs of the Indians. The "surplus" lands were then opened for homesteading and paid for at \$2.50 per acre, as and when the lands were taken up by homesteaders. By this and other devices contained in the Act, the Indians were relieved of some ninety million acres, or almost two-thirds of their land base, between the years 1887 and 1930. Without cost to itself, the federal government thus transferred large acreages from Indian to white ownership, even requiring the tribes to pay the costs of surveying and allotting. In every case

¹⁹ Arthur A. Ekirch, *The Idea of Progress in America, 1815-1860* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), p. 41.

where allotment was carried out, the Indian tribe objected; and in most cases the lands were covered by treaties in which the United States obligated itself to protect the tribe in its right of possession.

In the speeches in support of the bill while it was pending in Congress, are echoes of that sense of urgent mission which Europeans carried with them into the new world; which moved Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand to insist that the Indians be persuaded to dress up and to bathe less frequently, and led Robert Gray in 1609 to believe that the right education was all that was needed to make a European out of an Indian.

Now, in the 1880's, arguing for the legislation which would become the General Allotment Act, Senator Pendleton of Ohio declared: "They must either change their mode of life or they must die. We may regret it, we may wish it were otherwise, our sentiments of humanity may be shocked by the alterna-

tive, but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that that is the alternative, and that these Indians must either change their modes of life or they will be exterminated. . . . In order that they may change their modes of life, we must change our policy. . . . We must stimulate within them to the very largest degree, the idea of home, of family, and of property. These are the very anchorages of civilization; the commencement of the dawning of these ideas in the mind is the commencement of the civilization of any race, and these Indians are no exception."²⁰

In the heat of such a discussion, it would not have occurred to any of the debaters to inquire of the Indians what ideas they had of home, of family, and of property. It would have been assumed, in any case, that the ideas, whatever they were, were without merit since they were Indian.

²⁰ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 11 (Forty-sixth Congress, Third Session, 1881).

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all bound together by roads and runners the Romans would have admired. Nor were their rulers lacking the consciousness of power. When urged by Pizarro's chaplain, on his way to the conquest of Cuzco, the glittering Inca capital, to accept Christ as his Lord, the Pope as his master, and Emperor Charles as his monarch, the reigning Inca sovereign, Atahualpa, replied:

I will be no man's tributary. . . . Your emperor may be a great prince; I do not doubt it, when I see that he has sent his subjects so far across the waters; and I am willing to hold him as a brother. As for the Pope of whom you speak, he must be crazy to talk of giving away countries which do not belong to him. For my faith, I will not change it. Your own God, as you say, was put to death by the very men whom he created. But mine, my God still lives in the heavens and looks down upon his children.

In the "classic age" of their "Theocratic Period," which seems to have ended catastrophically about 900 A.D., the Mayas, possessors of the third great Indian culture, were the uncontested masters of the science of the sky. Their gods were many and were associated with the peaceful pursuit of husbandry. Their efficiency in cultivation supplied the wherewithal for the support of priestly learning, and especially the learning that had to do with the weather, the seasons, the round of the year. Mayan priests specialized in astronomy, to which mathematics was the key. Abstract thought itself was the key to mathematics. The Mayas' brilliant achievements along all these lines culminated, before the end of the seventh century, A.D., in their extraordinary 365-day calendar, one better than Europeans generally would have for a thousand years. The quality of Mayan thinking has prompted western historians to think of them as the Greeks, as they think of the imperial Incas as the Romans, and the marauding Aztecs as the Assyrians, of pre-Columbian America. Mayan triumphs in art serve only to underscore the Grecian theme. Only nowadays is pre-Columbian art being transferred from natural history museums, where they were preserved mainly as arti-

facts, to the galleries that house the aesthetic treasures of civilization.

This Grecian theme—in fact, it is but a metaphor of European-oriented men—can easily be overdone. The Indians of Mexico and Peru had a high civilization all their own. The Aztecs are said to have known of the wheel, yet to have used it for no productive purpose. They and others also practiced metallurgy, but only for ornaments, not arms. The Mayas in particular probably had many of what we call advanced ways and ideas, including a system of written notation for which we have yet to find the



Amulet; an example of Mayan pre-Columbian art.

Rosetta Stone. Invading Spanish soldiers, fearful of retribution, destroyed Mayan cities as they destroyed those of Mexico and Peru. So also, in the 1560's, intrusive Spanish missionaries, fearful of the Devil's words, burned almost all the Mayan books. Such desecration heightens the challenge of understanding, as its record heightens the challenge of shame, among those who are keenly aware today of the barbarism of Europe's own culture as well as of its blessings and beauty.

Indian Mexico and Peru, at their peak, held a population (possibly 30 million) almost as great as that of western Europe at

the time of the Renaissance; and their principal cities, despite much controversy over their precise size, far outdistanced contemporary Paris and London. The simple fact that such populations and urban concentrations were adequately fed for centuries alone testifies to the technological standards and political stability of what we may appropriately call the old New World.

From Mexico and Peru, long before the white man's arrival, aboriginal peoples had spread once more far into the temperate zones, north and south. The farther they moved from their great heartland, like Europeans from their Mediterranean havens, generally speaking the cruder and harsher their culture seems to have become.

Yet, even as far north as the St. Lawrence River Valley the earliest explorers from overseas marveled at the cities they encountered. One such was Cartier's Hochelaga, the site of modern Montreal, of which the Frenchman reported to his king in 1535, how impressed he was by "the immense numbers of peoples living there" and "their kindness and peacefulness." Ralph H. Brown, in his *Historical Geography of the United States*, remarks that "it has often been suggested, among other explanations, that originally the name 'Canada' signified a place of large Indian lodges." Brown goes on to describe the "underestimation of the extent to which the Indians had been engaged in agriculture," the frequency of Indian towns farther south, and the "Indian old fields" so commonly encountered and so zealously coveted for their open spaces by the first English settlers in what was to become the eastern United States.

Of the Indians in the rest of the future United States something new is being discovered almost every day as archaeological remains in the great river basins are exposed by the rush to develop hydroelectric power and establish flood control. And most of what is being discovered tends to undermine the myth of Indian savagery by which the first white settlers, on each new advance into fresh territory, comforted themselves and assuaged their guilt.

Of these same Indians, John Collier, a

former Commissioner of Indian Affairs, wrote in 1947: "At the time of the discovery, the region that is now the United States contained some one million Indians, . . . formed within more than six hundred distinct societies. . . . These societies existed in perfect ecological balance with the forest, the plain, the desert, the waters, and the animal life. . . . At the time of the white arrival there was no square mile unoccupied or unused."

By their step-by-step resistance to encroachment for almost three hundred years these Indians are said by some to have hardened the fighting qualities in the American character. Their more peaceful contributions to the American civilization include the canoe and the snowshoe, the white potato, the tobacco leaf that was to become the first staple of the English mainland colonies, and Indian corn, that remarkable man-made hybrid, which remains to this day the staple of much of the Middle West.

CONTACTS THAT FAILED TO ENDURE

While America was developing in isolation a still mystifying civilization of its own, other parts of the world were themselves much more restless than our casual inattention to them suggests. For our own purposes we will refer here only to activities in the Far East and the far North.

For hundreds of years, while Europe slumbered, China developed the most advanced civilization on earth and was to bequeath to the West such basic instrumentalities for its own later expansion as the compass, gunpowder and printing. One climax of Chinese achievement was reached in the opening decades of the fifteenth century when seven tremendous seagoing expeditions, each of fifty huge junks manned by some 25,000 hands, sailed westward to India, Siam, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, and even visited east Africa. These expeditions dwarfed the pitiful little Portuguese

course to the sea. Beyond the "fall line" of these rivers, where cataracts two hundred feet high dramatically signaled a halt to upstream navigation, the Susquehanna Valley in Pennsylvania and the "Great (Shenandoah) Valley" of Virginia tied the "back parts" of the British mainland "plantations" together (see map, p. 78). In the eighteenth century, immigrants by the thousands with no particular provincial loyalties settled in these valleys, and visitors like the Baptist circuit-rider James Ireland marveled at the "common state of sociability" in which the numerous sects and nationalities seemed to live there. By the 1750's, issues of church administration, participation in politics, law enforcement, and commercial growth, all indicated the need for freer intercourse between this hinterland and the cities and harbors of the seaboard. Forward-looking Americans like the Washingtons and Jeffersons of Virginia, the Norrises, Morrises, and Franklins of Pennsylvania, had begun to press for east-west roads and bridges to link up the natural north-south routes.

Here, then, by the middle of the eighteenth century, was a new land among the settled regions of the world, clearly marked off by natural boundaries, and a new people, a million and a quarter strong, with a

I. The New American Population

EXTRAORDINARY GROWTH AND SPREAD

Britain's ultimate success in North America sprang largely from the astonishing growth of her mainland colonies, which already gave many in Europe cause for wonder and alarm. After 1700 the population of these colonies almost doubled every 25 years. In round numbers the 200,000 people in 1688 had grown to about 1,800,000 in 1750. At that time, there were but 65,000 Europeans in New France.

The most densely populated mainland colonies were in the South, which in 1750 contained some 700,000 inhabitants. Of this

common official language, a common legal tradition, a common Protestant heritage. To these new "Americans" of the eighteenth century the country beyond the Appalachians still loomed as a trackless wilderness so densely wooded that the sun itself seldom penetrated the foliage beneath whose cover lurked wild brave and beast and terrifying creatures of the mind. Yet as we know, this land too was far from empty, and when, after 1768, permanent settlers at long last penetrated the region (see p. 128), "they found weatherbeaten trails," as J. B. Bartlett writes in his fine study of *The Explorers of North America*, "skilful, knowledgeable guides, and Indians who had dealt with the white man for a century."

When the war for this wilderness of North America finally was fought out between Britain and France in the middle of the eighteenth century, the British mainland settlements, a new nation despite themselves, were to play an American rather than a British role. In a sense, the American Revolution was a late phase of this war which red men, Spaniards, Frenchmen, and Britons had been waging intermittently for more than a hundred years and which, in fact, did not finally flicker out until the end of the Indian wars on the plains following the American Civil War (see Chapter 18).

total, 300,000 were Negro slaves, most of them West Africans carried over in British and colonial slave ships. Approximately a half-million people lived in New England at this time, and some 400,000 in the Middle colonies, which were expanding at the fastest rate. The high birth rate among the white colonists accounts in large part for the remarkable population growth—it has been estimated that the average colonial family increased by one child every two years. Immigration from the British Isles and from continental countries, and to a lesser degree from the West Indies, helped swell the total.

Before the 1680's, America had been a catch-all for Europe. Swedes, Finns, Netherlanders, French Huguenots, and Spanish and Portuguese Jews, together with a sprinkling of more exotic nationalities, had all settled in the British colonies. Thereafter, by far the largest numbers came from Germany and Northern Ireland. Most of the new arrivals settled first on William Penn's welcoming domains (see p. 66) and gradually filtered into the vast stretch of territory between the Allegheny foothills and the southern lowlands, spreading some 600 miles southwestward from the Maryland-Pennsylvania boundary.

THE GREAT GERMAN INFUX

Continuous German immigration began in 1683, when small groups of Mennonites and Quakers, harassed elsewhere for their radical Christianity, established Germantown, near present-day Philadelphia. During the next three decades other radical German Protestants founded such Pennsylvania towns as Bethlehem, Lititz, and Nazareth. These early German immigrants were mainly well-educated people, who paid for their own passage, brought property with them from the Old World, and bought land on their arrival. They built substantial communities where many of the original buildings still stand.

These first German settlers are to be distinguished from the poorer, conservative Lutherans and German-Reformed groups, the so-called "church people," who poured into Pennsylvania in the eighteenth century, mainly from the Rhine Valley. For a hundred years after 1618 the Rhine Valley had been the battleground in religious and dynastic wars, and the peasants there were periodically despoiled by military foragers and feudal overlords. When they learned through advertisements of promoters or the reports of friends of a country where there were no feudal obligations and where land was plentiful, they responded eagerly to the call.

Most of these church people were too poor to pay their way to America, and came


mainly as "redemptioners," one of the various forms of "white servitude." The "indentured servants" who were first shipped to Virginia and Maryland early in the seventeenth century had made contracts with the joint-stock companies or proprietary agents abroad to work in the colonies in exchange for their passage across the ocean (see p. 48). The "redemptioners" of the eighteenth century sold themselves to ship captains or "soul brokers" in European ports. As their numbers grew, the voyage itself, because of overcrowding and related conditions, became even more horrible than on slave ships, and it is estimated that on the average a third of the redemptioners died at sea. The contracts or "indentures" of those landed in America were sold to the highest bidders. Thereafter, their situation was the same as the earlier "white servants." The usual term was from four to seven years, at the expiration of which the servant was to receive "freedom dues," usually fifty acres of land, tools and clothing, and perhaps a bit of cash to get started on his own. The evidence suggests that these duties were often withheld or, when granted, that the servant sold off his land for a pittance in ready money. On the other hand, runaways were frequent and often went unapprehended. Many of the German redemptioners gradually occupied the rich farmland of the Lehigh, Susquehanna, and Cumberland valleys. When they reached less fertile lands in the north, they swung down into the Shenandoah Valley. German immigration reached its high point between 1749 and 1754 when to the dismay of the English colonists who feared they might be engulfed, over 5,000 Germans were arriving in American ports every year.

The Germans did their best to preserve in America the way of life they had known at home. They hoped to develop their farms in the quiet valleys, cultivate their traditional domestic arts, embrace their religion

in purity and peace. But the village pattern they had known in Germany could not be sustained in Pennsylvania. They were forced, instead, into the more isolated lives of independent farmers that were to become characteristic of the moving frontier. Nevertheless, they held tenaciously to their homesteads and, as the open spaces filled up around them, they gradually resumed their intensive farming methods, industrious practices, and traditional ways.

Their influence on both the agricultural and industrial development of Pennsylvania thus became profound. The Germans were celebrated throughout the colonies for their rich gardens and orchards, for their stout

barns and well-tended livestock, and for their sturdy self-sufficiency. Many skilled craftsmen, both German and Swiss, had settled in the Pennsylvania interior, where they introduced their techniques for knitting, weaving, shoemaking, and carving. German artisans developed the famous long rifle, which was first manufactured in Lancaster and was later adopted by other frontiersmen. Perhaps more important innovations were the iron stove and the Conestoga wagon. The stove was a vast improvement over the heat-wasting open hearth of the English-style dwelling, and the new wagon was a durable, efficient vehicle for carrying inland produce to the seaboard.



ULSTERMEN FROM NORTHERN IRELAND

Ulstermen from Northern Ireland, preceded by small numbers of Irish Quakers, began to emigrate at about the same time as the Germans. Of lowland Scot origin, the Ulstermen had settled in Northern Ireland during the reign of James I. Here they had prospered as farmers and small manufacturers until discriminatory laws shut off the English markets for their linen and woolen products. As Presbyterians, moreover, they resented having to pay taxes to support the official Anglican Church.

A few Ulstermen had trickled over to America from Northern Ireland during the Puritan revolution, but parliamentary legislation between 1660 and 1718 provoked a mass exodus. For example, to protect English farmers and the woolen interests, Parliament excluded Ulster meat, dairy products, and woolens from England and the colonies. The final blow came when British absentee landlords raised the rents of their Irish tenants. Around 1718, thousands of Scotch-Irish turned their backs on Europe for the New World, and they con-

ii. The Mature Southern Colonies

THE TIDEWATER

Throughout the colonial period, most of the population of the Chesapeake region, of tidewater Virginia and Maryland, and of adjacent parts of North Carolina, remained of English extraction. Here, although grain and other food crops were widely grown, the economy was based on the production and export of tobacco. The Carolina low country, extending southward to the Savannah River and inland about 60 miles, was settled later than the Chesapeake region, and for reasons of climate, crops, and the origins of its colonists, differed from it in its culture.

The Chesapeake planters, under the social and political leadership of an elite group of large landholders maintained close ties with England and aped the manners of

her aristocracy. The Carters, Lees, Byrds, Randolphs, and Fitzhughs of Virginia, and the Carrolls, Dulans, and Galloways of Maryland, lived in solid Georgian mansions with well-proportioned rooms filled with fine imported furniture. They also hired able American artisans to carry out the plans of English architects and the designs of foreign cabinet-makers. The evidence of colonial craftsmanship may be seen today in the Byrd mansion, "Westover," and in the stylish town houses of Annapolis.

Observers noted that the Chesapeake gentry were an outdoor people, fonder of fox-hunting and horse-racing and long house parties than of polite learning. Some of them boasted large libraries—William Byrd II, for example, who even made a practice of reading many of the old works he

tribes of the plains. In the poor but protected areas of the Colorado Plateau and the southern Great Basin, for example, agricultural and essentially peaceful tribes, such as the highly civilized Hopi and Zuñi, built their pueblos into the Basin's cliffs and cultivated fields sometimes as far as 20 miles from their homes. To the north and west, in the upper regions of the Great Basin and on the Columbia Plateau, lived such primitive tribes as the Utes, Shoshones, Bannocks, and Snakes, who never took up agriculture but eked out a thin diet of occasional bear and elk by eating reptiles, rodents, vermin, grasshoppers, and, as Mark Twain said, "anything they can bite." Still farther west lived the despised "Digger Indians" of California, who subsisted on roots, tubers, and seeds that they literally dug out of the earth. Mark Twain found them "the wretchedest type of mankind I have ever seen." Completing the Indian population were the sad remnants of the Five Civilized Tribes of the East who had been forcibly removed to Oklahoma country, and other "woods Indians" who had been pushed west. Both groups soon fell prey not only to government neglect but also to the "horse" tribes.

In 1860, about 225,000 Indians shared the "desert" and the mountain country with the buffalo, the wild horse, the jack rabbit, and the coyote. But the white man could not be excluded altogether. In the future Dakotas, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Nevada, were about 175,000 whites—probably 90 per cent of them male. Their numbers soon were increased by Civil War deserters from the North and the South. Except for the 25,000 Mormons settled in Utah, these whites, like the Indians themselves, kept on the move. They prospected for precious metals, hunted buffalo, trapped martens and beavers, drove cattle and sheep, guided and sometimes misguided emigrant trains bound for California and Oregon, scouted for the army, hauled overland freight and mail, gambled, drank, and wenched when occasion offered, and traded and fought with the Indians. Some of them,

like Kit Carson and Jim Bridger, were as free on a horse and as sharp on a trail as any red man.

