THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN INDUSTRY TO JAPAN DURING THE LAST YEARS OF THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD

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The modern period of Japanese history is generally dated from 1868, the year of the Meiji Restoration. Like most dates used in defining historical periods, this one gives the illusion of a sharp break in historical development that did not occur in fact, for many distinctive characteristics of modern Japan may be clearly traced at least as far back as the Tokugawa period. Even so recent a feature as industrialization began in the closing years of the " feudal " period with the introduction of Western technology and methods in several branches of industry. It will be the purpose of this paper to describe the conditions under which this movement began, the scope and character of the process, and to attempt to estimate its significance for the industrial history of the Meiji period.

1

It is a fact of capital significance in the history of the Far East that industrialization began earlier and progressed more rapidly in Japan than elsewhere. An important reason for this was the relatively advanced state that Western studies, and particularly the applied sciences, had reached in Japan by the initial phases of industrialization.

It will be recalled that the Tokugawa *Shōgun* had cut Japan off from all intercourse with Europe, save for a restricted commerce permitted the Dutch at Nagasaki, just on the eve of those great scientific achievements of the seventeenth century that were to lead indirectly to machine industry and the conquest of much of the Far East by European nations. Despite the enormous handicaps that isolation imposed, Japanese scholars tediously expanded their knowledge of Western science, geography, and armaments throughout the eighteenth century by the study and

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translation of Dutch books.[1] The movement, heretofore dependent upon the efforts of individual scholars, was given powerful official support shortly after the turn of the century. In 1808, the *Bakufu* 幕府,[2] which had been translating Western works on the calendar for several years, obtained the services of BABA Sajūrō 馬場佐十郎 (1787-1822), an illustrious *rangakusha* 蘭學者, or "Dutch scholar," and commenced the translation of Western geographical works. The work of BABA Sajūrō marked the beginnings of an official translation bureau, at which some of the most celebrated *rangakusha* of the time were employed. The activity of this bureau, together with the work of similar enterprises undertaken by individual *daimyō* 大名,[3] resulted in the translation and collection of Dutch works on such a variety of subjects as medicine, chemistry, shipbuilding, mechanics, mining, mathematics, physics, and pyrotechnics and the translation of an encyclopedia, which ran to seventy volumes and required twenty-eight years to complete.[4]

The appearance of PERRY's squadron in Edo Bay gave the movement a new urgency. "The necessity of defense against the barbarians," a Mito 水戸 official commented in 1854, "requires that we know them and know ourselves; there is no other way to know them than through Dutch learning."[5] It was for this purpose that the *Bakufu* established a school for Western studies

[1] C. R. BOXER, *Jan Companie in Japan, 1600-1817*, An essay on the cultural, artistic, and scientific influence exercised by Hollanders in Japan from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries (The Hague, 1936), Chaps. 3, 4.

[2] *Bakufu* literally means "tent government," hence military government or shogunate.

[3] The term *daimyō* denotes the hereditary head of a territorial government, of which there were over two hundred in the Tokugawa period, and in which the *daimyō* enjoyed a high degree of independence despite definite obligations and limitations on his power imposed by the *Shōgun*.

[4] *Numata Jirō* 沼田次郎, "Bansho-shirabesho ni tsuite" 蕃書調所に就いて ("Regarding the Bansho-shirabesho"), *Rekishi chiri* 歴史地理 (*History and Geography*) 71 (May, 1938).18-19. To expedite work on the encyclopedia, which was begun in 1811 and not completed until 1839, only items of practical utility were included. The pragmatic character of the selections may be seen from the Japanese title given the work, *Kōsei shimpen* 厚生新編 (*New Book for the Welfare of the People*).

[5] TOKUGAWA kōshaku ke 公爵家 ed., *Mito han shiryō* 水戸藩史料 (*Historical Materials on the Mito Han*) (Tōkyō, 1916) 1.919.

called the *Bansho-shirabesho* 蕃書調所 in 1855.[6] Language study was necessarily the most important part of the program, and its development is a rough index of the progress of the school. Instruction was at first offered only in the Dutch language, but English and French were added in 1860, German in 1861, and Russian in 1864.[7] Facilities for specialized study in the several branches of "Western learning" (*yōgaku* 洋學) were also developed, as foreign books and translations were accumulated and the general "Dutch scholar" on the faculty with a smattering of knowledge on many subjects tended to become a specialist in one of them. Government regulations in 1864 fixed the curriculum to include astronomy, geography, mathematics, physics, refining (*seirengaku* 精煉學), and painting, and there were four instructors in chemistry at the school in 1866.[8]

Although *samurai* 士 were admitted to the *Bansho-shirabesho* without distinction as to the *han* 藩[9] from which they came, most of the *han* also undertook independent programs to promote a knowledge of Western languages and "Western learning" among their *samurai*. *Rangaku*, or "Dutch learning," was introduced as a subject of study into many *han* schools.[10] Chōshū 長州 sent young *samurai* to Nagasaki to study Dutch,[11] giving them official

[6] The school was successively known as the *Bansho-shirabesho*, the *Yōsho-shirabesho* 洋書, the *Kaiseisho* 開成所, and Tōkyō Imperial University. Honjō Eijirō 本庄榮治郎, ed., *Meiji ishin keizai shi kenkyū* 明治維新經濟史研究 (*Studies in the Economic History of the Meiji Restoration*) (Tōkyō, 1930) 5.

[7] Numata, "Bansho-shirabesho," 29-31. In 1866 the school had 17 instructors in Dutch, 10 in English, 6 in German, 4 in French; no instructors in Russian are listed for 1866.

[8] *Ibid*. 31-32. For a list of the subjects in which lectures were given at the school in 1866, see Ōkurashō 大藏省 ed., *Nihon zaisei keizai shiryō* 日木財政經濟史料 (*Historical Materials on the Finances and the Economy of Japan*) (Tōkyō, 1922-25) 10.960.

[9] The territory under the jurisdiction of a *daimyō* was known as a *han*. The term *han* is usually translated as "fief," but the strong European connotations of this word are not appropriate to Tokugawa Japan, and the Japanese terminology has therefore been used.

[10] Numata "Bansho-shirabesho," 24.

[11] Horie Yasuzō 掘江保藏, "Yamaguchi han ni okeru bakumatsu no yōshiki kōgyō" 山口藩に於ける幕末洋式工業 ("Western-style Industries in the Yamaguchi Han at the end of the Tokuwaga Period"), *Keizai ronsō* 經濟論叢 (*The Economic Review*) 40 (Jan. 1935). 155, 164.

preferment upon their return,[12] and after 1864, the *han* employed several Englishmen as language instructors.[13] Tosa 土佐 sent *samurai* to Nagasaki and Edo for the study of European artillery as early as 1843; lectures on " Western learning " were afterwards introduced into the routine of the *han* school, and instruction in English and French was commenced in 1866.[14] Mito began instruction in Dutch in 1832; the program was permitted to lapse after the loss of the instructor to the Edo police authorities but was revived in 1855 and continued until the Restoration.[15] But it was in Satsuma 薩摩 and Saga 佐賀 that Western studies were most highly developed, and it is interesting to note that these *han* were also leaders in introducing Western industry.

Satsuma possessed an exceptionally favorable location for the development of Western studies. Her territories lay close by Nagasaki and the Ryūkyū Islands, which until 1854 were the sole means of direct access to Europeans.[16] Equally important was the character of the Lord of Satsuma in the years immediately before and after PERRY. SHIMAZU Nariakira 島津齊彬 (1809-1858) was himself a student of Dutch and an enthusiastic patron of " Western learning." Before becoming *daimyō* in 1851, he had

[12] A case in point is NAKAJIMA Jihei 中島治平, who came from a family of low rank and rose to a high position in the Chōshū bureaucracy through a knowledge of Dutch and English. HORIE Yasuzō, " Nakajima Jihei to Yamaguchi han no yōshiki kōgyō " (" Nakajima Jihei and Western-style Industry in the Yamaguchi Han "), *Keizai ronsō* 40 (May, 1935).135-37.

[13] HORIE, " Yamaguchi han," 156.

[14] ETŌ Tsuneharu, 江頭恒治, " Bakumatsu ni okeru Kōchi han no shinseisaku " 幕末に於ける高知藩の新政策 (" The New Policy of the Kōchi *Han* in the Bakumatsu Period "), *Keizai shi kenkyū* (*Studies in Economic History*) 14 (Sept. 1935).1-2, 4, 12.

[15] *Mito han shiryō* 1.916, 919, 921. There was an interesting element of conservatism associated with the program begun in 1855. All persons were forbidden to study Dutch save those specially designated by the *han* government because " Western studies have become increasingly fashionable of late, a fact which may in the future give rise to serious evils." *Ibid.* 922.

[16] Satsuma carried on a large-scale, illicit commerce with Chinese junks that touched at the islands, which had been a dependency of the *han* since their conquest in 1609. It has also been established that Satsuma was in contact with French and Dutch traders in the Ryūkyūs before the first commercial treaty in 1858. TSUCHIYA Takao 土屋喬雄, *Hōken shakai hōkai katei no kenkyū* 封建社會崩壞過程の研究 (*A Study of the Disintegration of Feudal Society*) (Tōkyō, 1927) 527-29.

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commissioned the translation of numerous Dutch books, among them an important work on steamships, and had been active in the collection of scientific works, particularly in the field of chemistry in which he had a special interest.[17]

In the year he became *daimyō*, Nariakira established the *Seirenjo* 製煉所 as a laboratory for the study of the practical applications of Western science. Here experiments based on Dutch works were made on such problems as the plating of metals, the bleaching of silk and cotton cloth, and the manufacture of acids, alcohol, and glass. A model reverberatory furnace was built and experiments conducted on the smelting of iron ore.[18] The activities of the *Seirenjo* were continued after the death of Nariakira in 1858, and in 1865 the policy of promoting "Western learning," with which his name is inseparably associated, was carried to its logical conclusion by the dispatch of fifteen young *samurai* to Europe as students.[19]

Saga, like Satsuma, was favored by geography. Nagasaki was located in the province of Hizen 肥前, a large part of which was Saga territory, and responsibility for the defense of the port in alternate years provided exceptional opportunities for direct, if clandestine, relations with the Dutch. As early as 1804 Saga was sending students to Nagasaki to study "Dutch medicine" (*ran'i-gaku* 蘭醫學),[20] and a medical school (*Igakkan* 醫學館), based on the accumulated body of "Dutch" medical knowledge, was opened by the *han* in 1834.[21] In 1851, the *Rangakuryō* 蘭學寮, or

[17] *Ibid.* 490.

[18] *Ibid.* 489, 491.

[19] Three Satsuma officials accompanied the students abroad to study European industry. *Ibid.* 512-13.

[20] The first student seems to have been SHIMAMOTO Yoshimasa 島本良順, who was sent to Nagasaki sometime before the Bunka era (1804-1818). ETŌ Tsuneharu, "Takashima tankō ni okeru kyūhan makki no Nichiei kyōdō kigyō" 高島炭坑に於ける舊藩末期の日英共同企業 ("The Joint Anglo-Japanese Undertaking in the Final Period of the Old *Han* at the Takashima Coal Mine"), *Keizai shi kenkyū* 13 (Feb., 1935). 42.

[21] *Ibid.* 43. The interest of Saga in Western medicine was not exceptional. It was the first branch of "Western learning" to attract interest in other *han*; study of the subject had progressed so far by 1859 that an American physician could report that: "Already are our systems of medicine and surgery in practice to a large extent throughout the Empire." *The Nautical Magazine and Naval Chronicle* (Nov. 1859) 569.

Bureau of Dutch Studies, was established. Although instruction was confined to the Dutch language and Western military science, a number of the graduates of the school were sent to Nagasaki to study shipbuilding, mechanics, and electricity under Dutch instructors.[22]

In 1852, Saga established a *Seirenjo* 精煉所 of the kind opened by Satsuma the previous year.[23] Like the Kagoshima 鹿児島 institution, study was based on Dutch books and focused on the applied sciences. The Saga *Seirenjo* studied photography, telegraphy, spinning, and sugar refining among other subjects and by 1855 had built models of the telegraph and steamship for experimental purposes.[24] The extraordinary interest of Saga in technology is indicated by the fact that the two representatives chosen by the *han* to accompany a *Bakufu* mission to the United States in 1860 were selected from among members of the *Seirenjo*.[25] The observations of these emissaries in the United States resulted in the final educational undertaking of the *han* before the Meiji Restoration. Instruction in Dutch, which was reported to be an unduly circuitous approach to Western science, was dropped, and an English language school (*eigakuryō* 英學寮) was founded at Nagasaki in 1865.[26]

The most striking feature of the early history of "Western learning" in Japan is the exceptional interest shown in the applied sciences. The reason for this is obvious. The period in which these studies were coming to maturity coincided with the most serious crisis in Japan's foreign relations since the Mongol invasions. The material superiority of the West had been clearly demonstrated by the Opium War (1839-1842), and the increas-

[22] Etō, "Takashima tankō," 43.

[23] *Ibid.* 51. It is interesting to note that several of the principal technicians and scientists employed at the *Seirenjo* were brought in from outside the Saga *han*, a measure that constituted a departure from the traditional policy of the *han*. Ishiguro Tadanori 石黒直寛 was a scientist from the Tamba *han* 但馬藩; Nakamura Yorisuke 中村奇輔 was a Kyōto chemist; Tanaka Chikae 田中近江 was from Kurume.

[24] *Ibid.* 53.

[25] The two representatives were Ishiguro Tadanori and Fukutani Keiko 福谷啓古. *Ibid.* 53.

[26] *Ibid.* 43.

ingly frequent appearance of European ships in Japanese waters suggested the probability that Japan would soon be put to a test that China had already failed.[27] It is not strange, then, that the Japanese showed a clear partiality for those branches of " Western learning " which, it was believed, gave the Westerners their margin of superiority. " It is a most amazing fact," SAKUMA Shōzan 佐久間象山 (1811-1864) commented, " that, with the invention of the steamship, the magnet, and the telegraph, they now appear to control the laws of nature." [28]

Once the military potentialities of Western technology had been grasped, it was but a short step to the attempt to develop the industries necessary for their realization. The fact that the Shogunate and the leading *han*, upon whom the principal burden of national defense fell, were acting under the compulsion of what they not unreasonably regarded as military necessity affected the early history of Western industry in Japan in two important respects. First, the earliest and most important of the Western industries developed during the Tokugawa period, such as iron, armaments, and shipbuilding, were of a military character. Consumer industries based on Western technology, such as cotton spinning, did not appear until the very end of the period. Second, the urgency of the new industries and the absence of a capitalist class with traditions and experience in industrial undertakings precluded the possibility of their development being left to private interests, and, consequently, the Western industries of the Tokugawa period were all owned and developed as government enterprises.

2

The significance of some measure of previous familiarity with Western science and technology, the directness of the connection between the crisis in Japan's foreign relations and the introduction of Western industry, and the characteristic features of

[27] TABOHASHI Kiyoshi 田保橋潔, *Kinsei gaikoku kankei shi* 近世外國關係史 (*A History of Japanese Foreign Relations in the Tokugawa Period*), (Tōkyō, 1940), Chaps. 6, 10, 12.

[28] Quoted in HONJŌ Eijirō, "A Survey of Economic Thought in the Closing Days of the Tokugawa Period," *Kyōto University Economic Review* 13 (Oct. 1938) .25.

Western industry in the Tokugawa period may be seen in the history of specific industries in this period.

Saga was the first *han* to introduce Western methods of smelting iron ore, a fact closely related to the defensive assignments of the *han* and the advanced state of Western studies in her territories. Since the seventeenth century Saga had been charged with responsibility for the defense of Nagasaki in alternate years with the Fukuoka *han* 福岡藩.[29] The inadequacy of defensive arrangements for the port had become apparent early in the nineteenth century, and in 1850 Saga drew up a plan for strengthening these defenses by emplacing a total of fifty-three guns, varying in size from twelve to one hundred and fifty pounds, on the islands lying immediately off the coast.[30] At that time copper was almost exclusively used in casting weapons, for the traditional methods of smelting iron ore did not yield high-quality iron in sufficient quantities for the purpose. As guns were cast in increasing numbers in the first half of the century, copper became prohibitively expensive and difficult to procure in quantity.[31] Confronted with the necessity of using iron to carry out such an extensive program of casting as its plans involved and of finding a more efficient means of smelting the ore, Saga, in 1850, built the first successful reverberatory furnace in Japan, using a Dutch book as guide.[32]

The capacity of this furnace soon proved inadequate, and three additional furnaces were built in quick succession.[33] The success of the entire undertaking was verified in 1853 when an iron gun was satisfactorily cast from one of the new furnaces. SUGITANI Yasusuke 杉谷雍介, the translator of the book upon which con-

[29] ETŌ, "Takashima tankō," 37.

[30] *Ibid*. 38-39. The estimated cost of casting and emplacing these weapons was 208,145 *ryō*, of which 50,000 *ryō* were borrowed from the *Bakufu*. (For *ryō*, see note 49.)

[31] *Ibid*. 46; *Mito han shiryō* 1.345. On the traditional methods of smelting, see ŌYAMA Futarō 大山敷太郎, "Bakumatsu ni okeru yōshiki seitetsu jigyō 幕末における洋式製鉄事業 ("The Western-style Iron Industry in the Bakumatsu Period"), *Keizai shi kenkyū* 20 (Aug. 1938).23-25.

[32] *Ibid* 16; HORIE, "Yamaguchi han," 153. A detailed construction sketch of the type of reverberatory furnace used in the Tokugawa period is to be found in *Mito han shiryō* 1.352 ff.

[33] ETŌ, "Takashima tankō," 48.

reverberatory furnace and a blast furnace (*yōkōro* 熔鑛爐) the following year. Two additional furnaces of the reverberatory type were built in 1865. In the same year Satsuma built a *sankaidai* 鑽開台, an apparatus powered by a water wheel for boring the solid iron gun barrels cast from the furnaces, from sketches of the device in a Dutch book.[40]

The iron produced with these furnaces was used chiefly for casting weapons, and a lively armaments industry developed at Kagoshima.[41] SHIMAZU Nariakira, the energetic *daimyō* of Satsuma, also established a number of small workshops to turn out a variety of iron products such as carpentry tools and agricultural implements both for direct use by the *han* and for sale on the commercial market. The iron and armaments industry, together with these workshops and a number of others for sugar refining and for the manufacture of leather articles and paper, were collectively known as the *Shūseikan* 集成館.[42] Although there are no satisfactory data on the output of iron by Satsuma in this period, some suggestion of the size and importance of the industry is contained in the fact that twelve hundred workers were being employed at the *Shūseikan* in 1858.[43]

The origin of the iron industry in Mito followed the same pattern as it had in Saga and Satsuma: the necessity for casting guns from iron led to the construction of Western-style furnaces for smelting ore.[44] There are, however, a number of details of the Mito industry which are of special interest. They indicate a surprising degree of co-operation among specific *han* and throw some light on the financial problems involved in the introduction of the new industry.

Co-operation with other *han* antedated the actual introduction of Western industry by Mito. In this early period TOKUGAWA Nariaki 德川齊昭 (1800-1860), the Lord of Mito, had exchanged Dutch books with other *daimyō* including SHIMAZU Narioki 齊興

[40] TSUCHIYA, *Hōken shakai hōkai* 491-94.

[41] HORIE, Yasuzō, "Bakumatsu no gunji kōgyō" 幕末の軍事工業 ("Military Industries of the Bakumatsu Period"), *Keizai shi kenkyū* 19 (May 1938).4.

[42] TSUCHIYA, *op. cit.* 491.

[43] *Ibid.* 498.

[44] *Mito han shiryō* 1.345.

(1791-1859) of Satsuma,[45] and in 1851, Mito was permitted to send a representative to Satsuma and Saga to inspect the work being done by these *han* on the reverberatory furnace. Two years later, when Satsuma had at last succeeded in smelting iron ore, SHIMAZU Nariakira reported the event to the Lord of Mito in detail.[46] By this time the latter was already embarked on a similar project and needed no instruction on the merits of the new furnace. He had obtained the services of ŌSHIMA Takatō 大島高任 (1826-1901), a *samurai* of the Nambu 南部 *han* who had been studying the reverberatory furnace through Dutch books, and TAKESHITA Norimichi 竹下矩方, a Satsuma *samurai* who had worked on the furnace at Kagoshima.[47] By 1853 these outsiders had produced a model furnace for Mito and the construction of a full-sized furnace had been ordered.[48]

The construction of a reverberatory furnace involved a substantial investment. Mito was unable to finance the project entirely from its own treasury and was obliged to solicit a loan of 10,000 *ryō* 兩 from the *Bakufu*. In April of 1854 the Edo government granted the loan and acceded to the proposed condition that the loan be repaid in weapons cast after the completion of the furnace.[49] Construction was begun four months later under the technical direction of ŌSHIMA and TAKESHITA, and the furnace was completed in December of 1855, after a little more than twelve months of work.[50] A second furnace was begun several months later and finished in June of 1856.[51] A *sankaidai*, necessary equipment in manufacturing iron guns, had been built in 1855 in conjunction with the first furnace,[52] and a blast furnace was built in 1858, marking the completion of the Mito iron industry.[53]

[45] ŌYAMA, "*Yōshiki seitetsu jigyō*," 19.

[46] TSUCHIYA, *op. cit.* 492.

[47] *Mito han shiryō* 1.344, 919.

[48] *Ibid.* 344.

[49] *Ibid.* 345. 1 *ryō* in gold was equal to 60 *momme* 匁 or 225 grams of silver; HONJŌ Eijirō, *The Social and Economic History of Japan* (Kyōto, 1935) 371.

[50] *Mito han shiryō* 1.348, 350. The Mito furnace was regarded as successful when the first gun cast from it was satisfactorily test-fired the following year.

[51] *Ibid.* 351.

[52] *Ibid.* 349. A sketch of this device is to be seen in *ibid.* 352 ff.

[53] ŌYAMA, "Yōshiki seitetsu jigyō," 22.

Despite the fact that the *Bakufu* bore the primary responsibility for national defense, it was not until 1858 that it built a reverberatory furnace. Even so, the initiative came from a Tokugawa provincial official, EGAWA Tarōzaemon 江川太郎左衛門 (1801-1855), who had built a small but unsuccessful furnace as early as 1842 at Nirayama 韮山 in Izu 伊豆 province.[54] Stimulated by the success of the Saga furnace, for the study of which he had dispatched a subordinate to Saga, EGAWA requested permission from Edo to build a furnace in his district. Permission for the project was granted, and after several years' labor and the death of EGAWA, the furnace was completed at Nirayama, and the casting of guns was begun in 1858.[55]

After 1858 the *Bakufu* developed the iron industry in connection with shipbuilding. The two industries are so intimately related in the materials for their study, as well as in fact, that it will be convenient at this point to consider them together.

3

Since the year 1635, the Tokugawa had prohibited the construction of seagoing vessels, as part of a program of eliminating those factors of growth and change that might disturb their dominance. It was not until 1853, when the arrival of PERRY's " black ships " had given unmistakable evidence of the danger to the nation from foreign powers, that the prohibition was lifted to make the building of a navy possible. There is no doubt of the motivation of this abandonment of a time-honored policy. It was to national defense (*kokubō* 國防) that the Lord of Mito had appealed in

[54] *Ibid.* 14. EGAWA was *daikan* 代官, a local administrative official in the domain governed directly by the Tokugawa, of the Kamo 賀茂 District in Izu Province. He was one of the most progressive men of his time: he was a student of Dutch, advocated the use of commoners as soldiers, and had studied European artillery, mathematics, and surveying with TAKASHIMA Shūhan 秋帆 (1798-1866), a student of Western military systems and a leading exponent of intercourse with foreign countries. Nihon keizai shi kenkyūjo ed., *Nihon keizai shi jiten* 辭典 (*A Dictionary of Japanese Economic History*) (Tōkyō, 1940) 2.1845.

[55] The furnace was begun at Shimoda, a small port in Izu at which foreign ships were permitted to refuel after 1854. The work was removed from Shimoda for security reasons and completed at Nirayama, which was less accessible to foreigners. *Nihon zaisei keizai shiryō* 1.1000; ŌYAMA, " Yōshiki seitetsu jigyō," 15.

petitioning for a reversal of policy in the less strenuous days of the Tempō era (1830-1844),[56] and the language of the decree announcing the new policy permitted the construction of large ships (*taisen* 大船) "because in the present state of affairs, they are a necessity. . . ."[57] A supplementary decree spoke of ships as "necessary items for maritime defense."[58] Thus, the immediate stimulus for the introduction of modern shipbuilding, which dates from this measure, came as clearly from strategic considerations induced by the menace of foreign aggression as it did in the case of the iron industry.

The iron and shipbuilding industries of the *Bakufu* mark the appearance of an important new feature in the early history of Western industry in Japan. Unlike the *han*, the Edo government from the first, if exception be made for a few early ships and EGAWA's furnace, relied heavily upon foreign engineers and machinery in the development of these industries. Later this dependence upon outside aid was broadened to include the use of foreign capital. Both Saga and Satsuma followed the example of the *Bakufu* in varying degrees, but this was almost a full decade later and concerns other fields of industry.[59]

The *Bakufu* built its first Western-style ship, a barkentine, at Uraga 浦賀 in 1855.[60] Several small two-masted schooners were built near Shimoda 下田 in the same and the following year,[61] and

[56] *Mito han shiryō* 1.97-98.

[57] *Nihon zaisei keizai shiryō* 4.1111.

[58] *Ibid.* 1111.

[59] Properly qualified, this statement would make allowance for the purchase by Saga of Dutch machinery for the manufacture of rifles in 1859 and the employment of a Dutch engineer in ship construction, an episode that will be mentioned later. ETŌ, "Takashima tankō," 51.

[60] The construction of the *Hōō maru* 鳳凰丸, as the vessel was named, was based upon Dutch books and the imitation of an English ship in Edo Bay at the time. TAKIMOTO Seiichi 瀧本誠一 and MUKAI Shikamatsu 向井鹿松 eds., *Nihon sangyō shiryō taikei* 產業史料大系 (*An Outline of Historical Materials on Japanese Industry*) (Tōkyō, 1926-28) 5.642. A contemporary print of the *Hōō maru* is the frontispiece of Tōkyō teikoku daigaku 東京帝國大學 ed., *Dainihon komonjo; bakumatsu gaikoku kankei monjo furoku* 大日本古文書: 幕末外國關係文書附錄 (*Old Documents of Japan; Supplement of Documents on Foreign Relations in the Bakumatsu Period*) (Tōkyō, 1901-26) 99.

[61] After having been shipwrecked near Shimoda, Count PUTIATIN, a Russian envoy to Japan, had built a small schooner in 1854 to return to Russia, using the villagers

the first Japanese-built steamer was completed at Nagasaki in 1857.[62] The construction of these ships seems to have been without the benefit of direct foreign aid. If so, they constituted the only wholly independent undertakings of the *Bakufu* in this field, for, by 1857, a program of naval training under Dutch instructors was sufficiently well advanced to contribute substantially to the knowledge of shipbuilding, and work had begun on the Nagasaki Iron Foundry.[63]

The policy of utilizing foreign aid, inaugurated with the naval training program of 1855, was first applied to industry in the establishment of the Nagasaki Iron Foundry. The equipment for the foundry was ordered from Holland, and upon its arrival in 1857, Dutch engineers and workmen were employed to supervise its installation. After 1861, when the plant was completed, Dutch employees were retained to provide technical guidance in its operation.[64]

The facilities at Nagasaki included a shipyard, and although a steamer was built there sometime after 1857, the yard was used chiefly for repair work.[65] The principal function of the foundry,

of Heta-mura 戸田村 in its construction. The *Bakufu* employed these same villagers to build six vessels of the same type, which was known to the Japanese as the *kimizōgata* from the name of the district in which the village was located. These ships were seventy-seven and one-half feet long and three hundred *koku* 石 burden. 1 *koku* is equivalent to 4.96 bushels. *Nihon keizai shi jiten* 1.339.

[62] *Ibid.* 2.1450. An account of 1859 by an American described the construction of what must have been this steamer as follows: "The greatest curiosity at Nagasaki . . . is a small steamer built entirely, the native engineer says, from drawings he met with in an old Dutch work. Dutch engineers are correcting some slight defects of the engine . . . I think that the ingenious mechanic must have seen the 'Mississippi' or 'Susquehanna.'" *Nautical Magazine* (Nov. 1859) 569.