While inhabitants of older sections of the country were making the United States a powerful newcomer among the great nations, and were keeping abreast of developments in science, philosophy, literature, and the arts, the Wild West was living an extraordinary life of its own—a life that has entered profoundly into the American spirit and mythology. Even before the Civil War was over, the pattern of cowboys, rustlers, and roundups, of six-shooters and branding irons, warpath and council fire, wide-open mining towns and posses and sheriffs, had imposed itself on the Great American Desert. After the war, it became so firmly implanted in the American consciousness that it remains a TV staple.

Yet the Wild West had but a short life. By 1890, only Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma had yet to become states. The older culture of the East had fully asserted itself over the West; railroads had long since spanned the continent and opened connecting lines in the new mining, cattle, and farming areas of the "desert." Mining, cattle-raising, and even farming had come conspicuously under the control of great corporations financed by eastern and foreign capital. By 1890, the Indian wars were over; the army had been withdrawn from the western forts; the frontier itself was officially declared closed.

REMOVING THE INDIANS

Commenting years later on the disease that had wiped out the Wampanoags and other tribes in Massachusetts within a decade after the arrival of the *Mayflower*, Cotton Mather said: "The woods were almost cleared of those pernicious creatures, to make room for a better growth." From the very beginning of white settlement in North America, the paganism of the natives served to justify Christian violence.

The white migration to Oregon in the late 1840's, the surveys for transcontinental railroads starting in 1853, the organization and settlement of the Kansas-Nebraska

region in 1854, and the Colorado Gold Rush of 1859 convinced the Indians of "the fatal tendency of their new environment." If further evidence was needed, it was furnished by the attitude of the United States government. Demands from traders, travelers, and explorers for protection against the Indians prompted the army in the 1840's and 1850's to establish a line of forts on the plains. In 1851, the policy of maintaining "one big reservation" on the whole expanse of the "desert" ended, and treaties were made with the Plains Indians forcing them onto reservations that (1) deprived them of their traditional hunting grounds, and (2) crowded them onto the lands of other tribes who resented their presence.

In the meantime, the administration of Indian affairs, which had previously been a function of the army, was given in part to the new Bureau of the Interior, created in 1849. The discontent among the Indians caused by the new reservation policy was fanned into rebellion by the maladministration of this new department. From the first, many of its officials were extremely corrupt; they made large fortunes by supplying the reservation Indians with shoddy of all sorts, by cheating them of their lands, and by selling them forbidden liquor. Many westerners took part in the Bureau's dealings with the Indians and naturally supported it. But the army was reluctant to yield its power to civilian politicians. Moreover, since army garrisons brought a great deal of money and business into the West, many western merchants wanted the troops to stay. Between corrupt administrators and touchy soldiers, the Indian was either starved on the reservations or killed in the open country. In the 1850's, one western settler wrote:

It was customary to speak of the Indian man as a Buck; of the woman as a squaw. . . . By a very natural and easy transition, from being spoken of as brutes, they came to be thought of as game to be shot, or as vermin to be destroyed.

The treaties of 1851 and after curtailed Indian lands and permitted the government to build roads and railroads across Indian preserves. As always, these treaties

were made only with nominal Indian leaders and rump groups. Most of the Indians were never consulted; if they raised their voices in protest, they were ignored. But it was one thing to set aside Indian reservations, and another to force the Indians onto them and to keep them there under the guns of the army. Trouble was constantly brewing. In 1862, when regular army units were recalled from the plains for Civil War service and were replaced by inexperienced recruits, the earliest of the Indian wars on the plains broke out.

That year a small band of irresponsible Sioux youths murdered five whites near a reservation in the vicinity of New Ulm, Minnesota. To forestall retaliation, the Sioux, under Little Crow, took to the warpath, killed hundreds of settlers, and burned their farmhouses. The militia finally overwhelmed them and 38 braves were hanged in a ghoulis public ceremony. Running conflict between the eastern Sioux and the army continued until late in 1863, when Little Crow fell in battle. The Sioux lands in Minnesota were confiscated, and the remnants of the tribe moved elsewhere.

Two years later, in an attempt to satisfy the miners' demands for better access to supplies and civilization, the government tried to build a sound wagon road along the Bozeman Trail from Fort Laramie, Wyoming, north to isolated Bozeman and Helena, Montana. This road would have cut across the choicest hunting grounds of the western Sioux. Red Cloud, chief of the western tribes, led his warriors in unremitting harassment of the work. "Every straggler was cut down, every wagon train bringing in supplies raided, every wood-cutting party attacked." To protect the project the army started three forts along the Trail and in December, 1866, a wood train approaching one of them was set upon by the Indians. To see the caravan through and to relieve the unfinished fort, a small force under Captain W. J. Fetterman was ordered to

the scene. Red Cloud's braves dissolved into the wilderness and Fetterman foolishly led his men after them. The Indians quickly ambushed Fetterman's force and massacred all 82 of them, including the rash Captain. Inflamed by their success, the Sioux increased the frequency and violence of their assaults, and in the next few months forced the abandonment of the whole Bozeman Trail project. They also forced a disconcerted country to rethink its approach to the red men. "Our whole Indian policy," cried the *Nation* after the "Fetterman massacre," "is a system of mismanagement, and in many parts one of gigantic abuse."

To the south, meanwhile, warfare with the Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes had been raging since 1861, when miners claimed their Colorado lands. This phase of the Indian wars came to a climax in 1864, when a force under Colonel John M. Chivington butchered about 450 men, women, and children in a Cheyenne encampment at Sand Creek. The Indians, under their chief,

Black Kettle, had tried every means to surrender peacefully, first by raising an American flag and then the traditional white flag. But Chivington's native lust had been set aflame by a telegram from his superior, General S. R. Curtis, United States army commander in the West: "I want no peace till the Indians suffer more." And suffer they did. A white trader, witness to the slaughter, reported that the Cheyenne "were scalped, their brains knocked out; the men used their knives, ripped open women, clubbed little children, knocked them in the head with their guns, beat their brains out, mutilated their bodies in every sense of the word." Such savagery fed upon itself, and Indian-army warfare in the Southwest grew more and more brutal until 1868. In that year, at Washita, in Oklahoma, an army contingent under Colonel George A. Custer (he had lost his title of Major-General when the volunteer army was disbanded following Appomattox) defeated a band of Cheyenne and Arapaho

warriors. Black Kettle was killed in the engagement and his braves thus the more easily subdued.

Scores of other battles took place between the army and the Indians and between Indians and marauding white civilians. But the Sioux and Cheyenne wars convinced a parsimonious Congress that the cost of subduing the Indians was too great and that the rate of subjugation was too slow. Thus, in 1867, peace commissioners were sent westward to convince the tribes to move to selected reservations, one in the Black Hills of Dakota, the other in present-day Oklahoma. By 1868, treaties to this effect were forced upon the war-weary Indians. General Sherman wrote:

We have now . . . provided reservations for all, off the great roads. All who cling to their old hunting grounds are hostile and will remain so till killed off. We will have a sort of predatory war for years—every now and then be shocked by the indiscriminate murder of travelers and settlers, but the country is so large, and the advantage of the Indians so great, that we cannot make a single war end it. From the nature of things we must take chances and clean out Indians as we encounter them.


As Sherman predicted, between 1869 and 1875 over 200 pitched battles were waged between the army and the Indians. The nature of these conflicts may be deduced from a statement of General Francis A. Walker, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in 1871: "When dealing with savage men, as with savage beasts, no question of national honor can arise. Whether to fight, to run away, or to employ a ruse, is solely a question of expediency." On the reservations, meanwhile, a new civilian Board of Indian Commissioners, created in 1869, tried to convert the Plains Indians to agriculture on inadequate land. By eking out the pitiful crops with bonuses, annuities, and other doles, these commissioners made the Indians increasingly dependent, and pauperization completed their moral undoing.

In the 1870's, violence continued to flare as the Indians were kept on the new reservations only with great difficulty, and as the whites, with equal difficulty, were kept off them. Moldy flour, spoiled beef, and moth-

eaten blankets made up the typical fare supplied to the reservation Indians by the commissioners. The Sioux in Dakota were further enraged by the encroachment on their reservation of Northern Pacific railroad crews, and by the influx of prospectors when gold was discovered in the Dakota Black Hills in 1874. In 1876, war broke out again. It was during this conflict that Colonel Custer made his famous "last stand" against Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull in the Battle of the Little Big Horn on June 25, 1876. The Sioux annihilated Custer, but shortages of ammunition and food forced them to scatter. An ill-timed attack on a wagon train gave away the location of the largest group of Indians, and their capture in October, 1876, ended the war. Sitting Bull fled to Canada but, facing starvation, returned in 1881.

In Oregon, the Nez Percé tribe, whose religious leaders urged them to drive out the whites, took to the warpath against encroaching miners in 1877. Until they succumbed to starvation and disease, the Nez Percé, under Chief Joseph, led 5,000 government troops on a wild chase over Oregon and Montana. In the 1880's, the Apaches in New Mexico went on a prolonged rampage until their chief, Geronimo, was captured in 1886.

What finally destroyed the Indians was the extermination of the buffalo herd. The building of the Union Pacific in the late 1860's cut the herd in two and left the southern bison at the mercy of every railroad worker, miner, adventurer, and traveler. Since a stampeding herd was capable of overturning a train, buffalo-hunting became a regular feature of railroad-building. "Buffalo Bill" Cody got his reputation by killing some 4,000 buffalo in 18 months as a hunter for the Kansas Pacific Railroad. As railroads continued to open, buffalo-hunting became a popular and devastating western "sport." In 1871, the fate of the buffalo was sealed when the sport changed





The mass slaughter of the buffalo on the western plains in the early 1880's.

into a business. In that year, a Pennsylvania tannery discovered that it could process buffalo hides into commercial leather; the hides, which had hardly been worth retrieving before, suddenly became worth \$1 to \$3 apiece. Between 1872 and 1874, the annual carnage of buffalo averaged 3 million, and by 1878 the southern herd had vanished. In 1886, when the National Museum wanted to mount some buffalo, it found only about 600 of the northern herd left, deep in the Canadian woods.

When Columbus discovered America, probably a million aborigines lived on the continent to the north of Mexico. These natives were grouped in more than 600 distinct tribes, few of which numbered more than 2,000 persons. With the coming of the horse, small groups of Plains Indians began to break off from the western tribes to hunt independently, and only once a year, in the summer, did they reunite for tribal ceremonies which grew into a decadent agglomeration of activities known, inaccurately, as the Sun Dance. This ritual, which lasted for four days, centered around offerings to the buffalo. In 1884, the Sun Dance and other Indian religious practices were prohibited by the government, but in 1890 the Sioux went ahead with the dance on their reservation. When troops appeared, the Indians fled. The troops followed, and in the "battle" of Wounded Knee massacred the half-starved remnants of the once fierce tribe. By then, hardly 200,000 Indians remained in the United States.

Three years before Wounded Knee, in 1887, Congress had passed the Dawes Act, which defined the government's basic Indian policy until 1934. This act broke up tribal autonomy even on the reservations. It divided up reservation land and gave each family head 160 acres to cultivate. After a probation period of 25 years, he was granted full rights of ownership and full citizenship in the United States. In 1924, the United States granted full citizenship to all the Indians in the country.

The Dawes Act, a dramatic reversal of former Indian policy, was the result of widespread humanitarian opposition to the extermination policy that had been conducted by the army and the Interior Department. A highlight of the humanitarian campaign was the publication in 1881 of *A Century of Dishonor*, and in 1884, of the novel *Ramona*, both by the prolific Massachusetts versifier and writer of children's books, Helen Hunt Jackson. The first, a scorching indictment of traditional governmental policy toward the red men, is no longer read except by scholars. *Ramona*, a kind of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* of the Wild West, has survived as a popular romance about the last days of Spanish rule in California, and has been the subject of a Technicolor movie and a popular song hit.

Despite Mrs. Jackson and Mr. Dawes, the reversal of the traditional Indian policy by the Dawes Act did the Indian little but harm. In dividing the land as the act provided, the poorest territory was usually

given to the Indians, and the best was sold to white settlers. Even where he gained good land, inexperience with ownership and with legal matters left the individual Indian vulnerable to the same kind of sharp practice that had marked the making of tribal treaties. Again and again, the red men were tricked into selling their best holdings. More disastrous still, they had neither the tradition nor the incentive to cultivate the land they retained. Great numbers of them became paupers, though there were a few exceptions—like the handful of Indians who held onto their oil-rich Oklahoma lands and became millionaires.

II. The Last Frontiers

MINING COUNTRY

The plains and mountains of the West, as we have seen, were far from being desert wastes; they pulsed with plant, animal, and human life. The 30 years after the Civil War were to reveal that this country was also rich in agricultural and mineral wealth, the enormous extent of which has even yet to be appraised accurately. The most productive of the earth's wheat lands, once the secret of cultivating them had been discovered, stretched across the Dakotas and eastern Montana. In the most westerly parts of these states, in large areas of Wyoming, Colorado, and Texas, and even in sections of Nevada, Utah, and Arizona, seemingly boundless grazing lands lay ready to feed the cattle and sheep that would supply most of America's and the world's beef, mutton, hides, and wool. Other parts of the plains and the mountains held some of the world's largest and purest veins of copper and iron ore, some of the world's most extensive deposits of lead and zinc, and valuable seams of coal. Beneath the earth in Texas (and elsewhere in the West, as time proved), were incredible reserves of crude petroleum and natural gas.

For centuries, nature had developed and stored these riches. But for generations the forest-oriented nation had even less use for

The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 again reversed Indian policy. Under men like John Collier, who had lived much of his life among the Navajos, the Office of Indian Affairs succeeded in restoring tribal land-holding and tribal incentive on a wide scale. Collier's administration turned the "vanishing Americans" into one of the fastest-growing groups in the population of the United States. By 1966 their number approached 600,000.

them than did the Indians who roamed the western lands. Americans had plenty of land elsewhere; their need for coal as a fuel and for iron in construction remained small, since the older settled areas were still well supplied with wood. Copper was almost wasted on a people with little use, as yet, for electric wire. The supply of Pennsylvania petroleum, which was burned almost exclusively as an illuminant rather than a fuel, was more than adequate for a nation still awaiting the automobile. In the mid-nineteenth century, traditional channels of investment continued to reward American capital well enough, and men of means were content to leave to prospectors with little standing and less credit the job of searching out new wealth. And the prospectors cared little about the future requirements of organized society; they followed, unflinchingly, only the most ancient of lures—the precious metals, gold and silver.

The early prospectors for gold in California had a fine code and fine camaraderie. "Honesty was the ruling passion of '48," one of them wrote. "If an *hombre* got broke, he asked the first one he met to lend him such amount as he wanted until he could 'dig her out.' The loans were always made and always paid according to promise." A year later, however, the California crowds had thickened:

expand as western Europe turned from farming toward industry, with populous manufacturing cities that had to be fed. The future of wheat-growing on the plains appeared all the rosier because for eight consecutive years after 1877 the region enjoyed such plentiful rainfall that many believed its characteristic aridity had passed.

While American agricultural production soared, the seemingly limitless demand kept prices high. From 1866 to 1875, the average annual price of a bushel of wheat was \$1.24. In the next decade the average price was still 92 cents. Such prices encouraged expansion, mainly by farmers mortgaging

their land to the limit in order to acquire more land before the next fellow got it. This practice was encouraged by the banks and their optimistic managers.

Wise heads knew that the West was riding for a fall; over-production in the United States by the mid-1880's, the entry of India and Australia into the world wheat market, the revival of Russian wheat production, the rise of tariff barriers in Europe, all were ill omens. Yet just as buffalo had drawn the Indians to the virgin West, as gold had drawn the prospector, and grass the rancher, so wheat had drawn the farmer. He alone had come to stay.

Readings

* Asterisk indicates that book is available in paperback.

R. A. Billington, *Westward Expansion* * (1967), has informative and admirably organized sections on each of the themes discussed in this chapter. Useful also are T. D. Clark, *Frontier America: The Story of the Westward Movement* * (1959); F. L. Paxson, *The Last American Frontier* (1910); and Allan Nevins, *Emergence of Modern America, 1865-1878* (1927). W. P. Webb, *The Great Plains* * (1931), J. C. Malin, *The Grassland of North America* (1948), and Isaiah Bowman, *The Frontier Fringe* (1931), are extraordinarily imaginative studies that add greatly to our understanding of the relationship between the natural environment and social life. Thurman Wilkins, *Clarence King* (1958); W. C. Darrah, *Powell of the Colorado* (1951); and Wallace Stegner, *Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: John Wesley Powell and the Second Opening of the West* * (1954), are unusually interesting biographies of men who first assayed the natural resources of the Far West. Good regional studies include O. O. Winther, *The Great Northwest* (1950); R. N. Richardson and C. C. Rister, *The Great Southwest* (1934); J. C. Caughey, *History of the Pacific Coast* (1933); and H. E. Briggs, *Frontiers of the Northwest: A History of the Upper Missouri Valley* (1940). Robert Taft, *Artists and Illustrators of the Old West 1850-1900* (1953), is well illustrated and contains much useful information.

A moving modern account of Indian life is found in J. C. Collier, *Indians of the Americas* * (1947). See also the general accounts in the Readings for Chapter I. F. G. Roe, *The Indian and the Horse* (1955), is outstanding. Harold McCracken, *George Catlin and the Old Frontier* (1959), is scholarly and superbly illustrated. Wayne Gard, *The Great Buffalo Hunt* (1959), does justice to its subject. J. P. Dunn, *Massacres of the Mountains* (1886), is a comprehensive contemporary account of the Indian wars. R. G. Athearn, *William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West* (1956), offers a modern introduction to this subject. Angie Debo, *And Still the Waters Run* (1940), is excellent on the later phases of Indian removal. H. H. Jackson, *A Century of Dishonor* * (1881), is a passionate indictment of Indian policy to that date. L. G. Priest, *Uncle Sam's Stepchildren: The Reformation of United States Indian Policy 1865-1887* (1942), is a scholarly modern examination of this subject.

The standard study of the mining country is T. A. Rickard, *A History of American Mining* (1932). More detailed on special subjects is Rickard's *Man and Metals* (2 vols., 1932). An outstanding more recent survey is R. W. Paul, *Mining Frontiers of the Far West*

1848-1880 * (1963). Useful also is W. J. Trimble, *The Mining Advance into the Inland Empire* (1914). More colorful are G. C. Quiett, *Pay Dirt, a Panorama of American Gold Rushes* (1936), and C. H. Shinn, *The Story of the Mine* (1896), mainly the story of the Comstock Lode. Shinn's *Mining Camps: A Study in American Frontier Government* * (1885) is solid. R. E. and M. F. Stewart, *Adolph Sutro* (1962), tells the story of the tunnel and its maker. Mark Twain, *Roughing It* (2 vols., 1872), is the great writer's stirring account of Nevada days. J. V. Frederick, *Ben Holladay, the Stagecoach King* (1940), is informative on transportation before the coming of the railroad, as are Arthur Chapman, *The Pony Express* (1932), and L. R. Hafen, *The Overland Mail, 1849-1869* (1926).

Three sound general works on the cattle kingdom are E. S. Osgood, *The Day of the Cattleman* * (1929); E. E. Dale, *The Range Cattle Industry* (1930); and Louis Pelzer, *The Cattleman's Frontier* (1936). More specialized are O. B. Peake, *The Colorado Range Cattle Industry* (1937); M. G. Burlingame, *The Montana Frontier* (1942); and Charles Lindsay, *The Big Horn Basin* (1932). On the cowboy himself, Andy Adams, *Log of a Cowboy* * (1903), and P. A. Rollins, *The Cowboy* (1922), are well worth reading. J. B. Frantz and J. E. Choate, *The American Cowboy: The Myth and the Reality* (1955), offers a modern appraisal. Enlightening on the badmen and the coming of law and order to the West is Wayne Gard, *Frontier Justice* (1949).

F. A. Shannon, *The Farmer's Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897* (1945), is a scholarly analysis of the settlement of the West and the transition from ranching to farming. On the distribution and sale of the western domain, useful accounts may be found in R. M. Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage* * (1942); B. H. Hibbard, *A History of the Public Land Policies* (1924); and A. M. Sakolski, *The Great American Land Bubble* (1932). A scholarly study of land policy in the twentieth century is E. L. Peffer, *Closing of the Public Domain: Disposal and Reservation Policies, 1900-1950* (1951). H. R. Lamar, *Dakota Territory 1861-1889: A Study of Frontier Politics* (1956), is a good introduction to statehood preliminaries. Farm technology is discussed in volume II of Waldemar Kaempffert, *A Popular History of American Invention* (2 vols., 1924). More specialized and detailed is W. T. Hutchinson, *Cyrus Hall McCormick* (2 vols., 1935). On pioneer farm life, Everett Dick, *The Sod-House Frontier, 1854-1890* (1937), and Mari Sandoz, *Old Jules* * (1935), present detailed and dramatic stories. Very revealing also are the novels of Ole Rølvaag, especially *Giants in the Earth* * (1929), and Willa Cather's *O Pioneers!* * (1913), and *My Antonia* * (1918).

the *Kitty's Amelia*, Captain Hugh Crow, out of Bristol, which got her clearance papers in time and sailed on 27 July 1807.

There has been a great deal of scholarly debate over the reasons for this extraordinary success in overthrowing an institution which had so recently been considered vital to the nation. Until the publication of Eric Williams's *Capitalism and Slavery* in 1944, most historians accepted the self-image of the abolitionists. They assumed that their triumph over the slave trade represented a moral revolution among the common people, closely linked with the evangelical revival both within and outside the Church of England.⁵⁰ The most prominent of this school of historians was Sir Reginald Coupland of Oxford, who accepted the famous dictum of W. E. H. Lecky that 'the unwearied, unostentatious, and glorious crusade of England against slavery [and the slave trade] may properly be regarded as among the three or four perfectly virtuous pages comprised in the history of nations'.⁵¹ Williams jettisoned this assumption, and argued that the real cause of abolition was a change in the balance of power of economic pressure groups. Slavery and the slave trade had brought profits which were central to the rise of the industrial middle class. As society industrialised, however, its needs became different. Free trade was essential to find markets, and it was therefore of the essence to destroy the protectionist pressure group of whom the West India interest were chief allies. At the same time, many of the West Indians themselves turned against the slave trade because soil exhaustion in the older islands created intense fears of competition, over-production and declining prices which would result if newer islands, British or foreign, were able to get a supply of slaves. Apart from this weakening, however, Williams's main conclusion is that the West Indians were attacked not because they were distasteful as slaveholders, but because they were dangerous allies of those opposed to the creation of the economic conditions required by a modern industrialised state. The moral arguments of the abolitionists were thus

⁵⁰ As for instance in Clarkson, *History of the Abolition of the African Slave-Trade*, passim.

⁵¹ R. Coupland, *The British Anti-Slavery Movement* (Oxford, 1933) p. 251. For other versions of this thesis, see C. M. McInnes, *England and Slavery* (London, 1934); Klingberg, *Anti-Slavery Movement*; G. R. Mellor, *British Imperial Trusteeship, 1783-1850* (London, 1951) pp. 31-80.

superficial, as indeed were the very issues of slavery and the slave trade.

Although it is quite true that economic change made slave-trade abolition possible, and that over-production was endemic in the islands, Williams's thesis now seems to require serious modification. It has been attacked by Anstey for its failure to show the relationship between economic forces and detailed political decisions on abolition.⁵² Moreover, there are many scholars who do not admit his almost total rejection of the emergence of humanitarianism as a force in itself. Nor does Williams explain the fact that many of the Members of Parliament who eventually voted *for* abolition came from county constituencies with agrarian interests, which supposedly represented the most reactionary and protectionist elements in English society. The last blow to the thesis is that after emancipation the British abolitionists fought a desperate rearguard action *against* free trade in sugar, since this would give a new impetus to slavery in Cuba and Brazil.⁵³

The history of the French anti-slavery movement in the eighteenth century, although it was cut short by the Revolution and the disaster of Saint-Domingue, also challenges Williams's assumption that abolitionists were primarily economic men. It has already been pointed out that the relationship between the West India trade and the growth of industrialism was even less marked in France than in Britain. The wares for the slave trade came primarily from Germany and the Netherlands, and profits, by and large, were not put into industrialisation. Certainly some French families did rise to prominence through the trade, but they appear to have ploughed their profits back into further ventures in Guinea and the West Indies rather than investing them in enterprises alien to the part of the economic world with which they had become familiar. In short, the French slave trade was largely a self-sufficient operation within the French economy,

⁵² R. G. Anstey, 'Capitalism and Slavery: A Critique', *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., XXI (1968) 307-20. Anstey has put forward an alternative hypothesis on the interaction between intellectual and political change in 'A Reinterpretation of the Abolition of the British Slave Trade, 1806-1807', *English Historical Review*, LXXXVII (1972) 304-32.

⁵³ C. Duncan Rice, "'Humanity Sold for Sugar!': The British Abolitionist Response to Free Trade in Slave-Grown Sugar", *Historical Journal*, XIII (1970) 402-18.

little connected with the advance of industrialisation. Moreover, at the time when French sentiment against the trade was increasing, the country's economy was by no means mature enough for even its businessmen to call for free trade, which would have exposed them to ruinous competition with the English. As for the state of the opposition, it was not weakening but strengthening, since sugar cultivation was still booming in Martinique and Guadeloupe, and there was every reason to demand a stepping-up of the slave trade rather than its abolition to bring the virgin soils of Saint-Domingue under cultivation – at least until the cataclysm of its slave revolt. Although the tardiness of French industrialisation and the increasing vested interest in providing a slave labour force raised doubts as to whether the French abolitionists could have been successful even if events had not been interrupted by the Revolution, what is clear is that the French produced an anti-slavery movement completely outside the kind of economic environment which Williams insists was essential to the emergence of abolitionism in Britain.

The eighteenth-century movement in France has never been fully studied, although the pamphlet literature it produced was enormous.⁵⁴ The Société des Amis des Noirs was admittedly founded in 1788 after letters of advice had been dispatched to France by the London Abolition Committee, but it was the product of a growing revulsion against slavery in the articulate sectors of French society. Although some of its members, like Jean-Pierre Brissot himself, were men from a relatively modest background, a majority of the subscribers to the *Amis* were drawn from the ranks of the liberal aristocracy, the very elements to whom the *philosophes* had made their appeal. Men like Clavière, Lafayette or Rochefoucauld were hardly the lackeys of a nascent capitalism. Subscriptions were high, the society met only infrequently, and its success in raising grass-roots enthusiasm in the provinces was negligible. There was nothing here to compare with the magnificent organisation of the English abolitionists, whose propaganda and correspondence created contacts throughout the country. The French anti-slavery movement, in fact, was socially more substantial yet politically less effective than the British. The Société des Amis des Noirs did not attack slavery,

⁵⁴ A convenient selection has been reprinted as *The French Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery*, 12 vols (The Hague, 1968).

and as late as 1790 it was stating only that it would not end its efforts until 'la traite des noirs ne fut abolie et l'esclavage adoucie', though this was no more conservative than the position of its English counterpart at the same time.⁵⁵ In spite of France's relative economic backwardness, the message of the abolitionists became attractive as soon as the power of the monarchy was broken. One of the National Assembly's first acts was to denounce the slave trade. Although this was connected with the general flush of libertarian enthusiasm, and was in any case not enforced owing to the confusion of war-time and the outbreak in Haiti, it is an impressive indication of the strength of French sentiment opposed to the trade, upon which the *Amis des Noirs* actually failed to capitalise. Slave-trade abolition did not come until the end of the Napoleonic period, under strong British diplomatic pressure. But it is clear that changing philosophical and religious attitudes produced a widespread questioning of the French slave trade without stimulus from substantial economic change.⁵⁶

The lesson here, in Britain and in America, was that the abolitionists could only succeed, as they did in England and the Northern English colonies, when the economic rationalisation for slavery or the slave trade had become weak. This is not to suggest that slaving and slaveholding survived only where they were economically essential. Like any institutions they acquired a momentum of their own, and they carried on even while they were effectively luxuries until seriously challenged. This challenge was not an economic one, for the abolitionist ideology emerged from a complex series of changes in European and American assumptions on hierarchy in society. Even then, where slavery or slave-trading was economically essential, it could defend itself against such change, as it did in the Southern states of the U.S.A., the French colonies and Latin America. Abolitionist success in the eighteenth century came only where the institutions then attacked were already weakening or where they had never really been necessary. It was only in the nineteenth century that abolitionist ideology and organisation gained its own

⁵⁵ *Adresse aux amis de l'humanité, par la Société des Amis des Noirs* (Paris, 1790) p. 1.

⁵⁶ E. D. Secber, *Anti-Slavery Opinion in France during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century* (Baltimore, 1937); G. Martin, *Histoire de l'esclavage dans les colonies françaises* (Paris, 1948) pp. 166–91.

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"California for Americans!" forcibly to eject the despised dark-skinned and under-sized foreigners from Mexico, South America, and southern Europe (including the French) "who were stealing the gold of the United States." English, German, and Irish miners helped the native Americans. Blood flowed abundantly, and anarchy reigned in the camps. Finally the foreigners were compelled to abandon their claims. Many moved to the cities or to the southern districts; thousands returned to their native lands rather than submit to indignities and persecution; and others became robbers and bandits. The agitation against the dark-skinned foreigners spread to San Francisco.

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The anti-foreign feeling in California was unquestionably intensified by the presence of Southerners, who comprised nearly one-third of her population in the first decade of American rule. Of these a minority were of educated, pure American stock. In some cases they brought with them their slaves and a profound conviction that California should be a white man's country. But this class was greatly outnumbered by immigrants from the border states, whose ignorance and extreme race antipathies classed together all persons other than white Europeans.

To that feeling contributed also the hatred against the Indian, now especially intense because of the attacks of the plains Indians upon whites passing through their country while crossing the continent to California. The Christianized, virtually enslaved Mission Indian of California was of a degraded type and aroused only contempt on the part of the settlers and newcomers.

"Poor whites" of the frontier of Georgia had been the first to draw the colour line against the Indian. In 1774, therefore, the government of Georgia had ordained that the murder of an Indian should be punishable under the laws of the province

even as was the murder of a white man. The preamble to this law observed that the law was passed because "it has been represented that some Indians in amity with this province have been barbarously murdered, to the great scandal of society and the danger of involving the province in a bloody and expensive war; and there is reason to believe that several ill-disposed persons have not considered such inhuman actions in a proper light but being influenced by the ill-grounded prejudice which ignorant minds are apt to conceive against persons differing in colour from themselves, and, unaware of the consequences, have looked on these murders rather as meritorious. . . ."

Before this time, during the French and Indian War (1754-63), Virginia had offered scalp bounties¹ as an incentive for soldiers and farmers to kill Indians siding with the French. Eager for scalp money, German settlers in the mountains—part ancestors of the "mountain whites" in the Appalachians today—led by a British officer, ambushed and slew forty Cherokees, who had entered the war on the English side. Of course the bounty was given for any Indian scalp as the hair of a French Indian could not be distinguished from that of an English one. In December 1763 a group of Presbyterian Scotch-Irish frontiersmen, "in private life, virtuous and respectable, not cruel but mild and merciful," collected in this way bounties offered by Pennsylvania—in its proclamation of war against the Delaware Indians (1756)—for the scalps of Indian converts of Moravian missionaries living in three tiny

¹ This method was introduced in 1641 by Wilhelmus Kieft, Dutch director-general of New Netherland—presumably imitating a similar practice in the East Indies—and later on was adopted by the Puritans. It was, in a way, a money-saving expedient. If the frontier farmers could be encouraged to make offensive war against the Indians on a commission basis, fewer regular soldiers—paid and maintained by the government during long periods of inactivity—would be needed. The last American scalp bounty was offered by the Territory of Indiana in 1814 as an "encouragement to the enterprise and bravery of our fellow citizens."

settlements in north-eastern Pennsylvania. Did not "the Scripture command that the heathen should be destroyed"? The Reverend Mr. Elder, pastor of these murderers, condoned their act and failed to assist the authorities in their apprehension and punishment, warning that it was "dangerous to act in opposition to an outraged multitude." In fact, the murders were generally and popularly approved. General Samuel Curtis—in his report on the Sand Creek massacre in Colorado (1864), for which the Methodist preacher and missionary to the Indians, the Reverend Mr. Chivington, was responsible—stated that the popular cry of settlers and soldiers on the frontier favoured an indiscriminate slaughter which was very difficult to restrain. He wrote: "I abhor this style, but so it goes, from Minnesota to Texas. . . ."

John Beeson, one of the early emigrants to Oregon—not a sentimental humanitarian, but a hard-headed, practical man of affairs—publishing his notes in the decade before the Civil War, writes about the covered-wagon epoch: "The majority of the first emigration to Oregon were from Missouri; and among them it was customary to speak of the Indian man as a buck; of the woman as a squaw; until, at length, in the general acceptance of the terms, they ceased to recognize the rights of humanity in those to whom they were so applied. By a very natural and easy transition, from being spoken of as brutes, they came to be thought of as game to be shot, or as vermin to be destroyed." In another passage Beeson gives us a picture of the sentiment of that period: "On another occasion, a white man being found dead, he was supposed to have been killed by Indians. A company was made up forthwith, an Indian ranch was surrounded, and all the inmates put to death, men, women, and children. The domineering spirit grew by what it fed on, until, excited to madness by these oft-recurring scenes of blood, men became utterly regardless of justice, even

towards those of their own race. Whatever a man's private views might be, he was expected to go with the crowd, to the full extent of every enterprise. . . . Personal freedom was thus frequently invaded; and life itself was not secure."

In Oregon the legislature, the subordinate Indian agents, the Methodist clergy, and the Know-Nothing political party—all were directly implicated in systematically carrying on "Indian wars." The destruction of the Indians was advocated openly. During this period of agitation a slump in the mining industry left many miners unemployed. These unemployed were supported for many months at good pay as soldiers of the state, their only duties being to go out in bodies and kill Indians—women, "the very seeds of increase," and children included.

In California the extermination of the Indians began in 1849 and continued until well on into the seventies. One of the early settlers wrote concerning events in which he participated at the late date of August 15, 1865: "I had often argued with Good regarding the disposition of the Indians. He believed in killing every man or well-grown boy, but in leaving the women unmolested in their mountain retreats. It was plain to me that we must also get rid of the women." Another settler wrote of an occurrence in April 1871: "The next day the whites trail the Indians with dogs, corner them in a cave, and kill about thirty. In the cave with the men were some Indian children. Kingsley could not bear to kill children with his fifty-six caliber rifle. 'It tore them up so bad.' So he did it with his thirty-eight caliber Smith and Wesson revolver." Such were the feelings of many of the early whites on the Pacific Coast. In California, without the ratification of any treaty or the semblance of purchase, the native Indians were completely dispossessed—in so far as the white man wished—during the first half-century of United States possession.

All these circumstances helped to establish the antagonism against the "dark-skinned foreigners." The repulsive stereotype had become "set" in definite feeling and emotional pattern.

It was during the gold-rush period that, enticed by the "Golden Romance," the first Chinese arrived in California. As soon as they began to enter the placer regions in ever-increasing numbers, the anti-foreign feeling of the whites, at first directed against the Spanish-Americans, was turned also against the Chinese. Their physical appearance, their queues, their strange attire, their habits of living, marked them as objects for attack. Their lack of political influence encouraged brutal treatment. This hostile attitude manifested itself in riots and attempted lynchings. During the fifties, through the efforts of the miners, the California state legislature passed several discriminatory laws intended to restrict immigration by taxation. Later, these laws were declared to be unconstitutional. Many Chinese left the mines, and the others confined themselves to the poorer or to the abandoned claims. Later on, when the mining corporations were organized, many of them were employed as labourers. In 1860, 60 per cent of the Chinese were in eleven mining counties engaged in mining and in domestic occupations. By 1870, only 45 per cent remained in these counties, while 38 per cent were now settled in and about the cities of San Jose, Sacramento, and San Francisco.