[63] The *Bakufu* acquired a Dutch steamer as a gift in 1855. Fourteen Dutch seamen were employed aboard the ship as instructors and a group of forty-three officers and men from the Dutch navy were procured as instructors at Nagasaki. Instruction included such subjects as navigation, mathematics, naval architecture, and mechanics. Horie, "Bakumatsu no gunji kōgyō," 6; *Nautical Magazine* 568.

[64] Ōyama, "Yōshiki seitetsu jigyō," 2-4; Horie, "Bakumatsu no gunji kōgyō," 6. The former gives a complete list of the machinery ordered from the Dutch.

[65] Honjō Eijirō, "Reon Rosshu to bakumatsu no shosei kaikaku" レオン・ロッシュと幕末の庶政改革 ("Léon Roches and the Reform of General Policy in the Bakumatsu Period"), *Keizai shi kenkyū* 13 (Jan. 1935).15; *Nihon keizai shi jiten* 2.1452.

as its name suggests, was the smelting of iron ore.[66] Although there are no data on its capacity or actual production, the fact that the foundry proper occupied an area of over 16,000 square yards may serve as an indication of the importance of this enterprise at the time.[67] An American physician gave the following description of the activities at the Nagasaki Iron Foundry in 1859: [68]

Dutch engineers are erecting a large machine shop for a steam hammer, and all the appliances needed for keeping the steam navy in repair. A steam engine is already at work moving lathes, at which apprentices, sons of men of rank, are turning, whilst others are molding, forging, or filing.

The repair facilities at Nagasaki soon proved inadequate. The number of Western-style ships was rapidly increased after 1858 by construction and the purchase of foreign-built ships, and it was found necessary to send the larger of these to Shanghai for repair.[69] Plans were made for additional repair facilities using the equipment purchased from Holland by Saga, which had been given to the *Bakufu* in 1859; [70] but after consultation in 1864 with the French minister, who emphasized the importance of large-scale construction facilities as a basis for naval expansion and offered to provide the necessary capital and engineering skill, the *Bakufu* decided upon a much more extensive program.[71] Closely related iron foundries were to be built at Yokohama and Yokosuka, and the latter was to include important shipbuilding facilities.

In 1865 the Saga equipment was installed at Yokohama by a French engineer.[72] The new foundry included " factories " (*kōba* 工場) for producing wrought iron, machine models, steam boilers, sails, ship fittings, and for casting iron. The machinery used in the shops was powered by steam.[73] It was intended that at least

[66] Ōyama, " Yōshiki seitetsu jigyō," 3.
[67] Honjo Eijirō, " Bakumatsu no kakushinteki shisō to seisaku " 幕末の革新的思想と政策 (" Reform Thought and Policy in the Bakumatsu Period "), *Keizai shi kenkyū* 12 (Aug. 1939) .70.
[68] *Nautical Magazine* (Nov. 1859) 567-68.
[69] Honjō, " Reon Rosshu," 15.
[70] See below. Etō, " Takashima tankō," 56.
[71] Ōyama, " Yōshiki seitetsu jigyō," 7, 11.
[72] *Ibid.* 9-10; Honjō, " Reon Rosshu," 16-17.
[73] Ōyama, " Yōshiki seitetsu jigyō," 7.

a part of the equipment required by the larger Yokosuka foundry would be produced at Yokohama and that such farm implements and household articles as could be made from iron would be manufactured for commercial sale.[74]

The Yokosuka foundry was planned on a much larger scale. In addition to the iron foundry (*seitetsusho* 製鉄所), there were to be three ways (*sendai* 船台) for ship construction, two docks for repair work, and an arsenal; construction was to be spread over a four-year period at a cost of 600,000 Mexican dollars a year.[75] A French loan was arranged with the foundries serving as security, and a *Bakufu* official was stationed in Paris to buy machinery and hire technicians.[76] Actual construction was begun at the end of 1865 under Francis L. VERNY, an engineer of the French navy, and two assistant engineers, also of French nationality; in addition, thirty-seven French mechanics were employed on the project.[77] Construction proceeded as scheduled despite the disturbed political conditions of these years, and the work was half finished at the time of the Restoration.[78]

An important feature of the new foundries, and one that provided a precedent for the industrial policy of the Meiji government, was the program of language and technical training established in conjunction with them. The objective of the program was clearly stated in the Draft Plan for the Yokosuka Shipyard (*Yokosuka zōsenjo gen'an* 横須賀造船所原案): [79]

> In order that the Japanese government may in future years replace the Frenchmen in charge of shipbuilding with Japanese, a school will be established at the shipyard to train persons of talent as engineers and technicians.

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[74] *Ibid.* 7, 9.

[75] HONJŌ, "Reon Rosshu," 16-17. The Mexican dollar (*yōgin* 洋銀) was the standard monetary unit used in foreign trade; it weighed 27.075 grams and was ninety per cent silver. *Nihon keizai shi jiten* 2.1600.

[76] HONJŌ, "Reon Rosshu," 17-18.

[77] ŌTSUKA Takematsu 大塚武松, "Fukkoku kōshi Reon Rosshu no seisaku kōdō" 佛國公使レオン・ロッシュの政策行動 ("The Implementation of the Policy of the French Minister Léon Roches"), *SZ* (*Journal of History*) 46 (July 1935).12; HORIE, "Bakumatsu no gunji kōgyō," 9.

[78] HONJŌ, "Reon Rosshu," 17.

[79] Quoted by HORIE, "Bakumatsu no gunji kōgyō," 9.

The training program at Yokosuka was conducted on two levels. *Samurai* were selected for training as "engineers" (*gishi* 技士) and were instructed in the French language by the chief interpreter and in technical subjects by the various department heads. Young workers at the foundry were selected by the French engineers for training as technicians (*gishu* 技手); they were given practical instruction in their respective jobs in the morning and attended school in the afternoon for instruction in "drafting and other essential studies."[80] The instruction at Yokohama was on a lower level: one hundred Japanese artisans, who were skilled in traditional industrial arts, were trained in Western industrial techniques by French instructors.[81] In addition, a language school was opened at Yokohama in April 1865, with fifty-seven students and five French instructors, to provide interpreters for the foundries, and six of the students were shortly afterwards sent to France for study.[82]

Shipbuilding activity was widespread among the *han* and was comparable to that of the *Bakufu*. Satsuma, Mito, and Saga held no such monopoly in the field as they did in the processing of iron; by the time of the Restoration, no less than fourteen *han* had either repair or building facilities, the chief of which were located at Ishikawajima 石川島, Kagoshima, Himeji 姫路, Tsu 津, Sabusawa 寒風澤, Hagi 萩, Tomonotsu 鞆津, Saga, Aomori 青森, Shingū 新宮, and Nanao 七尾.[83] Tosa completed a schooner in 1859 and is said to have built other Western-style ships after that date.[84] Before abandoning shipbuilding in favor of the purchase of foreign steamers, Chōshū built two schooners for her navy in 1859 and 1860. Sendai 仙台, Awa 阿波, Tsu,[85] Akita 秋田, Matsuyama 松山, Himeji, Shōnai 莊內, Tsugaru 津輕, Fukuyama 福山, and Ōno 大野 all built at least one ship of either the schooner

[80] *Ibid.* 9-10.

[81] Ōyama, "Yōshiki seitetsu jigyō," 8.

[82] Ōtsuka, "Fukkoku kōshi Reon Rosshu," 17-18.

[83] *Nihon sangyō shiryō taikei* 5.732.

[84] Tosa sent a number of representatives to the Mito shipyard at Ishikawajima for study; these persons were later used by Tosa in ship construction. Etō, "Kōchi han no shinseisaku," 9.

[85] The Tsu vessel was named the *Kamikaze maru* 神風丸.

or barkentine type.[86] At the end of the Tokugawa period all the *han* together possessed a total of ninety-four Western-style ships, as compared to forty-four for the *Bakufu*.[87] The combined figure indicates the rapidity with which knowledge of Western ships was being accumulated in the fifteen years after 1853 and represents a substantial beginning in the creation of a merchant marine.

Despite the remarkable spread of activity in shipbuilding among the *han*, the leadership of Satsuma, Mito, and Saga was conspicuous. They were the only *han* to build steamers, and Satsuma and Mito built Western-style sailing vessels earlier and in greater numbers than other *han*. The efforts of Satsuma and Mito in this field, as in the iron industries of all three *han*, were distinguished from those of the *Bakufu* by an absence of direct foreign aid and a very nearly complete reliance upon the study of Western books to master the necessary industrial arts; Saga also differed from the *Bakufu* in this respect but to a lesser degree.

Satsuma was the first *han* to build a Western-style ship. It had a particular interest in developing a navy by reason of its exposed position on the southern approaches to Japan and an important maritime trade with the Ryūkyū Islands. This interest was evinced as early as 1848 by the translation of a Dutch work on steamships,[88] and by 1852 Satsuma had built three model steamships based in part on this translation.[89] With the change in the Edo government's regulations on shipbuilding in 1853, Satsuma drew up a program for the construction of twelve sailing ships and three steamers.[90] The first of these, a sailing vessel, was completed the following year.[91] In 1855, three docks were built at Sakurajima with a capacity of two ships each, and three sailing vessels [92] and a small steamer were completed there in the

[86] *Nihon keizai shi jiten* 2.1553-56.

[87] *Nihon sangyō shiryō taikei* 5.644.

[88] The translation, which was done by an Edo "Dutch scholar" was partially supported by the Lord of Mito; the Japanese title of this important work was *Suijōsen setsuryaku* 水蒸船説略 (*An Abridged Treatise on the Steamship*). HORIE, "Bakumatsu no gunji kōgyō," 7.

[89] TSUCHIYA, *Hōken shakai hōkai* 502.

[90] *Ibid.* 503.

[91] HORIE, "Bakumatsu no gunji kōgyō," 4.

[92] The largest of these ships was 140.28 feet in length; the smallest, 119.40 feet.

course of the year.[93] The extraordinary activity of this year is an indication of the energy with which the building program was being pushed and of its potentialities had it been continued. However, shipbuilding ceased entirely after 1855, and during the remainder of the Tokugawa period, Satsuma sought to develop a navy by the purchase of foreign ships.[94]

Mito was but a few years behind Satsuma in shipbuilding. It had been among the first of the *han* to recognize the need for a navy and had been studying ship construction from Dutch works at least as early as the Satsuma translation of 1848.[95] In the year following the removal of restrictions upon shipbuilding, a measure Mito was instrumental in securing, the *han* began work on a shipyard at Ishikawajima which was to retain importance into the Meiji period.[96] The first Western-style ship, the "Rising Sun" (*Kyokujitsu maru* 旭日丸), a sailing vessel, was completed at the new yard in August, 1856.[97] Five additional ships were built there before the Restoration. Four of these were *kimizōgata* 君澤型, two-masted schooners of the type built by the *Bakufu* near Shimoda.[98] The final vessel was a steamer finished in 1866 after four years' work. Its description may serve as an index to the relatively advanced state of shipbuilding at Ishikawajima: the ship was equipped with a screw propeller instead of the usual paddle wheel, was ninety-seven feet long, displaced one hundred and thirty-eight tons, and was driven by a sixty-horsepower engine.[99]

Unlike Satsuma and Mito, Saga made a limited use of direct foreign aid in shipbuilding. Early study of the steamship was

All were constructed of wood and mounted eight to twelve cannon. TSUCHIYA, *op. cit.* 503.

[93] Construction of the steamer was based upon the translation of 1848. HORIE, "Bakumatsu no gunji kōgyō," 7.

[94] TSUCHIYA, *op. cit.* 503-04.

[95] Mito built a model of a Western-style ship from a Dutch book in the Tempō era (1830-1844) and another in 1853. *Mito han shiryō* 1.97, 115.

[96] *Ibid.* 118. SUZUKI Hambei 鱸半兵衛, who had received instruction in Dutch under the Mito language program of 1833, was placed in charge of shipbuilding at Ishikawajima. *Ibid.* 121.

[97] *Ibid.* 118. The vessel was 121.39 feet long and of wooden construction. A print depicting the "Rising Sun" is reproduced opposite p. 130.

[98] *Nihon keizai shi jiten* 1.41.

[99] *Ibid.* 41.

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based upon a model purchased through a Dutch merchant at Nagasaki in 1853, and three years later Saga ordered a complete set of equipment from Holland for steamer construction.[100] The expense of installation was too great and the equipment was given to the *Bakufu* in 1859 to be used eventually at Yokohama, but its purchase illustrates a feature of Saga policy which was unique among the *han* until the last few years of the Tokugawa period. While delivery of the equipment was being awaited, Saga acquired the services of a Dutch mechanic, and a fifty-ton cutter was built under his supervision.[101] In 1861 a steam boiler was built as a replacement part for a steamer that had been purchased three years earlier.[102] The boiler proved satisfactory and a number of others, including three ordered by the *Bakufu*, were built in the next two years.[103] Encouraged by success with the boilers, Saga undertook the construction of a small steamer which was completed in 1865,[104] shortly before the Restoration terminated shipbuilding by the *han*.

The Western industries of the Tokugawa period were predominantly in iron, armaments, and shipbuilding, but they were not confined to these. Both Satsuma and Saga developed Western industries in this period which were non-military in character and produced primarily, if not exclusively, for the commercial market. Even so, the introduction of these industries was indirectly related to the crisis in Japan's foreign relations. The exceptional financial strain of developing the new military industries and increasing armaments made the discovery of new sources of revenue imperative. Certain *han* had long engaged in commercial operations to supplement their revenues,[105] and it was natural that the most

[100] Etō, "Takashima tankō," 54-55.

[101] *Ibid.* 55.

[102] The vessel was purchased from the Dutch in 1855; in its enthusiasm for Western applied science, Saga gave the ship the extraordinary name of the "Electric Current" (*Denryū maru* 電流丸). *Ibid.* 56.

[103] *Ibid.* 56.

[104] The steamer was sixty feet long, eleven feet wide at midships, equipped with an external paddle wheel, and was driven by a ten-horsepower engine. *Ibid.* 57.

[105] Most of the *han* governments monopolized the sale of certain important items, such as sugar and indigo, within their territories; they also monopolized the sale of the chief products of their territories, shipping these to the Edo and Ōsaka markets, where they were disposed of through merchants, who acted as agents for the

progressive of them should have applied the practice of state enterprise to Western industry for profits as well as guns.

Direct foreign aid was a conspicuous feature of these enterprises, and, indeed, it was a condition of their success. In 1868, the year of the Meiji Restoration, one hundred looms and spinning machinery, with a total of 2,640 spindles, were purchased by Satsuma from the Pratt Company of Manchester. The machinery was installed at Kagoshima by seven English technicians and production was begun the same year under their supervision.[106] The new spinning and weaving mill, which marked the beginning of the modern textile industry in Japan, was " large scale " for a system of production in which the factory system was as yet unknown: the machinery was powered by steam, and two hundred workmen were employed at the mill, which had a capacity of nearly four hundred pounds of yarn a day.[107]

In this same year, Saga entered into a contract with the Garaburu Company[108] of England for the joint exploitation of the coal deposits at Takashima 高島. The technical and commercial experience of the English company was an outstanding advantage of the union, but it was the inability of Saga to finance the project independently that made the joint enterprise necessary.[109]

daimyō. Satsuma provides an excellent example of this practice. Certain areas were designated in which all suitable fields had to be planted with sugar cane. In these areas the entire produce, after the payment of taxes in kind, were sold to the *han* government at fixed prices, which were one-sixth of the Ōsaka market price in 1830 and one-fourth in 1853. The *han* then shipped the sugar to Ōsaka, where it was sold to the highest bidder among wholesale merchants. TAKAHASHI Kamekichi 高橋龜吉, *Tokugawa hōken keizai no kenkyū* (*A Study of the Tokugawa Feudal Economy*) (Tōkyō, 1932) 57-59, 436-42.

[106] TSUCHIYA Takao and OKAZAKI Saburō 岡崎三郎 *Nihon shihonshugi hattatsushi gaisetsu* 資本主義發達史概說 (*An Outline of the Development of Japanese Capitalism*) (Tōkyō, 1937) 267. The purchase price of the machinery was reported to have been "about 80,000 dollars, and the erection about 50,000 more." *Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan: 1875* (London, 1876) 101.

[107] TSUCHIYA, *Hōken shakai hōkai* 507-08.

[108] It is impossible to divine the correct name of the English company from the phonetic rendering in Japanese, which is used here.

[109] To support a large-scale enterprise such as was planned, a larger market than domestic consumption as yet afforded was necessary; Saga recognized the disadvantages of commercial inexperience and the invaluable aid that the English company would provide in disposing of the coal in Shanghai and to foreign ships in Japan. But it was financial considerations that were decisive. The state of the *han* treasury at the time

The English company was to provide the necessary capital for developing the mine, and one half of this investment was to be a first charge against profits, which were thereafter to be shared equally.[110] Under this arrangement a shaft was sunk by English engineers during the course of the year; the first coal was lifted in 1869, and a second shaft was sunk in 1871. The new enterprise was characterized by the use of a number of Western mining techniques: the coal was moved in the shafts by a steam-powered winch; steam-powered pumps were used to raise water from the sub-surface; and the shafts were lighted by " Western lamps " (*yōtō* 洋燈).[111] The scale of operations may be inferred from the fact that three hundred miners were involved in a wage dispute at Takashima in 1870 and that the interests of the English company were brought for $400,000 in 1874, when the Meiji government took over the mines.[112]

5

The last years of the Tokugawa period, as the preceding survey has indicated, were marked by successful efforts to introduce specific Western industries. That the movement had begun before the " opening " of Japan by PERRY, an event that undoubtedly imparted a new impetus to it, was an early demonstration of that precocity in mastering the arts and sciences of the West which was to raise Japan to a pre-eminent position among the nations of the Orient by the end of the century and to enable her to humble one of the greatest powers of the Occident in the first years of the next. No doubt the tradition of learning from China provided a favorable psychological background for learning from the " Western barbarians " as well. Other contributing factors may be found in the peculiarities of the Japanese political and social structure, but a more immediate factor was the long apprenticeship in " Dutch learning " which prepared the Japanese both to recognize and exploit the potentialities of Western technology.

the mining contract was signed may be surmised from the fact that Saga was obliged to borrow 43,750 *ryō* from the English company to pay for a recently purchased warship. ETŌ, " Takashima tankō," 6-8.

110 *Ibid.* 12. 111 *Ibid.* 14-15. 112 *Ibid.* 17.

The menace to Japan's independence implicit in the aggrandizement of the Western Powers in China and elsewhere in the Far East provided the immediate stimulus for its introduction. Consequently the first and most important Western industries of the period were of a military character and were, at least partly for that reason, undertaken as government enterprises. At the very end of the period two important non-military industries were begun by Satsuma and Saga as government enterprises, indicating that the absence of a class of industrial capitalists contributed to the monopoly of government in the field of commercial as well as military industries.

In the development of these industries the *Bakufu* and *han* anticipated several important features of the industrial policy of the Meiji government. Government ownership and management of industry was a salient feature of the early Meiji period and was in part the result of the inheritance by the new government of the industries developed by its predecessors; in extending the principle to new industries, the Meiji government was following their example. In the operation of these industries, the Meiji government made use of foreign engineers and technicians, a policy which had already been applied in the Tokugawa period on a lesser scale; and it was likewise following a precedent of the earlier period in supporting training programs both in Japan and abroad to provide qualified personnel to take over technical positions of responsibility from foreigners.

In an even more direct way the Meiji government owed much to the *Bakufu* and the *han* governments. It was not obliged to begin the process of industrialization from scratch. When the new government was launched, it was already the prospective heir to several iron foundries and numerous scattered furnaces for smelting iron ore, a mechanized spinning mill, a modern coal mine, assorted facilities for shipbuilding and repair, and a modest but significant merchant marine. Not the least benefit of its inheritance was a group of persons who had acquired invaluable technical experience in starting these industries and upon whom it could draw for administrators. Thus by the end of the Tokugawa period the first and in some ways the most difficult step in industrialization, that of overcoming inertia and initial technical difficulties and making a start, had already been taken.


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Fukuyama
Tomonotsu
Hagi
CHŌSHŪ
Matsuyama
AWA
TOSA
FUKUOKA
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SAGA
Nagasaki
SATSUMA
Kagoshima
Sakurajima
Edo
Ishikawa Jima
Yokohama
Yokosuka
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CHAPTER II

A Monarch for Modern Japan

JOHN WHITNEY HALL[1]

Among the varied examples of modern nation building, Japan has come to occupy a distinctive position, for Japan has proved the exception to most of the assumptions which we have commonly held about Oriental peoples or underdeveloped societies in their struggle for political modernization. Defying the obvious comparisons with her neighbors on the continent of Asia, Japan has not only emulated the most advanced countries of Europe but has increasingly forced historical comparisons with them. The simple circumstance that Japan exists today under the second of her modern constitutions reveals two remarkable political facts: first that during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Japan was able to maintain an unusual degree of political stability, and second that along with this stability the country has undergone two revolutionary changes of political complexion within the context of a constitutional monarchy.

Central to Japan's history of political modernization has been the role of the monarch—the *tennō*—and the institutions and ideas adhering to the imperial tradition. No aspect of the Japanese political system has proved so controversial and so little understood, for as with the English monarch, constitutional definitions of powers and functions reveal but a narrow range of the manifold sensibilities which the emperor was able

[1] I wish to thank the many persons, particularly Ishida Takeshi, William Lockwood, Herschel Webb, and James Crowley, whose suggestions at the time this paper was first read or at some later time proved helpful in my final revision. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Carnegie Corporation of New York for financial support received in connection with the preparation of this paper.

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to touch in the lives and minds of his subjects. The very diffuseness and mysteriousness of the imperial presence has frustrated systematic or objective analysis. The emperor has been many things to many people. In fact he has often seemed to hold contradictory meanings for the same individual who might rationally disapprove of, yet emotionally admire, the deep feelings of national pride which the monarchy stirred within him. The Emperor Meiji has been extolled as the father of progress in modern Japan, and yet his memory has at the same time been maligned as the ultimate source of the destructive forces of imperialism and militarism which nearly destroyed his country.

After the end of World War II, when the taboos against criticism of the monarchy were lifted in Japan, the emperor was subjected to a deluge of disparaging literature which heaped upon the "*tennō* system" blame for centuries of suffering by the Japanese people, for the recent failure of democracy, and for the drift toward disastrous war in the Pacific. In much of this literature of disenchantment and resentment, Japanese writers took refuge in the unhappy though self-comforting claim that they had faced unique handicaps as a nation because of the unmatched virility of reactionary forces which oppressed their country through the agency of the emperor system. Modern Japan, they have implied, was a victim of its monarchy.

Granted that from the point of view of its history and cultural context the Japanese monarchy has had features quite distinct from the monarchies of the Western world, yet taken in broad perspective, in terms of the many interrelated processes of political change out of which modern nation states have evolved, the relationship of the Japanese emperor to the problem of nation building has not been so unique as some have claimed. The fact that Japan, unlike China or Indonesia, carried its monarch into modern times is an index to one of the most obvious and significant differences separating Japan's political history from that of other Asian states, making it in reality more nearly comparable to those of the Western democ-

racies today. "The stability of any given democracy," Martin Lipset has observed, has depended "not only on economic development but also upon the effectiveness and the legitimacy of its political system." And monarchies have proved sufficiently useful as legitimizing devices that today "we have the absurd fact that ten out of twelve stable European and English-speaking democracies are monarchies."[2]

Of course these Western monarchies are not the only "modern" states in the world today, and many a Japanese will opt for the greater openness of an America or the social policies of a Russia. But if we are inclined to place value upon the factor of stability during the process of political modernization, monarchy has been able to play a crucial and not altogether negative role. If Japan has achieved in outcome a condition comparable to the "stable democracies," she also shared at the outset many of the problems which confront the late modernizers in the world today. And though the Japanese may look back upon the last hundred years of their history to decry the burden of state authoritarianism which weighed upon them, one wonders whether they are prepared to exchange those conditions for the prospect of national disintegration which could have resulted from a society warring upon itself or under a headless political anarchy. It is possible, then, that the monarchy helped carry Japan through certain phases of modernization that would have proved difficult under a less controlled political system.

In their study of the challenges faced by Japan and Turkey in achieving the transition between traditional and modern national organization, Ward and Rustow have observed a typology of crises and necessary responses. These nations—and they suggest others fit the pattern as well—were faced first with the crises of national identity, then with the critical need of self-defense against external enemies, then with the need for adequate development (chiefly economic), and ultimately with the

[2] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man, The Social Basis of Politics* (New York, Anchor Books, ed., 1963), pp. 64, 65.

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need to achieve a satisfying internal political adjustment—the problem of popular relationship to the political process.[3] Unquestionably in the case of Japan the emperor played a decisive role in getting Japan through the first several crises on the path toward modernization. As an embodiment of Japan's sense of national identity, as the bridge linking traditional sources of legitimacy to the new state authority, as the father figure which justified his subjects' self-discipline and sacrifice, the monarch became both a rallying point for his people and a means of concentrating authority behind the emerging national leadership. In the first decades after 1868 the emperor came to symbolize all the forces of self-control and enforced stability which combined to channel the prime energies of the Japanese toward meeting the foreign challenge and toward adopting essential social and economic reforms.

Yet if the emperor served the Japanese people well in the initial stages of the forced march toward modernization, the same cannot be said for all that followed. No thinking Japanese who lived through the 1930's and 1940's can easily forget the extremes to which the Japanese people were driven in the name of the emperor. (And the fact that the same individual continues on the Japanese throne perpetuates to this day a lingering fear that the spirit which once made him the agent for nationalist excesses may still lie latent beneath the benign exterior of the postwar polity.) It is understandable too that thinking Japanese, who had been obliged to make their settlement with the dogmas of the imperial polity (*kokutai*) and the public ritualism of emperor veneration during the prewar decades should live in horror of a repetition of that experience. Outsiders who have come upon Japan in her second modern incarnation, reborn out of the ashes of war and defeat, have sometimes dismissed too casually those black years. Yet they need only refresh their memory of the literature of hatred

[3] Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, 1964), ch. 10, particularly pp. 465–66.

and denunciation in the West which accused Japan so vehemently of a "crime against herself and against civilization."[4]

What went wrong? Why was it that an institution which seemed so appropriate to the problems of Meiji Japan should have failed so disastrously in the age of Shōwa? Our typology of political modernization suggests that the answer lay in the area of adjustment between the mass needs of the modern state and the political process as a whole. With respect to the monarchy this involved essentially the related problems of the transfer of sovereignty from out of the hands of the emperor into those of the people and of relinquishing the mythological beliefs surrounding the throne. The conversion of transcendental monarchy into a modern representative government, of whatever political orientation, has never been smooth, and it may well be that it has never been achieved without violence or at least the generation of a great deal of social heat. Nonetheless, the eventual change from monarchal to popular sovereignty has been a necessary prelude to the formation of the modern state, and the alternative routes which Japan might have used to achieve a government responsible to the people were perhaps more limited than we care to admit. The question even suggests itself whether, if the transfer of sovereignty had been accomplished without the experience of the totalitarian 1940's, it could have been done without an equal and compensating trauma of another sort. Was Japan's recent war simply the direction outward of the violence of the social and ideological revolutions which Japan had avoided by its conservative resolution of its first steps in the modernization process? Or was there a more moderate alternative?

It would be hard to deny that the initial form that the modern Japanese monarchy took proved resistant to the changes which might have permitted an easy transition to popular sovereignty. The present status of the emperor, though perhaps anticipated in the hidden desires of the Japanese dur-

[4] The phrase is taken from Willis Lamott, *Nippon: The Crime and Punishment of Japan* (New York, 1944), p. 1.

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ing the tragic years of wartime suffering, was brought about only as a result of defeat and occupation directive. The constitution of 1946, in giving legal form to a government "of the people with whom resides sovereign power" and in which the emperor assumed the position of a "symbol of the state and of the unity of the people," has completed the long transition of the monarchy from absolute sovereign to popular symbol. Has Japan, then, at last entered the ranks of the "stable democracies"? Have the Japanese attained a state of affairs in which they feel secure in their own sense of achievement and control over their political destinies and sufficiently affluent that they can support without begrudging it a family-man monarch and a tennis-playing crown prince? Or is the emperor still a lingering threat to popular sovereignty and democratic life in Japan? The masses, who are so often evoked in regard to questions of this kind, seem to forget the past more readily than do their interrogators. The recent acts of right-wing violence which have struck terror into the hearts of the intellectual keepers of the Japanese conscience have not stirred many to demand the total eradication of the "emperor system."[5] And certainly the framers of the new constitution have made it most difficult to return the emperor to the center of a virile ultranationalist movement without the most obvious tampering with the legal foundations of the state. Time may indeed have fashioned a safe monarch for modern Japan.

But among the Japanese people some are apt to be skeptical. After having succumbed to the myth of imperial omnipotence during the years of wartime hysteria, they find it hard to believe that the imperial institution can be easily restructured. And although the literature of polemic criticism of the "emperor system" has begun to subside, Japanese writers are still inclined to question whether the emperor has been safely democratized and whether on historical grounds the monarchy can justly be admired. To follow this critical literature too closely would

[5] Ishida Takeshi, "Popular Attitudes towards the Japanese Emperor," *Asian Survey*, II (1962), 29–39.

distract us unduly from the effort to bring impartial judgment to bear on the problem of the emperor's role in the modernization of Japanese politics, yet it is of some use to put it on the record so as to identify one extreme in the range of interpretations to which serious scholars subscribe. It is hard, furthermore, to attempt any discourse on the Japanese monarchy without implicit engagement with this literature because of its continued prevalence.

Let us take for example the works of Inoue Kiyoshi, not because he is necessarily a representative writer, but because he is respected as an historian, and is in fact rather moderate among those who have written to "expose the *tennō* myth" since the war. His 1953 paperback publication entitled *The Emperor System* (*Tennōsei*) brings together articles published by him from 1946 to 1952, and features his "History of the Emperor System" which had served as the lead article in the important volume edited by the Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai in 1946 entitled *How Do Historians Look at the Emperor System?*[6] Inoue's history of the emperor in Japan has little good to say for the monarchy. "The line of emperors, unbroken for ages eternal," he begins, "was able to perpetuate itself only because it served as the apex of an unbroken condition of suffering for the people." There was, of course, a prior condition, before the appearance of the emperor, "when the Japanese people inhabited the islands enjoying a democratic society in perfect peace and freedom. All land was owned communally and there was neither ruler nor subject." But thereafter, with the appearance of social class distinctions, the *tennō* emerged to serve as the legitimizing element behind an elite power hierarchy. The climax to the long line of exploitation of the people perpetrated in the name of the emperor came with the Meiji Restoration. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Inoue claims, evidence of a popular desire for a "people's state" had begun to manifest itself, but before

[6] *Rekishika wa tennōsei wo dō miru ka* (Tokyo, 3rd ed., 1949), pp. 1–113.

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this could be achieved, the samurai leadership, utilizing the revolutionary energies of the people, had carried out a counterrevolutionary movement.

The people, betrayed by their leaders, traded the domination of feudal rulers for a modern absolutism. And so, "Japan put into practice an absolute monarchy of the kind that France had discarded a hundred years before, an absolutism much more colored by pure feudalism than that which had prevailed in France, in other words a 'Japanese variety' of absolutism." With the promulgation of the Meiji constitution this system was legitimized and the modern emperor system was created. "What this *tennō* system represented was a feudalistic control mechanism in which the bureaucracy and military using the police and the armed forces and in complete accord with the *zaibatsu* capitalists and landlords carried out a policy of domination over the workers at home and of militarism abroad. The emperor stood at the head of this state, at the point at which the bureaucracy, military, *zaibatsu*, and landlords came together, serving as their pivot. He himself was the greatest of the feudal landlords, the greatest of the *zaibatsu*, the highest bureaucrat, and the highest military officer."[7]

There are many variations on this line of interpretation, differing chiefly in the manner in which the Meiji Restoration is handled. But it is not the bias which needs to concern us so much as certain viewpoints of a more general nature which these and other writings take for granted. Inoue has in fact made four basic assumptions which take him beyond pure polemic or historical dogma and serve to define a recurring set of questions which appear in nearly every treatment of the emperor in Japan today. These are, first, that the emperor system in premodern times had a notoriously bad influence on Japan's historical development and should be evaluated chiefly as a force for political conservatism in Japan. Second, that the

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 111–12.

emperor system of Meiji times was not a direct legacy from this earlier tradition but was an entirely new and reactionary creation. Third, that the modern monarchy was essentially antidemocractic and bears the responsibility for bringing the era of fascism and war into being. And fourth, that the present emperor represents a continuation of the prewar system. These four assumptions which characterize what might be called the "antiestablishment" approach to the imperial institution are not necessarily new with the present generation of Japanese scholars. They have commonly been voiced by critical writers outside of Japan who had no reason to be bound by the taboos which hampered free discussion of the emperor within Japan. But from whatever source they come, they pose for us four important lines of inquiry which this paper proposes to probe, namely:

1. What is the historic nature of the imperial institution?
2. What was the role of the emperor in the critical period of transition from traditional to modern government?
3. What link was there between the modern institutions of monarchy and Japan's course of development as a modern state?
4. What is the significance of the monarchy today?

The Historic Nature of the Japanese Monarchy

Let us begin with our first question concerning the historic nature of the Japanese monarchy and, by extension, its relevance to the present. The history of an institution does not necessarily explain or justify its later manifestations. But where continuities exist, history can provide revealing insights. Like monarchs in general, the Japanese emperor has functioned historically at three levels. As an actual holder of *power,* he has served as a supreme ruler or at least a participant in the competition for power within Japan. As the repository of *sovereignty,* he has served as the ultimate source of authority within

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the Japanese state, exercising such authority if only to provide legitimacy for successive de facto hegemonies.[8] Finally, as an ultimate *symbol* of the moral order and identity of the Japanese people, he has served as the sanctifying element in a variety of theories of government and national organization. Historically the imperial institution has been many things at many times as it has undergone changes within these three functional levels; for although a single imperial lineage was able to perpetuate itself in Japan, the relationship between the dynasty, the government, and the people of Japan has changed frequently in the course of events.

The head of the Japanese imperial family did not often exercise political power. At the outset the dynasty was obliged to establish itself through forceful leadership, military prowess, and direct sacerdotal influence.[9] But it was the nature of the Japanese authority system that the ultimate holder of authority was quickly raised above the realm of personal influence, freely exercised, to serve as ritual head of the corporate power body. What we can surmise about the emperor prior to the Taika Reform of 645 is that his position was largely ritualistic, while the decision-making functions of government were exercised at a level where they were responsive to the competitive interests of the group of families which constituted a ruling oligarchy. This might always have remained the norm if it had not been for the influence of Chinese political theory and institutions. The Chinese model, having been impressed upon Japan fairly early in the develop-

[8] The practice of sovereignty obviously has different manifestations and usages between Japanese and European society. As a general concept I use this term here in the broad sense as defined by Lasswell and Kaplan to be "the highest degree of authority." Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society, A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven, Yale paperbound ed., 1963), pp. 177–81.

[9] Herschel Webb has suggested that the Japanese emperors never served as military leaders as the myths of Jimmu or Jingō imply. No doubt our picture of the early Yamato chiefs is confused, and the tradition of ritual leadership appears to predominate from the outset.

ment of the Japanese monarchy, tended to overlay native practices of rulership so that the latter were placed on the defensive. Japanese tended to accept the Chinese concept of emperor as both sovereign and ruler, and for this reason the constant tendency of "political heads" in Japan to retire into ritual seclusion has been considered undesirable. The historical records, written under Chinese influence, depict the emperor as constantly struggling to retain elements of power which he should be exercising by virtue of the very idea of monarchy. Yet the Japanese tradition of power-holding has never really supported the possibility that the monarch might rule as well as reign.

Surely the model to which the Japanese returned time after time was not the Chinese style of monarchy but rather the kin-based system of ritual headship or legitimizing symbol. The Yamato sovereign, for instance, served in two capacities, as head of the imperial house and head of a power coalition made up of other family heads. In neither situation was he expected to function as a real power but rather as the legitimizer of group consensus. An obvious result of this has been that the machinery for the direct exercise of power by the monarch has normally been neglected, while the apparatus of ritualism which placed the monarch in a position of veneration but political powerlessness has constantly proliferated. For all the respect paid by Japanese writers toward the men of action in Japanese history, and especially the decisive monarchs, the actual system of government has not encouraged such decisiveness.

It is informative to look at Japanese monarchs who have shown administrative vigor. First of all it is evident that most of them reigned during the period of heaviest Chinese influence. In addition, in almost every instance these rulers found sources of influence outside of the institution of monarchy itself, outside the monarch's normal channels of action. Tenchi (668–671) remained behind the scenes for sixteen years while Emperor Kōtoku and Empress Saimei fronted for him.

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Temmu gained the throne in 672 after leading the successful side in a succession war. Kammu came to the throne after a plot in which he had joined forces with the Fujiwara and Wake families against the priest Dōkyō. Shirakawa and his successors exercised power through the office of the cloister. Godaigo plotted for power as a result of the division of the imperial house into two branches, and to gain a direct voice in government he had to create an entirely new machinery of rule.[10]

A complicating factor which makes this point seem less clear-cut stems from the history of the imperial house itself. To say that the monarch normally was cut off from sources of real power does not mean that the imperial family was necessarily devoid of influence. What distinguishes the Nara and early Heian periods in particular is not so much the fact that an occasional monarch actually ruled as well as reigned but rather that the imperial house was successful in its control of both the sovereign and the organs of government. Thus with the rise of the Fujiwara at court, the imperial *family* was obliged to become a competitor for power along with the rest of the court nobility, and it is in this context that the headquarters of the cloister came into being. So long as the game of court politics was played for real political or economic stakes, the imperial family competed quite successfully along with the rest. But we know the result. Godaigo's ill-fated attempt to realize the myth of imperial rule did as much as anything to throw away the assets behind those stakes.

Historically, then, it has been in the role of sacred legitimizer that the emperor has most typically been cast. As the ritual monarch—the supreme repository of sovereign authority—the head of the imperial family has been an essential part of the Japanese polity from its inception. And this continuity of the imperial institution (and the imperial house) constitutes one of the undeniable and remarkable *facts* of Japanese political

[10] For details note my *Government and Local Power in Japan, 500 to 1700, A Study Based on Bizen Province* (Princeton, 1965), chs. 1–7.

history. The fact of continuity (and the reasons for it) cannot be shrugged off as myth or hoax, for it relates to some of the deepest realities of the Japanese political tradition. First of all, continuity of the emperor, whether as a ruler or merely as a symbol, reveals as nothing else the enduring homogeneity of the Japanese political corpus. Japan has literally been a "single country" from the beginning of its political history. While there were civil wars in Japan, the political fabric was never torn so far that such wars became a contest of sovereignties. (The so-called dynastic wars from 1336 to 1392 represented only a momentary factionalism between claimants to the same throne.) Protected from conquest by foreign powers because of their isolation, the Japanese islands themselves never seemed to afford a geographic base of sufficient size so that a rival indigenous dynasty might gain sufficient power to challenge the established order. Even the shocking assertions of sovereign ambition made by Taira-no-masakado in 939 were only that he was a rightful claimant to the existing throne.

This continuity of dynasty then suggests the continuity of a political order in Japan of unusual homogeneity and constancy. While the pyramid of power in Japan has frequently changed in composition, its structure—namely a federated hierarchy of aristocratic houses presided over by the emperor—did not change its fundamental characteristics from the time of its first appearance. And this structure was the result of a recurring pattern in the manner in which the power hierarchy was formed and reformed as the result of internal factional wars rather than massive and unilateral conquest. Even the initial conquest of the islands by the sovereign family, as it is recorded in the earliest histories, did not rest on an absolute victory over all the country. The imperial group (*tenson*) did not obliterate its rivals but conquered when necessary and compromised where possible, constantly exalting the powers of its chief as a religious as well as political leader. From the beginning, the head of the imperial family played the role of a sacred peacemaker exercising hegemony over a constantly

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expanding federation of elite families. His position was gained through incomplete civil war in which compromise and conciliation had been extensively used, and in which the competitors were frequently not eliminated but rather incorporated into the balance of power but in a reduced capacity.[11]

Once the head of the sovereign family was established as the symbol of elite unity, he continued to serve this function without serious lapse into modern times. The failure to exercise real political influence probably served in the long run to protect the head of the dynasty from destruction. Conversely the strongly oligarchic nature of Japanese power politics that served to make political authority and social position synonymous had much to do with perpetuating a condition in which a peacemaker possessed of only residual sovereignty continued to be useful. In premodern times struggles for national hegemony tended to take the form of factional intrigues or of restricted military action which repeated almost exactly the pattern of incomplete victory and compromise which had brought the imperial house to its original position. And in these struggles each leader of a winning coalition eventually sought legitimacy for his de facto hegemony by acquiring imperial backing, just as the emperor had justified his own position of sovereignty through his claims to sacerdotal legitimacy. Even the Emperor Meiji was similarly relied on as the symbol of legitimacy for the real leaders of the Restoration.

All of this helps to explain why, even after the decline of the court nobility, the whole set of attitudes toward court ranks, the traditionally "noble" genealogies, and certain ancestral or guardian Shinto shrines retained their importance. Despite the loss of power by the emperor and later the court nobility, the social hierarchy remained, so that in each age the politically ambitious families were obliged to climb the same ladder of social prestige as they gained political power. Even those

[11] The disposition of the chieftain of Izumo by the Yamato group is the best early example.

leaders who came to the fore by military force were no exception. Since the power of each military hegemon rested upon a coalition rather than absolute force, legitimacy secured through the imperial system was always a necessity. One of the first acts of a newly risen military leader was to adjust his genealogy so as to place his family comfortably high in the social hierarchy. Along with a military title, such as shogun, went court ranks and honorary posts which gave its bearer the requisite prestige to assume leadership over a sometimes reluctant following.[12]

This functional explanation of the continuous role of the emperor in Japanese politics is to some extent an explanation after the fact. The ultimate source of the emperor's peacemaking or legitimizing authority came from his exercise of what we have called sovereignty. If such a term is justified it needs explanation, for the concepts of legitimization and of ultimate authority which are meant by it were decidedly original to the Japanese system.[13] What was it that the imperial family retained throughout its long descent through Japanese history? Essentially, it was the fact of its own existence through direct succession together with the special charisma derived through religious sanctification. Both these practices of succession and sanctification were common to the larger body of socioreligious practices to which we give the generic name Shinto. Succession was not strictly biological but ritualistic, following the rules which sociologists have made familiar in their studies of the Japanese system of family (*ie*) succession. In other words, perpetuation of the lineage was maintained in

[12] For a modern example of this practice we have the reconstitution of a nobility in 1885 by which the new political power structure was set by reference to a hierarchy of social ranks.

[13] Sir George Sansom's observation is particularly apt at this point. European rulers, he wrote, "might call themselves sovereign 'by the grace of God,' but the emperors of Japan described themselves as 'manifest gods.'" *A History of Japan to 1334* (Stanford, 1958), p. 45. Differences with the Chinese concept of "mandate of heaven" have received frequent attention.

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the abstract by the family acting as a corporate body, so that fictionalization of the actual kinship lines was liberally permitted. Once succession was determined, however, the designated head of the lineage received all the authority vested in the position as though he were a direct blood successor. And it was this authority which was sanctified through Shinto practices directed toward the deified ancestor (*uji-gami*).

The relationship between "lineage deity" (*uji-gami*) and "lineage head" (*uji-no kami*) upon which the charismatic leadership of the ancient chieftains of Japan was based is well known. The ritual symbolism of this relationship as it pertained to the imperial house became institutionalized as the fundamental rituals of accession for the Japanese monarchy. In theory, each successive head of the lineage is conceived of as having renewed the tie between the sun goddess Amaterasu (the lineage deity) and himself (the lineage head) through ceremonies performed before the earthly "deity body" (*shintai*, most importantly the mirror) of the sun goddess. The powers of the ancestral deity are considered available to the living head through the power of "linkage" by which the worshiper is literally possessed by the power of the deity, becoming a *kami* (hence the concept of *kannagara* or living deity). Symbolic of this successive identity between emperor and ancestral deity was the sacred necklace (*mikubi-dama*), the soul spirit (*tama*) of which held the power to evoke the deities and assure spiritual linkage.[14]

Probably the most significant feature of this entire ritualism of succession is that the religious concepts were particular rather than universal. Succession was genealogical, and "divine right" came as a private bond between the sun god-

[14] Religious Affairs Section, Research Bureau Ministry of Education, Government of Japan, *Religions of Japan* (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 9–24. See the appearance of these concepts in the coronation of the Shōwa Emperor, Asahi Shimbunsha, *Gotairei gahō* (Osaka, 1928).

dess and the emperor.[15] No person could substitute in this relationship. There was no superior priesthood. Or to put it another way, without the continuity of the imperial family, the powers of the sun goddess could not have been properly evoked. No other person could have accepted the necklace and obtained "linkage" with the imperial ancestor. And it is this fact which gave to the imperial family its ultimately unassailable status and made usurpation an impossibility. In its final residual form, then, sovereignty was simply the fact that within the Japanese political order no higher authority could be evoked. Political power could be exercised legitimately only "in the name of" this authority.

Another reason that the emperor retained his powerless though exalted role can be explained in terms of the distinctive decision-making process which the Japanese clung to throughout their history. For at all levels of the society, power groups normally resorted to the pattern of consensus decision behind *the name of* a legitimizing authority. The "family council" served as a model not only for family affairs but also for the highest level of state deliberation. And while at the more intimate levels the leader might well play the role of an autocrat, at higher levels the leader was most often assigned a passive role of merely adding his presence to the debate of policy, legitimizing by his presence the ultimate consensus. Unlike the medieval kings of Europe, who heard the counsel of their courts but then retired in private to make their own "absolute though not arbitrary" decisions, the Japanese sovereign remained above responsibility.[16] This function gave to the sovereign an unusual duality, for though the emperor was absolute and in theory could rule arbitrarily, he nonetheless was little more than the repository of the will to

[15] The emperor in essence "announced" his own succession before the spirit of the sun goddess.

[16] See Paul L. Ward, "On the King's Taking Counsel," paper read at Annual Meeting of American Historical Association, Dec. 1960.

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achieve agreement and maintain order among the various interests which competed for power under him. His sovereignty was to this extent a reflection of the continuing sense of responsibility among the Japanese political elite to maintain order within the power coalition.[17]

Beyond these aspects of the emperor's actual performance of the functions of sovereignty, we enter the realm of the ideological and religious extension of the sovereign's position in the culture. To the Japanese the emperor served not only as sovereign but also as pope, except that in Japan the emperor's rulership was idealized from the point of view of two religious systems, Shinto and Confucism (Buddhism exerted a less sustained influence). The first conceived of the emperor essentially as high priest in the worship of the sun goddess and other national deities. And although strictly speaking Amaterasu was related to the imperial family in a genealogical, and hence private, capacity, yet since she was considered the most exalted of the heavenly *kami*, it was believed that her powers extended to the ultimate protection of the entire Japanese homeland. If we reverse this set of beliefs, we have the ingredients—historically quite variable in intensity to be sure—of a national sentiment directed toward the emperor as supreme guardian of the nation. As a Shinto monarch, then, the emperor was expected to serve as the agency through which the national *kami* could be evoked for the protection of the land. And he himself was venerated as the embodiment of the genius of the Japanese people. Characteristically this placed no moral obligation or responsibility for ultimate performance on the emperor. But it is also significant that not until the last war did the emperor face the possibility of being held responsible for national disaster. And it is perhaps even more sig-

[17] For discussions of this fundamental function of the emperor in modern context, see Warren M. Tsuneishi, "The Japanese Emperor, A Study in Constitutional and Political Change," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale, 1960, particularly pp. 21–29; also T. A. Bisson, "Japan as a Political Organism," *Pacific Affairs*, XVII (1944), 392–420.

nificant that in this recent instance the emperor acted in the capacity of a "savior" who intervened to save the Japanese from ultimate extinction and not as the one who took onto himself the ultimate responsibility for the war.[18]

Confucian theory called for a more positive assertion of imperial responsibility for the well-being of the state, but even here the ultimate necessity to prove possession of a mandate from heaven was never acknowledged in Japan. By contrast to China, which was governed by a succession of upstart emperors who were obliged to prove their legitimacy by demonstration of the possession of the Mandate of Heaven, the Japanese emperor conceived of himself as having received the mandate by virtue of succession. Thus there was no recognized separation of the moral order from the actual, or of a divine law to which the sovereign was accountable.[19] What the Confucian scriptures added to the Japanese practice of monarchy was the conception of a moral society presided over by a benevolent authority. The emperor, in other words, was "concerned" for the well-being of the people. In return he expected to be served by loyal and responsible officials and submissive subjects. It was difficult to give such principles meaning in actual performance, of course, unless a fairly extensive and unified system of administration was in existence. And since for so many centuries after the decline of the Nara administration Japanese government remained decentralized, these ideas remained largely disembodied until the Tokugawa period, voiced only in isolation by such writers as Nichiren or Kitabatake Chikafusa.[20]

The Tokugawa period deserves special attention not simply because it provided the immediate background out of

[18] Tsuneishi, *op.cit.*, pp. 120–31.

[19] The point is brought out by Reinhard Bendix in his paper "Preconditions of Development: A Comparison of Japan and Germany," in R. P. Dore, ed., *Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan* (Princeton, 1967).

[20] Bitō Masahide, "Nihon ni okeru rekishi ishiki no hatten," *Iwanami kōza, Nihon rekishi* (Tokyo, 1963), XXII, 30–43, for Nichiren's views.

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which the emperor emerged to assume his modern guise, but because of the significant additions it brought to his institutional and symbolic status. The "mikado," whom the nineteenth century Westerners found secluded in Kyoto, is commonly depicted as having reached the lowest ebb of significance, a condition from which only the Mito loyalist movement succeeded in rescuing him. But the judgment stems from a too narrow concern over the emperor's exclusion from political power. It overlooks the many important institutional and ideological functions which the emperor played in the Tokugawa political system and in the political attitudes of the day.

Admittedly as a ruler the emperor had reached a point of negligible influence. The emperor and his court had been relegated to the city of Kyoto, placed under restrictions imposed by the shogunate, and even under the surveillance of shogunal ministers. But the emperor was not deprived of sovereignty nor of his position in the ideal Shinto and Confucian worlds. Ishii Ryōsuke in discussing the status of the emperor makes the point that the shogun exercised "sovereign political rights" by seizure and not by delegation.[21] Yet he also admits that the residual functions of the emperor as "titular sovereign" (*meimokuteki tōjisha*), namely to grant titles and award ranks, to adjust the calendar, and to announce era names, were of high symbolic significance for the entire country. Since even constitutional historians like Minobe appear to share the opinion that the shogun exercised sovereignty (disputing only whether there was delegation or not), it may seem presumptuous to suggest that these writers are missing an obvious and important point.[22] If we draw a distinction between the seat of political *power* and of legitimizing *authority*, it seems clear enough that the shoguns, though they

[21] Ishii Ryōsuke, *Tennō* (Tokyo, 1950), pp. 152ff. Also Tsuda Sōkichi, *Nihon no kōshitsu* (Tokyo, 1952), pp. 7–9.

[22] Ishii Ryōsuke, *Meiji bunkashi, Hōsei hen* (Tokyo, 1954), pp. 46–47.

exercised power to the fullest, were obliged to recognize the emperor as the source of legitimacy (in other words, as the ultimate sovereign).[23] Granted that historically the Tokugawa house first grasped power and then set to work to exalt the prestige of the emperor, the fact remains that the shogun subordinated himself to the emperor. And such subordination was no less real, even though the emperor was powerless and the act of submission was voluntary. The legitimization provided by the emperor through the title of shogun was no less valuable to the Tokugawa house in its effort to assert its mastery over the country.

The claim that the shogun did not receive a specific delegation of powers from the emperor (in other words, that the shogunate was a usurpation) is really beside the point. The emperor in 1603 had no real powers to delegate, and furthermore Japanese politics had never resorted to comprehensive and public clarification of the distribution of authority. The exercise of political powers and responsibilities, since there had been no real break in the continuity of Japanese political development, was commonly publicized ceremonially and assumed by reference to the precedents which adhered to certain titles or posts. The title of shogun awarded no powers that the shogun could not personally command but justified the exercise of nearly every function of governance save only that final residual element of sovereignty, which was retained by the emperor.

Again it is claimed that the shogun did not actually rule "in the name of" the emperor. The closing of the country to foreign travel, minting, negotiations with foreign powers, all these were carried out by the shogun without even a passing reference to imperial authorization. To the early Westerners,

[23] European observers commonly referred to the shogun as the temporal king or emperor and the mikado as the spiritual monarch. See Sir Ernest Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan* (London, 1921), p. 33. Lasswell has no difficulty in separating "sovereignty" and "rule" as differences between formal and effective power. *Op.cit.*, p. 188.

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the shogun was king. But his actions were covered by powers which had gradually accrued to the military hegemon in Japan and could presumably have been explained as having been delegated sometime in the past. Shogunal control of the channels of imperial audience was such that it could be assumed that imperial sanction would be received whenever it was needed. And near automatic sanction was constantly being given throughout the Tokugawa period, as the emperor "granted" court ranks and "approved" successions. It was certainly expected between 1853 and 1858, when the shogunate sent to Kyoto for the ratification of the treaties with foreign countries. The very fact that a situation arose in which the denial of ratification could be used to embarrass the shogun illustrated the importance of the emperor's expected support.

But what the emperor lost in real power he gained in the ideological stature assigned him in the several theories of government which blossomed during the Tokugawa period. The point is often overlooked because of our more consuming interest in the theme of "restoration." The attention given to the loyalist element in the Mito school of thought, for example, obscures the more obvious and more important point that the Tokugawa period contained the beginnings of a change in theory of government which greatly enhanced the significance of the Japanese monarch. At the root of this change was the fact that society had begun to transform itself from one of rule by custom to one of rule by law—or should we say principle.[24] Specifically the Japanese of the Tokugawa period were in many important respects moving away from conditions in which the individual's life was determined solely by his private relationships with superior authority as personified in the head of his house, the land steward, or the military or proprietary lord. Instead, with the formation of villages, towns, bands of retainers, and other such administratively de-

[24] The concept of "rule by status" as applied to Tokugawa law by Dan Henderson is a useful one. See p. 392 below.

fined bodies, the individual was coming increasingly under legal codes enforced by a generalized higher authority, through impersonal administrative devices.[25] It was this which began to instill in the Japanese a new consciousness of authority in the abstract, and of their being "subjects" rather than simply personal lieges, serfs, or bondsmen. For the first time in Japanese history, government was becoming an object of contemplation as an external order which could be manipulated and in any case should be made to justify itself.

If, then, we read the great outpouring of philosophical writings after the middle of the seventeenth century not for signs of the technical differences between schools of thought, of whether writers showed more or less reliance on Chinese precedents, or of whether they were proshogun or proemperor, but instead look upon them for what they reveal of a new conception of man and state, we find in them a remarkable consistency of purpose and ultimate design. From Hayashi Razan to Yoshida Shōin the common theme that runs through the writings of both supporters and critics of the Tokugawa regime is the effort to define a theory of social order and political action which would fit the realities of the time. If Hayashi sought to discover a way of explaining an ideal society in which emperor, shogun, and the four classes could take their proper stations, Yoshida groped for a more concrete conception of the nation and of a theory of personal action in defense of the nation.

This does not mean that all Tokugawa thinkers wove identical theories about the ideal nature of government or the political values by which the individual should live. Confucianists and Shinto revivalists inhabited quite different

[25] The point has been made in as early a work as Kan-ichi Asakawa, *The Documents of Iriki* (New Haven, 1929), p. 46. It is also the burden of Thomas C. Smith's *The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan* (Stanford, 1959) and chs. 12 and 13 of my *Government and Local Power in Japan*.

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worlds. The humorless Confucianist still dreamed of a rational universe in which rulers justified themselves by their benevolent concern for the people. He sometimes extolled the fact of Japan's "political uniqueness"—comparing Japan's divinely descended emperor with China's changeable dynasties—but he was most comfortable when he could conceive of the emperor as a moral monarch and assign symbolic rather than actual significance to the myths of succession and sanctification. Hayashi Razan, by rationalizing the "three sacred treasures" as benevolence, wisdom, and courage, hoped to magnify the emperor's distinction by virtue of his possession of these supreme virtues. Shintoists, on the other hand, would have none of such rationalization, for to them the *fact* of being was its own justification. The eighteenth century scholars who began the revival of interest in Japanese literature and history (the Kokugakusha) called for a return of the actual state of innocence which Japan had enjoyed before contamination from China. To them the emperor and the elements of the imperial myth continued to exist as facts which had power by virtue of their existential being. Their approach was irrational, perhaps, but emotionally verifiable.