Driven from the mines, the Chinese had found employment as common labourers; as domestics; in the manufacture of cigars, boots, shoes, woollen goods, clothing, bags, oakum, soap, and candles. They worked as store-keepers, hotel-keepers, laundrymen, carpenters, cabinet-makers, upholsterers, carvers, restaurant cooks, and so on. They were to be found in lumber, paper, and powder mills, in tanneries, rope-walks, lead-

works, and tin shops. There was scarcely a trade in which they did not engage.

In the beginning (1851-59) there was a labour vacuum. The fortune-seekers had no intention of performing menial, petty, and laborious tasks, or of earning their money as common labourers. Under these circumstances it can easily be understood how the Chinese got their chance. During this first period of western manufacturing, before organized white labour succeeded in gradually displacing the Chinese, many industries were monopolized by the latter. The making of boots, shoes, slippers, brooms, and underwear, the packing of pork and the drying of fish, were wholly in Chinese hands. The making of cigars, shirts, tinware, tallow, and jute products was almost entirely so. By 1865, 80 per cent of all the labour in the woollen mills of California was Chinese.

Several hundred Chinese were engaged in the fishing industry; thousands of them were employed in the canneries as year-round employees, seasonal labourers, and as emergency or extra labourers. The willingness of the Chinese to undertake any sort of labour was of particular value in a population largely made up of males. The lack of white female labour made the Chinese indispensable for work in the kitchen, in hotels and restaurants, in laundries, and in other activities.

But there was also plenty of work in other fields. Without Chinese labour the building of the Union Pacific, Northern Pacific, and Southern Pacific railroads would hardly have been possible. The delta region of the Sacramento Valley was a marshland. The wilderness had to be cleared.

The Chinese were needed, thousands of them. Poverty, famine, and ruin in China after the great Taiping rebellion (1850-64) made thousands emigrate from the agricultural districts of Kwang Tung to the "Golden Mountains." They reclaimed swamplands, constructed railroads, built levees and

themselves are not convinced that, aside from some folk-lore, folk-dances, and folkways, there is a cultural background worth preserving and developing. In recent years the problem of teaching English to Spanish-speaking children has also gained the attention of the Federal Bureau of Education and the state departments of education in the Southwest.

The main purpose of all these experiments is to develop a vocabulary (by means of activities and formal instruction) on which to build the education, and to make pupils think in English. The principal difficulty will be to avoid producing a cleavage in the children's minds between home and emotional life on the one hand and school and intellectual life on the other. Other countries confronted with the same bilingual and bicultural problem have abandoned the exclusive use of the direct method. They have adopted the practice of developing the elementals with the vernacular as the medium of instruction; the "foreign" language is introduced gradually in order to effect a more perfect synthesis. This method is, however, not possible in most of the states, as the state laws prohibit the use of Spanish in the grammar school. Social and political conditions are of such nature that a change in this attitude is not likely, at least in the near future.

The most important point in these experiments is that the problem has finally been recognized and is being studied, and that this study forms an integral part of the preparation of teachers. The work done by L. S. Tireman in Albuquerque, New Mexico, deserves special mention since it also reaches the teachers actually in service.

The American attitude towards the Mexican and the indigenuous Spanish culture of the Southwest is in strange contrast to the official attitude towards the Indian civilizations in New Mexico and Arizona.

It is not necessary to recall here the whole history of the

relations between the Indians and the American settlers.² The Indians passed from being independent aboriginal tribes, sovereign "foreign" nations, to becoming protectorates. Tribal sovereignty was gradually limited until the Indians became "dependent nations" "under the immediate care and patronage" of the United States, and finally communities of "wards" or reservation Indians. Intertribal warfare, often stimulated by the whites; rivalry and wars between the European colonies, in which the red men participated as allies; "Indian wars"; and diseases and epidemics, sometimes said to be propagated by the whites, decimated their numbers. While the traders attracted the wrath of the Indians by cheating, sexual irregularities, and slave raiding, the land hunger of the frontiersmen frustrated all government policies and treaties devised to set aside a separate Indian country. If the settlers did not actually say that the Indians were the Hittites who were to be driven out before the saints of the Lord, they did accept the doctrine that "manifest destiny" must drive the Indians from the earth. Ahab never spoke kindly of Naboth. A policy of extermination was put into practice;³ it found its ideology in the doctrine that "the red man withers at the touch of civilization." The old Indian custom of exchanging presents as a ratification of treaties developed into a form of bribery to persuade the Indians to sign treaties and to keep peace. Payments were also made to save them from starvation since "it was cheaper to feed the whole flock for one year than to fight them for one week." These treaty payments actually be-

² In this report I have touched on the Indian only slightly and incidentally. I am fully aware that in a complete study of American race relations much more space should be given to this particular race problem with which even the first settlers were confronted. However, I restricted myself to actual conditions for the understanding of which the general and historical problems are of only secondary importance.

³ See Chapter I.

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Misc extracts on Indian-White issues

as were the injuries not resulting in death. The fact that more white men were not killed or wounded during attempted rape was due without question to the profound fear, on the part of the Indians, of stirring up a so-called war, which could only result disastrously to themselves.¹¹¹

Although immediate, armed resistance was thus the primary instinctive response, it did not constitute the entire reaction pattern. Abortive or frustrated resistance and, more often, involuntary compulsory acquiescence did not relieve the feelings of the offended persons or their community. A long series of violations or an occasional single vicious crime was adequate to stir in the native soul the most bitter rancor and animosity. More often perhaps than is realized these emotions built up to a point where some individuals, or perhaps the whole tribe, could no longer inhibit them. Then a desire for revenge became predominant and manifested itself in depredations on the whites or even in open warfare. This secondary or delayed response was more significant to native welfare than blind resistance at the scene of the crime. For the majority of sober white men sympathized with the outraged sentiments of the natives when the latter were directly defending their homes and families against criminals. But this sympathy vanished very quickly when innocent white people began to suffer for the derelictions of the guilty. For the sake of immediate protection and by virtue of pure racial solidarity revenge upon the community at large was not tolerated, no matter how extreme the original provocation. The final result, inevitably, was further punishment of the natives.

These considerations apply, to be sure, to many other types of outrage committed on the Indians. But in this instance the initial cause of trouble was so flagrant, so inexcusable, and so offensive to social decency that its effect on Indian sentiment was much greater than the actual harm done would appear to justify. The failure of both intuitive responses—immediate resistance and subsequent revenge—left a permanent scar upon the Indian nature. It forced him back to a silent,

¹¹¹ Resistance through legal channels, that is by the arrest and trial of offenders, was completely eliminated by the refusal of any white jury to convict a fellow countryman of any crime upon the Indian. But no case, to my knowledge, ever reached a jury, for no officer would make an arrest under such circumstances, nor would public opinion support a prosecution. Finally, owing to the law throwing out Indian testimony, no native, even the injured party herself, could be heard as a witness. Physical resistance on the spot was therefore the only means open to the Indians for the prevention of assault on women.

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ineradicable, suppressed animosity against all things American which was not forgotten long after other wrongs had passed into oblivion. As a focus for hatred and emotional conflict between the races the wholesale rape of Indian women stands unique.¹¹²

There is some evidence that the reaction of the native males was not directed exclusively toward the whites. When outright abduction or rape was involved, resentment probably was felt only against the perpetrator, not the victim. But on the frequent occasions when the circumstances were not wholly clear, the possibility of consent existed. Then jealousy might incite the husband or brother to take action against the woman. Even more serious was the reaction when the female was not directly assaulted but yielded to moral or financial pressure. Reference has already been made to the expression of M. B. Lewis that prostitutes were "outcasts among their own people," and the same idea is set forth in different words by the Yurok, Mrs. Lucy Thompson. A few extreme cases are on record, such as that mentioned

¹¹² In connection with offenses against Indian women it is pertinent to inquire briefly concerning the attacks by Indians on white women, for one might anticipate that the Indians would seek revenge in this manner. However, the facts do not bear out any such hypothesis. Molestation of white women by natives was a relatively rare phenomenon. In a survey of the press I have been able to find only five cases of the sort. The first was in 1852 (*Sacramento Union*, February 24), when Indians merely insulted a woman near Sacramento. The second was in 1859 (*San Francisco Bulletin*, July 2; *Sacramento Union*, June 28), when two drunken Indians made "insulting proposals" to a small girl at Yreka. The third was in 1861 (*Sacramento Union*, July 15), when a former mission Indian at San José attempted to rape a girl. The fourth, in 1861 (*Sacramento Union*, September 24), was a case of actual rape near Cache Creek. The fifth (*Marysville Appeal*, March 29, 1864) was an "attempted rape" on a woman on Bear River. Since an attack on a white woman was the most heinous crime an Indian could commit, every such case was certain to be reported in the metropolitan press. This means that in nearly fifteen years only four white females actually suffered sexual violence from Indian men, and it is not clear that in three of these the deed was actually consummated. (In the 1852 case, the woman was not physically disturbed.) This is a remarkable record, particularly when we consider the number of rapes by white men on white women during the same period and the number of Indian men who were in a position to perpetrate the crime. The fact that in three of the four cases the Indians were summarily lynched and in the fourth the attacker was shot by a parent might lead to the supposition that fear of consequences acted as a deterrent. However, Indians committed plenty of other crimes for which the punishment was just as certain, and must have foregone many opportunities for rape when escape was easy. The explanation must lie elsewhere. As a matter of fact, the entire long and bloody history of Indian warfare in the United States is remarkably free from accounts of Indian sex assaults on white women. Unless the chroniclers and historians have been deliberately suppressing the facts, the American Indian, who has been distinguished for his ferocity and cruelty, has shown himself singularly free from the urge to commit sexual violence on his enemies.

by Mason in which "a squaw was stoned to death in Sacramento County in 1850 for yielding to a white man,"¹⁴² or that in which a jealous Indian husband murdered his wife for cohabiting with a white man.¹⁴³ Such actions were infrequent, but they are indicative of the deep animosity which burned in the hearts of many Indians and which could find partial release in retaliation on their own kind. The emotional strain engendered by all types of interracial sexual congress is impossible to evaluate in concrete terms, but nevertheless it must have constituted a serious obstacle to rapid adaptation by the native to the American social order.

Before we leave the field of sex relations, a brief consideration of abortion is desirable. This phenomenon, although not strictly sexual in nature, reflects a state of unrest among the female population which may be associated with sexual factors as well as with other elements of the social order.

There is a cumulative mass of evidence to show that both abortion and infanticide were known and practiced by many of the California tribes, prior to the coming of the whites.¹⁴⁴ It is not surprising therefore that the custom should have continued even to modern times. It is impossible to determine statistically whether the number of these crimes increased after 1848, for no quantitative data whatever are available. Nevertheless, the opinion may be held that such an increase did occur.

One tribe among whom the habit of abortion was rather highly developed was the Pomo. Thus when Gifford and Kroeber studied the northern valley tribes their informants for the River Patwin, Hill Patwin, Hill Wintun, and Lake Miwok denied the aboriginal existence of both abortion and infanticide, whereas for the Pomo, six out of sixteen groups admitted abortion and seven admitted infanticide.¹⁴⁵ Aginsky has made a detailed study¹⁴⁶ of the custom as a means of birth

¹⁴² J. D. Mason, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

¹⁴³ *Sacramento Union*, May 30, 1859.

¹⁴⁴ Numerous recent ethnographic studies contain information on this point, particularly many of those which have appeared in the University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology.

¹⁴⁵ *Culture Element Distributions, IV: Pomo*, Univ. Calif. Publ. Am. Arch. and Ethn. (1937), 37:150.

¹⁴⁶ "Population Control in the Shanel (Pomo) Tribe," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.* (1939), 4:209-216.

control. He concluded that such procedure "was a traditionally accepted pattern of behavior and an integral aspect of their culture." The basis of such behavior he thinks was a somewhat limited aboriginal food supply and consequent mild population pressure. With the mechanism of control thus already in operation, it is entirely logical to expect its amplification and extension when the inflow of the white race further reduced the food supply and rendered existence precarious in all respects. At least two observers commented on the prevalence of these methods among the Pomo or their neighbors. Thus George Yount stated with reference to the Napa Valley Indians:¹⁴⁷ "...they murder their offspring at birth to rid themselves of the care and toil of nursing and raising them into life." Stephen Powers was even more explicit:¹⁴⁸

Neither was it [infanticide] caused, *as in later years*, by that deep and despairing melancholy which came over the hapless race when they saw themselves perishing so hopelessly and so miserably before the face of the American. [*Italics mine.*]

Powers (*op. cit.*, p. 416) agrees with Aginsky in his opinion that "the very presence of the crime of infanticide points to an over-fruitfulness and an over-population." Regarding the effect of the white invasion, he also states (p. 207) that the Clear Lake Pomo asserted they had not known infanticide before the whites came. This tribe, moreover, during the early period of settlement killed all half-breed infants at birth (p. 214). In another connection Powers (pp. 183-184) maintains that the Russian River Pomo commit this crime "to this day [1877] for they say they do not wish to rear any more children among the whites."

It is quite apparent from these citations that at least one tribe, the Pomo, showed an increase in the abortion and infanticide rate and, furthermore, that they rationalized their behavior with respect to the presence of the whites. The killing of half-white children indicates that not only were general economic conditions responsible, but that sexual factors, through miscegenation, were also involved. A statement of

¹⁴⁷ C. L. Camp, "The Chronicles of George C. Yount," *Calif. Hist. Soc., Quarterly* (1923), 2:56.

¹⁴⁸ *Op. cit.*, 3:178.

Mason regarding the Sierra Miwok shows that similar factors operated:²⁰⁰

They did not hesitate to commit infanticide when the means of living was scarce, believing... that an infant had better die than grow up to starvation.

Elimination of infants by murder or abortion must thus have been a material factor in population decline. Unfortunately, we have no way of determining its relative significance, nor can we set up regional or tribal comparisons. From the social standpoint, the prevalence of the custom must be regarded as a spontaneous response by individuals of the group to the unfavorable living conditions created through racial conflict.

SUMMARY AND COMPARISONS

In these pages, and in two previous essays, the attempt has been made to analyze the conflict between the California aborigines and the white race in terms of the material factors involved. From these studies certain similarities and differences in the Indian response emerge with respect to the mission type of culture, to the pre-American settlers of Latin extraction, and to the Yankee invasion after the Mexican War.

The fundamental clue to success in interracial competition is the change in population. Under the relatively favorable control of the missions the natives suffered considerable diminution. From the mission records it is ascertained that approximately 53,600 Indians underwent conversion. At the end of the mission period (1834) there were 14,900 left, a reduction of 72 per cent. This signifies a mean annual reduction of 0.9 per cent. The six wild tribes which came into direct contact with the California civil and military civilization between 1800 and 1848 were reduced from approximately 58,900 to 35,950, or 0.8 per cent annually. The surviving mission Indians together with the remainder of the wild tribes which were subjected to Anglo-American influence from 1848 to 1865 diminished from 72,000 to 23,000, a mean annual depletion of 2.9 per cent. From these figures alone, it is apparent that the impact of the settlement from the United States was three times as severe as that of pre-American colonization.

²⁰⁰ J. D. Mason, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

The triad of factors which brings about a decline in population is war, disease, and starvation. In the missions, war was of negligible consequence. A study of expeditions and sporadic fighting shows that for the six wild tribes mentioned above, roughly 11.5 per cent of the decline may be attributed to casualties suffered in armed conflict. The corresponding value for the period after 1848 is 8.6 per cent. Hence, although the absolute effect of warfare was greater in the American period, its relative influence on population decline was substantially the same as in the years of Ibero-American domination.

The relative effect of disease was also quite uniform, since in the missions, in the valley before 1848, and generally after 1848, approximately 60 per cent of the decline may be attributed to this cause. Such a result is not surprising, since most of the mortality was due to introduced epidemic maladies and the action of these upon a nonimmune population is entirely independent of the culture which introduces them. It is probable that the spread of disease was intensified in the missions by the crowded living conditions there but, on the other hand, this factor may have been nullified by the hygienic, sanitary, and curative measures adopted by the missionaries.

The effect of dietary maladjustment cannot be evaluated in strictly numerical terms. This factor operates on both birth rate and death rate; moreover, very few persons actually died of direct starvation. In the missions the subsistence level seems to have been low, and, because of a tendency to rely upon cereal crops, there may have been vitamin and mineral deficiencies. The nonconverted Indians encountered the problem of depletion rather than alteration of diet. Until 1848, the reduction of food supply was not serious because the few settlers in the interior did not materially alter the natural flora and fauna. After the gold rush, however, the universal conversion of fertile valleys into farms, the widespread cattle ranching on the hills, and the pollution of the streams all combined to destroy the animal and plant species used for food. The transition to a white dietary, although ultimately accomplished, was rendered difficult by economic and social obstacles. During the interim a great deal of malnutrition was present. From the nutritional standpoint, therefore, the natives suffered most under Anglo-Saxon domination.

Certain quasicultural items were undoubtedly significant in intensifying the effect of the primary lethal factors. Among these were, in particular, labor and sex relations. In the missions a great deal of unrest and maladjustment was caused by the current system of forced labor and of drastically restricted liberty in sex matters. In both these, the basic difficulty was not physical but emotional and was derived from the compulsion which forced activity into new and unaccustomed channels. Under the Americans, compulsion was of a different character, but even more disruptive in its effects. The native was compelled to labor by economic necessity rather than by personal command. In acquiring the tools and the facility for work he was obstructed by a hostile society, rather than aided by a paternal government. Hence his progress was slow and his entire material welfare—diet and health—suffered in consequence. From the sexual inhibitions of the mission environment he was carried by the Americans to the most violent and brutal excesses and his women subjected to universal outrage. The hatred and despair thus generated found expression in still further retardation of his material adjustment.