Yet once we grant these differences, we see that both schools of political thought shared important areas of commonality—shared them in fact with parallel developments in the real world of administrative technology—namely that they both contributed to the intellectual rationale supporting what can be described as the shift in government from private to public authority and from custom to law. We have tended to neglect these common elements in Tokugawa political theory because they remained strictly within the confines of traditional philosophical schools and hence seemed irrelevant to Japan's later political development. Yet surely the measure of increased political sophistication is not to be looked for simply in the increase of "predemocratic" aspirations or of social "class consciousness." If after years of combing the sources only one

maverick, Andō Shōeki, can be found to have voiced an alienated attack on Tokugawa feudalism, it is quite obvious that the entire discourse remained within the establishment.[26] But this need not be discovered with disappointment, for we know full well that there was nothing in either the Confucian or Shinto traditions that might have suggested the desirability of an egalitarian society or could have supported the possibility of popular sovereignty.

What was happening was that an increasingly rational approach to political ideas as bodies of general principles was gaining momentum during the Tokugawa period along lines quite independent of the West, but the implications for Japan's political modernization were no less significant because of this independence. We can see this exemplified in at least three related developments in late Tokugawa thought and political practice, to which we should turn our attention. We notice first of all a trend toward what was clearly an idealization of the concepts of authority and loyalty. Since both Confucian and Shinto theorists conceived of the political world abstractly as a general order in which monarch and subject related according to ideal principles, they gave rise to concepts of "rulership" and of the "way of the subject" which applied broadly and not simply to particularistic conditions. The principles of loyalty expounded by the Confucianists made everyone within a status equally responsible for the achievement of good government. Conversely, the loyalist writings of the late Tokugawa period made the emperor "available" as an inspiration to all Japanese. These attitudes were not necessarily new, of course, to the Japanese of the late Tokugawa period. What is new was that they for the first time gained wide currency and even application in the behavior of whole groups and classes.

[26] E. Herbert Norman, "Andō Shōeki and the Anatomy of Japanese Feudalism," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, 3d ser., II (1949).

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Second, the Japanese by the end of the Tokugawa period were beginning to acquire a sense of nation.[27] The sentiment was still vague, to be sure, and gained expression in the writings of only a few scholars; nor could its spread be separated completely from the new awareness of the encroachment of the West. If the accent on Japan's uniqueness which colored the writings of Motoori Norinaga came from a rejection of the central position which the Confucianists gave to China, the discovery by the late Mito scholars of Japan's "unique position" among nations of the world—"a divine land where the sun rises and where the primordial energy originates"—came from an unsought-for familiarity with world geography.[28] The first steps in the search for a national identity, therefore, took the Tokugawa Japanese back into the familiar realm of Shinto beliefs to the secure landmarks of an "unparalleled" polity (*kokutai*) and a "divine" emperor. Yoshida Shōin for all his obscurantism and his emotionalism was struggling for a more inclusive conception of the Japanese political order and of the individual's place in it. He saw, if only dimly, the outlines of a nation personified by the emperor. And he saw himself and others being called to act on behalf of a greater national loyalty, even to "die" loyally for the sake of their country.[29] The coalescence of Shinto revivalism and emperor-centered loyalism was a natural development leading toward a new national consciousness. That it was to join the myth of Japan's uniqueness to the ideas of nation and nationalism as these began to take shape in the mid-nineteenth century was perhaps an inevitable by-product of this Tokugawa background.

The third area of development is rather more difficult to

[27] R. P. Dore, in his *Education in Tokugawa Japan* (Berkeley, 1965), pp. 295–301, makes a major point of the sense of nation as a legacy of Tokugawa education.

[28] Tsunoda, de Bary, and Keene, *Sources of the Japanese Tradition* (New York, 1958), p. 595 (quoting Aizawa Seishisai's *Shinron*).

[29] David Magarey Earl, *Emperor and Nation in Japan* (Seattle, 1964), p. 170.

demonstrate, yet there is evidence that acceptance of the principle of "responsible rule" had begun to call forth a rudimentary concern for a sort of representation in the exercise of government which was to have important repercussions during the Restoration era. A growing emphasis on government by merit and according to group discussion (*kaigi*) or representation was finding its way into the political writings of the day. The argument that if government was to be truly solicitous of the well-being of the people, administrators should be selected on the basis of merit rather than heredity, and decisions should be based on counsel widely solicited, was essentially an attack upon an overly closed political system.[30] Both these principles called for the exercise of authority on a more "responsible" basis. And though the Japanese remained indifferent to concepts of a divine law superior to government or of the sovereignty of the people, they nonetheless, without breaking with the elite premises of their theories of government, managed to justify demands for wider involvement of individuals in the political process.

Our views of Tokugawa Japan as a "traditional base" from which to measure Japan's political development have changed sufficiently to allow us to absorb the evidence that important structural and attitudinal changes had taken place, especially after the middle of the eighteenth century. The emperor in his personal life and his daily round of activities in the Kyoto *gosho* may seem not to have shared in these changes. Yet the emperor as *institution* and as *belief* was certainly far different in the 1850's from what he had been in 1600, and it is worth reflecting on precisely what the emperor stood for among *the politically significant and articulate* segments of the Japanese populace in the years prior to the breaking of the foreign crisis. In 1850 the emperor was no forgotten relic destined to be discarded at the first sign of weakness in the Tokugawa regime. The Tokugawa shogunate had enhanced

[30] See T. C. Smith's treatment of this point in R. P. Dore, ed., *Aspects of Social Change.*

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and institutionalized the emperor's status as legitimizer. Moreover, in the efforts of the shogunate and the political theorists to evolve a rationale for a government which was touching the people in an increasingly pervasive and impersonal manner, the emperor was placed at the center of political ideologies of both Confucian and Shinto persuasion. The emperor had entered the Tokugawa period as a private legitimizer for the Tokugawa shogun; he came out of it a symbol of national consciousness and unity—the natural rallying point for the nation once it felt the threat and the challenge of the West upon it.

The Emperor and the Meiji Restoration

We have now reached the threshold of the period of crisis precipitated by Perry's arrival during which the shogunate was swept away and the emperor was projected into his position as monarch of the new Meiji state. The momentum of our argument up to now should not lead to an expectation that these changes took place easily, or above all that they might have been foreordained. The years between 1853 and 1871 into which Japan squeezed a political revolution and the beginnings of a cultural transformation of revolutionary proportions are the despair of the historical generalizer. The complex interaction between interests and ideas which caught the emperor up from his world of ancient rituals behind the plastered walls of the Kyoto palace created the most baffling problems of interpretation.

What role did the emperor play in these dramatic events which led to his "restoration"? For all the importance of the emperor in the Restoration movement and in the resulting Meiji polity, the question has not received a great deal of direct attention. The vast literature on the Restoration and on the origin of the "emperor system" consists by and large of broader political and social histories which deal mainly with what was done by "using" the emperor or in the name of loyalism. The kind of history by formula that this has produced is all too

familiar. On the one hand, by the 1940's the official version which claimed that the emperor had been the recipient of a spontaneous surge of loyal support from the nation had given form to the most grotesque distortions. "The great Emperor Meiji," a *Japan Times* publication told its foreign readers, "purged all the evils of feudalism from the national structure and assumed charge of the nation and race. The people reverently began to sing the 'Kimi Ga Yo' and the whole nation cooperated with the Emperor and his officers to bring the Island Empire up to the level of other modern nations."[31] That a whole generation or more of Japanese youth was forced to accept such propaganda explains much of the vehemence of the postwar reaction which has proclaimed that the whole Restoration movement was a betrayal of the people. Inoue's exposé is quite restrained by comparison to many. "The modern *tennōsei*," he claims, "did not evolve through the gradual modification and improvement of something which Japan had possessed for ages in unbroken succession from the beginning of the country. It was created only very recently at the time of the so-called Imperial Restoration. . . . At the same time among the people there was a desire to create a nation in which sovereignty would reside in the people, not the emperor. And among the most advanced groups there was even a movement to create a people's republic. But Meiji Tennō, the bureaucracy, and the military used every device, heaping pressure upon pressure, to combat this movement . . . and so establish the emperor system."[32]

Interpretations of this sort suffer from the all too common habit of historians to see what they want in history by looking back on past events from the vantage point of a particular age or a particular political belief. But it would surely have taken the mass-indoctrinated fervor of the 1930's to have aroused the Japanese of the 1860's to "rally spontaneously" around the Emperor Meiji. And similarly it would have taken

[31] Amar Lahiri, *Mikado's Mission* (Tokyo, 1940), pp. 11–12.
[32] Inoue Kiyoshi, *Tennōsei* (Tokyo, 1953), p. 1.

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a heavy seeding of the political leadership in the 1870's with men brought up on the social welfare ideas of the mid-twentieth century and trained in party techniques to have brought Inoue's "people's republic" into being.

But between the "must have happened" claims of the official historians and the "should have happened" regrets of the historian critics, we have the task of comprehending in terms of the Restoration age itself the significance of the irreducible political facts behind the Restoration. We can begin with at least two givens: that between 1853 and 1871 the Japanese abolished the shogunate while retaining the sovereign position of the emperor, and that they tore down the Tokugawa political order while creating a new one that presided over the rapid modernization of Japanese society. The bare statements in themselves are startling enough, for Japan not only carried its monarchy into modern times, but actually strengthened the institution while undergoing its initial effort at creating a modern state.

While monarchies have preserved themselves in many of the most stable democracies of Europe, the emergence of modern states in Asia have more often been accompanied by a rejection of monarchy and bitter attack on the traditional aristocracy. But Japan produced no Nasser or antidynastic T'ung-meng Hui and left no Farouk or Pu Yi in the wake of its revolution. The simple fact of monarchial continuity therefore is doubly significant in Japan's case. Was it due to the irresistible loyalties of the Japanese people? Even the loyalists (*shishi*) discovered the emperor late in their active careers. Was there a conscious fear of social revolution on the part of the ruling interests? Mito Nariaki pointed to the specter of urban riots of the Ōshio variety, but he did so as much to startle the shogunate as out of conviction that his society was on the edge of upheaval. Was it alarm over the approach of the West which sent the Japanese searching for a new rallying point? This certainly brings us closer to the heart of things, for without the foreign crises there was certainly no real likelihood that the shogunate would have collapsed as it did. It was the foreign crisis which revealed to those in a position to dispute the shogun's authority that Edo had proved inadequate to its mission. Without denying the many real social and economic problems which complicated the power struggle of the 1850's and 1860's, the chief actors in that struggle behaved as if their main concerns, other than self-interest or local interest, were for the identity and inviolability of their country. And it was surely significant to the outcome of that struggle that the emperor had been institutionalized by the Tokugawa as a secluded, but ultimately "concerned," sovereign of the entire nation. The mikado of Kyoto had been neither a scourge nor a burden to his people. Thus in the search for a new symbol of unity, the emperor could be raised aloft, uncontaminated by responsibility for the Tokugawa policies. The old order could be attacked in the name of a still higher and more venerable one.

How was the monarchy carried into modern times? Was it simply as a sacred ark of tradition, an inanimate symbol manipulated by whatever hands could reach it? To large degree the tradition of the "passive emperor" remained undisturbed. But also, as at various times in the past, political instability provided the opportunity for involvement. The emperor played a role in his own "restoration." This was not as a full-fledged ruler, to be sure, for admittedly if the emperor and his immediate advisors had been able to gain control of the government during the crisis years, they would have handled things differently from the way they eventually turned out. But it is also true that the Kyoto court and the emperor became (if only for a moment) an active element in late Tokugawa politics. First of all, the existence of a community of courtiers in Kyoto and of an imperial establishment of palaces, shrines and rituals provided, if nothing else, a dead weight of institutional inertia. The court possessed sufficient resources and vitality (especially among some of its younger members) to allow it to work for its own perpetuation

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and even enhancement. Moreover, once the slightest opportunity was given for emperor and courtiers to engage in political affairs, they quickly exploited it. Emperor Kōmei and courtiers such as Iwakura and Sanjō were deeply enmeshed in the intrigues which first challenged the shogunate to adhere to its seclusion policy and later connived to put the emperor into the hands of Satsuma and Chōshū. In fact the first breaks in the monopoly power enjoyed by the shogun came with Kōmei's expression of "imperial concern" in his letter of 1846 over the state of Japan's coastal defenses and in 1858 when he refused to ratify the treaty of commerce with the United States.[33] Emperor and court thus found ways to carry on the kind of intrigue which became possible in those transition periods when the power structure was being shaken. But the possibility of interference in political affairs was short-lived and the range of influence limited largely to the realm of factional intrigue. And above all the emperor did not represent a powerful vested interest capable of obstructing political and institutional change.

For the most part it was in the two familiar roles of legitimizer and symbol of national consciousness that the emperor was cast during the transition years. And it was part of the nature of the first of these roles that the emperor should serve two purposes: one as peacemaker and the other as ultimate source of authority. Throughout most of the transition period the peacemaker function predominated, the emperor providing a sort of umbrella under which a revolution in the locus of power was carried out while keeping intact certain fundamental features of the Japanese political structure (the *kokutai*). To this extent critics such as Inoue are justified in linking the continuity of the emperor with the perpetuation of a conservative social and political order. But this was not the only motivation behind the preservation of the imperial

[33] Sakata Yoshiō's works are useful at this point. Among them "Meiji dōtoku shi" in *Meiji bunka shi* (Tokyo, 1955), pp. 439ff. Also "Changes in the Concept of the Emperor," *Zinbun*, II (1956), 1–22.

authority. There was the influence of the foreign threat as well.

The foreign crisis had two immediate effects on the Japanese political scene. It shocked responsible leaders into a realization of national danger, and it placed new and difficult responsibilities on the shogunate. Once the shogunate lost its ability to act decisively as though its decisions carried sovereign authority, the structure of assumed delegation which had been carefully exploited by the shogunate fell apart. From the instant that Abe Masahiro made inquiry to the court and daimyo on how to deal with Perry, the process of deterioration set in. At that moment the emperor suddenly took on renewed importance. The rapid shift of the political center of gravity to Kyoto, once the "automatic" legitimacy which the shogunate had held broke down, indicates how much the shogun had relied on his ability to act "as if" he possessed a national mandate. Mito Nariaki's attack on the shogunate, couched in terms of the failure of the shogun to look to the defense and well-being of the country, opened a new competition for that mandate but in terms of a new context created by the foreign menace and by the new expectations for government performance which were being formulated by the late Tokugawa political theorists. Increasingly in the years of crisis the emperor was brought into the political process, first as the shogunate tried to regain his public backing, then as referee in the efforts to balance the interests of the daimyo and the shogunate (the so-called *kōbu-gattai* policy), and finally as the authority through which the anti-Tokugawa coalition legitimized itself. The final stages of the struggle were played out in familiar fashion until among the contending political interests the activist agents chiefly of Satsuma and Chōshū, holding on to a precarious balance of military power, managed to "gain possession" of the emperor and by speaking through his person carried out a "conquest" of the country in the name of a new mandate.[34]

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 16–17.

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In the history of Japanese factional politics possession of the emperor was nine tenths of the game. Once the Sat-chō group obtained control of the young Emperor Meiji, it could invoke his authority for all subsequent action. With this advantage, between January 3, 1868, and August 29, 1871, the new group executed a series of measures in the name of the emperor which brought the entire country firmly under its command. From the declaration which named the Tokugawa rebels and led to the prosecution of military operations against Edo, to the demand that the daimyo turn in their land registers and submit to the direct authority of the central government, to the final abolition of the daimyo territories (*han*) and the unification of the country under a prefectural system, each step was carried out through a combination of military power in hand (though often barely sufficient to gain the initiative) and the assertion of imperial authority. Certainly at no time did the Sat-chō group have the capacity to win an outright military victory over the country had a substantial portion of the daimyo decided to challenge its authority. And granted that much of the country was immobilized by weakness or confusion, it was still a major factor in favor of the precarious Sat-chō coalition that it could act in the name of the emperor. Thus the emperor was retained as the ultimate symbol of unity, serving, as it were, to remind the competing political factions of their primary responsibility to the corporate interests of the nation.

To the extent that the new government returned to a direct public reliance on the supreme authority of the emperor it affected a restoration. There was, of course, no literal "return to imperial rule" as the words *ōsei-fukko* implied. Yet it was as much a restoration as Japanese tradition would have permitted. The confusion over the meaning of *ōsei-fukko* comes both from the tendency to claim too much for the Meiji emperor and from failing to recognize the importance of the less dramatic changes which actually took place in the status of the monarchy. The coup d'état of 1868 returned no more real

power to the emperor than he had possessed under the Tokugawa system. (He remained isolated, idealized, and passive.) But by wiping out the distance between shogunate and court it again placed government directly under his symbolic leadership and returned to the idea of government "in the name of" the emperor. Under such a system it was to the interest of the government to enhance in every way possible the degree to which the imperial authority was recognized and respected in the country.

The techniques used by the new power faction to extend the emperor's prestige and visibility went far beyond anything employed by the Tokugawa. The shift of the imperial court to Tokyo renewed the unity of imperial ritualism and administrative affairs which had been separated under the shogunal system. By making the emperor party to the deliberations of state (though he had no voice) and by making all government decisions "imperial decisions," the possible discrepancy between the imperial will and the actions of the government was eliminated. Meanwhile the decision to assign private wealth to the imperial house soon made the emperor independent of political vicissitudes and permitted the elaboration of an imperial ceremonial capable of dazzling the eyes of the populace. On a more immediate level, "imperial agents" were sent out across the country to instruct the local administrators on the nature of the "imperial rights."[35] Simultaneously the forces which ultimately linked the emperor to the vast network of Shinto shrine worship and which placed the emperor at the center of instruction in national history were also released. The secluded rituals and the esoteric philosophies which had made the imperial institution such a potent element of elite political affairs under the shogun were now applied to the entire nation.

Historians who describe all of this as either a sleight of hand trick which denied the fundamental desire for freedom

[35] Mombusho, *Ishin shi* (Tokyo, 1942), v, 482. The agents were known as *senkyōshi*.

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of the Japanese people or as a literal return to a long neglected ideal of direct imperial rule miss the essential dynamics of the role of the emperor during the early phase of the Restoration era. In becoming the revitalized symbol of national unity and the new rationale for the exercise of government, the emperor in many ways was actually fulfilling the new expectations which had grown up around the conceptions of monarch and government during the late Tokugawa period. On the one hand the emperor by amplifying the traditional myths of sanctification that made him a transcendental monarch reaffirmed the principles upon which the Shinto nationalists built their theory of Japan's national uniqueness against the threat of foreign encroachment. And by making his person visible to the entire populace, the emperor became the very embodiment of the nation in the Shinto sense. At the same time the new government, in the name of the young emperor, accepted the obligation to provide for good government and the national welfare as these aims had been understood by the Confucianists. If the imperial rule was to be in the best interests of all, it would have to rest upon responsibility in the execution of government and the formation of policy. And this evoked the principles of "government by agreement" (*kōron*) and the willingness to adopt policies of political and social reform, in other words the vision of modernization. Finally, the emperor's government took over the defaulted political debts of the shogunate, namely the responsibility to unify the country and to defend it against its external enemies, particularly the West. Thus the Restoration, for all the private and sectional interests which lay behind it, contained an element of response to public aspiration which cannot be discounted.

We need go no further than the Charter Oath of January 1868 to find a clear statement of the broader ideological foundations adopted by the new monarchy and the government taken in its name. Among its five articles the first advocated the idea of wide discussion; the second called for the common effort of the people to enhance the national good; the third

promised social reforms to eliminate popular discontent; the fourth and fifth foresaw the modernization of the culture so as to bring justice to the people and strength to the imperial polity. These were the principles upon which the Meiji government proposed to rest its appeal for its mandate to rule the country, but they were principles taken in the name of the emperor and presumably issued by him. They became, as a consequence, part of the theoretical justification for the exercise of imperial authority. The ideas behind the Japanese monarchy to this extent went beyond either a pure "restoration" or a maneuver to justify the ascendancy of a new power oligarchy.

By 1871 the first stage in the transformation of the Japanese monarchy was essentially complete. Four years after the Restoration and eighteeen years before the promulgation of the Meiji constitution the basic foundations of the modern Japanese monarchy had been laid, and this largely out of building stones taken from Japan's own institutional and ideological traditions. (The influence of the West up to this point had been minimal.) The emperor continued as a transcendental and passive sovereign with authority which was theoretically absolute but which was actually exercised by ministers who governed in his name. A department of religion (Jingishō) supported the ceremonial and sacerdotal features of the monarchy. The imperial ministry (Kunaishō) provided for an independent monarchal establishment, and the continuation of the imperial court system kept alive a social elite surrounding the monarch. Sovereignty and the locus of "accountability" remained with the emperor, but political influence remained in the hands of an oligarchy which could be entered only by simultaneous ascension of the social and bureaucratic ladders. And so the new monarchy perpetuated that peculiar feature of the Japanese imperial tradition in which the elite both controlled and were controlled by the emperor, in which the high bureaucracy both governed and was governed by the "imperial will." It continued, also, the particular style of

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decision-making by consensus that had proved congenial to the Japanese power elite throughout the ages. Government remained "unrepresentative." Yet the reluctance of the new leaders to share their political influence was balanced by an extreme sensitivity to the mission of domestic reform and the need to satisfy a wide range of the popular desires. They may have been politically conservative, but they were remarkably progressive in their social and economic policies.[36]

But was this remarkable combination of political conservatism and technological progressivism enough? Did the monarchy serve simply as an instrument for preserving a political absolutism in the face of an incipient social revolution so as to put off indefinitely the achievement of popular representative government? This is the frequent criticism laid against the Restoration by antiestablishment historians. And this assumption that things might have been different, and presumably better, is one that cannot be ignored. Were there alternatives to what happened in Japan between 1853 and 1871? And did the alternatives lie in the direction of greater or lesser social change? Was Japan prevented from following the models of France or England or was she saved from going the way of China or the Congo? Alternatives, if they are to be more than wishful projections of theory into history, must be treated realistically and must be followed through to their real consequences.

If we are to think of alternatives we need to start with the obvious. To begin with, what were the alternatives facing Japan as a nation in the years between 1853 and 1871? During these years Japan certainly confronted the very real danger of falling apart into competing (and possibly warring) fragments. The fact that the Japanese avoided civil war, deepened their sense of national identity, and protected their independence as a nation was not accidental. It was the purposeful achievement of leaders, on both sides of the late Tokugawa struggle for power, to whom unity in the face of the foreign threat was an obsession and for whom the idea of national breakdown was deeply abhorrent. But what if this had not been so, or supposing the leadership had been unable to maintain unity, would the possibilities of social revolution have been enhanced? Had Japan in 1853 been dragged into an era of civil war or perhaps colonization, would not this have profoundly altered the calendar of political and social reform and wiped out for an equally long time the possibility of attaining a popular sovereignty? Present-day historians seem more willing to take a chance with this alternative, especially since it would have pushed back to their fathers' and grandfathers' times the problems of dealing simultaneously with the tasks of nation-building, social revolution, and cultural transformation.

Let us assume, then, that social revolution achieved under fairly stable political conditions was more desirable for Japan than the sort of progress through chaos which China was to exemplify. If national unity and independence were essential, then what alternatives were left? There was, of course, the possibility that the shogunate might have gathered strength and assumed dictatorial rule, abolishing the daimyo. Or an anti-Tokugawa coalition of daimyo might have seized the government. But neither of these alternatives is likely to have made much difference in the status of the monarchy or to have led to more generous social policies.[37] What then of the alternatives on the other side; was there any real likelihood that a successful social revolution could have thrown up a leadership between 1853 and 1871 capable of unifying the

[36] The concept of "reinforcing dualism" as applied by Ward and Rustow in their study of Japan and Turkey has suggestive possibilities at this point. *Op.cit.*, pp. 445–47.

[37] A contrary speculation is made by Marius B. Jansen in his "Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization." If there had been no downfall of the shogunate, he believes, "Tokugawa hegemony would probably, for instance, have spared Japan the Emperor system." Marius B. Jansen, ed., *Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization* (Princeton, 1965), p. 44.

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country and devising a new and more popular form of government? Where were such leaders to be found—some Tosa *gōshi*, a few disgruntled lower shogunal officials, a Shibusawa here and a Emori there? The possibility seems fantastic because not only was the very idea of social revolution alien to most Japanese at that time, but also there was so little organizational base upon which a revolutionary group might have built a national following.

If, then, we accept the rise of the Restoration leadership as a fortunate alternative to national chaos, it is still conceivable that these men could have espoused very different policies once they had gained power. What if they should have persisted in an anti-Western policy, inviting perhaps a disastrous conflict with the Western powers? What if the samurai aristocracy had clung to their hereditary political and economic privileges? This, in fact, was the more common reaction in other parts of Asia. Or is it possible to expect that the Meiji leaders might have moved to the other extreme, adopting by 1871 even more revolutionary policies than the ones they actually undertook? Inoue Kiyoshi suggests that 1871 was the appropriate time to have abolished all social distinctions and to have established a popular sovereignty.[38] But how much can we ask of leaders who already were pushing reforms in the face of considerable opposition? And at any rate could a further leveling of the center of political influence have been achieved without even greater reliance on imperial authority? Certainly it is inconceivable that both the shogun and emperor could have been eliminated without disastrous consequences to the Japanese ability to maintain political cohesion as a nation. And it is hard to imagine how, once the Sat-chō leaders were in control of the government, they could have unified the

[38] A novel twist to the idea that the people should have been "led into democracy" during the early Meiji years is suggested by analogy by Nakamura Kichisaburo. Given democracy by the Allied Occupation "the people realized that democracy was quite acceptable." *The Formation of Modern Japan* (Tokyo and Honolulu, 1962), p. 126.

country and urged the adoption of modernizing policies had they not been able to dramatize the conception of the national unity and destiny in the person of the emperor, gaining through him the commitment to group discipline and private sacrifice which so distinguished the Japanese of the time.

But of all the obstacles to the successful ascendancy of the social revolution, it seems likely that the administrative decentralization of the country would have made the seizure of power from outside of the establishment most difficult. The activist leaders (*shishi*), having first joined in common cause in the fencing schools of Edo, remained in a position to work through their respective domain administrations until the new government had taken form. What kind of political apparatus could nonsamurai leaders have taken over? Would it not have required simultaneous uprisings in the several domains each successful in putting a locality under revolutionary control? And how then could these separate revolutions have been unified without resort to warfare or reliance on a transcendental imperial will? In essence it is hard to conceive that there was a reasonable alternative to the kind of samurai leadership which arose at the end of the Tokugawa period and the kind of "enlightened absolutism" which they had established by 1871. All of this is not to say that the Restoration led to the only and best possible resolution of the crisis which Japan faced after 1853, but it does suggest that the realistic alternatives to what happened were less along the lines of further social change than in other and less desirable directions of national disintegration, terror perhaps, or some sort of traditionalist reaction.

The Emperor and Japan's Development as a Modern State

But if the imperial institution and the leadership behind it may have been right for Japan in 1871, this does not mean that it remained so. And while the fundamental elements of the monarchy remained unchanged until 1946, it is equally clear

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that the form of the monarchy and its relationship to the needs of the country underwent considerable change. As for the monarchy, there was a constant intensification of its involvement in national affairs reflected in a broadening institutionalization of its political and cultural role and a deepening ideological penetration of the popular mind. Even before the adoption of the constitution of 1889 the Japanese emperor had begun to adopt the guise of a European monarch, appearing resplendent in Western-style uniform, acting the part both of head of state and commander in chief. At the same time the indigenous instruments of monarchal prestige and influence were expanded with the augmentation of state support to the Shinto establishment and the insertion of nationalist themes in the school curriculum. It was the document in 1889, of course, which fully clothed the monarch in the role of constitutional legality, putting into terminology consistent with Western practice the particular institutions which had been carried out of the Japanese past. All of this was, however, essentially an intensification of the patterns which had been set in 1871, so that Japan was to retain for the next seventy-five years a polity headed by a transcendental monarch, dominated by aristocratic groups, and strongly dedicated to the retention of traditional values. Since Japan was not a Western nation, it is somewhat beside the point to accuse Japan of failing to "continue in what many have thought to be the main line of the evolution of Western society."[39] But did Japan continue along the main line of evolution to which she herself may properly have aspired?

Admittedly once we enter the course of history which leads from 1871 beyond the Meiji constitution and into the twentieth century we find it difficult to keep our eyes from the disastrous party struggles of the 1920's and the fanatical ultranationalist excesses of the 1930's and 1940's. It is hard to avoid the conviction that some fatal flaw of original sin was lodged

[39] Bendix, *op.cit.*, takes this phrase from Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Glencoe, 1954), pp. 116, 287.

in the Meiji settlement, and that the emperor himself was its foremost embodiment. "When the leaders of the Meiji clan clique," writes Maruyama Masao, "using every means in their power to suppress the movement for democratic rights, set about constructing an absolutist regime (discreetly covering it with a figleaf of a constitution patterned after that of Prussia), they were in fact laying the foundations for the country's bankruptcy."[40] The chain of causation argued by Maruyama has seemed irresistible to a whole generation of historians and political scientists. And with it we hear the repeated recrimination: if only the "clan clique" had listened to the voice of the people or of their "proper leaders."

Maruyama does not argue, of course, that Meiji Tennō astride his white charger or dressed in white robes before the Kashiko-dokoro was the unassisted cause of "Japanese Fascism," but rather that he became the ultimate incarnation of the ideology of the fascist state. This surely was true. The New National Structure of 1940 placed the emperor at the center of its conception of the "family state." And it is also true that as of 1871 all the elements which went into the later Shōwa manifestation of the Japanese monarchy were at hand. Nothing new had to be invented, merely amplified or distorted. But the question of whether these elements, particularly as given legal form in the constitution, necessarily led to the national bankruptcy of the 1940's can hardly be answered categorically; for it raises problems of alternatives both with respect to what might have happened and to explanations of how that bankruptcy came about.

How, for instance, are we to account for the changes in the imperial institution which took place after 1871 either with respect to the attitudes of the Japanese people toward the imperial myth or the manner in which it touched their lives? Some changes stemmed from Meiji Tennō's own increase in stature, his putting on of the beard and his filling out of the

[40] Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (London, 1963), p. 126.

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father figure. Some resulted from the deliberate work of men such as Motoda Eifu behind the throne and in the Shinto establishment. But what of the pressures from the people themselves who clothed the emperor in new uniforms or old myths and pinned on him their hopes for national pre-eminence in an imperialistic world? The increasing intensity with which the Japanese identified with their emperor their deepest feelings of national pride and aspiration and their willingness to submerge in him their political and private interests were as much their making as his. Was all this imposed upon the mass of the Japanese against their better conscience? Or was it a product of their own feeling of discrepancy between national achievement and aspiration? Did belief in a "uniquely Japanese emperor" provide a psychic substitute perhaps for the failure to match the West in the arts of civilization and the products of industry? Is it not quite possible to conceive of the modern Japanese monarch, not so much as a device by which the vested interests managed to suppress the will of the majority but rather as a reflection, in part at least, of the irrational and contradictory aspirations of a Japanese people, bewildered by the changes which the modern world was forcing upon them, exhilarated by new challenges and opportunities, and above all unwilling to take a second place among the people of the world?

Surely the emperor-centered totalitarian regime of the 1940's was neither the inevitable outcome of the form which the monarchy had taken in 1871 nor the intent of even the most unenlightened of the Meiji leaders. Why then did not Japan avoid the disastrous turn to war and political regimentation after 1930? Was it, as the answer is so often given, a result of the failure to move in due course toward democratic government and popular sovereignty? History offers no assurance that the voice of the people is less apt to call for nationalist extremes than that of a leading minority, yet there was undoubtedly in Japan's case a close connection between the continuing transcendental position of the emperor and the

buildup of popular pressures which ultimately found their release in the restless drive for expansion and the fanatical dedication to conformity at home.

But if the monarchy was unquestionably involved in the spread of militarism and totalitarianism in Japan, it still does not follow that the "emperor system" was the driving force in this relationship. If there was a failure to liberalize the powers of the monarchy or to curtail its prerogatives, where did the responsibility lie? There were at least three major points along the road toward the New National Structure at which important choices affecting the meaning of the monarchy were offered to the Japanese. The first of these came at the time of the framing of the Meiji constitution when alternatives in the legal definition of the emperor's powers were debated. The second came during the period from 1890 to 1910 when the meaning of the imperial institution as defined in the constitution was interpreted by the highest legal minds in the country. And the third came with the effort to modify the interpretation of the "absolute and irresponsible" monarch *in practice* by the adoption of responsible party cabinets. In each of these instances, presumably, the course of political development (and with it the interpretation of the powers of the monarchy) could have taken a turn toward greater popular representation or toward abandonment of the mystical traditions surrounding the throne. But the turn was not taken, and we need to know why.

For those who see in the emperor system the shadow of original sin, it has become axiomatic to claim that the Meiji constitution merely gave legal form to the effort of the oligarchy to suppress the movement for "democratic rights." But the crux of this accusation lies in whether the movement, even though it bore the high-sounding slogan of "liberalism and popular rights" (*jiyū-minken*), was as sincere a people's cause as it purported to be. Recent studies have probed the movement in terms of actual rather than idealized objectives, asking the hardheaded question whether Itagaki and

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Ōkuma offered genuine alternatives to the leadership of Itō and Yamagata. Can the words "liberal" and "democratic" be used to characterize the opposition leaders? If so, then, how is one to explain the ease with which they changed their political objectives or became chauvinistic nationalists? One suspects that as far as the institution of the monarchy was concerned they represented no great choice.[41] For in the final analysis even men like Fukuzawa found themselves more concerned with Japan's competitive powers as a nation than over whether the people were given adequate political voice.

We too often fail to appreciate how unusual it would have been in the decades of the 1870's and 1880's to have found political figures of any consequence who would have denied the special symbolism of the emperor and have advocated the establishment of a popular sovereignty. Real issues were publicly and officially debated, and these included questions of how much power should be given an elective assembly and where the locus of responsibility in government should rest. But one looks in vain in this debate for a clear and articulate demand for the establishment of a government responsible to an elective process. Even Ōkuma, who startled the government in 1881 by openly coming out in favor of the British form of parliamentary government, proved unspecific on the point of the locus of sovereignty.[42] Beyond this we must also realize that the choice offered the Japanese people at this time was not simply one between greater and lesser representation, it was in fact between some representation and none at all. The final inclusion of the Diet in the constitution of 1889 was no mere concession tossed to a noisy opposition. Itō worked hard against heavy resistance within the government to gain its acceptance, and he himself believed that he had provided the apparatus for a true sounding of public opinion and the eventual expansion of popular participation in the decisions of government.[43] The constitution was carefully devised to maintain the political status quo, but it proved far less authoritarian than some members of the high bureaucracy would have wanted. And once it was promulgated, it had the hearty approval of the Japanese press as well as constitutional lawyers and scholars the world over, from Herbert Spencer to Oliver Wendell Holmes.[44]

As it turned out, the Meiji constitution had its defects. Not only did it institutionalize sovereignty in the person of a divine emperor, it gave a cloak of credibility to the myths and dogmas of sanctification which had historically supported the Japanese monarchy. It added to the Japanese monarchal tradition, in other words, the legal magic and imperial ritualism of the modern Prussian system. But were there voices which might have been raised against this in the days before the principles of popular rule were fully understood or before the doctrine of socialism had touched many minds? Figuratively and emotionally the emperor remained the most cherished symbol of national identity to Japanese from Iwakura to Uchimura Kanzō. However clearly the issues may have been drawn over the question of monopoly of power by the "clan clique," there were certainly few who foresaw in 1889 the problems created by carrying "Japan's particular form of monarchy" into modern times.[45] The constitution also perpetuated

[41] This point requires considerable substantiation which is only recently appearing in English. Joseph Pittau's "Ideology of a New Nation" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1962), pp. 150–53, is a recent treatment. Maruyama Masao's "Meiji kokka no shisō" is probably one of the most balanced Japanese treatments. But Inoue Kiyoshi has written a whole article on the historiography of the thesis that the movement was democratic. "A Historical Outline of Studies in the 'Ziyu Minken' Movement," *Zinbun*, II (1958), 23–50. Nakamura, *op.cit.*, p. 89, has it both ways by claiming a division between "sincere democrats" and the "opportunists."

[42] See the translation of Ōkuma's opinion in George M. Beckmann, *The Making of the Meiji Constitution* (Kansas, 1957), pp. 136–43.

[43] Pittau, *op.cit.*, ch. 6.

[44] Takayanagi Kenzo, "A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 1868–1961," in Arthur T. von Mehren, ed., *Law in Japan* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 6–9.

[45] Takeda Kiyoko, "Tennōsei shisō no keisei," *Iwanami kōza, Nihon rekishi* (Tokyo, 1962), XVI, 281–98.

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that particular form of Japanese political decision-making which obscured the locus of responsibility behind an "irresponsible" sovereign who spoke for the consensus of his political advisors. The combination of imperial absolutism and undefined responsibility continued a practice of government which was second nature to the Japanese leadership. That it passed so easily into the clauses of the Meiji constitution is to some extent the result of the failure of the German advisors to the Japanese drafters of the constitution to appreciate fully the practical differences between the Prussian and Japanese monarchies.[46]

If, then, the constitution was a relatively progressive document for its day and in its context, why did its defects loom larger and larger in the years which followed? Why was the document never really liberalized through interpretation, but on the contrary came to be applied more narrowly and rigidly, and the emperor made the object of an increasingly irrational devotion? Was it simply that the constitution had so protected its "authoritarian and antipopular bias" as to make it unassailable, particularly for a people who had no tradition of orderly process of political change? Somehow the answer seems too easy. Why, for instance, did not a responsible opposition to the government come into being with the creation of the Diet? What brought on the change of national mood which made nationalists of Fukuzawa Yūkichi and Tokutomi Sohō and drew crowds to Ueno Park to imbibe the emotions of national indignation? Why was there no real opposition to the Hozumi interpretation of the "emperor as state" and the variations of the imperial myth which were fed into the educational system? Why did Yoshino Sakuzō have so little success in his effort to create a theoretical basis for party government?

[46] Pittau, *op.cit.*, pp. 249–51. The German expectation that the emperor would play a positive role in political decision-making was thwarted both by the traditional relationship of the "sacred emperor" to government and by the personalities of the Taishō and Shōwa emperors.

We have too often interpreted these "failures" as part of a continuing fall from grace in which popular political aspirations lost out against the entrenched forces of authority and chauvinism. But surely there was a more fundamental key to this behavior, the possibility that the drift toward totalitarianism was eased by something which the Japanese desired even more than the conversion of their emperor to a symbol of their own self-government. For such a key we would need to probe the inner psychology of a people struggling for preeminence in a hostile world. For once on the defensive, where were the Japanese to find comfort but in the dream world of the imperial myth and the warmth of a family-state togetherness? And certainly once the retreat to unreality was begun, the very sacredness of the emperor and self-deceptions embodied in the revived concepts of national uniqueness precluded the possibility of self-awakening. In all of this the web of responsibility between leadership and followers, between system and masses is not easily untangled.[47]

The Emperor Today

In the end it took defeat in war and the intercession of an occupation force to explode the imperial myth and to wrest sovereignty from the inviolable emperor and grant it to the people. The new constitution not only limited the emperor to the status of national symbol but drastically stripped from him the means of maintaining himself independently of the peoples' representatives. The emperor's disavowal of his divinity, the discrediting of nationalist myths, the withdrawal of state support from Shinto, the abolition of a separate imperial military command, the elimination of the emperor's private wealth were all significant subtractions, each devised to remedy a major source of danger in the prewar system and to prevent the emperor from again being used either by an

[47] See the excellent treatment of this period by Marius Jansen, *op.cit.*, pp. 65–81.

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

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irresponsible leadership or an irrepressible people for ultranationalist purposes.

But if the institutionalization of the Meiji monarch had the full force of Japanese historical tradition behind it, the postwar establishment of a shadowy symbol devoid of power had a ring of artificiality about it. The logical result of military defeat for a Japan which had gone to war behind its sacred emperor would have been the destruction of the imperial system. Not only was it clear to the Japanese that the victorious forces after World War II could just as well have abolished the emperor, but they also took into the postwar period their own private aversion to the institution for which they had so recently been ready to give their all. For once the war was lost, the emperor inevitably became a victim in the effort of the Japanese to fix the blame for their wartime experience. And despite the spread of the word that the emperor had been opposed to the war and the confirming judgment of the Tokyo Trials absolving the emperor of war guilt, the thought was to persist that he should have abdicated, or even committed suicide, in 1945 and that the new constitution should have abolished the institution once and for all. The knowledge that prior to the Japanese surrender there were strong voices raised in the Allied councils which demanded the elimination of the emperor as a necessary corollary to "unconditional surrender" served as a reminder that the institution was saved only by the decision of a conquering enemy. The presurrender disagreement among the Allies on what to do with the emperor had brought out all of the questions which still remain unresolved in the minds of the Japanese: the questions of the necessary relationship between emperor and emperor system, between emperor and aggressive militarism, and between emperor and the capacity of the Japanese to achieve political democracy. And many Japanese were unconvinced of the wisdom of the ultimate American decision and refused to believe that the emperor could be "democratized," that a knife could be inserted between the emperor as symbol of

national unity and his rampant other being, the emperor as champion of conservatism and ultranationalism. For such sceptics it was no comfort to know that retention of the emperor was in part agreed upon as an occupation expediency.

The early years of the Occupation during which the Japanese awoke to their first freedom to attack the emperor produced a flood of critical literature which questioned the intentions of the Americans in retaining the emperor and refuted the possibility that the "emperor system" had been destroyed.[48] Inoue Kiyoshi, for instance, put the entire subject into the context of America's desire to use Japan as a base of operations against Soviet Russia. "In keeping with this ultimate objective," he wrote "America, making superficial concessions to the forces of international democracy and to democratic forces in Japan, carried out 'a colonization of Japan in the name of democratization.' The emperor and the emperor system were part of this same design. And so, enacting a phony land reform and *zaibatsu* dissolution, they laid the economic foundations for a continuation of the *tennō* system."[49]

But as Ishida Takeshi has shown in his study of postwar Japanese opinion toward the emperor, this hypercritical attitude ultimately faded.[50] The relative stability of postwar politics, the growing economic prosperity, and the new public image of the imperial family all contributed to the acceptance of the new constitutional formula and a return of the monarch to a position of popularity of a vastly different sort from the prewar style. The new popularity retained little of the fanatic nationalist fervor of prewar days but took delight in a sense of familiarity and intimacy. The great outpouring of interest in the wedding of the crown prince, the new ease with which the Japanese have turned back to the prewar years without rancor, taking pride in the "great men of Meiji" or in the

[48] Ishida Takeshi, *Sengo Nihon no seiji taisei* (Tokyo, 1961), pp. 7–25.

[49] Inoue, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

[50] Ishida, *Sengo Nihon*, pp. 40–47.

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figure of Emperor Meiji, the ability to look with clinical objectivity at movies depicting the patriotic excesses of Japanese wartime behavior, all indicate a new maturity of the popular mind.[51] And although there are still cynics who warn of the danger inherent in the emperor's continued existence, the behavior of the Japanese in recent years would seem to indicate otherwise. The emperor today stands as symbol, not of some irrational "superiority" of the Japanese race, but rather as a projection of their own pride in their own achievements as a modern people; not as a reminder of the terrors of war and humiliation of defeat but rather as symbol of Japan's purity of intent to lead the world in working for peace.

Perhaps it was in the ceremonies attending the 1964 Olympics that the new popular sovereignty and the status of the emperor were most clearly displayed to the rest of the world. For amid the frenzied efforts to bring order out of the chaos which was Tokyo and in the excitement of the opening-day pageantry, the mild-mannered Shōwa Tennō belied the fact that he had once served as the mystical center of every national ritual and the rationale for every major national effort. As he stood before his countrymen in the great Olympic Stadium, it seemed no longer that it was simply through him that the fiercest feelings of pride were drawn from the hearts of the Japanese. Rather it was in the physical surroundings themselves, in the bold sweep of prestressed concrete, in the visions of superhighways arched over central Tokyo, and in the thought that the athletes of the world had been assembled with unprecedented efficiency and hospitality that the majority seemed to find their deepest satisfaction.[52] To an observer of that moment it appeared that for the Japanese their knowledge of what they had wrought was sufficient to the occasion; through their own works they

[51] Note the recent issue of *Bungei shunjū* containing a special series on Emperor Meiji (XLIII, Jan. 1965). Ishida cites the examples of the films *Meiji Tenno to Nichi-ro daisenso* and *Nippon horobarezu*.

[52] On the "Japanese features" of the Olympic architecture, see Kōjirō Yuichirō, "Building for the Olympics," *Japan Quarterly*, IX:iv (1964), 437–55.

were speaking to the world in a language more direct and universal than that which could have been expressed symbolically through a sacred emperor. Clearly, a basic change in the relationship between monarch and people was being ritualized.

For the historian, the Japanese monarch today stands as both a symbol of national unity and a reminder of the vicissitudes through which the institutions of national sovereignty have passed in modern times. Few Asian nations entered the modern world by strengthening a monarchal system rather than destroying it. For Japan in its period of crisis between 1853 and 1871 the monarchy served the essential functions of assuring national unity and impressing a sense of responsibility upon the nation's leaders. Thereafter the emperor became a symbol of Japan's determination to modernize and to gain a place among the nations of the world. Japan's modern monarchy was a direct institutional and functional inheritance from the Japanese past, yet it served as a receptacle for new national aims. As the sovereign who presided over Japan's early steps toward modernization, Meiji Tennō became an inspiration to his people in their struggle to create a strong independent state. The person of the emperor linked both past and future, giving the Japanese a sense of security and identity while encouraging their dedication to the difficult tasks of reforming their social and economic institutions. But the government he stood for remained shrouded from public view by its transcendental nature and remained resistant to the kinds of modern change which were affecting the rest of the culture. If history could ask more of the Meiji leaders, it would be that they might have built into their constitution a broader vision of political tutelage which would have looked forward to both the material development of the country and to its political evolution toward fuller representation. For without such enlightened guidance the Japanese people as a whole, overwhelmed perhaps by manifold domestic and international problems,

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found the further reform of their government beyond their capacity. Increasingly they heaped upon their emperor the burden of their frustrated aims until they found themselves caught in the mythology of the most traditional and irrational inheritances which the emperor had brought with him out of the Japanese past.

Reborn out of the ashes of military defeat and wartime disillusionment, the Shōwa Emperor, by virtue of retaining the same body under a new constitutional system, has again become the symbol of continuity despite drastic change. And by virtue of the new myth which depicts the emperor as the symbol of Japan's good conscience which suffered silently during the war, he has literally come to embody the new determination of the Japanese to remain a peaceful democracy. Thus in its second modern transmutation the monarchy has passed still further into the realm of symbolic meaning, hopefully leaving behind those many irrational inheritances from the past which proved so dangerous when taken literally by the modern nationalist. Stripped today of power and sovereignty, the emperor serves only in the most disembodied of the manifestations with which he was historically endowed, as symbol of his country's moral consciousness. Yet behind this symbol there burns as fierce a fire of determination that Japan shall be first—this time in peace, not in war.[53]

[53] Eto Jun has put this into critical context. "Before the war Japanese intellectuals wished to make Japan rank first among all nations by force of arms. These same intellectuals are still out to make Japan first among all nations, but this time by merely chanting, 'Absolute peace!'" "The Bankruptcy of Our Idealistic Intellectuals," in *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan*, II:ii (April 1964), 105.

leadership and followership genius, isolated security, and postwar external guidance—give pause for thought because they do not seem readily reproducible elsewhere.

Regarding timing and priorities, we have seen that the positive, justiciable law of Tokugawa jurisprudence was primitive; but that Tokugawa social "law" and administration (rule-of-status) was remarkably refined, a fact which needs to be fully appreciated to understand the success of Japan's rapid growth after 1868. For, by adapting these traditional skills, Meiji Japan could modernize effectively in the early phase without a very wide range of political participation or a high degree of justiciability. But she could have accomplished little without an effective unified power structure to administer the nationwide programs with minimal disruption by uninstitutionalized political competition. This message from Meiji Japan may have utility for those just approaching the ladder of modernity without an effective administration.

As a model for modernizers Japan's postwar democratic phase has many difficulties. First, it is difficult to measure the external (Occupation's) contribution to Japan's successes of the past two decades, and second, there is the difficulty of duplicating such a contribution or finding a substitute for it, or of doing without it, for indubitably the foreign suggestions were quite important to the success of the postwar rule-of-law to date. But simply realizing these facts will underscore the risks of an assumption that liberal democracy will eventuate inevitably from today's widespread authoritarian modernization process. History will doubtless again require some popular assistance to these ends.

CHAPTER XII

Decision-Making in the Japanese Government: A Study of Ringisei

KIYOAKI TSUJI

RINGISEI means literally a system of reverential inquiry about a superior's intentions. It is an archaic term that is scarcely comprehensible to many postwar Japanese. Yet it is commonly used in academic and professional circles to describe a method of decision-making that has been extensively employed in Japanese governmental and private agencies since the early days of the Meiji era (1868-1912).[1] Although seldom defined, it is frequently encountered in technical literature.[2] There it is used to refer to a system whereby administrative plans and decisions are made through the circulation of a document called *ringisho*. This is drafted in the first instance by an official of low rank. It is then circulated among other officials in the ministry or agency concerned who

[1] Since no brief translation of *ringisei* is possible in English, we will use the Japanese term. Synonyms for *ringi* are *rinshin* and *ukagai*, both of which carry the implication of a subordinate respectfully consulting the opinion of a superior. For studies of the operation of *ringisei* in private enterprises, see Ono Toyoaki, *Nihon-teki keiei to ringiseido* (Tokyo, 1960), or Yamashiro Akira, *Keiei* (Tokyo, 1958). Comparable studies in the field of public administration are Kawanaka Nikō, *Gendai no kanryōsei* (Tokyo, 1962), and Watanabe Yasuo, "Kanryōkikō no kōzōkaikaku," *Chūō Kōron* (Oct. 1961), pp. 315-21. Generally speaking, however, there have been very few studies in this field.

[2] The word *ringi* first appeared as a legal term in Government Ordinance (*Dajōkan fukoku*) No. 106 of Aug. 1, 1876, entitled "Revision of the National Bank Ordinance." See *Hōrei zensho, 1876*, (Tokyo, 1890), p. 83. The first known usage in private enterprise was by the Ōji Seishi Company in 1871.

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are required to affix their seals if they agree with the policy proposed. By complex and circuitous paths the document gradually works its way up to higher and higher administrators, and finally reaches the minister or top executive official. When he approves the *ringisho*, the decision is made.

Viewed as a system, this process is called *ringisei*. One should be aware of the fact that it is far more than an administrative technique. *Ringisei* actually is a fundamental characteristic of Japanese administrative behavior, organization, and management. Seen in this light, its most important attributes are:

1. The *ringisho* is initially drafted by a low-ranking official who himself has neither authority nor leadership status.
2. Thereafter the *ringisho* is discussed and examined separately by the officials of all relevant bureaus and divisions. It is not discussed at a joint meeting of the administrators concerned.
3. Although in a technical sense the legal competence to grant or withhold final approval for the *ringisho* lies with the highest executive (e.g. the minister in a ministry or the president of a private business), in actual practice he is expected to approve it without change or modification because of this long process of prior scrutiny—in fact decision-making—by lower administrators.

The process is lengthy and the distance between the person who originates the first draft and the person who makes the final decision is great both in time and space. Because of these characteristics, *ringisei* is sometimes referred to as the "piling-up" or "accumulative" system (*tsumiage hōshiki*). The communications system involved is depicted graphically in Figure 1.[3] Figure 2 provides an actual sample of a *ringisho*, the docu-

[3] As shown in the *Report* of the Third Group of the Third Subcommittee of the Temporary Research Commission on Public Administration, p. 11.

ment that must work its way through this communications labyrinth. The particular form involved requests a decision by the Ministry of Agriculture on a projected loan to promote the livestock industry. Forms used in other ministries are practically identical. The relevant officials are required to imprint their seals at the places marked. It is clear that many seals are required on a *ringisho*, a fact that explains the common criticism of Japanese administration as "administration by seal."

Ringisei has some merit in that all administrators concerned with the policy proposed in a *ringisho* are informed of the prospective action and participate in the decision-making process. This makes it impossible for these administrators subsequently to offer open opposition to the policy, and it creates an expectation and a probability that they will co-operate in its execution. However, this kind of decision-making suffers from at least three serious faults.

The first is a lowering of efficiency. It takes a great deal of time to reach a final decision by this method. Much time is consumed because the *ringisho* must be examined separately by each section, division, and bureau. The proper officials may be absent when it arrives, or the *ringisho* may inadvertently be set aside. Sometimes it is intentionally held up by an administrator who disagrees with its recommendations. In Japanese administration it is often difficult for an administrator to express explicit disagreement in the face of pressures from influential figures or interest groups, or in the event that his superior is favorable while he is not. In such cases he may display implicit disagreement by keeping the *ringisho* for a long time.[4] If he were to make his disagreement explicit, there would be friction between him and his colleagues. This must be avoided at all costs, for he has life tenure in his ministry

[4] Imai, Kazuo, *Kanryō-sono seitai to uchimaku* (Tokyo, 1953), p. 125. The author, who once held an important position in the Ministry of Finance, points out this fact based on his own experience as a higher civil servant. He calls it "clutching" or "hanging on" (*nigirikomu*).

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FIGURE 1

Model of *Ringisei* Communications System



FIGURE 2

Sample of a *Ringisho*

Date of Final Decision ______________

Entry made in Files______

Referrer's seal______ Documents Filer's seal______

Bureau seal______ Section seal______

RE: The Establishment of Governmental Measures for Financial Assistance in the Expansion of the Livestock Industry.

Minister ______

Parliamentary Vice-Minister ______

Career Vice-Minister ______

Ministerial Chief Secretary ______

Chief, Archives Section ______

Chief, Budget Section ______

Chief, Local Affairs Section ______

Chief of the Agricultural Economics Bureau ______

Counselor ______

Chief, General Affairs Section ______

Chief, Finance Section ______

Chief of the Livestock Bureau ______

Counselor ______

Chief, Livestock Administration Section ______

Chief, Economics Section ______

Chief, Breed Improvement Section ______

Chief, Artificial Feeds Section ______

Chief, Natural Feeds Section ______

Chief, Sanitation Section ______

Chief, Livestock Management Section ______

Drafter ______________
Name

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and expects to remain there until retirement. Face-to-face human relations in the office, therefore, are very important. Another factor adding to delay is that the *ringisho* must start from the beginning again when it becomes necessary to amend the original draft in the course of its circulation.

The second fault is dispersion of responsibility. As we have seen, the chief executive officer is ultimately responsible for the decision. In Japanese public administration, which follows German administrative law, especially its "theory of authority," only the supreme head possesses authority in a legal sense, and he alone, therefore, must decide. Lower-ranking administrators are there to assist the minister in his decision-making. Under *ringisei* all discussions and examinations of a *ringisho* at subministerial levels are regarded as preparatory to decision-making by the minister. While all relevant administrators examine the *ringisho*, they can hardly be expected to have a strong sense of responsibility for the policy involved, because the responsibility is not really theirs.

Moreover, because of the inadequacies of the classification system, the competence and responsibility attaching to each position are not clear, and the relationships between them are very vague. Each position in an organization is described in abstract terms by that organization's constituent law, but its actual content is decided in practice by the conventions obtaining in that office. Each administrator's sense of responsibility is, so to speak, only one of many, because he puts his seal on a *ringisho* as one of many seals, and to him it is apt to mean no more than that.[5] Furthermore, the minister, though legally responsible, may not have either experience or ability to improve the contents of *ringisho* sent to him. Nor does he have a staff who could help him in this respect. The regular "line" administrators are looked upon as his staff, and, since they have already placed their seals on the *ringisho*, it is impossible

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 118. "The bureaucrats leave the results to take care of themselves. It would not be too much to say, it seems to me, that they do not care at all for the results of decision-making."

to expect an independent judgment of them. The result is that the top executive, too, is in no position to exercise effective responsibility for the contents of a *ringisho*. Therefore, except when illegal behavior is involved, those who suffer from this inefficient system of administration cannot put the blame on anyone because it is not possible to determine who is really responsible. This is the reason for which Japanese administration is often called a "system of irresponsibility."