On the whole, therefore, and for many causes, the conflict of the native with the settlers from the United States was characterized by far greater violence than the conflict with the invaders from Latin America. This violence was reflected in greater relative population decline and in more difficult adjustment in all material respects under the American occupation.

APPENDIX

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gap and other inland routes, would have exposed the British colonies to very grave danger from the French. Far from being hostile, however, leaders of the coastal tribes, such as Powhatan in Virginia, welcomed the whites both as traders and as potential allies against Indian rivals. Nor did these leaders grudge the comparatively small amount of land required, particularly as some of the colonists resorted to purchasing land in order to avoid difficulties of title—a policy which certain colonial governments sought to restrict by legislative enactment. Very soon, however, a growing flood of colonists, white aggression, and white participation in native wars, opened the eyes of the Indian leaders and led to bloody and costly conflicts. As the Emperor Powhatan pathetically asked the Virginian settlers, "Why should you destroy us who have provided you with food?" "Why should you take by force from us that which you can obtain by love?" A twelve years war in the Virginia area virtually exterminated tribe after tribe. Again, in 1675-6, King Phillip's War practically destroyed the Indian race and influence in New England. In this war half the hostile Indians together with one eleventh of the adult white males and an unrecorded number of white women and children perished. From 1649 onwards the Iroquois, frequently armed with white weapons, destroyed or conquered the Hurons, Susquehannocks, Delawares, the Moundbuilders of the Ohio valley and other native peoples. This aggression depopulated a large part of North America and left the Iroquois themselves exhausted and depleted in numbers even before they completed their ruin by participating in the Anglo-French wars.

Two centuries of European invasion saw the initial friendly relations (including frequent marriages between white traders and Indian women) pass into a period of hatred and race prejudice. The Indians learnt to despise the traders for their cheating, rum selling, sexual irregularities, kidnapping and slave raiding, and to detest the frontiersman who invaded, occupied and despoiled their hunting territories. From the white viewpoint the Indian men and women were of value to the trader. To the frontier settler, however, Indian males proved of little use as labourers, while Indian women proved inferior to European women experienced in domestic or farm life. For these and other reasons the settlers frequently attempted to exterminate the Indians. Some groups

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retreated westwards to the territories of other groups, with resulting disturbances, and colonial governments established small reservations as havens of refuge for the dispossessed survivors and even began to consider moving all the Indians westwards in the hope of placing them beyond the reach of "the Indian slaying frontiersman".

AMERICAN AND INDIAN CONTACTS

During the century which followed the War of Independence the American frontier rolled across the continent. The process was marked by American policies and atrocities possibly even less excusable than those of the Colonial-British, for philanthropic ideas had advanced, and the centre of Government was now seated within the United States. The young Republic gained the right to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes and this power gave Congress "almost unlimited control over Indian affairs" excepting in certain of the original Thirteen States". As early as 1775 the Continental Congress appointed Northern, Middle and Southern Departments to replace the British organisations, and in 1789 the first Congress gave the War Department all duties "relative to Indian affairs".

The years 1789-1871 have been called the "Treaty Making Period", because the Federal Government made treaties with the tribes as the white wave foamed across their territories. The Government attempted by treaty and legislation to prevent the whites trespassing on Indian country; to monopolise land purchases; to prohibit the sale of liquor and to prevent outrages by either side. Nevertheless from Washington's presidency onwards the Federal failure to control white delinquencies resulted in constant wars and a steady decline of Indian population. As an American historian has put it the uncontrollable frontiersmen constantly encroached on Indian lands in defiance of treaty; they destroyed the game on which the Indians depended for food and clothing, and in many cases were ready to slay any redskin on sight. Of course the savages were often the aggressors, but the inexorable westward thrust of the whites was the principal cause of conflict".

Soon after the American Revolution General Wayne invaded the Ohio Great Lakes region and subdued it for white settlement by the devastating campaign of 1794. In the following years

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the whites descended on the great Indian Confederations of the South-East—the Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks and Cherokees, and the demand grew that these peoples should be transplanted west of the Mississippi. Devastated by smallpox most of the surviving Chickasaws, Choctaws and Creeks emigrated voluntarily, but the Federal Government and the State of Georgia were forced to exercise great pressure to move the Cherokees. The story ranks amongst the worst in English-speaking history. The Americans dragged from their homes a largely civilised people; drove them to concentration camps at the point of the bayonet, and abandoned their dwellings and possession to white plunderers and thieves. From the white viewpoint the deportation was "a complete success". Of twelve thousand Indians "probably four thousand slept in unmarked graves around concentration camps or along the line of march" to the west". A Georgian volunteer summed up this atrocity of 1838 in one biting sentence, "I fought through the Civil War, and have seen men shot to pieces and slaughtered by thousands, but the Cherokee removal was the cruellest work I ever-knew".

The mass of surviving Indians was now across the Mississippi and for a passing moment the Americans played with the idea that they could segregate the natives in a consolidated Indian territory between the frontier farms along the Mississippi and the mountains and deserts of the West. As a Senate Committee on Indian affairs smugly reported in 1836, "With this uninhabitable region on the west of the Indian territory, they cannot be surrounded by white population. They are on the outside of us, and in a place which will ever remain on the outside".

Even in 1836 such hopes were mere folly. The Americans were already establishing communications by road, canal and river steamer. They were founding States and Territories west of the Mississippi, and they were penetrating the Indian country by the Santa Fe and Oregon trails to the Pacific, where, since 1811, they had been extending their trading posts.

In 1846-7 the Mormons made their heroic trek and proved that Utah was suitable for white settlement, and when gold was discovered in California in 1848, thousands of miners traversed the Indian country by the Oregon trail.

Owing largely to the gold discoveries the whites disrupted the

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Indians of the Pacific areas before they descended on those of the plains. In Oregon and California from the eighteen forties to the eighteen seventies miners and settlers displayed a brutality, and the United States Government a neglect, which were all the more scandalous because they extended into allegedly civilised times". In Oregon the legislature, politicians, subordinate Indian agents and even Methodist clergy participated in massacres which were embellished but not disguised by the title of Indian wars. In California the whites killed Indians as "a sport to enliven Sundays and holidays". In 1871 the kindly Kingsley wrote that he had had to use his 38 calibre revolver to shoot children as his 56 calibre rifle "tore them up so bad".

A recent student, A. G. Harper, paints a ghastly picture in an official report of 1939. The miners, he says, were followed by lumbermen, farmers and cattlemen, who were contemptuous of the peaceful Indians. No quarter was given. Those who escaped slaughter or enslavement were ruthlessly pushed up and down the country. Women were raped and enslaved in a sudden and brutal race-miscegenation that created many mixed bloods. In spite of such crimes the Government remained disgracefully passive. In 1852 no less than eighteen treaties were signed with Indian groups providing for the creation of reservations in return for the surrender of farm lands. Californian influences prevented their ratification lest the proposed reservations contained gold deposits. Later when the unfortunate Indians established small farms and orchards the Californians ruthlessly evicted the owners. From 1906-1927 the Government granted the dispossessed natives some minute reservations of worthless land on the public domain".

There remained the solid block of country between the Pacific region and the Mississippi States. From time to time proposals were made to create this an Indian State, but these did not eventuate and the whites broke the territory into fragments. The invasions were marked by treaties which were often forced upon the natives and were sometimes fraudulent. Land robbery and the destruction of resources, particularly the buffalo, reduced the tribes to destitution with consequent warfare and outrages on both sides. In 1864 a Methodist preacher-Colonel was responsible for a revolting liquidation of a Cheyenne village at Sand

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Creek and as late as 1876 the Sioux annihilated Custer's army in a famous battle.

Clark Wissler has portrayed the terrible effects of the destruction of the buffalo on Indian tribal life. An agent wrote in 1884 that the natives were in a deplorable condition. Many were gradually dying of starvation; little children had suffered most, and many passed away. Owing to insufficient supplies of Government rations the Indians were stripping bark from the trees to appease their gnawing hunger²¹.

The closing years of the nineteenth century saw the end of the moving frontier, for a vast white population had now spread over most of the country.

In 1823 Mr. Justice Marshall laid down that the Indians were domestic dependent nations with no rights of sovereignty or soil against those of the United States but had to be protected while in peaceful possession of their lands²². In 1871 Congress terminated all treaty-making with the surviving tribes. The once proud Indian natives now became wards of the United States, living on such reservations as Congress granted and subject to such enactments as Congress dictated²³.

INDIAN NUMERICAL DECREASE

By the end of the frontier period the whites had secured most of the Indians' lands. They had destroyed the natives' living resources, riddled them with disease and alcohol, slaughtered many directly, or indirectly by the sale of firearms, and wrecked their pride of life by ridiculing their religious and social customs.

At the beginning of the white conquests the Indians were probably increasing slowly in numbers. Indian population figures at any period are open to criticism but the decline from Mooney's pre-Columbian estimate of 846,000 to the Commissioner's estimates of 278,000 in 1870 and 244,000 in 1880 seems no exaggeration. Moreover, the later figures included many mixed bloods, including not a few in whom white blood predominated. Official estimates are variable and even contradictory, but the census of 1910 gave the proportion of full bloods as 56.51 of the total: the Indian office estimated them at 52% in 1938, and Clark Wissler, writing in the previous year, put them at about 50%. If we accept the census figures of 1910, which gave a full

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blood Indian population of 150,053 the reduction from Mooney's figure of 840,000 is 82%. In January, 1938, the Office of Indian Affairs had 342,497 natives under its jurisdiction. Allowing that about half of these were full bloods the white invasions had by then reduced the full bloods from 840,000 to 171,000, a fall of 80%.

Much of the destruction is now shrouded by the mists of history, but the researches of Kroeber and Merriam on the Californian tragedy indicate the course of events in many regions. Kroeber considers that from 1770 to 1910 these Indians declined from 133,000 to 15,850, and Merriam that their numbers fell from 100,000 to 35,000 in the brief period, 1849-1860. Merriam states such decrease which "amounted to the complete annihilation of scores of tribes and the reduction to scattered remnants of scores of others, was wholly due to the coming of the white man". Kroeber notes that the survival of the Indian was in adverse ratio to the density of white population, which is a sad condemnation of the European²⁴.

DESTRUCTIVE FACTORS

At this period of time it is impossible to estimate the respective weight of the various destructive factors, but their nature is clear. Mooney placed their order as "smallpox and other epidemics, tuberculosis, social diseases, whisky and attendant dissipation, removals, starvation and subjection to unaccustomed conditions, low vitality due to depression, and wars". He believed that all these evils, with the exception of wars and tuberculosis, came from the whites, and that even here the increasing destruction of tuberculosis was largely due to conditions imposed by their advent²⁵.

Dr. J. C. Townsend, Director of Health, U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, has summed up the story. He quotes the opinion of Dr. Ales Hrdlicka, of the Smithsonian Institute, that before the white discovery America was one of the most healthful of continents, if not the most so. Skeletal remains, barring a few exceptions, are remarkably free from disease. Apparently there was no rickets, no proved tuberculosis, no smallpox, measles or trachoma; cancer was rare and even fractures infrequent. Furthermore, there

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is not an instance thoroughly authenticated of pre-Columbian syphilis.

The white settlers sweeping across the continent brought diseases old in Europe but new and deadly to the Indians. Even before the Pilgrim Fathers landed smallpox reached New England from the French in the north or by coastal vessels. One reason that the Puritans were allowed to settle so peaceably was that the nearby Indian village had been abandoned owing to the epidemic. Back through the forest country the disease had made Indian forest sites "like a new Golgotha", littered with skulls and bones. The susceptible, unvaccinated Indians died off until the Massachusetts tribe was reduced from 3000 to 1000, and Delaware villages were abandoned, never to be revived.

Similar havoc accompanied and often preceded the whites in their westward advance. Smallpox, for example, repeatedly swept over wide areas, sometimes destroying half the natives in its path. There were historic outbreaks in 1781-2, 1801-2 and 1837-8, with results that read like a medieval chronicler's account of the Black Death. The same story comes from many parts of the country. In 1837, for example, smallpox, emanating from an employee on a river steamer, ravaged the Missouri valley. The Mandan tribe of 1600 persons was reduced to 31. The Minnetarees and Arickarees lost half their numbers. In a few weeks 10,000 Indians died and the land became a scene of desolation strewn with corpses". Smallpox epidemics also swept the prairies, the Rockies and the far North-West. Other scourges were measles and tuberculosis. Tuberculosis possibly existed to some extent in pre-Columbian days, but the disease spread rapidly, particularly when the whites forced the Indians out on small reservations where they lived under conditions which differed greatly from their ancestral life. Although the Jesuit Fathers reported the existence of the disease as early as 1633, the Indians had little immunity and it spread with devastating results.

The recent researches of Meigs and Cook paint a vivid and important picture of the ravages of disease on the Pacific coast. Cook points out that there was little Indian-white or intertribal warfare in Baja California during the years 1697-1793. The Spanish missionaries prevented the ravages of alcohol and the white population was too small for extensive miscegenation. Neverthe-

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less, during these eighty years, the Indians decreased from 41,000 to 4000 in nearly linear fashion; at least 20,000 persons perished from epidemic diseases while syphilis created further decline. Cook believes that from 30 to 40% of the diminution of population was due to the introduction of epidemic and venereal diseases. The balance of the shrinkage can be attributed to nutritional, social, and economic factors which cannot be evaluated quantitatively at the present time".

Meigs considers that the fundamental cause of the decline of the Spanish missions in Baja California was disease. Smallpox and other epidemics ravaged the Indians while syphilis attacked them ceaselessly".

Alcohol combined with poor hygiene to increase the incidence of disease. This curse of liquor preceded the main invasions as fur traders and others used alcohol for barter, while the French and English authorities, including even the Puritans, poured it out to weaken hostile tribes or to inflame Indian allies against white enemies. The natives possessed no alcoholic beverages and hence had no immunity. They evinced an insatiable craving for liquor, and comparatively small quantities produced insobriety, violence, and drunken slumber under exposed conditions which favoured the onset of disease. The chiefs of various tribes frequently begged the whites to forbid the sale of the "stinking water" which drove their young braves crazy. Some British colonies made efforts to curtail the traffic and prevention later became a feature of American legislation. Unfortunately the evil persisted. As late as the nineteen thirties Nash's account of the Seminole of Florida denounced the modern "bootlegger" as a twentieth century breed of vermin that has been systematically debauching the Indian since 1492".


Other disruptive factors were firearms and horses. The British, French, Dutch and Swedes all armed native tribes for hunting or warfare with the tragic consequences that have been enumerated. Tribe after tribe invaded its neighbours' territories for war or the chase while the frontiersmen slaughtered the natives and the game on which they relied. Mooney gives warfare the last place in his list of disruptive factors, but it appears to deserve a higher place. Firearms certainly assisted the Iroquois in the invasions which exhausted these people and devastated their neighbours.

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Mooney himself stated that the "enormous decrease" in the number of Californian Indians was chiefly due to the cruelties and wholesale massacres perpetrated by the miners and early settlers, and in these the rifle and revolver held a leading place²².

The introduction of the horse provided a means of rapid communication and transport which increased tribal warfare, assisted to destroy Indian resources, and helped to disrupt tribal life. The Spaniards in the South imported horses at an early date and the Northern Europeans brought them to the East coast. The animals quickly revolutionised the lives of many tribes, particularly on the great plains. Wandering and slow-moving foot hunters, who had rarely met or clashed, now became ferocious mobile raiders equipped with white weapons and means of transport. Woodland tribes poured on to the prairies for battle and sport. No matter how varied were the human alliances and combats the peoples of all races successfully pursued one object. By the eighteen eighties they had destroyed almost completely the vast herds of buffalo which were the Indians' staff of life²³.

Destructive factors such as disease, alcohol, warfare, firearms, horses, the wrecking of native resources and land robbery are obvious. Important but far less easy to evaluate are aspects such as the disruption of native religion, culture, ambition and tribal life. Wissler believes that the early trading period brought to some groups a wider intellectual outlook, an enriched culture, economic prosperity and greater material equipment. Much of this progress was, however, deceptive. It rested on the destruction of capital such as hides and furs. It weakened social organisation, community life and co-operation, and it undermined the authority of the chiefs. The growing flood of land hungry settlers continued, and in most cases completed the disruptive process, with results which the following chapter will discuss²⁴.



Indian School—Mescalero Apache Reservation

Photo: Author



A Pueblo Village, New Mexico

Photo: Author

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granted titles to the land which they actually cultivated. This was a policy of peaceful penetration, largely effected by fur trading and mission establishments.

The French invaders were comparatively few in numbers and lived an extremely simple life. They freely borrowed Indian ideas; cultivated Indian crops, such as beans, pumpkins and tobacco, and adopted articles of Indian dress and methods of transport. Living close to the land, and with little education, the French pioneers differed only superficially from the Indians and mingled with them freely. Indian girls, trained in convents, made excellent wives for isolated farmers and traders. There was a shortage of white women in the colonies. The French had little of the racial prejudices so strongly embedded in the Northern European races and their American descendants so that neither the Indians nor the half breeds experienced disabilities. These conditions, which endured for a century and a half, blended the French and Indians as a new people, in certain regions.

It is impossible at this length of time to analyse the course of this absorption, but today a substantial population of French-Indian descent occupies the Indian reserves of Eastern Canada or roams over Northern Ontario and Quebec. Jenness considers that, although the eastern tribes of the maritime provinces and the St. Lawrence valley bore the first shock of invasion, they were in some respects the most fortunate. The figures which he gives for the migratory tribes of the East Canadian woodlands, for example the Ojibwa and Cree, and for agricultural peoples such as the Iroquois, show a far smaller decrease than tribes in other parts of Canada; for example, the Ojibwa declined only from 30,000 to 20,000, while the Crees and Iroquois showed no decrease and retained respectively populations of 20,000 and 16,000. It must be remembered, however, that some groups were completely exterminated. English and French settlers united with the Miqmaq Indians to annihilate the unhappy Beothuks of Newfoundland. Even more important is the fact that a high proportion of the Indians of Canada now contain white blood. As official publications are silent on this vital question it is impossible to estimate the extent of the Indian decline in Eastern Canada.