The third fault is lack of leadership. *Ringisei* prevents the minister and higher civil servants from assuming a role of leadership in decision-making. In modern management systems the top managers assign tasks to subordinates who are well qualified by training and experience to perform these tasks. The most important problems with respect to such tasks are settled by the top managers themselves, or by them with the assistance of their staff, and the rest are delegated to subordinates for decision in accordance with standards set by the top managers. In this way both overconcentration of authority and irresponsible diffusion of competence are avoided. Furthermore, in modern management it is clear who is responsible for a particular decision, and thus necessary steps can be taken to narrow the gap between policy formation and its results by matching the former with the latter. In *ringisei*, however, the higher executives cannot assume the role of leaders and decision-makers. A higher civil servant, a friend of mine, once told me that when he thought of a plan or policy that he wanted to effect, he could only send it as a mere proposal or item for future reference to the appropriate low-ranking administrator. Even if this lowest administrator accepted and acted upon it, he still had to wait a long time until the *ringisho* concerning that policy reached him. It seems ridiculous, but is nevertheless true, that this higher civil servant would then have to approve his own plan sent back to him from below.

Should the higher executive ignore the protocol of *ringisei* and try to assume leadership in this decision-making process, he would be certain to antagonize his associates and create dis-

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turbances in the office. There are two alternatives for such a higher executive: either accept exclusion from the office, or accept the conventional methods of *ringisei*. The following story is relevant. Before World War II, Kobayashi Ichizō, president of the Hankyū Electric Railways, was appointed minister of international trade and industry. Being a businessman and not a bureaucrat, Kobayashi tried to introduce the methods of business management into the administration of his ministry, but he was confronted with strong resistance on the part of most of its bureaucrats, including the vice-minister, Kishi Nobusuke. He was actually boycotted by his subordinates and was finally compelled to resign his position. More recently, Minister of Construction Kōno Ichirō ordered major reconstructions of Tokyo's streets to be carried out at night to minimize traffic and other problems for the citizenry in general. This new policy shocked the administrators of the Ministry of Construction, who had been accustomed to carry out street construction during the day. The new idea faded away very quickly.

It is apparent, therefore, that *ringisei* makes it difficult for higher executives to assume a role of leadership in decision-making. A by-product of the system is that even an incompetent higher executive feels that he can remain in his position, because so many "experts" have already examined and approved the contents of any *ringisho* that comes to him for action. If he has confidence in his subordinate administrators and in the conventional methods of *ringisei*, he can easily accept the *ringisho* as it stands and feel that it contains no serious errors. Many so-called rubber stamps are affixed in this way.[6]

Since the Meiji era most Japanese higher executives have been graduates of faculties of law. Consequently, while they normally have a good deal of knowledge of law and juris-

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 127. Imai claims, with some understandable exaggeration, that, when he was a bureau chief, he affixed his seals more than 8,000 times a day.

prudence, they are not usually well informed in other fields. An adequate staff would help them in this regard, but Japanese administrators really have no staff, or only an incompetent one if there is any at all. For this reason, I view *ringisei* as comparable to such premodern systems of authority and decision-making as the feudal lord system (*tonosama hōshiki*) or the patriarchal system (*kachō hōshiki*). In all of these Japanese administrative systems the functions of decision-making are widely dispersed but with technical authority concentrated in a supreme head.

Relationships between Japanese Bureaucracies and Ringisei

Ringisei has been closely linked with Japanese bureaucratic organization and practice in both private industry and government since the Meiji era. A business expert points out that although business and industry in Japan may seem to be modern in form, they have in fact adopted *ringisei*.[7] According to Ono, the development of Japanese business and industry was supported and facilitated by the spirit of the feudal patriarchal system. The family management system of the feudal merchants and the traditional behavior patterns of workers from rural and agricultural areas were adopted along with modern types of organization and technology. This patriarchal element in business and industry makes human relations in the firm similar to those in a feudal family. The interest of the company comes first, not the interest of individuals. The company is thought of as a family, and the positions of workers and managers are determined by age and academic career (a kind of seniority rule). Life tenure for workers is guaranteed by the company, and welfare programs for the workers are considered to be an act of benevolence on the part of the president of the company, i.e. the patriarch. This relationship produces high morale among the workers and prevents them from moving to other companies.

This idea survives today. As is well known, most Japanese

[7] Ono, *op.cit.*, pp. 4-5.

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labor unions, which were largely organized after World War II, are not craft unions, but company unions. In such community-like companies the power of the president is very strong, and a deep gulf in status separates white-collar from blue-collar workers. There is no distinction between staff and line. It is *ringisei* that lies at the heart of this patriarchal system of the management of what are in a formal sense modern enterprises in contemporary Japan. Another expert on business management claims that *ringisei* is peculiar to Japanese business and that he cannot find any equivalent to it in other countries.[8]

The characteristics of *ringisei* in private administration have much in common with those in public administration. During the Meiji era the Japanese government changed from the *dajōkan* or conciliar system of top executive organization to a cabinet system, where the emperor stood at the apex of the entire system. This formed a hierarchy in the sense that Max Weber described as one of the characteristics of modern bureaucracy. But in a normal hierarchy the decisions and orders of the supreme head are transmitted to all subordinate positions in the organization without modification. In the case of Japanese administration, however, this flow of "commands" goes in the opposite direction, namely from bottom to top, because of *ringisei*. This reverse flow has been made possible by the fact that each administrative agency is in fact a sort of patriarchal community.

In a discussion of Japanese bureaucracies it should be noted, first, that the close relationship between *ringisei* and the particularism of each ministry is characteristic of Japanese bureaucracy. In each ministry or community internal agreement is obtained by the conventional method of circulating *ringisho*. Once such internal agreement has been obtained, each ministry insists very strongly upon the correctness and interpretations of its own scope and competence, regardless of conflicts with other ministries. To be sure there are factors other than

[8] Yamashiro, *op.cit.*, pp. 173ff.

ringisei that explain this particularism in Japanese administration: the pluralistic nature of political power at the time of the Meiji Restoration; the fact that the Meiji constitution rejected joint responsibility for the Cabinet and made each minister separately responsible to the emperor; the fact that ministers were members of the Cabinet and heads of administrative agencies at the same time; and the establishment of the prerogative of a separate and independent supreme command over the armed forces. Because of such factors a ministry could exert great influence upon decision-making in the Cabinet if that ministry was strongly united internally, resulting in a weakly united Cabinet. Not infrequently cabinets collapsed because of the opposition of single ministries.[9] Thus while particularism cannot be attributed to *ringisei* alone, even today it is one of the most important factors promoting particularism in administration. From the point of view of organizational theory, we can say, therefore, that when the smaller units in a large organization pay too much attention to their own internal communications and their own objectives, the efficiency of the organization as a whole will be seriously qualified.

Second, *ringisei* is calculated to maintain a strict sense of rank among administrators. The word itself, *ringi*, meaning "to ask from below," implies a relationship between master and servant. This in itself may have some psychological influence on administrators. And the resulting sense of separation of higher from lower has been greatly strengthened by the higher civil service examination system (*kōtōbunkan shiken seidō*), which was in effect until the end of World War

[9] In 1901, for example, the fourth Itō Cabinet, ostensibly a strong government headed by a veteran leader of the imperial Restoration, was compelled to resign en masse because of the opposition of a single ministry. When the budget, which had been already decided by the Cabinet, came to be implemented, the minister of finance strongly opposed it and was backed by his subordinates within the ministry. For the reasons for such particularism in the Japanese government, see Tsuji Kiyoaki, *Nihon kanryōsei no kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1952), pp. 67-128.

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II. Only those who passed this examination could be promoted to higher positions. Those who were successful were promoted very rapidly, but those who were not spent their lives as lower or middle-ranking administrators until retirement, however able they might be. The discontent felt by these lower administrators was compensated for to some extent because they became more technically experienced and proficient than the higher administrators. It was these permanently low-grade administrators who drafted *ringisho* and who helped the non-expert higher administrators through their experience and practical knowledge. This may have given them some sense of self-satisfaction in their jobs. To use an analogy, their circumstances resembled those of a wife who lives under the despotic control of her husband; she may comfort herself by thinking that she has assisted her husband's career.

On the other hand, the fact that *ringisho* were drafted by these lower administrators on the basis of their own narrow experience tended to insure the narrowness of their perspectives. Since the drafter could refer only to the past experience and precedents of his own office, there was certain to be a built-in lag between the contents of *ringisho* and conditions in the outside world. In other words, *ringisho* tended to be desk plans that were out of touch with reality. Because precedents were considered to be important, their drafters were apt to seek the advice of veteran administrators who also had little hope of promotion. Thus the contents of *ringisho* today tend to be dominated by old precedents, and the conventional knowledge of earlier generations of administrators is transmitted in this way to new generations of lower administrators.

As a result of *ringisei*, higher administrators depend on lower administrators and lower administrators acquire a sense of loyalty to higher administrators. This is the way in which a sense of community is maintained in governmental offices. *Ringisei* contributes to what M. P. Follett called the "final authority system." In other words, the sense of loyalty of the lower to the higher and the overall sense of communal

relationships are strengthened by *ringisei*, and this helps to produce the "final authority system."

Third, because of *ringisei* decision-making tends to be influenced by private considerations. Since the drafting of *ringisho* is assigned to lower administrators and the number of relevant administrators involved in the review and approval system are numerous, individuals among them are often in a position to influence the nature of the decision during the circulation of the *ringisho*. In extreme cases, private interests come to dominate public decision-making, especially decisions concerning the issuance of licenses. Lower administrators, like assistants to division heads, are sometimes called barnyard emperors (*hiryō tennō*) because of their capacity to influence the contents of *ringisho*. There have been many cases of corruption in postwar Japan in which lower as well as higher civil servants have been arrested, an indication of the influence of lower civil servants in decision-making in Japanese public administration.

The Reform of Ringisei

Democratization in postwar Japan has been the main factor leading to the reform of *ringisei* in private enterprise. The cartels (*zaibatsu*) were broken up, prewar higher executives were purged, and many new labor unions were organized. Partly as a result of the revision of the Commercial Code and partly for other reasons, decision-making by boards of directors and the role of managers in general became more important in business management. Also American techniques of management were introduced to Japan. In the early stages of these reforms, the main purpose was to increase production and to improve labor management. Job classification, job evaluation, social and job security measures, in-service training programs, wages keyed to positions rather than seniority, and a variety of other innovations were introduced. In this way industrial rationalization and adjustments in human relations within industry were begun. Then came reforms of top man-

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agement, the comptroller system, and the organization of boards of executive directors, and since about 1955 top leaders in private enterprises have been concerned about planned management and marketing, gradually decentralizing decision-making powers.

The circumstances and needs of postwar business have thus strengthened the role of top management and produced staff organizations whose roles are distinguished from those of line agencies. At the same time a good deal of decision-making power has been assigned to lower levels such as the sales and production divisions. As a result it seems probable that *ringisei* will gradually disappear in the business community.[10]

Criticisms of *ringisei* and the efforts to reform it in private enterprise have also had an impact on public administration, where *ringisei* has been the subject of increasing criticism and of several proposed reforms. The first such reform was proposed in 1949 by the Council for the Reform of Public Administration. It suggested, first, that the Cabinet abandon management from below in order to give more authority to top executives and their assistants, and to enable them to make decisions more promptly, and second, curtail the use of assistants and reassign those that remained to other more appropriate positions. Then, in 1950 the Council for Public Administration recommended that both responsibility and competence be made clear at each level of administration; that a sense of responsibility and will to innovate be cultivated among administrators; and that the handling of business be simplified. It was high time, the proposal of 1950 claimed, to reform *ringisei*, which it criticized as extremely inefficient. Similar reform proposals were presented by the First Public Administration Council in 1953, and by the Fourth Public Administration Council in 1959. The latter, for example, made four proposals for the reform of *ringisei*: (1) the circulation of *ringisho* should be limited to three levels at most, and they should be drafted by the responsible executives or by higher civil serv-

[10] Ono, *op.cit.*, p. 67.

ants; (2) in order to prevent delays in decisions as a result of the circulation of *ringisho*, only a report of the decisions taken rather than a *ringisho* requesting concurrence should be sent to all indirectly affected offices in and outside the ministry concerned; (3) both responsibility for and competence to affix seals should be clarified; and (4) in order to reduce the number of levels involved in decision-making, less important decisions should be made at the division level and more important ones only should be forwarded to higher authorities after formulation by the division head concerned. The Cabinet was impressed by these recommendations and by the force of public opinion and decided that "the number of levels of decision-making should be reduced to as few as possible, and that higher civil servants should participate in drafting *ringisho* wherever possible." This decision by the Cabinet has, however, not actually been carried out in practice.[11]

The Temporary Research Commission for Public Administration presented recommendations for the reform of public administration in September 1964. This commission, which had investigated the problem for two and a half years, strongly recommended the reform of *ringisei*, and suggested the adoption of what they called an "assignment" or "allocation" system (*waritsuḳe hōshiḳi*) instead of *ringisei*. Under this system higher civil servants would assign tasks to qualified subordinate administrators and would be responsible for checking their results, thus bringing about a feedback effect in Japanese public administration. As a result of these reforms, the commission said, the following objectives would be realized: leadership by higher executives; a narrowing of the gap between formal competence and actual practice; a speedup in approval

[11] In July 1961 a colleague and I interviewed higher civil servants holding positions ranging from division heads to vice-minister in the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture, and Local Autonomy. We asked them about 70 questions. One of these was: "Do you think that there has been any improvement in office management at your agency in the past two or three years?" The answers were: (1) very much—16; (2) some—133; (3) almost none—81; (4) none at all—11.

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and licensing procedures; and the prevention of arbitrary administrative decisions. An administrative form exemplifying the recommended procedures is shown in Figure 3.

Actually if a higher civil servant today were required really to assume a role of leadership, it would be a most unsettling experience for him. Should he be required to draft *ringisho,* for example, he would find it practically impossible to do without extensive assistance. In Japanese terms he would be a lonely lord, bereft without his subjects. The situation is not, of course, peculiar to Japan.

The most crucial need in the reform of *ringisei*, however, is for the recognition and provision of staff services. As long as this is not done, all attempts to reform *ringisei* will remain mere paper plans. If higher executives are really to lead, able and experienced staff members to help them are indispensable. The tasks of large organizations are so numerous, complicated, and technical that it is practically impossible to manage them without the help of a staff that plans, advises, suggests, and collects and analyses information for the higher executives. This is true for the individual ministries as well as for the government as a whole.

In Japanese administration, however, staff functions have been little recognized, and staff organization has been very weak. For example, in the case of the Japanese government as a whole, the first attempt at improvement was the establishment of the Planning Agency in 1937, which unfortunately became a refuge for bureaucrats having close relationships with the army and navy rather than becoming a real staff organization. At that time, self-centered and particularistic administration was the rule in all ministries. Consequently the authority of the Planning Agency was largely ignored by the ministries, and each of them continued to operate according to the old precedents and practices to which it was accustomed.

The only exception was the Japanese armed forces. In military organization, the distinction between line and staff had been very clearly defined since shortly after the Restoration.

FIGURE 3

ADMINISTRATIVE FORM EXEMPLIFYING THE "ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM" RECOMMENDED IN 1964

Pre-Decision Consultation		Post-Decision Disposition	
Drafter	Chief of the Livestock Management Section	Document No.	No.______
Drafting Date	__/__/__ month day year	Decision Date	__/__/__ month day year
Endorsements by:		Document examined	__/__/__ month day year
Chief, Sanitation Section		Document revised	__/__/__ month day year
Chief, Natural Feeds Section		Decision executed	__/__/__ month day year
Chief, Artificial Feeds Section		Other matters	__/__/__ month day year
Chief, Breed Improvement Section			
Chief, Economics Section			
Chief, Livestock Administration Section			
Counselor			
Chief, Agricultural Economics Bureau		Document Filer in charge (name)	
Ministerial Chief Secretary			
Parliamentary Vice-Minister			
		File No.	No.______

I certify that the following decision has been made: (text of policy decided upon is appended).

______________________ ,

(name) (seal)

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

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In the army the general staff office became independent as early as in 1878, while in the navy the naval general staff was created in 1886. Both thought highly of the functions and value of staff work. The military ranks of staff members were actually higher than those of line officers. This was so primarily because the emperor's supreme prerogative in military matters was in practice entrusted to and managed by the two general staffs independently of the ministries of the army and navy. This superiority was reinforced when in 1930 Prime Minister Hamaguchi was assassinated after his Cabinet had signed the London Naval Limitation Treaty over the objections of the naval general staff. An additional point that fostered a sense of superiority among staff officers was the wearing of special shoulder straps, distinguishing them from ordinary military officers. One important reason why the functions of the staff are recognized to this extent in military organization is that decisions on military strategy and movements are clearly distinguished from general military administration. These are the vital decisions that can decide the life or death of one's country. They are the keys to victory or defeat.

If the importance of staff organization and services should come to be recognized in public administration as it is in the armed forces, and if additionally it were to become possible to assign responsibility for policy results, the probability that administrative decision-making would become more deliberate and more thoughtful would be greatly enhanced. If military decisions in time of war were made by *ringisei* through the solicitation of opinions from a great variety of private soldiers and higher officers, the battle would be lost every time. Decisions at the front must be expeditiously made and executed, and if the decision is to be a good one, the quality of its preparation is crucial.

Unlike the military, the public does tolerate errors and faults in decision-making without seriously questioning the ability or integrity of public servants or the merits of their system of decision-making. Thus *ringisei* survives in public administration because of the patience and apathy of the public. In fact, because the contemporary system of public administration implicitly assumes that the public will submit to its authority, the very concept of public service has been greatly weakened in the minds of so-called public servants.

The situation is changing, however. The shortcomings of business management in Japan are being criticized because the Japanese economy must face the competition of free trade with other countries. Decision-making in public administration also is now beginning to face an open system, and it should gradually come to adapt itself to this rapidly changing environment. *Ringisei* will shortly face other criticisms even more severe than those of the Temporary Research Commission for Public Administration, which will be leveled against a crucial aspect of Japanese government that has been modernized in form only.

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$297

Thomas Parke Hughes

ELMER SPERRY
Inventor and Engineer

R-IV/4

The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971 Baltimore and London (M-348)

INTRODUCTION

When Elmer Sperry began his career as an inventor, engineer, and entrepreneur in 1880, America had embarked upon a course of rapid industrialization and urbanization. The wilderness was being transformed into an industrial society with unmatched technological power. Before Sperry's time, America's great resource had been nature; within a few decades her strength would be technology. Elmer Sperry played an outstanding role in this transformation.

In 1880, arc lights lined the streets of a few cities, but the era of electric light and power had only begun. The railroad reached across the continent and into small villages, including Cortland, New York, where Sperry grew up, but the electric streetcar and the automobile were unknown. America had drawn world-wide attention to her system of manufacturing and her civil engineering, but other technology had not yet put down roots in the new world. Water wheels turned at innumerable power sites, but more than a decade would pass before electricity harnessed the power of Niagara. Lighter-than-air craft carried observers aloft in wartime and thrilled gaping crowds at county fairs, but heavier-than-air craft remained the vision of a few. Iron-clad warships had appeared, but the steel-hulled, long-gunned, turbine-propelled *Dreadnought,* the most awesome of pre-aerial weapons, had not been launched. Industrial concerns had been founded and grown great on patents, but corporations had not yet seen the possibility of cultivating research and development—nor had governments. The next century would see the rapid rise of the industrial research and development laboratory and a heavy commitment of government funds for this activity—first in war and then in peace.

Virtually every age and man can be portrayed as transitional, but this is a remarkably accurate description of Elmer Sperry. Born near the rural village of Cortland, he died in heavily industrialized and urbanized Brooklyn He attended a small normal school offering only an introduction to science; later he was honored by great universities educating thousands of scientists and engineers each year. His first major invention was an improvement in arc lighting; the major inventions of his later years were in gyroscopic closed-loop, or feedback, controls (cybernetics). When he began as an inventor

CHAPTER I The Cultivation of an Inventor

Necessity is the mother of invention. A race of inventors has sprung up in this country because they were needed. Human labor was scarce and high. A new country was to be conquered and brought under cultivation. Wide fields demanded rapid means of sowing and harvesting. A scanty population and distant markets demanded greater facilities for rapid transit. A high ideal of life demanded a thousand new elements of gratification; and to supply all these demands a thousand new machines and processes had to be invented.

SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
XXXVIII (1878), p. 192

JUDGED BY MID-TWENTIETH-CENTURY STANDARDS, ELMER AMBROSE SPERRY enjoyed few of the advantages that would prepare one for a life of invention, engineering, and innovation. He was not from a family with a background in science or engineering; he did not attend outstanding schools or graduate from a great university; he did not grow up in an urban environment permeated by the latest ideas of science and built and maintained by the most recent technology. Yet, by the age of twenty, without leaving rural Cortland County, New York, he had invented a complex arc-light system, and local businessmen had invested thousands of dollars in him and the invention. Not only had he won the confidence of others, but he had gained the self-confidence that carried him to Chicago to compete with inventors, engineers, and entrepreneurs in the risky and open field of electrical technology. The seeming paradox of the young man's achievement invites explanation. It is not enough to say, as many inventors have, that the answer is inventive genius. A more plausible explanation exists in the circumstances of Sperry's first twenty-three years.

i

The farmers who cultivated the Cortland County wilderness were sturdy stock. Many of them, like Elmer Sperry's great-grandfather, Medad Sperry, settled there early in the nineteenth century after migrating from the East.[1]

[1] Genealogy traces Medad back to Richard Sperry, first of the American Sperrys. He settled in New Haven Colony and is remembered for having secluded two of the

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Figure 1.1 The Sperry property is in quadrant 96. From Combination Atlas Map of Cortland County, New York, *Everts, Ensign, and Everts, 1876.*

The Sperry farm stood on the slope of one of the many rolling hills to the south of the village, and these offered some shelter from the winter winds. When the rock maple and beech turned, the inhabitants justly boasted of the beauty of the countryside, but in the winter the barren trees, bare fields with outcroppings of stone, and the deforested slopes presented a cold and somber landscape. Sperry's later unsympathetic attitude toward nature would be difficult to explain unless we conclude that the general impression he carried away from the farm was one of a hostile environment. After he moved to the city, Sperry—his daughter recalled—showed no interest in the country or country life. As a child he had seen nature in terms of bitter cold, howling wind, driving rain and hard soil. Perhaps this explains why, decades later, he hung on his office wall in Brooklyn a large picture of a giant tree, half uprooted in a raging storm, clinging tenaciously to a cliff. Beneath the picture Sperry wrote, "an intrepid pioneer, conquering the sympathetic though dignified recognition of a forbidding, ever terrifying, environment."

If nature seemed hostile and disorderly, technology was, in 1860, a protective, helpful order. Unlike the urban child of the twentieth century, who looks at technology from a distance, Elmer Sperry and other farm boys of his era became thoroughly acquainted with the workings of the machines and structures of rural technology and developed thereby a keen appreciation of the problems that they were designed to solve. It is no accident that country boys like Elmer Sperry became interested in how things worked and that many inventors and engineers of his era—including Edison—came from the country. The relationship between apparent natural disorder and technological order—however primitive—was clearest in such a setting.

Two miles east of the Sperry farm lay the twenty-home community of Blodgett Mills. There, on the Tioughnioga River, young Elmer was able to study water-driven mills, which provided excellent examples of practical mechanics. Among them were a wool-carding mill, a grist mill, and, by 1869, a steam sawmill. Through his uncle, Judson Sperry, he also had access to a steam-powered mill. Uncle Judson and Blodgett Mills had additional attraction because the Syracuse, Binghamton, & New York Railroad had a station there.

Sperry was not only an observer. As a child he built small water wheels and windmills of such excellent design and construction that relatives and friends remembered them years later. These he sold as toys, but he gave his grandmother a small hand mill for grating horseradish that proved a labor-saving device. His Aunt Helen also remembered what he made for her and marveled at his pronounced interest in mechanical things at an early age.

iii

After moving to Cortland village, Sperry became familiar with a technology more complex than that of the farm. Although a village of only three or four thousand, Cortland knew industry; its boosters spoke of rapid industrialization during the decade or so Sperry lived there. Before the

perience before becoming superintendent of the works.[34] Duffey allowed Sperry to work near him so that they could discuss mechanical problems as they arose. The wagon company also assigned a skilled machinist, Jesse Vandenburgh, to assist Sperry in his construction of the dynamo [35] (the two applied, incidentally, for a joint patent on a vehicle wheel in September 1881). Two wagon works employees made the patterns for the generator castings. The company's machine shop and forge cast and finished parts in both brass and iron for the Sperry generator. From these skilled workmen he learned the properties of materials and the uses of various machine tools. If he had been content to invent improvements in machine tools—as one of his early patents showed him capable of doing[36]—he might have remained in Cortland with the wagon works and found a satisfying challenge.

Wayland Tisdale, treasurer of the company, took a particular interest in the progress of the young inventor. From Tisdale, Sperry learned more of the financing and management of invention and development. Almost every day from August 1880, until February 1881, when Sperry was building his generator and arc light, Tisdale discussed the problems with him. As the generator moved from drawing board to successful operation, their talk turned from development problems to those of marketing, or innovation, for Tisdale believed that a company manufacturing electrical equipment based on Sperry patents would be a commercial success.

These plans depended on Sperry's preliminary success in obtaining patents. To help him the company turned to Cortland's patent lawyer, John W. Suggett, noted for his comprehension of science and technology as well as the intricacies of patent procedure. During the two years Sperry worked in Cortland developing his inventions with the support of the wagon company, he learned much about the patent process. He learned to keep a record of his inventive activity, dating, and obtaining witnesses for important verbal disclosures, sketches and drawings—a record that would be essential in case of interference. Sperry also learned how to draft an application that described his invention in a patentable way. In 1881 the company sent Sperry to Washington for six weeks to work in the office of J. R. Nottingham, the solicitor of patents who handled Suggett's patent affairs at the Patent Office. In Washington, Sperry became intimately acquainted with the complexities of shepherding a patent application through the Patent Office. From Suggett—and Nottingham—he was learning a critical part of the invention-development process.

Why did the wagon company invest so extensively in a young local inventor in a foreign field? Probably because the company was dynamic and a sanguine risk taker. Inventors also received considerable publicity, and the outstanding successes of Edison demonstrated the profitability of invention and innovation. Since Edison was one more example of an inventor's rising from humble circumstances—and the small town—to world renown, Sperry's

[34] *"Grip's" Historical Souvenir of Cortland* (1899), pp. 118–19.

[35] Hugh Duffey testifying, June 1883, in patent interference 8596, *Daft* v. *Thomas* v. *Sperry*, *"Electric Arc Lamp,"* National Archives, Box 1005.

[36] Filed September 30, 1882, "Machine for Cutting Screw Threads," issued February 26, 1884 (Patent No. 294,092).



Figure 1.10
Dynamo Electric Machine
(Patent No. 260,132).
Below: front elevation.
Top: plan view.
(Key: governor, L; armature,
a; armature shaft, D; drive
pulley, F; field magnet
helices, H; field magnet
castings, I; commutator, J;
commutator brushes, K.)

chances seemed good. Furthermore, Sperry had a local reputation as an inventor, and the company had received Professor Anthony's favorable opinion of his work. Sperry's exciting, new, well-publicized field must have been an attractive diversification move for a company building wagons and carriages. An immediate motive was the company's need for arc lighting in its new buildings so that longer hours could be worked during the short winter days. In the long run, the company could use its Chicago branch to establish a foothold if it should decide to compete for the expanding arc-light market in a large city. Nor should the personality of the young inventor be overlooked, for he was already known for his sincerity, enthusiasm, and persuasiveness. Whatever its reasons, the company gave Sperry a great boost in his career.

vi

With the support of the wagon company, Sperry developed a complete arc-light system between the summer of 1880 and the fall of 1882. Initially, he concentrated his efforts on the generator, the construction of which was completed in December 1880. He borrowed a single arc lamp from Cornell to display his creation in the Cortland First Baptist Church on Christmas Eve. An account of the scene survives:

> As one entered the Church on Friday Evening last the objects which first met the eye were two graceful evergreens, one on each side of the rostrum loaded with presents and brilliantly illuminated with waxen tapers. The rostrum beneath the trees was filled with packages of various shapes and sizes and in the immediate neighborhood were sleds, chairs, pictures &c.
>
> The exercises began promptly at seven o'clock before a crowded house. The singing by the double quartet was very fine and the little folks did themselves great credit in all their parts. . . . At the conclusion of the literary part of the exercises old Santa Claus made his appearance. . . .
>
> An extra feature of the evening was the exhibition of Elmer Sperry's electric lights. Owing to a defect in the engine which was located in the O'Neil wagon works at the rear of the Church the full capacity of the lights was not brought out, and yet all were permitted to see the light and make a comparison between it and gas—a comparison which was decidedly unfavorable to gas.[37]

A few weeks later he again displayed the light, which this time illuminated several blocks of Cortland from the tower to the lower shops of the wagon company. For a village whose streets had been dimly lit by gas, the brilliance of the display was dramatic. Wherever the arc light first appeared it caused a sensation, whether in Cortland, New York City, or Berlin.

Assured by its performance and supported by the wagon company, Sperry applied for a patent on his generator in December 1880—his first patent application.[38] The next problem for the young man was to build

[37] *Cortland Standard,* December 30, 1880.

[38] Filed December 22, 1880, "Dynamo Electric Machine," issued June 27, 1882 (Patent No. 260,132). When several claims in the application were found in interference by the Patent Office examiner, Suggett divided it, leaving only the uncon-

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to me to call for assistance. I was not usually at all sure that I could aid in improving the state of affairs in any way, but was fascinated by the challenge. So I would study the matter over; I would have my assistants bring before me everything that had been published about it, including the patent literature dealing with attempts to better the situation. When I had the facts before me I simply did the obvious thing. I tried to discern the weakest point and strengthen it; often this involved alterations with many ramifications which immediately revealed the scope of the entire project. Almost never have I hit upon the right solution at first. I have brought up in my imagination one remedy after another and must confess that I have many times rejected them all, not yet perceiving the one that looked simple, practical and hard-headed. Sometimes it is days and even months later that I am brought face to face with something that suggests the simple solution that I am looking for. Then I go back and say to myself, 'Now I am prepared to take the step. It is perfectly obvious that this is the way to do it and that the other ways all have their objections.' It usually transpires that the innovation-resisting public will find any amount of fault with the one that is finally chosen. But I have always been tolerably well fortified because I have the feeling that I have made a pretty thorough canvass of the methods which would in all probability occur to the other workers in this field.

In the same essay, Sperry also felt free to discuss the importance to the creative man of a trait more often associated with men in other walks of life. "Let us consider," he wrote:

courage in a somewhat broader aspect. Courage is one of the greatest world forces, if not the greatest. It is courage that has marked leadership in all times. The great world advances in all departments, including the arts, have from time immemorial depended on the courage of leaders. True it is that this word has almost always been associated with wars and warriors. Men dream dreams and have visions and we call them visionary. Once in a while some of these have the inquisitive faculty, but their projects still may die in an early stage. In this case the world has not been advanced. However, when one other factor is added, namely, indomitable courage, then the pioneer pushes his way through untold hardship, finds the mountain pass, and is the first to envision the whole new world lying beyond—the sunlit fertile valleys and vast unutilized resources. Thus it is that the inventor achieves and, also, thus it is that in unfolding the secret of any nation's advance Courage is given a much broader significance than is usually conveyed by narrative history.

Sperry's courage did not go unnoted by his professional colleagues. Willis R. Whitney for example, was impressed by how, under trial, Sperry showed external equanimity and even sanguineness, "no matter how deeply you are internally hurt. . . . You were always a marvel to me," the scientist continued, "you have often perhaps unwittingly helped me by that spirit."[49]

Sperry had known, he wrote, "untold hardships" in bringing about technological change. Rarely did he reveal other than a sanguine character, but in this essay of his mature years, he spoke out against tradition and dogma, "these downright deterrents to progress and blights on the energy and will that bring progress." Sperry was recalling the indifference he had

[49] Willis R. Whitney to EAS, March 12, 1930 (SP).

encountered, the unorthodox approaches he had made, and the tireless promotion to which he—a very proud and dignified man—had resorted so that his ideas might survive. "Conservatism," he wrote, "is simply an effort to gloss over . . . [dogma's] evils and does not excuse it from any of its iniquities." Paradoxically, Sperry damned dogma and tradition in the technological world, while supporting the social status quo. Yet, he had the wisdom to conclude his essay with the thought that, "if modern civilization is troubled in its soul about the so-called evils of the machine," it might be because it has not thought through its problems and presented them "effectively" to inventive minds. An effective presentation to Sperry was one that emphasized "reaching out" and building up, not lashing out and tearing down.

v

Sperry came to appreciate the Japanese as wonderfully inventive people who were, he believed, reaching out, and building up. The last years of his life were enriched by an interest and emotional attachment he developed for Japan and the Japanese. His correspondence about Japan and with Japanese friends reveals values and ideals that had shaped his professional life. He projected onto Japan many of the ideals that had long motivated his own activity, and he imagined in Japan a congenial environment.

When, during World War I, his interest first turned to Japan, his motivation was primarily to promote sales of company products there. The Japanese were in a period of naval expansion and wanted a navy as advanced as those of the occidental powers, which meant, among other things, gyrocompasses. Sperry hoped not only to sell them the compass but also to install gyrostabilizers on their warships. In this effort, Tom Morgan, the Sperry sales manager, and Elmer Sperry, Jr., visited Japan.

Other influences increased Sperry's interest. His daughter Helen visited Japan in 1917, and she, Morgan, and Elmer Sperry, Jr., all brought back enthusiastic reports. Sperry subsequently joined the Japan Society of New York, an organization which encouraged closer relations between the United States and Japan, and he became in 1922 a member of the society's fund-raising committees, along with Gerard Swope, president of General Electric. Sperry found that a number of other leading American industrialists and engineers shared his interest in rapidly industrializing Japan. Sperry was further drawn toward Japan by the interest the YMCA and Christian missionaries had in the country. Sperry had long been sympathetic to both of these activities and was increasingly involved in committee work on their behalf.

In 1922 Sperry visited Japan to attend the twenty-fifth anniversary celebration of the Japanese Society of Mechanical Engineers and the Japanese Society of Naval Architecture, the corresponding societies in America having made him, undoubtedly with his encouragement, their official representative. Named for the occasion an Honorary Vice President of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and enjoying a world reputation among engineers and industrialists, Sperry was cordially welcomed by the

Figure 10.12 Luncheon party for Elmer and Zula Sperry at Baron Iwasaki's villa in 1922. Tom Morgan, later president of the Sperry Gyroscope Company, stands behind Zula Sperry; Admiral Hideo Takeda, Sperry's friend, is to Morgan's left. Also present were Hantaro Hagaoka (fourth from right), the physicist known at the Lord Kelvin of Japan; Masawo Kamo (third from right), professor and president of the Japanese Society of Mechanical Engineers; and Baroness Iwasaki (seated to Mrs. Sperry's right and in front of Baron Iwasaki). From the Sperryscope, *III, 1923.*

Japanese as a distinguished guest.

Zula accompanied Elmer on the two-month trip, and the reception they received in Japan was flattering. Besides being a guest of honor on ceremonial occasions, he was singled out for invitations to small dinners attended by leading personalities in the government, army, navy, industry, and the universities. Among those with whom Sperry became acquainted and whom he and Zula entertained at their farewell dinner at the Imperial Hotel were General Yamanashi, Minister of War; Vice Admiral K. Ide, Vice Minister of the Navy; Prince Tokugawa, President of the House of Peers; and Baron Hachiroemon Mitsui, head of the Mitsui family and of the giant Mitsui business enterprises.

Some of those whom Sperry met later became much closer to him through subsequent correspondence and visits. Mostly from the navy, the shipbuilding industry, and the science and engineering faculties of the universities, they represented the elite then presiding over the introduction of modern technology to Japan and were therefore influential in Japan during the twenties, a decade when parliamentary regimes primarily interested in developing the economic strength of the nation prevailed. This small group included Takuma Dan, the general director of the Mitsui firm, who had graduated in engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Professor Hantaro Nagaoka, a professor of science and engineering at the Imperial Tokyo University and known as the Lord Kelvin of Japan; and Professor Baron Chuzaburo Shiba, professor of shipbuilding at the Imperial University, who had studied at London's Central Technical College (later the Imperial College of Science and Technology). Baron Vice Admiral Hideo Takeda, a retired naval engineer who headed the

Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Company and also the Mitsubishi Electrical Engineering Company, became a close friend of Sperry's. The two men were about the same age and found that their views on society and human nature were quite similar.

Sperry's reputation preceded him to Japan. A shipbuilding nation could not avoid appreciating his major inventions. His close relations with the United States Navy and his service on the Naval Consulting Board were also highly regarded in a country where naval-industrial relations were close. Having learned of his many patents in other fields and of his high standing as a professional engineer, his Japanese friends regarded him as second only to Thomas Edison as an inventor-engineer. As they came to know him better, they also came to appreciate the course of his career from simple rural beginnings to national prominence and to admire his moral values, which were not unlike their own.

Sperry left Japan in November with strong impressions of the country's rapid strides in technology. At a time when many Americans thought of Japan as imitative and second rate, Sperry's keen and experienced eye saw the unmistakable signs of technological excellence and maturity. Later, he carried this message to the world-wide engineering fraternity, which was also ill-informed about Japanese technology. Sperry had been especially impressed by two large dockyards, one of which he judged to be four times larger than any in America. He admired the systematic layout and operation of the yard, where they "take in Swedish pigiron at one end of the place (only it happens to be the middle) and put out a 33,000 ton battleship at the other end."[50] He observed that America had only two model ship basins for scientific experiments but that Japan had four. In Japan he also saw superior machine tools which were, he knew, the essence of precision manufacture and represented a heavy capital investment. He judged a Japanese-built, horizontal milling machine and a forging press to be larger than any in America. In a decade when the construction of high-voltage electrical-transmission networks, or grids, was a sign of advanced technology, Sperry found the Japanese construction of the finest kind, better than that he had seen in America. He also heard that the Japanese had three times more high-tension transmission lines per capita than the United States. The Japanese were no longer dependent upon the import of complex materials and machines such as generators, turbines, and armor plate.

After his return home, when he was giving his many talks on Japan to American engineering groups, he cited the physical evidence of technological excellence and he also praised the Japanese spirit that made these accomplishments possible. He thought there were no engineers in the world more studious, devoted, and enthusiastic. The explanation for their technological achievement was, he said, the absence of traditions and precedents, leaving "their minds . . . free to go straight to the mark."[51] He also attributed their technological achievement to the spirit of teamwork and

[50] Elmer A. Sperry, "Some Observations on a Trip to Japan," *Michigan Technic*, XXXVI (1923), p. 5.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

this spirit, in part, to the racial homogeneity of the nation. Sperry greatly admired another characteristic which he believed contributed to their technological progress: the orderliness, self-restraint, and dignity "on every hand."[52] Though no social scientist, Sperry probably perceived far better than most observers the spiritual foundations of technological development.

Sperry thought that the Japanese potential for technological greatness was manifested by their conquest of the natural environment and often referred to the cruel Japanese mountains that dominated the landscape and symbolized for him a hostile nature. These, he thought, had taken a toll for thousands of years, but in response to the challenge, the Japanese had developed techniques that made the environment livable. This capacity carried over into the modern era in which they used modern technology not simply to adapt to nature but to subdue her.[53] "I did not know," Sperry would say, "that 19/20 of the entire surface of Japan was covered with ragged, cruel mountains. . . . The vigor of the ceaseless effort to conquer these barriers has wrought marvels throughout the land and reacted strongly upon the people themselves."[54] These mountains may also have reminded Sperry of the rugged hills of Cortland which he knew as a child.

Baron Vice Admiral Hideo Takeda agreed with Sperry that the mountains had influenced Japanese character. Through his frequent letters to Sperry after the 1922 visit, Takeda deepened and extended the American's understanding of Japan. The two had first become acquainted during World War I, when Takeda, like so many other Japanese engineers, had visited the Sperry plant in Brooklyn. After Takeda's company, the Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Company (*Mitsubishi Zosen Kaisha*), became the licensee for Sperry products in Japan, business problems brought the men in closer contact. During the 1922 visit, Takeda accompanied Sperry on his government-sponsored visit to Korea. An extended correspondence followed and a warm relationship developed.

Takeda interested Sperry and seemed to reflect the strength of developing Japan. Son of a Samurai, he graduated from the Japanese Naval Engineering School in 1883 and then studied for a year in France. He rose to the rank of Vice Admiral of Engineers in 1913 and was decorated for wartime service in the wars with China and Russia. Before retiring in 1918 from active service to become the chairman of the Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Company, and later of the Mitsubishi Electrical Engineering Company, he was the director of the Naval Engineering School. Like most high-ranking naval officers, he spoke and wrote English (the Japanese Army officers used German).

Although mutual business interests were originally the basis for their relationship, Sperry discovered soon that they shared similar values. Their letters, extending over the years from 1922 to 1930, show the similarity of their views.[55] When Takeda praised frugality, simplicity, dignity, and

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[53] EAS to H. Takeda, February 14, 1923 (SP).
[54] Sperry, "Trip to Japan," p. 8.
[55] There are almost 50 long letters in the Takeda-Sperry correspondence.

serenity in mature men, Sperry warmly applauded. Takeda believed that older men, wise from experience, must guide the young, and Sperry wrote of the responsibility to improve and give "uplift." The Admiral lauded studiousness, attentiveness, politeness, courtesy, and unremitting hard work in young men, and Sperry heartily agreed. When Takeda counseled patience and resignation in the face of life's tribulations, Sperry gained strength in a time of personal sorrow. Elmer Sperry did not hesitate to tell his more articulate and philosophical friend Takeda that from him he drew inspiration and counsel. When Takeda asked himself whether he "had not betrayed Truth for the sake of the flesh and the dross of the world," Sperry acknowledged that "the material unfortunately is the realm in which I have my being."[56]

The Takeda-Sperry correspondence continued uninterrupted; Takeda was one of the last persons to whom Sperry wrote before his death. He never lost his admiration for Takeda and Japan but continued to find in both a manifestation and articulation of his own values and objectives. Japan revivified Sperry's youthful vision of America. In the twenties he was disillusioned by many aspects of the American social and political scene, often referring to the demoralizing influences of recent European immigration and holding up Manhattan Island as an example of all that was wrong with America—its loose morals, its alien radicalism, and its social discord and abandonment of the ethics of hard work and frugality.[57] By contrast, he found in the Japanese his own faith that technology would create an ideal world and the willingness, because of this faith, to work unquestioningly for material improvement through engineering and science.

On numerous occasions Sperry translated his attitude toward Japan into action. Besides his willingness to share his experience in technology with them, he contributed financially to the organizations promoting Japanese-American friendship. He often spoke and wrote about Japan, especially for audiences of engineers and industrialists. When the Congress of the United States abrogated the "gentleman's agreement" existing between the two countries, and totally excluded Japanese immigrants in 1924, Sperry wrote to many influential persons in the United States government, hoping to reverse the decision, as well as to his Japanese acquaintances, hoping to soften the blow to their pride. His major contribution toward better relations between Japan and the West was his promotion and organization of the World Engineering Congress held in Japan in the fall of 1929.

As the originator and American organizer of the World Engineering Congress, Sperry established himself as Japan's foremost friend among American engineers. His enthusiastic talks and lectures stimulated an interest that prepared the ground for his proposal for a congress there. After hearing Sperry speak on Japan, Calvin Rice, secretary of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, predicted that every member of the audience would be eager to see Japan's remarkable technological progress. Sperry also

[56] EAS to Takeda February 14, 1923 (SP).
[57] Sperry, "Trip to Japan," p. 7; and *Suffolk County News*, May 10, 1929.

used his influence in several engineering organizations to promote a Japanese congress. With the cooperation of his friend Calvin Rice, he interested past presidents and the council of the ASME in the congress. As a member of the Engineering Foundation, an organization representing the major engineering societies, and as a member of the Division of Engineering and Industrial Research of the National Research Council, Sperry coordinated the interest of the engineering societies. He also used his many close contacts with leaders of the engineering world, such as Herbert Hoover and Thomas Edison. He had similar contacts in Japan.

A Sperry luncheon held early in 1925 at the Engineers Club in New York City for Dr. Masawo Kamo, the president of the Japanese Society of Mechanical Engineers, Calvin Rice, and the past presidents of the ASME, resulted in the formation of an informal ASME committee and a resolution that all of the great engineering societies of America sponsor a congress to be held in Japan within five years. Rice proceeded to enlist the cooperation of the other societies and Sperry, in March 1925, asked Kamo to inaugurate the effort there.[58]

Kamo, a professor of engineering at the Tokyo Imperial University, whom Sperry had met in 1922, was not only president of the Japanese mechanical engineers but also head of the Association for the Promotion of the Industrial Policies (*Kosei Kai*), an organization of several thousand engineers, industrialists, and educators who advised the government. Kamo elicited the aid of Takuma Dan, head of Mitsui and president of the Engineering Club of Japan, Baron Shiba, and others who knew Sperry.[59] These men and the Japanese Society of Engineers—an amalgamated engineering society (*Kogak Kai*)—persuaded the Japanese government to endorse officially and support financially the congress to be held in 1929.

In America, Sperry persuaded Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, to endorse the congress and serve as honorary chairman of the American committee helping organize it. In response to the request for endorsement, Hoover replied succinctly and candidly that although he did not regard "these conferences as having any profound effect on advancing technology," they had other important values; in this case he thought it would be a well-deserved compliment to Japanese progress.[60] Sperry made the most of the support from the world-famous engineer and administrator. Letters were sent out over Hoover's signature inviting eighty-two prominent American engineers and industrialists to serve on the American committee. It was an indication of respect for him and the interest in Japan that eighty accepted, among them Edward Dean Adams, John J. Carty, Howard E. Coffin, Everette DeGolyer, Gano Dunn, W. F. Durand, Thomas A. Edison, John Hays Hammond, Samuel Insull, Dugald C. Jackson, Frank B. Jewett, Arthur E. Kennelly, Charles F. Kettering, Dexter S. Kimball, John W. Lieb, Arthur D. Little, A. A. Michelson, Ralph Modjeski, Robert A. Millikan, William Barclay Parsons, M. I. Pupin, E. Wilbur Rice, Jr., Charles M.

[58] EAS to M. Kamo, March 6, 1925; and cable, March 30, 1925 (SP).
[59] M. Kamo to EAS, April 22, 1925 (SP).
[60] Hoover to Charles F. Rand, May 20, 1925 (SP).

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Schwab, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., Lewis B. Stillwell, Ambrose Swasey, Gerard Swope, D. W. Taylor, Elihu Thomson, and Orville Wright. Most of these men were known personally to Sperry and were among the elite of American engineering in the 1920's. Elmer Sperry was named chairman of the committee; Hoover remained the honorary chairman.

The problems of organization encountered between 1925 and 1929 demanded Sperry's energy during a period when his health was not robust. Besides the many letters written to Americans and Japanese asking their cooperation, there were dinners to be held, funds to be raised, committees to be formed, and a program to be planned. Sperry freely gave his energy. For administrative expenses the Americans turned to private enterprise, a move indicative of the temper of the times. Almost $30,000 was contributed, mostly by large American corporations. Those contributing $1000 were the Sperry Gyroscope Company (the first contributor), Westinghouse Electric Manufacturing Company, Ford Motor Co., General Electric Co., Bethlehem Steel, Baldwin Locomotive Works, and others with interests in Japan. Samuel Insull, the Chicago power and light tycoon, gave $2000, and William S. Barstow, an electrical engineer and utility head, contributed $3000, the largest single contribution.[61]

Sperry wanted the congress to offset the adverse effects of the Japanese Exclusion Act, the small acts of prejudice that Japanese encountered in America, and, more generally, to promote peace and cooperation between America and Japan. He had a deep faith, as did many engineers then, in the ability of engineers to succeed in international relations where politicians failed. Sperry thought that engineers had a common sense, a rational approach, and a language that precluded misunderstanding. The engineer, Sperry predicted, "by his quiet work can be a great factor in bringing nations together." He wrote Takeda that

> it is the engineer, through the fact that he speaks a common language in every tongue and not only has a common understanding but reaches common conclusions that must be looked to to draw the nations closer together; and when the engineers of the world have an appreciative understanding of each other, not only as to their common problems but their methods of solution, then in my judgment a mutual admiration and fondness for each other will spring into being, which no amount of political pressure or the devious ways of so-called diplomacy will ever be able to break through or change.[62]

The Japanese organizers of the congress also saw it as an opportunity to initiate and promote international cooperation and understanding among the engineers of the world, who were "so essential to the advancement of the welfare of mankind."[63] More than this, the Japanese interpreted the presence of the congress in Japan, the first major engineering congress to be held in the Far East, as a recognition of their technological achievement. "Japanese engineers," the official program commented, "have long hoped for and

[61] Maurice Holland to Frank Jewett, February 3, 1930 (SP).
[62] EAS to H. Takeda, April 9, 1929 (SP).
[63] *Program of the World Engineering Congress and World Power Congress* (Tokyo: Kosei-Kai Publishing Office, November 1, 1929), p. 29.

awaited the opportunity for such an international congress . . . and at last their hopes are to be realized."

The Japanese government, the engineering societies, and industry showed in many ways the importance they attached to the congress. Prince Yasuhito of Chichibu, eldest brother of Emperor Hirohito, acted as "patron" for the congress and attended, with his princess, several congress meetings and social occasions. Sperry was given to understand that never before had the royal family taken so deep and active an interest in any civil affair.[64] Sperry's Japanese acquaintances, Takuma Dan, Baron Shiba, and Masawo Kamo, were officers of the congress and helped to organize an unusually large program of 800 technical papers. Sperry found the organization of these sessions by the Japanese "nothing short of marvelous in perfection of every minutest detail." He found the 435 papers presented by the Japanese especially informative and vital and marveled at the ninety-one social events scheduled for the nine-day congress. Although modest, Sperry did not fail to note that he was singled out for honors and recognition by the Japanese before and during the congress. At the dinner given on October 2, 1929, in Washington by the Japanese ambassador for the American delegates to the congress, the ambassador said that Japan was particularly indebted to "Dr. Sperry" who, with his associates, "spared no effort in ensuring the success of the congress." As the head of the American delegation and an honorary vice president of the congress, Sperry gave a short address at the opening ceremony in Tokyo on October 29 and was told that his was the only speech that Prince Chichibu applauded. During a gala festivity at the premier's residence, he was escorted "away from the crowd" to a private reception for a few congress dignitaries and the premier, the prince, and princess. Sitting close to the royal couple and noting that all looked silent and glum, Sperry ventured to strike up a conversation with the princess and "the ice was broken."[65] As toastmaster at the dinner given by the American delegation for their Japanese hosts, he found himself seated at the speakers' table near the royal couple once again. Hearing that the prince was somewhat shy of public occasions and speaking, Sperry told him that he too found public speaking an awful challenge—which, in truth, was somewhat wide of the mark. Of all the festivities, Sperry decided that the dinner given in his honor on November 7, the last evening, the "greatest."[66] The *Mitsui Bussan Kaisha* (the export-import firm of the family), the *Mitsubishi Zosen Kaisha* (Takeda's shipbuilding company), and *Tokyo Keiki Seisakusho* jointly gave the dinner. The Japanese engineering and industrial leaders did not mute their praise of him, "ascribing all manner of virtues to me that we know I do not possess at all." The occasion caused him to write Zula:

I am extremely fond of these marvelous people. I have tried hard to analyze it. It may come from my worshipful attitude towards progress. The job of the engineer is to make progress, and the progress made ever since you and I

[64] EAS to H. W. Moody, February 15, 1913 (SP). This was the official letter-report that EAS sent to all the organizations he represented.
[65] EAS to Zula, November 2, 1929 (SP).
[66] EAS to Zula, November 10, 1929 (SP).

were here before has been so amazing as to almost paralyze one.[67]

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Sperry attributed continuing Japanese progress, in part, to mushrooming Japanese research and development facilities. His appreciation of the importance of industrial research in an industrial economy had been increased by his work for professional engineering organizations. In the twenties, he gave considerable time to engineering societies, which recognized him as a senior statesman of the profession. His association with them, it should be recalled, began during his Chicago days when he helped found the National Electric Light Association and the American Institute of Electrical Engineers. Because the organization of professional engineering in the United States was loose and ill-defined, Sperry's later contributions to the profession can be better understood if the structure of the profession is briefly examined.

No single society represented professional engineers in America. The best-established societies—the civil, mechanical, electrical, and mining and metallurgical engineers—had some claim to speak for the entire profession because of their encompassing scope. These, termed "founder societies," cooperated formally and informally to influence the character of the profession. Because the work done by most engineers was determined by the industrial corporation or the government agency for which they worked, the profession had comparatively little influence in this respect. The professional societies, however, did have more impact on the way in which the work was done. During the twenties, for example, the profession was particularly interested in promoting engineering research.

Sperry, recognized as a pioneer in engineering research and development, was chosen for positions of leadership in two organizations, the Engineering Foundation and the Division of Engineering and Industrial Research of the National Research Council; both were supported by the founder societies to promote research. The Engineering Foundation was founded in 1914 by a grant from Ambrose Swasey, the mechanical engineer and industrialist famous for his machine tools and scientific instruments; its purpose was "the furtherance of research in science and engineering. . . ."[68] Swasey succinctly described it as "a research institution under the direction of the Founder Societies." The Division of Engineering and Industrial Research was formed in 1919, when its parent body the National Research Council was reorganized on a permanent basis to promote scientific research in the national interests.[69]

[67] *Ibid.*

[68] The Engineering Foundation, *Annual Report for the Eighth Year* (New York City, 1923), p. 4; Swasey to W. L. Saunders, March 17, 1925 (copy of letter in files of Engineering Foundation, United Engineering Center, New York, N. Y.)

[69] *A History of the National Research Council* (Washington, D. C., 1933). The purpose of the Engineering and Industrial Research Division was to "encourage, initial, organize, and co-ordinate fundamental and engineering research in the field of industry." For several years, the similarity of purpose of the foundation and the

raw materials were figured. Consequently Japan again saw its import prices diminish, although its manufactures, now more expensive in foreign markets, were rendered less competitive in price. The 1970s produced particularly large Japanese surpluses in Japanese-American trade. Japan was now the largest or second largest trading partner of virtually every country with which it traded. It was investing heavily in other countries, and its manufacturers were building plants throughout the world.

The People's Republic of China was particularly important to Japan's long-range economy, and the Chinese turn from ideological rigidity to pragmatism in the 1970s, after the death of Mao Tse-tung, encouraged increasing numbers of Japanese to seek Chinese markets. In 1978 an eight-year agreement for a total of $20,000,000,000 in industrial contracts was signed with China, and in August Japan and China signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship referred to above.

Within Japanese politics and opinion, the long-standing polarization over Japan's treaty with the United States was made obsolete by these developments. Although opponents of the treaty had long argued that the American tie and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces threatened to cut Japan off from the People's Republic, Peking now saw both that treaty and those forces as constraints against its Soviet rival and no longer criticized them. The Socialist and Communist ideology of class warfare also lost ground in the atmosphere of general affluence, and the overwhelming majority of Japanese showed that they considered themselves to be members of the middle class. Meanwhile the Liberal-Democrats' dominance had been eroded by movements of population that made Japan increasingly urban. As a result, that government's inclination to attempt revision of the constitution of 1947 had only academic interest in a situation in which it required allies in the Diet to maintain its hairline majority.

The late 1970s thus found the Japanese aware that the shibboleths of the postsurrender decades were obsolete. Japan was not poor but wealthy, not weak but a power in the international economy, not isolated but the largest trading partner of almost every country in the world. This awareness was reflected in a surge of introspection in which writers discussed the role for their country and the nature of their society. What remained was a growing consensus around general principles, summed up by Prime Minister Fukuda in 1978: Japan should adhere to its decision not to become a major military power, and should promote friendly cooperation with all nations and work to accept growing responsibility within the international community. Japan remained unusually dependent upon the stability of the world economy, but that stability in turn was more dependent upon the quality of Japanese participation than it had ever been before.

(M.B.J.)

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(Ma.Ka./M.B.J.)

Japan, Sea of

The Sea of Japan is a marginal sea of the western Pacific Ocean, bounded by Japan and the Soviet island of Sakhalin to the east and by the Soviet Union and Korea on the Asian mainland to the west. Its area is 389,100 square miles (1,007,800 square kilometres). It has a mean depth of 4,429 feet (1,350 metres) and a maximum depth of 12,276 feet (3,742 metres).

Physiography and submarine morphology. The sea is almost elliptical, having its major axis from southwest to northeast; to the north it is approximately bounded by latitude 51°45′ N, while to the south it is bounded by a line drawn from the Japanese island of Kyūshū westward through the Gotō-rettō (Gotō Islands) of Japan to the Korean island of Cheju (also known as Quelpart Island) and then northward to the Korean peninsula.