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THE FRENCH MISSIONS

An outstanding feature of the French invasions was Catholic Missionary effort. The Recollects began work on the St. Lawrence in 1615, and the Jesuits joined them in 1626. Within about fifteen years they had won over the Hurons and had established what was virtually a mission State, but this was destroyed between 1641 and 1649 by New York Iroquois armed with firearms secured from the Dutch.

Nevertheless the good work went on. Canada received its first bishop in 1608 and the church fought valiantly against such evils as the Indian liquor traffic.

While all authorities recognise the heroic labours, the sufferings, and, in some cases, the martyrdoms of the French missionaries, it has been suggested that they achieved little of permanent value and that they did great harm by disrupting native life. For example W. C. Macleod, a warm admirer of the Spanish missions, states that in Canada and Louisiana the French fathers gained little but martyrdom. F. G. Speck, in his study of the Naskapi of Labrador makes a close and important examination of Christian influences. He believes that the missionaries had effects on the settled coastal tribes, but made little appeal to the nomadic hunting groups, who felt that Christianity neither controlled the spirits of wild animals or fish, nor saved human beings from freezing, drowning or starvation in a cold and barren wilderness. He wrote that during a prolonged siege by Roman influence these Indians were at first bewildered and later captivated by the unaccustomed splendour of Roman ritual, but relapsed quickly if away from the priests' influence. After prolonged effort there emerged only "a handful of miserable, unhappy and dwindling bands of errant hunters, galvanised with an ill-becoming sheen on feast days, but sick and corroded at heart". In support of this opinion a leading Roman Catholic missionary of great Canadian experience told the author that he would permit only the medical missionary to make contact with the Indians owing to the evils resulting from detribalising influences.

It will be argued of course that this criticism applies only to the most primitive and nomadic peoples, and that, as admitted by Speck, Christianity achieved, amongst the more settled Indians,

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THE BRITISH INVASION

As indicated previously the British occupation reduced the numbers of Australian aborigines from perhaps 300,000 in 1788 to 77,501 full and mixed bloods in 1921, the first year in which a careful census was taken. This reduction was effected by the usual factors of disease, slaughter and land robbery together with the destruction of tribal resources, religion and culture. Owing to the peculiar nature both of the immigrants and the indigenous peoples the whites wiped out the natives more rapidly than those of Canada, the United States and New Zealand. The aborigines were particularly backward and dis-united. Their arms were extremely primitive and, unlike the American Indians or Maoris, they showed little inclination to secure or use white weapons. Britain on her part sent to Australia for the first fifty years some of the most unruly elements in her population—convicts, their military guards, and individualistic, venturesome and widely roaming colonists.

The American revolution ended the British export of criminals to the United States, and in 1788 Britain founded Sydney on the East Australian Coast as an outlet for her convicts. For a time she played with but rejected proposals to despatch in addition to convicts American loyalists with their negro slaves. A little later the first governor—Governor Phillip—disobeyed Imperial orders that he should import Pacific Island women for his criminals. Thus, even in her foundation years, Australia avoided two types of colour problem". In 1803-1804 the motherland founded penal settlements in Northern and Southern Tasmania, and from 1824 to 1838 she established temporary convict posts at Moreton Bay (later Brisbane) on the North-East coast, and at Albany in the south-west of Western Australia. Britain continued to send her worst elements to the Australian mainland up to 1840, and to Tasmania until 1853, and later continued the system in a small, modified and comparatively harmless manner by despatching probationers to provide labour in Western Australia until 1867. Over the whole period the Imperial Government sent 137,161 convicts to Australia. Numbers escaped to debouch the aborigines; others were assigned to remote districts where they caused frequent difficulties with the natives. In many cases the military

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guards, and later the police, inherited a legacy of brutality from the convict days".

Free settlers began to come as early as 1793, and increased so rapidly that by 1821 the free immigrants, the free born and the freed were more than twice as numerous as the prisoners. The exploration of the interior began. Macarthur pioneered the sheep industry. In 1813 Governor Macquarie supported the sheep men in storming the mountain barrier behind Sydney and a flood of pastoralists swept northwards to occupy Queensland, and southward to Victoria in the south-east. In 1829 British officials and free settlers founded the colony of Western Australia; in 1835-6 free Tasmanians forced the New South Wales authorities to open the Port Phillip district. In 1836-7 Wakefield colonising theorists secured the establishment of free settlers in South Australia".

DESTRUCTION OF THE NATIVES

The early years of convict settlement and squatter penetration are regarded as the romantic period of Australian colonisation but they provided little romance for the unfortunate aborigines. Facing the menace of a white occupation, conducted in some cases by depraved invaders, the coastal aborigines withered away very rapidly. Few scientific efforts have been made to analyse the causes of this decline, and many factors, such as the loss of ambition and the fall in the number of children, are far from clear. The evidence on slaughter, land robbery and disease is, however, indisputable, and will be summarised. It is particularly necessary to examine the evidence in regard to slaughter as recent research students have tended to minimise this factor on the grounds that most of the settlers treated the natives tolerantly, appreciated their economic value and expressed regret when they disappeared. This, in general, may be the correct view, but it tends to overlook ill-treatment, which, however new and unexpected were the difficulties of colonisation, was discreditable to the British Government, to the colonial authorities and to many of the pioneers.

The coastal explorers generally found the aborigines timid and inoffensive creatures. From the earliest time, however, Dutch navigators tried to kidnap them, and British and French visitors,

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summarily shot a native, but at the same time a native who had murdered a white was hanged".

Little relief came until 1838, some fifty years after the foundation, when the effects of the humanitarian revolution in Britain were evident. In that year the Colonial authorities hanged seven whites, who had perpetrated the infamous Myall Creek massacre—the murder of some 28 harmless, innocent and friendly natives of various ages and sexes. At long last the colonists realised that the wanton murder of aborigines was prohibited.

The previous state of affairs is best shown by the intense popular indignation which accompanied the executions, and the murderers' own protest. "We were not aware that in killing the blacks we were violating the law or that it could take any notice of our doing so, as it has (according to our belief) been so frequently done before".

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TASMANIANS

Britain occupied Tasmania as a gaol for particularly hardened criminals, and the white contacts with the two or three thousand natives in that land were the most terrible in Australia. When the convict parties established stations on the north and south coasts in 1803-4 the natives were peaceable but trouble soon eventuated. At Risdon Cove some 300 to 500 aborigines appeared on a kangaroo drive—clearly with peaceable intentions as they were accompanied by their women and children. Yet the military completely lost their heads and shot about 50 of all ages". This atrocity was the probable cause of native reprisals which became increasingly savage when wild sealers kidnapped native women, and when convicts, bushrangers and even some settlers treated the helpless aborigines with appalling cruelty.

Governors and official commissions unhesitatingly blamed the whites, Governor Daly, for example, reporting in 1813 that native resentment was almost wholly due to a barbarous and inhuman mode of proceeding "under which the whites robbed the aborigines of their children". The same Governor reminded his subjects in the strongest possible terms that the natives were unsuspecting and peaceable when the stockkeepers treated them decently. Governor Arthur repeated in 1828 that the troubles were due to

AUSTRALIA

the Risdon massacre followed by the savage action of sealers and stockkeepers in shooting the natives and seizing their women". John West, the author of a "History of Tasmania", gave a fearful account of white atrocities as reported by eye witnesses, "the wounded were brained; the infant cast into flames; the bayonet was driven into the quivering flesh; the social fire around which the natives gathered to slumber became before morning their funeral pile".

In spite of condemning these atrocities the colonial officers made no effort to punish white aggressors. They hanged without any legal proof of guilt a mainland aborigine "Mosquito", who led the Tasmanian native defence, but, according to Melville, who spent many years in the island, "not one single individual was ever brought to a court of justice for offences committed against these harmless creatures". Under Governor Arthur, the natives turned more savagely on their torturers, and a full scale native war took shape.

Arthur established military posts along the frontier; appointed an aborigine protection committee; offered rewards for the capture of unharmed aborigines, and sought British permission to exile the survivors, providing them with clothing and sustenance".

Britain gave her sanction. Capture parties hunted the natives like wild beasts, using women as decoys, until the aborigines protection society protested against an indiscriminate killing which made all Christian men shudder. In desperation Arthur in 1830 employed some 4000 whites as a cordon to round up certain groups. Despite an expenditure of £30,000 his farcical effort was unsuccessful".

Kindness succeeded where force had failed. George Robinson, a Methodist by denomination and a builder by trade, knew something of the native language, and, going unarmed amongst the embittered aborigines, gained their confidence and brought in some 300 miserable survivors.

Even then, however, the white victors proved incapable of pity. Colonists interfered with the captives, and the Government, refusing to place them on the fertile Maria island, sent them to the barren and repulsive King Island and then to Flinders Island, where all but a handful died under conditions which the following chapter will relate".

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X

The Indian In the Nineteenth Century

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THE PATTERN of the treatment of the Indian by the English colonists had been set in the seventeenth century. It was not the kindly attitude of Roger Williams, John Eliot, and the Quakers which generally prevailed. When the Indians gave trouble, the colonists made war against them, often adopting customs as savage as those of the Indians themselves. As early as 1653, the English had begun the system of reservations—assigning each warrior fifty acres of land and the privilege of hunting in unoccupied territory. As the white men moved west, they developed a pattern with regard to the land of the Indians which was repeated over and over again. The Indians would be assigned to a reservation. In time, the white men would covet their land and by one means or another seek to acquire it. They would send to the Indians agents who would offer gifts—often trinkets or whiskey—in exchange for vast tracts of land. Sometimes they would choose some chief or chiefs willing to sign away the land for a price and then assume arbitrarily that this man or these men spoke for all the members of a tribe or of many tribes. Old treaties which had promised eternal boundaries for Indian lands were ignored. If cajolery, trickery, or threats failed, the white men would use force to move the Indians westward.¹

When the United States became a nation, the policy toward the Indians had already been set in motion. From the beginning, however, there was often a glaring discrepancy between high-sounding statements of policy and actual practice. The Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787 would seem to be a

model document so far as the treatment of the Indians was concerned:

The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians, their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.²

It is difficult to equate the language of this document with the fact that territorial governments sometimes offered white citizens bounties for the Indian scalps they brought in. The Dutch had done this as early as 1641 and later on the Puritans engaged in the practice. In the early nineteenth century, it was sometimes argued that if frontiersmen and farmers could be encouraged to kill Indians on a commission basis, the governments could save money because this method would be less expensive than paying soldiers to do it. The last American scalp bounty was offered by the Territory of Indiana in 1814 as an "encouragement to the enterprise and bravery of our fellow citizens."³

Because of the savagery of many Indians, it is not surprising that frontiersmen—who were most often the men in conflict with the Indians—should have developed the firm conviction that the only good Indian was a dead Indian. The frontiersmen were frequently violent toward the men in their own group who violated their rules or got in their way, and they were still more violent against the Indians—who neither lived by nor understood the rules of the white man. The idea expressed by Cotton Mather in the seventeenth century that the Indians were the devil's minions, damned from birth by God and incapable of redemption, shifted in the nineteenth century to the conviction that the Indians were damned by biology—that they were inherently incapable of taking the first step toward civilization. At best the Indians were an inferior breed of men and at worst no more than savage beasts. Hugh Brackenridge, the jurist and

novelist, indicated the direction of the shift when he wrote in 1782 that "extermination" would be most fitting for "the animals vulgarly called Indians. . . ."⁴

The Constitution mentioned the Indians only briefly. One can infer from the section dealing with them that—following Colonial precedent—the Founding Fathers thought of the Indians not as citizens, real or potential, but as members of autonomous foreign nations. The Constitution declares, for example, that "Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." A treaty would imply that the government had no specific obligation to extend the blessings of citizenship to the Indians. This point of view was not limited to the conservatives, who were inclined to interpret individual rights of people rather narrowly. Thomas Paine, one of the most ardent apostles of liberty in the American Revolution, had little inclination to extend the blessings of American citizenship to alien peoples—to the French and the Spanish in the Southwest, for example—much less to the Indians. After the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, a Louisiana delegation was sent to Washington asking for the privileges of citizenship for French and Spanish settlers. Paine declared that the fact that Americans had fought for their own rights did not make it "incumbent upon us to fight the battles of the world for the world's profit." Paine was equally indifferent to the idea of the rights of citizenship for Indians.⁵

John Quincy Adams was reflecting a widespread conviction when he said in 1800 that the Indian tribes had a "questionable foundation" to land:

But what is the right of a huntsman of the forest of a thousand miles, over which he has accidentally ranged in quest of prey? . . . Shall the exuberant bosom of the common mother, amply adequate to the nourishment of millions, be claimed exclusively by a few hundreds of her offspring?

Adams suggested that the title of Indians to land was valid only when they had settled upon it and cultivated it. This meant, in

effect, that in order to acquire title to land the Indians had to stop being hunters and become farmers, a transformation which would have been very difficult for them to bring about even if they had been able to comprehend and had agreed to the reasons for it.⁶

The process of encumbering Indian lands went steadily on, but an important change occurred in 1825. Up until that time, the aim of Indian policy had been to confine the Indians in the eastern part of the nation to reservations in which they could take up farming. However, as these lands were more and more coveted by white settlers, this solution no longer was satisfactory. The federal government decided that all Indians should be moved to new reservations west of the Mississippi. At that time, there was a general conviction that the treeless plains of the West were unsuitable for habitation by white men, and thus the removals were apparently planned as a permanent solution to the Indian "problem."

In Illinois, the forcible removal of the Sauk and Fox tribes led to the Black Hawk War in 1832. Black Hawk was a chief-tain who refused to cede tribal lands. In 1831, when civilian frontiersmen had gathered to drive the Sauk tribe out, Black Hawk and his followers had retreated west across the Mississippi. The tribe spent a miserable winter in the Iowa country, since they had arrived too late to plant crops. Black Hawk's apparent intention was to return peacefully to Illinois to ask the white man for permission to settle on what had been the Sauks' own land. The fact that the whole tribe—including women and children—accompanied him was proof that his party was not warlike. Nevertheless, a wave of panic swept the white settlers. The Indians were attacked, and at the end of the ensuing "war" of nearly three months' duration, only 150 of the 1,000 Indians who had begun the march from the Iowa country were still alive. The other Indian tribes of the Middle West got the point that it was better to give up their lands and move west than to be exterminated. From 1832 to 1837, the Indians ceded nearly two million acres in the Northwest, and by 1846 the last of the In-

dian tribes had been transported—whether they wanted to go or not—to their new “home” in the West.⁸

In Georgia, the Cherokees—a tribe of about seventeen thousand—met the requirement that they live upon and farm their land. They maintained schools and had a written constitution based upon the American model with an executive, a legislative, and a judicial branch. Sequoyah, one of their chiefs, had invented an alphabet for the Cherokee language with eighty-five characters and had published parts of the Bible and edited a newspaper, the *Cherokee Phoenix*. None of this prevented them from losing their land. Both the federal government and the state of Georgia were determined that they should be removed.⁹

In 1828, Congress appropriated \$50,000 for the removal of the Cherokees. The War Department agents were authorized to offer the Indians land in the West, transportation, a blanket, a rifle, a kettle, five pounds of tobacco, a year’s supplies, and fifty dollars in cash. The Indians refused the offer and stayed where they were. Then the state legislature of Georgia declared all Cherokee laws to be void, denied the Indians the right to be a party in a legal suit or to testify in court against any white man, and denied them also the right to prospect for gold on their own lands, though white men could do so. In 1830, Congress passed a Removal Bill which authorized the President to resettle any eastern tribe—by force, if necessary, and without regard to any treaties which the government had previously signed. The land of the Cherokees was ruthlessly taken over by white settlers, debts owing to them were declared canceled, and government agents attempted to induce factions of them to rebel against their leaders. Three white missionaries protested against the policy of the state and national governments and, as “citizens” of the Cherokee nation, refused to swear an oath of allegiance to the state of Georgia. They were arrested, chained, and forced to walk twenty-one miles behind a wagon. Later they were sentenced to four years of hard labor in the state penitentiary. When the Cherokee case came before the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Marshall, in the famous *Worcester vs. Georgia* de-

cision, declared that the Cherokees were a “domestic dependent nation” under the protection of the federal government and that the state of Georgia had no right to molest them. In reply, President Andrew Jackson, an old Indian fighter himself, declared: “John Marshall has rendered his decision; now let him enforce it.”¹⁰

In 1834, federal agents were finally successful with the old trick of bribing a minor faction to deed the tribe’s land. General Winfield Scott, with seven thousand troops and followed by “civilian volunteers,” invaded the Cherokee domain, seized all the Indians they could find, and, in the middle of winter, sent them on the long trek to Arkansas and Oklahoma. The “civilian volunteers” appropriated the Indians’ livestock, household goods, and farm implements and burned their homes. Some fourteen thousand Indians were forced to travel the “trail of tears,” as it came to be called, and about four thousand of them died on the way. An eyewitness to the exodus reported: “Even aged females, apparently ready to drop into the grave, were travelling with heavy burdens attached to their backs, sometimes on frozen grounds and sometimes on muddy streets, with no covering for their feet.”¹¹

Alabama and Mississippi, following Georgia’s lead, acted to rid themselves of the Indians in their midst. They forbade tribes to meet or Indian chiefs to exercise their offices—a device to make it easier for Indian agents to bribe minority factions. The Choctaws and the remnants of the Creeks were forced to join the Cherokees in their pitiful exodus. It is little wonder that General Sam Houston could say after the Mexican War that he saw no reason why the United States government should not appropriate the lands of the Mexicans. Americans, said Houston, had always cheated Indians and since the Mexicans were no better than the Indians, “I can see no reason why we should not go on the same course now, and take their land.”¹²

Up until 1849, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the federal government was under the control of the War Department, but it was then transferred to the Interior Department. On its face,

this would seem to be an improvement, in that it transferred the Indians to civilian control; but it was not. The Interior Department was then the agency through which Congress could dispose of public lands, and it proved too strong a temptation in the distribution of these lands to include the Indian property as well. The War Department had initiated a policy of dissolving tribal societies, since it was organization which gave the Indians their cohesiveness and enabled them to resist encroachment. Under the Interior Department, the Indian Bureau set about more systematically than had the War Department to dissolve tribal societies and to "liquidate" the Indian title to land, selling it to white settlers and to speculators.¹³

The Indian titles to the lands in the West were immediately in danger as soon as the white man got around to wanting them. In 1851, the Indian Bureau negotiated treaties with 119 of the tribes of California. The Indians surrendered more than half the state and in exchange were offered perpetual ownership of 7,500,000 acres. By a ruse, the Indian Bureau deprived the Indians of this land. Because of pressure from white politicians in California, the Senate in Washington did not confirm these treaties but merely kept them in its files. The Indians were not told that the treaties were invalid and at the time had no means of discovering the intricacies of American law. The treaties remained in the files of the Senate until 1905, still unratified; the 7,500,000 acres were sold to white settlers and speculators. How strongly the Indian Bureau felt about engaging in honest dealings with the Indians or keeping its word is indicated by the frank comment of General Francis C. Walker, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in 1871. "When dealing with savage men, as with savage beasts, no question of national honor can arise. Whether to fight, to run away, or to employ a ruse, is solely a question of expediency." Walker was referring to outright warfare with the Indians, but his comment is also relevant to the political and legal aspects of the policy of the American government.¹⁴

The Indian tribes steadily declined in numbers. In California,

for example, the number of Indians was estimated in 1850 to be from 110,000 to 130,000, but by 1880 their number had declined to fewer than 20,000. What happened to the Indians? Some of them, it is true, died from the diseases of the white man to which they had acquired no immunity. Nobody knows how many were murdered, but in most parts of the West killing an Indian was rarely considered a crime. Some of the Indians died because, forced off their own land, they were obliged to move to areas so barren that they could not maintain an existence there. Undoubtedly, the shock of losing their land, the security of their tribal life, and their accustomed ways of farming and hunting led to a decline in their numbers. Sometimes the white people wondered, with a cynicism or a naïveté which is well-nigh incredible, what it was that made the Indian disappear from the land. "There seems to be something in our laws and institutions, peculiarly adapted to the Anglo-Saxon-American race, under which they will thrive and prosper," said Congressman Alexander Duncan in 1845, "but under which all others wilt and die. . . . There is something mysterious about it." This "Lo, the Poor Indian" tradition in American thought is surprisingly widespread.¹⁵

If the land reserved for Indians was desirable to the white men, especially if any discovery was made which enhanced the value of the land—for example, the existence of gold or silver—the great probability was that the Indian title would soon be extinguished. In 1881, Helen Hunt Jackson wrote *A Century of Dishonor*, a record of the white man's injustice in dealing with Indians in this country. She found that this injustice followed a remarkably consistent pattern:

It makes little difference . . . where one opens the record of the history of the Indians; every page and every year has its dark stain. The story of one tribe is the story of all, varied only by differences of time and place; but neither time nor place makes any difference in the main facts. Colorado is as greedy and unjust in 1880 as was Georgia in 1830, and Ohio in 1795; and the United States Government breaks promises now as deftly as then, and with an added ingenuity from long practice.¹⁶

As recently as 1880, Congress had debated a bill which was designed to force the Colorado Ute Indians to sell their lands because gold and silver had been discovered on them. American miners must be given the privilege of taking up claims on this land, declared Representative James B. Belford of Colorado, and Congress must "apprise the Indian that he can no longer stand as a breakwater against the constantly swelling tide of civilization." Thus would be settled the doctrine that

an idle and thriftless race of savages cannot be permitted to guard the treasure vaults of the nation which hold our gold and silver, but that they shall always be open, to the end that the prospector and miner may enter in and by enriching himself enrich the nation and bless the world by the results of his toil.¹⁷

The final episode of white violence against an Indian tribe took place in 1890. The battle was comparatively minor, but as clearly as any single example it illustrates the cruelty and stupidity of the government's policy toward Indians. Wovoka was a Paiute Indian of Nevada who, on a day when there was an eclipse of the sun, went into a trance and proclaimed a vision of a heavenly messiah who would return to earth, cause the white man to disappear, and restore the Indian to his former status. Wovoka did not advocate violence against the white man. Instead, he maintained that the Indians should simply wait patiently for the great spirit to appear. The news of Wovoka's vision spread to Indian tribes all over the western half of the United States. The Sioux Indians of South Dakota began engaging in "Ghost Dances" to bring about the appearance of the messiah. The U.S. Army chose to see these dances as a preparation for warfare and at the Battle of Wounded Knee massacred ninety-eight disarmed warriors and two hundred Indian women and children.¹⁸

Hatred and contempt for the Indians were strong among those who stood most to gain from appropriation of Indian lands. A frontiersman writing to the *Illinois State Register* in 1846 said of the California Indians that those "reptiles" must "either crawl or be crushed." Some of the leading scientific students of

race were scarcely less harsh. Dr. Samuel George Morton, the authority on craniology, asserted in 1839 that Indians were inherently savage and intractable. Morton believed that all native tribes in North and South America were members of one race "peculiar and distinct from all others" and that the differences in the cultures of the Indians were superficial. Josiah Clark Nott, Morton's disciple in anthropology and coauthor of the popular *Types of Mankind* (1856), had an extremely low opinion of the inherent character of the Indians. In spite of all the "glowing accounts" from missionaries, said Nott, there was no such thing as a "civilized full-blooded Indian." Nott had seen Indians in Alabama who were farmers and who had partially absorbed the white man's civilization, but he thought they were little different from the savages of the West. They were "scarcely a degree advanced above brutes of the field, quietly abiding their time." Education and religion were alike helpless, said Nott, to change their nature. The study of crania disclosed, he maintained, that whereas Caucasians had those parts of the skull developed which indicated intellect, the Indian skulls indicated strong "animal propensity." Another contributor to *Types of Mankind*, Dr. Henry S. Patterson, wrote of a young friend who had been killed by Utah Indians while on a surveying expedition for a proposed railroad to the Pacific. "We have had too much of sentimentalism about the Red-man," declared Patterson. "If only this young man could be restored to life, his resurrection would be 'cheaply purchased back if it cost the extermination of every miserable Pah-Utah under heaven!'"¹⁹

If anti-Indian racism had declined in volume and virulence by the end of the nineteenth century, a major reason was that the Indians were no longer a threat to the safety of the whites and that they no longer had huge tracts of valuable land. We still find the opinion widely held that it was the Indians' race which was their single but insuperable handicap. Theodore Roosevelt castigated Helen Hunt Jackson's *A Century of Dishonor* as "beneath criticism" as history and important only because

the high character of the author and her excellent literary work in other directions have given it a fictitious value and made it much quoted by a large class of amiable but maudlin fanatics concerning whom it may be said that the excellence of their intentions but indifferently atones for the invariable folly and ill effect of their actions.

The real fault of the policy of the white Americans toward the Indians had been, Roosevelt maintained, that it had been irresolute and was unwilling to "resort to the ultimate arbitrator—the sword." Of his own opinion of the Indian, Roosevelt said:

I suppose I should be ashamed to say that I take the Western view of the Indian. I don't go so far as to think that the only good Indians are the dead Indians, but I believe nine out of every ten are, and I shouldn't inquire too closely into the case of the tenth. The most vicious cowboy has more moral principle than the average Indian.²⁰

Of course, not all nineteenth-century opinion concerning the Indians was unfavorable. Sometimes they were highly praised for their courage and skill as warriors, their ability to endure pain, and their loyalty to their friends. One can find in nineteenth-century America much more praise of the Indian than of the Negro, though the Negro was allowed to survive as a slave whereas the Indian was either slaughtered or banished to lands where it was impossible for him to thrive. De Tocqueville observed that the Negro and the Indian were fundamentally different in character. "The servility of the one dooms him to slavery," he said, and "the pride of the other to death."²¹

One of the genuine friends of the Indian early in the nineteenth century was the Reverend Mr. Jedidiah Morse, well known not only as a clergyman but as a geographer. In 1820, he visited many of the major Indian tribes to prepare a report for the secretary of war. Morse had genuine insight into the character of the Indians. "There is as visible a difference of character among the different tribes," he observed, "as there is in our own population," and therefore, "few general observations . . . will apply to them as a body." He does, however, come to some general conclusions concerning Indians. He thinks they are in-

ferior to whites in physical strength. He likes their custom of not talking when they have nothing to say. He finds them "not vociferous, noisy, or quarrelsome, in their common intercourse, but mild and obliging." He thinks they often have "a high sense of honor, justice, and fair dealing, and great sensibility, when advantage is taken of their weakness and ignorance, to deprive them of their property, and in other ways, to trespass on their rights." To the charge of the white men that the Indians are cruel, Morse replied, "Physician, heal thyself."²²

Morse recognized clearly that the policy of the white men toward the Indians was wrong and that it might ultimately lead to their extinction. He quotes an Indian chief as saying, "Where the white man puts down his foot, he never takes it up again." Morse criticizes the policy of taking Indian lands by fraud or by force. He says that the result of such a policy is that the Indians are "constrained to leave their homes . . . either to go into new and less valuable wildernesses, and to mingle with other tribes, dependent on this hospitality, for a meagre support; or without the common aids of education, to change at once all their habits and modes of life. . . ." If they choose the latter, "they become insulated among those who despise them as an inferior race, fit companions to those only, who have the capacity and the disposition to corrupt them." Morse's remedy is that the Indians should become wards of the government. He reacted with horror to a proposal which had been submitted to Congress calling for their extermination under the theory that they were irrevocably savage and unchangeable in their character. Morse said the Indians were a race which "on every correct principle ought to be saved from extinction, if it be possible to save them."²³

James Fenimore Cooper was, in general, favorably disposed toward the Indians. In some of his novels, at least, the Indian appears as a truly admirable character—the intrepid adventurer, the master of forest lore, the trusted friend. Chingachgook, the friend of the white hero Natty Bumppo, is only one of a series of noble Indian characters who appear in Cooper's fiction.

17. *Adventure* (New York, 1921), p. 106.
18. The most famous of Wister's tales dealing with lynch law is *The Virginian* (New York, 1902).
19. *The Complete Edition of Frank Norris*, X, 35-42.
20. Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
21. (New York, 1913), p. 26.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-34.
23. Joan London, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
24. Kidd, *Social Evolution* (New York, 1894), p. 268; see Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought 1860-1915* (Philadelphia, 1945), pp. 80-84.
25. Quoted in Joan London, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-13.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 284.
27. (New York, 1906), p. 171.
28. *Roosevelt: The Story of a Friendship*, pp. 134-35.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 136-38.
30. *The Valley of the Moon* (New York, 1913), pp. 15, 102-3.
31. Article in *San Francisco Wave*, February 20, 1897, reprinted in *The Complete Edition of Frank Norris*, X, 87; "Grettir at Drangey," *The Complete Edition of Frank Norris*, IV, 146.
32. "La Tinaja Bonita," in *Red Men and White, The Writings of Owen Wister* (New York, 1928), [Vol. 1], p. 215; "The Right Honorable the Strawberries," *When West Was West, The Writings of Owen Wister*, [Vol. 6], pp. 160-61; *The Virginian*, pp. 4, 16, 116.
33. *Moran of the Lady Letty, A Story of Adventure Off the California Coast* (New York, 1898), pp. 71-72, 216; *A Man's Woman*, p. 49; *Blix: Moran of the Lady Letty, The Complete Edition of Frank Norris*, III, 3-4.
34. Ernest Marchand, *Frank Norris: A Study* (Palo Alto, California, 1942), p. 108n; quoted in Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 142; *Moran of the Lady Letty*, p. 184.
35. *Moon-Face and Other Stories* (New York, 1906), p. 60; *Adventure*, p. 90; *The Valley of the Moon*, p. 129.
36. *The Virginian*, pp. 350, 452.
37. *Lady Baltimore*, pp. 260-61.
38. London, *Adventure*, p. 47; Wister, *The Virginian*, p. 366; London, *The Sea-Wolf*, pp. 24-25, 47.
39. *The Mutiny of the Elsinore* (New York, 1924), pp. 148-49.
40. *The Complete Edition of Frank Norris*, X, 198, 201.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 199, 207.
43. *The Virginian*, p. 372; "The Evolution of the Cow-Puncher," *The Writings of Owen Wister*, [Vol. 1], p. xxi.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. xxii-xxiv.
45. *The Sea-Wolf*, p. 149; *The Scarlet Plague* (New York, 1915), p. 147.
46. *The Mutiny of the Elsinore*, p. 226.
47. "The Evolution of the Cow-Puncher," p. xxxii.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. xxii-xxiv.
49. *Burning Daylight* (New York, 1910), p. 151.
50. *Collected Writings Hitherto Unpublished in Book Form, The Complete Edition of Frank Norris*, X, 99.
51. *A Man's Woman*, pp. 105-6.
52. *The Sea-Wolf*, pp. 34, 50, 75, 98, 243.
53. *The Octopus: A Story of California* (New York, 1901), pp. 502-5.

54. "The Unexpected," in *Love of Life and Other Stories* (New York, n.d.), p. 127.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 138-44.
56. *The Valley of the Moon*, p. 41.
57. *The Mutiny of the Elsinore*, pp. 75-77; *Adventure*, p. 199.
58. "The Responsibilities of the Novelist," p. 101.
59. *The Sea-Wolf*, pp. 95-96.
60. *The Effects of Tropical Light on White Men* (New York, 1905), *passim*; London, *The Mutiny of the Elsinore*, pp. 148-49.
61. *The Mutiny of the Elsinore*, p. 149.
62. "The Evolution of the Cow-Puncher," pp. xxvi-xxvii.

CHAPTER X

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3. Quoted in B. Schricke, *Alien Americans* (New York, 1936), p. 31.
4. *Narratives of the Perils and Sufferings of Dr. Knight and John Slover* (Cincinnati, 1867), pp. 62-71; quoted in Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore, 1935), p. 77.
5. *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, ed. Moncure Conway (New York, 1894-96), III, 431.
6. Quoted in Jedidiah Morse, *A Report to the Secretary of War of the United States on Indian Affairs* (New Haven, 1822), p. 282.
7. Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 297; Harold E. Fey and D'Arcy McNickle, *Indians and Other Americans: Two Ways of Life Meet* (New York, 1959), pp. 62-63.
8. See Frank E. Stevens, *The Black Hawk War, Including a Review of Black Hawk's Life* (Chicago, 1903), *passim*.
9. Grant Foreman, *Sequoyah* (Norman, 1938), pp. 11-15.
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13. Collier, *op. cit.*, p. 213.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 224; *Commissioner's Annual Report* (1872); quoted in Fey and McNickle, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
15. Collier, *op. cit.*, p. 223; Duncan, *Congressional Globe*, 28th Cong., 2nd sess., App., p. 173; quoted in Weinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
16. (New York, 1881), p. 338.
17. *Congressional Record*, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 4262; quoted in Weinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
18. Hagan, *op. cit.*, p. 133; Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 667; Collier, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
19. "Dow, Jr.," *Illinois State Register*, July 17, 1846; quoted in Weinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 168; Morton, *Crania Americana . . .* (Philadelphia, 1839), p. 6; Morton, "Some Observations on the Ethnology and Archaeology of the American Aborigines," *American Journal of Science and Arts* (1846), p. 9; Josiah Clark Nott and George

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EPILOGUE

THE HEEL OF THE CONQUEROR

THE Winning of the West meant the annihilation of the Indian. True, their annihilation had begun much earlier, with the first landing of the Spaniards. Yet strange as it may seem, the Spaniards, in spite of all their cruelty and lust for gold, did not eradicate the native population so completely as did the Anglo-Saxons. With the exception of the West Indies, Indians are to-day still living in large numbers throughout Spanish America and although they are nominally Catholics many of their old cultural possessions have been incorporated in the new civilizations that have arisen there. In fact, Argentine and Brazil excepted, Spanish America is racially Indian. The two greatest presidents Mexico possessed, Juarez and Diaz, were of Zapotec lineage, the first a full-blood and the second a half-blood.

Not so where the Anglo-Saxons landed. The Pilgrim fathers, thorough in everything, fell upon their knees, and then, as the saying goes, upon the aborigines. Within a few years of their landing New England was pretty thoroughly freed from the harmless natives. The descendants of the South English who settled in the southeast of the United States among an Indian population that could have taught them quite a number of things, were almost as ruthless as the Puritans. The organized cruelty with which they exterminated the Creek is one of the most infamous incidents in a record that few of the Spanish *conquistadors*

have equalled. The Spaniards and the French enslaved the natives but they never broke their spirit. That was reserved for the Anglo-Saxon. To the latter Indian warfare was essentially a man-hunt.

As the Indian populations were pushed westward across the Alleghanies and the Blue Ridge Mountains, they fought back as best they could. Although always defeated their spirit was unbroken for most of the United States was still open to them. The crisis came during the first few decades of the nineteenth century when the white invaders pressed them closely first in the valley of the Ohio and then throughout the old northwest territory. The circle became smaller and smaller; the leaders of the Indians more and more puzzled and desperate. What was to be done? Three possibilities existed: either to make one last stand and drive out the hated and destructive invaders, or incorporate what seemed best in white culture into their own culture, or finally, to give up their old culture and adopt that of the white man.

From the very beginning the leaders of the Indians seem to have realized these alternatives and were divided among themselves as to which was best. There were always Die-hards who insisted that no concession of any kind was to be made if they wished to preserve their old past and there were always others who felt that some sort of an adaptation, some sort of a compromise was imperative. Needless to say the number of those who advocated the complete giving up of their old culture was at all times small. One contingency existed that none of the Indians, even the wisest among them and there were many wise men among them, could possibly have foreseen, namely, that their own culture would break up and that they would adopt little from the

Whites except their vices. Yet this is exactly what has happened in the vast majority of cases.

As was to have been expected most of the energies of the Indians were expended in seeking for a compromise between their own culture and that of the Whites. Many prophets arose. One of the most famous was the Kickapoo Kanakuk. The speech that he delivered to General Clark shows clearly how willing the more intelligent and practical-minded Indian was to recognize that something in their old culture must have been wrong if they could be so easily exterminated, and that something in the white man's culture must be worthy of emulation if the white man could be so uniformly victorious. Naturally they did not know—they could not have suspected—what it was that made the white man successful.

Kanakuk even drew a picture of the journey to heaven which he had undertaken in order to have the Great Spirit enlighten his bewilderment.

"My father," he said to General Clark, "I will explain to you what the Great Spirit said to me, but to do so I must make some marks. The Great Spirit said to me you must start from a certain point. This is the point: I have marked it. Then we got to a point that I have marked B and finally to one that I have marked C where the Great Spirit said he would appear. At point B the Great Spirit gave his blessings to the Indians and told them to throw away their medicine bags, not to steal, not to tell lies, not to murder, and not to quarrel. He told them that if they did not do this they could not get on the straight way but would have to go along the crooked path. That path led to an abyss of fire. He told us to go to a place I have marked E, where there would be collected all the Indian chiefs and

where there would be a great preaching. He told us that if we had not thrown away all our bad things by the time we got there, this place E would meet and become united with the abyss of fire and that then he would destroy everything and the world would be turned over; that if, on the contrary, we threw away our bad doings we would be able to cross this fire as well as the river which came next and finally come to a country where there was nothing but the prairie and on which nothing grew. There the sun would be hid from us by four black clouds. Then he would come and explain everything to us."

It is in such a strain that Kanakuk continues. He was a mild man, and a man of peace and a compromiser. He realized that much in the land situation could no longer be changed and he very cleverly developed a new theory as to the original ownership of the land. "Some of our chiefs," he told the General, "claim that the land belongs to us. But this is not what the Great Spirit told me. He told me that the land belongs to him and that no people own the lands and that I was not to forget to tell the white people this when I met them in council."

Yet of his old culture he was not willing to give up more than was necessary. Much of the old social organization and many of the religious beliefs were in the process of disintegrating even in his time. Particularly was this true of the personal guardian spirits and totems. So he makes the Great Spirit say, "Our old men had totems; they were good and numerous. Now you have scarcely any. If you follow my advice you will soon have totems again."

Compromise could go no further.

Kanakuk was only the first of a long line of prophets and compromisers, some of whom achieved notable if only

temporary success. Only one, the great Handsome Lake of the Iroquois succeeded in forging a compromise religion that has lasted to the present day.

One of the last of these prophets, Smohalla, born in a little village in distant Nevada, was destined to initiate a new religion which would sweep over all the west, unite peoples who had known very little of each other, cause enemies to forget their grievances and which was finally to terminate in massacre.

Smohalla was a typical prophet. He had the most beatific of visions and his program was in part simply a variant of the dream that has always been dear to the human heart. "My young men shall never work," he said. "Men who work cannot dream and wisdom comes to us in dreams."

The religion which he founded was a mixture of old Indian beliefs and Christianity. Belonging to a non-agricultural tribe where the earth was regarded as sacred, he protested vigorously against the instructions that had been sent out from Washington.

"You ask me to plow the ground," he said. "Shall I take a knife and tear my mother's bosom? Then when I die she will not take me to her bosom to rest.

"You ask me to dig for stones! Shall I dig under her skin for her bones? Then when I die I cannot enter her body to be born again.

"You ask me to cut grass and make hay and sell it, and be rich like white men but how dare I cut my mother's hair?

"I want my people to stay with me here. All the dead men will come to life again. Their spirits will come to their bodies again. We must wait here in the homes of our

fathers and be ready to meet them in the bosom of our mother."

The spiritual crisis of the Indians was getting desperate; they were beginning to lose their nerve. No wonder then that the doctrine of resurrection made a tremendous appeal upon them. There was little to be hoped for in this world and so they hoped for something better in another one.

Smohalla himself went to heaven to find out whether anything was still in store for the hard-pressed Indians. He came back with a message that the earth was getting old and worn out and the people bad, that he had been selected to renew it, make it what it used to be and make it better. Now when people feel that they must return to a pristine golden past that has long since disappeared, we can be sure that it is the beginning of the end. Let us listen to what Smohalla promised:

"The Great Spirit told us that all our dead were to be resurrected; that they were all to come back to earth and that, as the earth was too small for them and us, he would do away with heaven and make the earth itself large enough to contain us all; that we must tell all the people we meet about these things. He spoke to us about fighting, and said that it was bad and that we must keep away from it; that the earth was to be all good hereafter and we must all be friends with one another. He said that in the fall of the year, the youth of all good people would be renewed, so that nobody would be more than forty years old and that, if they behave themselves well after this, the youth of every one would be renewed in the spring. He said if we were all good he would send people among us who could heal all our wounds and sickness by mere touch and that we

would live forever. He told us not to quarrel or fight or strike each other, or shoot one another; that the Whites and Indians were to be all one people. He said if any man disobeyed what he ordered, his tribe would be wiped from the face of the earth; that we must believe everything he said, and we must not doubt him or say he lied; that if we did, he would know it; that he would know our thoughts and actions in no matter what part of the world we might be."

All sorts of old beliefs, customs and even costumes immediately clustered around the new faith, and it spread with lightning like rapidity in every direction, north, west, south, taking on new aspects, new emphases, new interpretations. Smohalla's spiritual crisis found an echo in the breasts of thousands of Indians.

Far to the east the great individualists, the Sioux, welcomed it fiercely. Everywhere it aroused new hopes, led to new and hitherto unheard-of interpretations of the old past. Among the Arapaho it led to an intensification of their old mysticism. People danced till they fell exhausted to the ground.

The disturbances and the excitement among the Sioux finally grew to such proportions that the government decided to disarm the Indians preparatory to taking them to the agency. A conflict naturally broke out. An Indian is supposed to have fired the first shot. The white soldiers immediately replied by pouring a volley of shot directly into the crowd. Many Indians fell at the first volley. The survivors sprang to their feet and for a time there was a hand-to-hand struggle.

Soon the Hotchkiss guns trained on the camp, opened fire and sent a storm of shells and bullets among the women and

children who had gathered in front of the tipis to watch what they thought was simply an unusual military display. The guns poured in two-pound explosive shells at the rate of nearly fifty per minute mowing down everything alive. The terrible effect may be judged from the fact that one woman survivor, Blue Whirlwind, received fourteen wounds. In a few minutes two hundred Indians, men, women and children were lying dead and wounded on the ground, some of the tipis were torn to pieces by the shells while others were burning above the helpless wounded. The surviving handful of Indians fled in wild panic to the shelter of the ravine pursued by hundreds of maddened soldiers and followed up by a raking fire from the efficient Hotchkiss guns which had been moved into position to sweep the ravine. The pursuit was simply a massacre where fleeing women with infants in their arms were shot down after resistance had ceased and when almost every warrior was stretched dead, or dying, on the ground.

The white man had triumphed. From that time on the Indians were crushed. Their nerve was gone. Broken, disorganized externally and internally, they gave up the fight.

THE END

obviously a rhetorical round number, the 2000 need not be taken as historical. Herrera, not an original authority but a careful compiler, writes half a century later that the press to join the expedition at Seville was so great that the ships hastily put to sea with 800 men; possibly he does not include the sailors. The late M. Paul Groussac, a learned exponent of Argentine history, argues from probability, from the capacity of the ships and from the terms of Mendoza's capitulation that the number did not exceed 800. On the other hand the contemporary evidence of Oviedo and of the lady's letter cannot be ignored. The impression conveyed by the accounts is that there was big talk at Seville and frequent mention of 'Two thousand men!', that in fact a much smaller number left Seville and that considerably less than 1500 reached the river Plate.

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The Pioneers Histories ed by V. T. Harlow & A. Williamson
 A & C Black, London 1934.

The Spanish Conquistadores B.M.: W.P. 5063/7
 by P.A. Kirkpatrick, M.A. F.R.H.S.
 (Eminent Reader in Spanish in the Univ of Camb)

CHAPTER XXVII

SPAIN THE PRECURSOR

I like a plantation on a pure soil; that is where people are not dis-
 planted to the end to plant in others. FRANCIS BACON

Our principal intention and will has always been to preserve and
 augment the numbers of the Indians. CHARLES V

IN viewing the work of Spaniards in America, thought naturally turns to the later work of the English farther north. Points of contrast at once occur. Since the first permanent Spanish settlement dates from 1493 and the first permanent English settlement from 1607, both countries reproducing themselves in the New World, the England so reproduced was the England of the Stuarts and the Commonwealth, whereas the Spain so reproduced was that of the Catholic sovereigns and of Charles V. Spanish settlement coincided with the period of adventurous exploration: English settlement followed the period of adventure. When the Spanish Conquistadores are accused of inhumanity and inefficiency, this difference of time must be remembered: all that has been said—in the first instance by Spaniards—about that inhumanity and inefficiency is true, but not the whole truth. It may be noted that during the same period the English too were pursuing conquest and colonisation—in Ireland: and one would hesitate to claim that their work was more efficient or more humane.

Thus the two movements differed in the world which they brought with them; they differed still more in the world which they found: the English found no Mexico, no Peru, no Bogota.


But there was also a difference of theory: 'In Spanish America', says E. G. Bourne, 'the natives from the start were regarded as the subjects of the Crown of Spain, whereas in English America they were generally treated as independent nations—friends or enemies as the case might be. . . . Daniel Denton in 1670 quaintly observes: "it hath been generally observed that where the English come to settle, a divine hand makes way for them by removing or cutting off the Indians either by wars one with another or by some raging mortal disease".' The Spaniards on the other hand constantly deplored the depopulation which they caused; they wished to rule a subjugated population. The Spaniards were conquerors who spread in little groups over a vast area: the English were colonists who made homes for themselves on the margin of the Atlantic. Yet theory and method were modified by circumstances; the Spaniards had to deal with peoples and tribes differing widely in culture, and where the natives did not fit into the Spanish scheme, they disappeared: the Pampa Indians have travelled the same road as the 'redskins' of New England and Virginia.

Spain was the precursor; the English leaders of thought and action, Hakluyt and Raleigh, repeatedly point to Spanish example. Raleigh in his *History of the World* turns aside to write: 'I cannot forbear to commend the patient virtue of the Spaniards. We seldom or never find that any nation hath endured so many misadventures and miseries as the Spaniards have done in their Indian discoveries; yet persisting in

their enterprises with invincible constancy, they have annexed to their kingdom so many goodly provinces as bury the remembrance of all dangers past. Tempest and shipwrecks, famine, overthrows, mutinies, heat and cold, pestilence and all manner of diseases both old and new, together with extreme poverty and want of all things needful, have been the enemies wherewith every one of their most noble discoverers at one time or another hath encountered. Many years had passed over their heads in the search of not so many leagues; yea more than one or two have spent their labour, their wealth and their lives in search of a golden kingdom without getting further notice of it than what they had at their first setting forth; all which notwithstanding, the third and fourth and fifth undertakers have not been disheartened. Surely they are worthily rewarded with those treasuries and paradises which they enjoy; and well they deserve to hold them quietly, if they hinder not the like virtue in others, which perhaps will not be found.'

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407 Offerings of the Mandans, from a lithograph after a drawing by Charles Bodmer, in Maximilian, *Travels in the Interior of North America, 1832-34*, London, 1838-43

THE PASSING OF THE MANDANS

ONE result of the advent of the white men in the Indian country became clear in 1837. In the spring of that year the *St. Peters*, the annual steamboat of the American Fur Company, churned up the Missouri on its customary business. After it had left St. Louis the dreaded smallpox broke out among its crew. The boat kept on, however, knowing that the Indians and the forts along the Upper Missouri would be anxiously awaiting its arrival. At Fort Clarke, as the *St. Peters* lay along the bank, the whites strove desperately to keep the Indians from coming on board, but they, childlike people that

they were, could not understand the warnings of the traders. A Mandan chief stole a blanket from a white man ill with the disease. A few days later smallpox began to rage in the Mandan villages. Never had an epidemic of such virulence been known to these western traders. A brave, vigorous and healthy in the morning, would be stricken as if by an unseen hand and in the midst of terrible sufferings die before the sun went down. Nearly all those who were attacked succumbed. There were many men who, beholding the agonies of the sick, killed themselves with their knives rather than await the disease. The lodges and the streets of the villages were strewn with unburied dead. Some fled to the open plains where they contracted the disease and died uncared for and alone. When the epidemic had burned itself out, something less than fifty terror-stricken and despairing Mandans, a tiny remnant of a once important people, remained. These went to live with the Hidatsas and the independent history of the Mandans came to an end.

SPREADING OF THE PLAGUE

THE plague did not end in the Mandan villages, for the *St. Peters* went on up the river, stopping at forts and carrying the smallpox to tribe after tribe. The pestilence raged among the Assiniboin; it reached the Blackfeet. Wherever it went it took a heavy toll of death. The Assiniboin accused the white men of bringing desolation to their villages and urged war against them. The Blackfeet looked upon the scourge as a punishment from their gods for the war they had undertaken against the white men. Yet the white man was responsible. The American Fur Company, which could have prevented the spread of the disease among the Indians, allowed the *St. Peters* to continue on its course. Cupidity, and the desire for gain, outweighed whatever humanitarian feelings the traders may have had. Yet they also were among the sufferers, for the epidemic raged in the forts where there were many who had not been vaccinated. They suffered also in the decline of the amount of furs and robes brought in by the decimated tribes. This plague, more terrible than any war between hostile tribes, far surpassed any disaster known to the Great Plains in the Indian days.



408 Tent of an Assiniboin Chief, from a lithograph after a drawing by Charles Bodmer, in Maximilian, *Travels in the Interior of North America, 1832-34*, London, 1838-43

REFUGEES FROM THE APPALACHIANS

Two years after the despairing remnant of the Mandans had thrown in their lot with the Gros-Ventres, another group of discouraged Indians camped for the winter of 1839 on a small river called the Illinois in what is now eastern Oklahoma. (See Chapter V.) They were the Cherokee nation, driven from their ancient hills and valleys. With them they brought their constitution and their organization as a nation. They were filled with bitterness when, here on the western plains, they were brought face to face with that handful of their own number who had signed the treaty of New Echota. This group, in the opinion of the bulk of the refugees, had betrayed their people. They had broken the law which forbade any individual to sign a treaty ceding away the Indian lands. Three hundred Cherokee full-bloods, every one of whom had suffered some peculiar misfortune in the transfer from the old land to the new, banded themselves together to punish the treaty men. In June of 1840, John Ridge, Major Ridge, and Elias Boudinot fell by the hands of assassins. Their alleged treachery was repaid in blood. The treaty men, however, were not the chief problem which confronted the migrating Cherokees. For many years a part of the nation had lived along the banks of the Arkansas. These were now known as the Old Settlers. They had long had their own government and now they looked somewhat askance upon their kinsmen from the East who claimed to represent and to exercise the authority of the Cherokee nation. The Old Settlers, as individuals, met the refugees with hospitality and friendship, but between the two groups a sharp party fight developed, arousing the passions of both sides. For more than a decade political division disturbed the harmony of the Cherokee nation. In the end, however, the difficulties were settled and the government which had been brought from the mountains extended its control to all the Cherokees. But the contest for power between the Emigrants and the Old Settlers prevented the settlement of the financial arrangements between the tribe and the United States. For a decade, therefore, the Indians struggled against great adversity to establish themselves in their new country.

ON THE BANKS OF THE ARKANSAS

THE Cherokees, after their first winter, promptly set to work to cultivate the land which had been allotted to them. The nation owned it in common and any Cherokee might lay out his farm where he chose. His improvements, however, were his personal property. The soil proved to be fertile and the Cherokees, in spite of their difficulties, began again to prosper. Two decades passed. The first rude shacks gave way to log cabins and these in turn to occasional houses of brick. Two years after reaching the Arkansas, the Council provided for the establishment of eleven primary schools for the education of their children. Five years later there were eighteen such schools, with an enrollment of more than six hundred and fifty pupils. The teachers were Cherokees who had proved themselves qualified for their tasks. In 1846 a law was passed by the Council establishing two seminaries of high-school rank, one for boys and one for girls. There was little money in the public treasury; yet the Cherokees built two brick buildings and to these seminaries came many students. Finally, a selected few of the young men and women of the tribe went to eastern colleges, particularly Mount Holyoke and Princeton, to complete their education. After their four years of academic life they returned to their own people to further the development of their nation and to help improve the lot of their kinsmen. The printing press which the United States had seized at New Echota had not been paid for. So the nation itself was compelled to buy a new one. In 1843 began the publication in Cherokee and English of *The Cherokee Advocate*, intended to disseminate information and to encourage agriculture, education, and religion.



410 Cherokee Primer in the New York Public Library

28th Congress, 1st Session. Doc. No. 235. Ho. or Rep.

CHEROKEE INDIANS.

MEMORIAL

JOHN ROGERS, Principal Chief.

JAMES CAREY and THOMAS L. RODGERS, Chiefs and head men, being members of a Committee on behalf of the Cherokee old settlers west of the Mississippi, for themselves and their people.

April 13, 1844. Referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs.

April 17, 1844. Ordered to be printed.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America:

An oppressed and ruined people, stripped of the property and deprived of the protection which were repeatedly promised and solemnly guaranteed to them by the Government of the United States, appeal to the Congress of those United States for reparation. Peniless and in exile, we are able to bring no influence to bear on the Government or people of this Republic, but the power of truth and the sympathy which wrong and oppression, when made manifest, never fail to excite. If these be not sufficient to procure your interposition in our behalf, nothing will be left to us and our people but oppression, dispersion, despair, and death.

We ask, we beseech you, turn a deaf ear to our complaints because other portions of the red men have been troublesome to your Government. If your policy has at times been thwarted, it was not by them; if your treasury has been plundered, they have shared no part of the spoil. In all their dealings with the United States, they have been open and fair and honest; always ready to accede to every reasonable wish expressed by your Government, committing encroachments upon none, and asking only to be allowed the enjoyment of their country and their homes in

409 Protest of the "Old Settlers" against their Treatment by the United States, from a pamphlet in the New York Public Library