The sea itself lies in a deep basin, separated from the East China Sea to the south by the Tsushima-kaikyō (Tsushima Strait) and Korea Strait and from the Sea of Okhotsk to the north by Sōya-kaikyō (Sōya Strait, or La Pérouse Strait) and Tatar Strait, all of which have sill depths of less than about 700 feet. To the east it is also connected with the Inland Sea of Japan by Kanmon-kaikyō.

Component basins

Underwater, the sea is separated into the Japan Basin (about 9,800 to 11,500 feet deep) to the north, the Yamato Basin (8,200 feet deep) to the southeast, and the Tsushima Basin (6,600 feet deep) to the southwest. While a narrow continental shelf with an average width of about 19 miles fringes Siberia and the Korean peninsula, on the Japanese side of the sea there are wider continental shelves with depths at the edge of between about 430 and 1,300 feet, as well as groups of banks, troughs, and basins lying offshore. The banks lying off the coasts of Japan are divided into groups, which include Okujiri Ridge, Sado Ridge, Hakusan Banks, Wakasa Ridge, and Oki Ridge.

Geology and bottom deposits. Yamato Ridge, which has an average depth of about 1,475 feet (450 metres), consists of granite, rhyolite, andesite, and basalt, with boulders of volcanic rock scattered on the seabed. The top of the Korea Plateau is about 3,000 feet below the surface and has a depression in its central part. Geophysical investigation has revealed that, while Yamato Ridge is of continental origin, the Japan Basin and the Yamato Basin are of oceanic origin.

Bottom deposits in the Sea of Japan indicate that earth-born sediments, such as mud, sand, gravel, and fragments of rock, exist down to depths of 650 to 1,000 feet; hemipelagic sediments (*i.e.*, half of oceanic origin), mainly consisting of blue mud rich in organic matter, are found down to depths of about 1,000 to 2,600 feet; and deeper pelagic sediments, consisting of red mud, are found down to a depth of nearly 13,000 feet.

A number of submarine canyons are found on the continental slope, at depths of more than 6,500 feet on the west side of the basin, while those near the islands of Japan lie at depths of only about 2,600 feet.

Argument over the formation of the Sea of Japan has not yet ended, although there is agreement that the four straits that connect the sea either to the Pacific Ocean or to marginal seas were formed in very recent geological periods. The oldest of these straits are the Tsugaru-kaikyō and Tsushima-kaikyō, whose formation interrupted the migration of elephants into the Japanese islands at the end of the Tertiary Period (about 2,500,000 years ago); the most recent is Sōya-kaikyō, which was formed at the end of the Wisconsin Ice Age (60,000 to 11,000 BP) and which closed the route once used by the mammoths whose fossils have been found in Hokkaidō.

Climate. The Sea of Japan contributes greatly to the mild climate of Japan because of the effect exerted by its relatively warm waters; evaporation is especially noticeable in winter, when an estimated 5,000,000,000 tons of water vapour rise as steam fog near the Polar Front (*i.e.*, the frontier between the cold, dry polar air mass and the warm, moist tropical air mass). From December to March the prevailing northwest monsoon wind carries cold and dry continental polar air masses over the warmer waters of the sea, resulting in persistent precipitation in the form of snow along the mountainous coasts of Japan. In summer the southerly tropical monsoon blows from an area of higher atmospheric pressure over the North Pacific onto the Asian mainland, causing dense fog when its warm and moist winds blow over the cold currents that prevail over the northern part of the sea at that season. The winter monsoon brings rough seas and causes coastal erosion as a result of the heavy surf that breaks along the western coasts of Japan. In summer and fall typhoons occasionally occur.

The northern part of the sea, especially off the Siberian coast as well as in Tatar Strait, freezes in winter; as a result of convection, melted ice feeds the cold currents in that part of the sea in spring and summer.

Hydrography. The waters of the sea generally circulate in a counterclockwise pattern. A striking contrast occurs between the cooler and relatively fresher water in the western part and the warmer and relatively more saline water in the eastern part. A branch of the Kuroshio Current, the Tsushima Current, together with its northern branch, the East Korea Warm Current, flows north, bringing warmer and more saline water, before flowing into the Pacific through the Tsugaru-kaikyō as the Tsugaru Current, as well as into the Sea of Okhotsk through the Sōya-kaikyō as the Sōya Current. Along the coast of the Asian mainland, on the other hand, three cold currents—the Liman, North Korea, and Central (or Mid-) Japan Sea cold currents—bring cooler, relatively fresh, and turbid water southward.

Prevailing currents

Economic resources and resource exploitation. Fisheries and mineral deposits form the main economic resources. Fisheries may be divided into pelagic (oceanic) and demersal (sea-bottom) categories. Pelagic fishes include mackerel, horse mackerel, sardines, anchovies, herring, fishes of the salmon and trout family, sea bream, and squid; the demersal category includes cod, Alaskan pollack (bluefish), and Atka mackerel. Seals and whales are also to be found, as well as such crustaceans as prawns and crabs. The fishing grounds are for the most part on the continental shelves and their adjacent waters, as well as in the Polar Front zone and on the submarine banks.

Herring, sardines, and bluefin tuna have traditionally been caught, but since 1946 the fisheries have been becoming depleted. In the late 1970s squid fishing was being carried on in the central part of the sea, salmon fishing in the shoal areas of the north and southwest, and crustaceans were being caught in the deeper parts.

Mineral resources on or in the sea bottom include magnetite sands as well as natural gas and petroleum deposits off Japan and Sakhalin Island.

Matsue Plain

(Matsue Heiya). Located in northeastern Shimane Prefecture, western Honshū. Situated between Lake Shinji in the west and the lake called Nakaumi in the east, this low-lying plain is formed by sediment from the river Ōhashigawa, which flows between the lakes, and is susceptible to flooding. The major city is Matsue, which covers much of the plain, where numerous industrial development projects are underway. Area: approximately 40 sq km (15 sq mi).

Matsue Shigeyori (1602–1680)

HAIKU poet of the early Edo period. A prosperous Kyōto merchant, he was a major figure in the establishment of haiku as a new, innovative poetic genre independent of the older *renga* (see RENGA AND HAIKAI), showing in this more initiative than his teacher MATSUNAGA TEITOKU, who was more cautious in his approach. He quarreled with his fellow disciple NONOGUCHI RYŪHO over the selection of verses for a proposed Teimon (Teitoku school) anthology, became in turn estranged from Teitoku, and finally published the pioneering haiku anthology *Enokoshū* (1633) on his own. In 1638 he wrote *Kefukigusa,* an extensive guide to the vocabulary, rules, and techniques of haiku which clarified its distinction from *renga* and became a popular sourcebook for practitioners of the art. Through his friendship with NISHIYAMA SŌIN, he even influenced the emergence of the most radical school of haiku, the DANRIN SCHOOL, and it is worth noting that BASHŌ's first verses appeared in an anthology that he compiled in 1664, the *Sayo no Nakayama shū.* A man of strong and independent character, he was the object of criticism from less progressive quarters, but his great role in the early history of haiku is beyond question.

Matsugaoka Bunko

(Matsugaoka Library). Library specializing in collections of ZEN Buddhist classical texts. It was formally established in 1946 by D. T. SUZUKI, the renowned lay Buddhist philosopher, scholar, and author. Matsugaoka is a hill in Kamakura, Kanagawa Prefecture, where the Zen temple Tōkeiji is situated. The library was named by the chief priest of the temple and Suzuki's master, Shaku Sōen (1859–1919), who provided funds for establishing it. In excess of 50,000 volumes, the collections are housed in two reinforced concrete storerooms. Holographic works dating from the time of Shōichi Kokushi (1202–80) and other works considered NATIONAL TREASURES are found here. Suzuki donated a complete set of his own works, which number over 100 titles, to the library, as well as all of his personal property, including his many prizes and medals. The collections of his late wife, Beatrice, are also housed in the library. There is a wealth of material on religion in foreign languages as well.

Theodore F. WELCH

R IV/6

Matsui Sumako (1886–1919)

Japan's first Western-style actress; original name, Kobayashi Masako. Born in Nagano Prefecture into a former *samurai* family. After a brief first marriage, she moved to Tōkyō and married a teacher, Maezawa Seisuke (d 1923). Bored and frustrated, in 1909 she joined the drama group Bungei Kyōkai, led by TSUBOUCHI SHŌYŌ, which was introducing Western theater into Japan. Her husband left her the next year, just around the time she appeared on stage in her first major role, as Ophelia in *Hamlet.* She is probably best remembered for her 1911 portrayal of Nora in Ibsen's *A Doll's House,* which helped fire controversy over the emerging feminist movement in Japan.

Her acting was directed and inspired by Shōyō's protégé SHIMAMURA HŌGETSU, who eventually left his wife and children for her. When their affair became known in 1913, they left the Bungei Kyōkai and started a new drama company, the Geijutsuza, which toured throughout Japan and Manchuria. A recording of Matsui singing "Katusha's Song," from a play based on Tolstoy's *Resurrection,* became extremely popular. She also performed such roles as Anna Karenina, Salome, and Carmen. But apparently she felt unable to continue her career without Hōgetsu: just two months after his death, she committed suicide.

Matsukata fiscal policy

(Matsukata *zaisei*). Policy of retrenchment, deflation, and currency and banking reform adopted by the Meiji government in 1880–81 in response to the severe inflation and paper currency depreciation after 1877. It was largely carried out under Finance Minister MATSUKATA MASAYOSHI from 1881 to 1885. The immediate objective of the policy was to restore the value of paper money and its long-range goal was to establish a unified convertible currency system. These goals were to be achieved by creating a budget surplus with which to redeem inconvertible paper notes and to build up specie reserves, and by founding a central bank, the BANK OF JAPAN. Although it gave rise to a serious depression in the agricultural sector of the economy, the Matsukata fiscal policy brought order to the nation's financial system and set the stage for the rapid growth of modern industry after 1886.

The Financial Crisis of 1878–1880 —— In the years immediately preceding Matsukata's appointment as finance minister in October 1881, the Japanese economy was in the throes of a serious inflation triggered by the huge issue of inconvertible paper currency in 1877 and 1878. The government defrayed the cost of putting down the SATSUMA REBELLION of 1877 by printing ¥27 million in government notes and borrowing ¥15 million from one of the NATIONAL BANKS. Mainly as a result of this, the total issue of government and national bank notes increased by 55 percent between 1876 and 1878. Under the impact of excessive note issue, the economy began to show all the signs of a violent inflation. Prices rose rapidly, with that of rice doubling between 1877 and 1880. Interest rates also climbed, while the market value of government bonds declined. Furthermore, inflation stimulated imports, heightening the foreign trade deficit and accelerating the outflow of specie. The loss of gold and silver coupled with enormous note issues meant a sharp drop in the rate of specie held in reserve. By 1880 the ratio of specie to government and national bank notes had plunged to 4.5 percent. In consequence, the value of paper money fell alarmingly. From 1878 to 1881 government notes depreciated 35 percent relative to silver.

These inflationary trends had a variety of economic repercussions. To rural areas the inflation brought an actual reduction in the tax burden and a corresponding rise in prosperity. Landlords, in particular, received huge windfall profits owing to the combination of an increasing price and a fixed land tax paid in paper money. In the industrial sector, the speculative boom accompanying inflation spawned a number of small-scale enterprises, but key modern industries shared little in this expansion. In fact, the inflationary movement tended to restrict the development of modern industry, as rising interest rates discouraged long-term investment. The Meiji government, however, was hardest hit by the inflation, primarily because of the fixed income from the land tax, which during the years 1878–80 averaged over 70 percent of its total tax revenues. While the real value of its income was falling drastically, the government was receiving an increasingly smaller share of the proceeds from the land. This loss was only aggravated by a reduction in the land tax rate from 3.0 to 2.5 percent in 1877, just before the inflation began.

The Matsukata Reform —— By 1880 government leaders were agreed that they would have to take drastic steps in order to regain control of the financial situation. In May 1880 ŌKUMA SHIGENOBU, who had been finance minister until February of that year, came forward with a radical plan for redeeming the outstanding paper notes by raising a loan of ¥50 million in London. His proposal was defeated for being too risky, and in September 1880 the government decided instead to embark on a program of currency reform through financial retrenchment and increased taxation. Ōkuma and Councillor ITŌ HIROBUMI then jointly hammered out the details of this program. With Ōkuma's ouster from the government in the POLITICAL CRISIS OF 1881, Matsukata replaced SANO TSUNETAMI, Ōkuma's hand-picked successor as finance minister, and proceeded to carry out and extend the new financial program.

The Matsukata fiscal policy was basically a continuation of the policies devised by Ōkuma and Itō. Nevertheless, Ōkuma and Matsukata differed markedly in their views on the proper method of currency reform. Ōkuma called for the immediate recovery of all inconvertible paper money through foreign borrowing or domestic bond issues so that the results of the industrial promotion policy (see SHOKUSAN KŌGYŌ) he had been pursuing since the early 1870s would not be jeopardized. By contrast, Matsukata advocated the gradual withdrawal of inconvertible notes, together with the accumulation of specie, until paper currency was restored to face value, followed by the gradual replacement of the outstanding notes with convertible notes issued by a central bank. Thus, under the Matsukata program, short-run growth was sacrificed for long-term stability, as Matsukata's orthodox policies brought on the economic slowdown that Ōkuma had sought to avoid.

Matsukata fiscal policy

The 1878–1881 Inflation and the Matsukata Deflation

	Inconvertible paper currency in circulation							
	Government paper money (million yen)	National bank notes (million yen)	Total (million yen)	Specie reserve (million yen)	Ratio of government paper money to silver	Tōkyō wholesale price of rice (yen/*koku*)	Wholesale price index (1877=100)	Interest rate (%)
1877	105.8	13.4	119.2	15.1	1.033	5.34	100	10.0
1878	139.4	26.3	165.7	17.8	1.099	6.39	108	10.4
1879	130.3	34.0	164.4	10.0	1.212	7.96	130	12.0
1880	124.9	34.4	159.4	7.2	1.477	10.57	148	13.1
1881	118.9	34.4	153.3	12.7	1.696	10.59	164	14.0
1882	109.4	34.4	143.8	16.7	1.571	8.81	155	10.1
1883	98.0	34.3	132.3	25.9	1.264	6.31	131	7.9
1884	93.4	31.0	124.4	33.6	1.089	5.29	123	10.1
1885	88.3	30.2	118.5	42.3	1.055	6.61	128	11.0

NOTE: The interest rate is the annual average for loans between ¥1,000 and ¥10,000 in Tōkyō.
SOURCE: For columns 1, 2, and 5: Andō Yoshio, ed, *Kindai Nihon keizai shi yōran* (1975). For column 4: Ōishi Kaichirō and Miyamoto Ken'ichi, ed, *Nihon shihon shugi hattatsu shi no kiso chishiki* (1975). For columns 6–8: Henry Rosovsky, "Japan's Transition to Modern Economic Growth, 1868–1885," in Henry Rosovsky, ed, *Industrialization in Two Systems* (1966).

Upon taking office, Matsukata set about restoring the value of paper money by contracting the volume of currency in circulation and building up specie reserves. He continued the program initiated under Sano of cutting administrative expenditures and increasing existing indirect taxes and instituting new ones and began implementing the policy announced in November 1880 of selling off government enterprises (see KAN'EI JIGYŌ HARAISAGE). He thereby generated a budget surplus between 1882 and 1884 of ¥40.1 million, of which a third was used to recover inconvertible paper notes and the rest added to a reserve fund for acquiring specie from abroad in preparation for the resumption of convertibility.

Matsukata's fiscal measures succeeded in reversing the inflationary trends of the 1878–81 period. The tight money policy reduced the quantity of paper money by 23 percent between 1881 and 1885. Aided by a favorable balance of trade and a net inflow of specie, the reserve ratio of notes in circulation rose from 8 to 36 percent during the same years. Through contraction of the money supply and the accumulation of specie, parity between paper and silver was restored by 1886. Matsukata's policies also produced a sharp drop in commodity prices, with the price of rice cut almost in half and the general price level falling by a quarter between 1881 and 1884. Because of the fixed land tax, the deflation resulted in a huge increase in the real value of government revenues.

By 1885 the Matsukata deflationary program had provided the necessary stability for the creation of a unified convertible currency system. The Bank of Japan, established in 1882 as the central bank and given a monopoly of note issue in 1883, began issuing convertible Bank of Japan notes in May 1885. In the meantime, the government had set up a program for the conversion of national banks into ordinary commercial banks and for the gradual liquidation of their inconvertible bank notes. Finally, on 1 January 1886 all government notes became redeemable in silver at the Bank of Japan, marking the culmination of Matsukata's currency and banking reform.

Impact of Matsukata's Policies —— Clearly, Matsukata's policies ended in placing the government on a sound financial basis. In so doing, however, they severely depressed the economy, causing a wave of bankruptcies and forced mergers among the small, speculative ventures that had sprung up during the years of inflation. For example, between 1882 and 1885 the number of joint-stock companies fell from 3,336 to 1,279. Nevertheless, Matsukata's program supplied the requisite financial stability for sustained industrial growth. After 1886 the Japanese economy entered an upswing, as stable prices and relatively low interest rates encouraged business investment and the central bank guaranteed the convertibility of paper currency.

By far the Matsukata deflation hit the agricultural sector the hardest. The combination of falling agricultural prices and increased taxation led to a serious depression in rural areas, although other factors such as the poor harvest of 1884 and the working out of the effects of the LAND TAX REFORM OF 1873–1881 also contributed to agrarian distress. According to one estimate, total land taxes as a proportion of agricultural and forestry income soared from 11.2 percent in 1880 to 15.5 percent in 1882, 20.2 percent in 1883, and 25.0 percent in 1884. Moreover, the price of rice fell more sharply than did the general price level. Increases in indirect taxes added to the growing tax burden, the *sake* excise being raised some 250 percent and the tobacco excise 740 percent between 1880 and 1883. Largely as a result of these trends, between 1883 and 1890 nearly 368,000 peasant proprietors, or something on the order of 10 percent of all independent holders, were dispossessed for failure to pay taxes. An even larger number of farmers lost their holdings through mortgage foreclosure, an estimated one-seventh of total arable land being foreclosed in the years 1884 and 1885 alone. The economic decline of small proprietors is also evidenced by the drop in the number of people eligible to vote in elections for prefectural assemblies. In 1881 roughly 1.8 million people met the voting qualification of paying a land tax of at least ¥5, the amount assessed on 0.79 hectares (1.96 acres) of land. This figure had fallen to about 1.5 million by 1887, a loss of 17 percent in 5 years.

In short, the Matsukata fiscal policy heightened the burden placed on agriculture by the modernization program of the Meiji government. Yet, in terms of its objectives of curbing inflation, of restoring the value of paper money and therefore the real income of the government, and of establishing a unified convertible currency, the policy proved highly successful.

📖 —— Ōishi Kaichirō, " 'Shokusan kōgyō' to 'jiyū minken' no keizai shisō," in Chō Yukio and Sumiya Kazuhiko, ed, *Kindai Nihon keizai shisō shi,* vol 1 (1969). Ōuchi Hyōe and Tsuchiya Takao, ed, *Meiji zenki zaisei keizai shiryō shūsei,* vols 1 and 11 (1931, 1932). Henry Rosovsky, "Japan's Transition to Modern Economic Growth, 1868–1885," in Henry Rosovsky, ed, *Industrialization in Two Systems* (1966). Unno Fukuju, "Matsukata zaisei to jinushisei no keisei," in *Iwanami kōza: Nihon rekishi,* vol 15 (Iwanami Shoten, 1976).

Steven J. ERICSON

Matsukata Masayoshi (1835–1924)

Finance minister, prime minister, and GENRŌ (elder statesman) of the Meiji period (1868–1912). Born 23 March 1835 in Kagoshima, the castle town of the Shimazu domain of Satsuma (now Kagoshima

Prefecture). His father was Matsuda Masaki, the second son of a GŌSHI (farmer-*samurai*) of Taniyama, a village south of Kagoshima. Lacking an inheritance, Masaki entered into trade between Kagoshima and the Satsuma subfief of the Ryūkyū Islands. Ambitious to obtain a samurai education for his sons, Masaki managed to change both his residence and status by becoming the adopted heir of Matsukata Shichiemon, a low-ranking samurai in charge of the production of guns in Kagoshima. Shichiemon was the 29th-generation descendant of a follower of Shimazu Tadahisa, who came to Satsuma from the Kantō area as a Minamoto henchman in the 12th century.

Masayoshi was the ninth child of Matsukata Masaki and his wife Kesako. At the age of 6 he became a member of the Gōjū, a unique Satsuma educational fraternity for samurai boys and young men up to age 25 which was designed to preserve martial spirit and fighting skills even in times of peace. Members led frugal, spartan lives, learning endurance and courage through mountain climbing and war games; they disciplined themselves and each other, practiced the martial arts daily, memorized *kambun* (Chinese) texts, and practiced calligraphy. In the Gōjū, Masayoshi became closely associated with SAIGŌ TAKAMORI and ŌKUBO TOSHIMICHI, eight and five years his senior respectively, who were to become leaders of the MEIJI RESTORATION (1868).

At the age of 13 Matsukata entered the Zōshikan, the domain Confucian academy, where he studied the Chinese classics, the history of Japan and Satsuma, and the martial arts. Here, he was introduced by two progressive teachers to unorthodox ideas outside the Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi) interpretation of Confucianism (SHUSHIGAKU), an event that helped determine the course of his life. These ideas were based on the Wang Yangming interpretation of Confucianism (YŌMEIGAKU), which was banned by the shogunate for its subversive emphasis on loyalty to the emperor as the only true sovereign. At the age of 15 he also started working part-time as a clerk-accountant in the financial office of the domain.

Matsukata came to the attention of his *daimyō*, SHIMAZU NARIAKIRA and became a member of the elite military corps that Nariakira was training for an eventual attack against the Tokugawa shogunate. When Nariakira died suddenly in 1858 SHIMAZU HISAMITSU, his half brother, succeeded him to power (though not to the post of daimyō). Hisamitsu suppressed an attempt to carry out Nariakira's antishogunate plan, which was led by an activist group (the Seichūgumi, "Spirited and Loyal Band") of which Ōkubo was the leader and Matsukata a member.

In 1862 Hisamitsu led Satsuma forces to Kyōto to present his policy for *kōbu gattai* (see MOVEMENT FOR UNION OF COURT AND SHOGUNATE). It was accepted by the court. He then escorted an imperial messenger to Edo to summon the shōgun to Kyōto. Matsukata was in Hisamitsu's entourage, which, on the return journey, encountered a group of four Britishers and killed one of them for supposedly disrespectful behavior (see RICHARDSON AFFAIR). Matsukata was one of the four chief guards of Hisamitsu's palanquin, and in the fray distinguished himself as the only one to remain at his post. From this time he rose rapidly in the Satsuma bureaucracy; he was appointed chief steward *(okonando)*, the highest post an ordinary samurai could occupy, and in 1864 was appointed *giseishogakari*, a member of the policy-making body of the domain.

In 1866, as assistant commissioner for ships in charge of naval vessels, he decided upon a naval career and went to Nagasaki to study Western science, mathematics, and surveying. He also obtained practical naval knowledge from British officers on board warships in the port. His studies were frequently interrupted by trips back to Kagoshima, since Ōkubo and Saigō, who were in Kyōto plotting the overthrow of the shogunate, used him as their liaison with the domain government. In Nagasaki Matsukata was also charged with purchasing ammunition and ships for the coming conflict with the shogunate. At one time he bought the fastest and most modern ship available at great cost, planning to convert it into a warship that he would then command. When the ship was put to other uses, he abandoned all thought of a naval career. Ironically, the ship was converted a few months later into the warship *Kasuga*, which played a major role in a naval engagement off Kōbe in January 1868. Furthermore, naval men from Satsuma went on to become the founders of the modern Japanese navy. At the time of the Restoration Matsukata was still in Nagasaki, and he and a representative from the Tosa domain (now Kōchi Prefecture) took charge of maintaining order in the city, which had been left in turmoil after the flight of the shogunate authorities.

In April 1868, on behalf of the new central government, Ōkubo appointed Matsukata governor of Hita Prefecture, formerly a *tenryō* (shogunal domain) in the western extremity of what is now Ōita Prefecture. His assignment was to collect funds from the rich merchants of this area for the operation of the new government. He raised the enormous sum of 100,000 RYŌ. He established a strong administration in Hita, initiating programs of reforestation, constructing roads and bridges, and increasing food production by the reclamation of wastelands. He also abolished the custom of giving gifts to officials, reduced the social barriers between commoners and officials, and attempted to cut down the high rate of abortion by offering incentives to women to bring their unwanted children to the Yōikukan, an orphanage he had built. While still governor, Matsukata was appointed assistant minister of civil affairs in charge of special assignments. In 1870 he successfully handled the problem arising from Western outrage over the government's harsh treatment of a community of secret Christians (KAKURE KIRISHITAN) newly discovered in the Nagasaki area. He also succeeded in destroying a large-scale counterfeiting operation within the castle premises of the powerful former daimyō of Fukuoka.

Matsukata moved to Tōkyō in 1871 and, with the establishment of the Ministry of Finance, became assistant to ITŌ HIROBUMI, who was in charge of the Land Tax Reform. When Itō went abroad with the IWAKURA MISSION in late 1871, Matsukata succeeded him and worked for the next few years drafting the laws for the Land Tax Reform and supervising their (very difficult) implementation. The reform was of fundamental importance, since it converted the basis of agricultural taxation from a percentage of the annual yield to a fixed tax based on the value of the land. One major purpose was to produce a stable tax yield, on the basis of which the government could develop annual budgets; a secondary purpose was to clarify that landownership rested with the person paying the tax. (See also LAND TAX REFORM OF 1873–1881.)

In 1878 Matsukata made his first trip to Europe as the official Japanese representative to the Paris International Exhibition. He was able to observe first-hand the industrialized countries that Japan was attempting to follow. The diligence with which he studied the financing and organization of the Tobacco Monopoly Bureau in Paris brought him to the attention of the finance minister, Léon Say. Much impressed with Matsukata, Say invited him to occupy a desk in his office during his stay in Paris and instructed him in matters of modern finance. This proved excellent preparation for Matsukata's subsequent service as finance minister, and he later credited Say with the success of his own famous deflationary policies and for the establishment of the BANK OF JAPAN in 1882.

Matsukata replaced ŌKUMA SHIGENOBU as minister of finance in 1881, at a time when the Japanese economy was in critical inflationary trouble. The deflationary measures he undertook during the next few years (see MATSUKATA FISCAL POLICY) were a daring and successful experiment. They established confidence in the currency and financial institutions, thus creating the conditions under which modern economic growth could begin. These achievements marked the apogee of Matsukata's career. When the cabinet system was created by Itō in 1885, Matsukata continued as the first finance minister and served in this post in 7 out of the first 10 cabinets, occupying this critically important position for a total of 18 out of 20 years between 1881 and 1901. In the drafting of the Meiji CONSTITUTION of 1889, his chief contributions were in the articles on finance (arts. 62–72); he was also responsible for the enactment of the Finance Law, which went into effect concurrently with the constitution and became the basis of financial administration. It was also at his insistence that the Chinese indemnity following the SINO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1894–1895 was paid in London and Berlin in British money, thus laying a sound basis for Japan's continued economic growth and permitting the nation to adopt the gold standard in 1897.

By his own admission, Matsukata was never a politician, and he was unable to understand why political parties should be allowed to intefere in government operations. However, as a member of the Satsuma–Chōshū oligarchy (see HAMBATSU), he felt compelled to take his turn as prime minister and contend with the political parties in the Diet. During the first seven cabinets, a pattern was set of alternating between Chōshū (now Yamaguchi Prefecture) and Satsuma men as prime ministers. Since Matsukata's two old associates, Saigō and Ōkubo, were long since dead and the other Satsuma men, including Saigō's younger brother, SAIGŌ TSUGUMICHI, were felt to be unqualified for the post, Matsukata was persuaded to take the position of prime minister. He followed YAMAGATA ARITOMO

of Chōshū from 6 May 1891 to 8 August 1892 and succeeded Itō of Chōshū from 18 September 1896 until 12 January 1898.

Matsukata's first cabinet was initially called the *kuromaku* ("black curtain" or hidden manipulator) cabinet, because the other members of the cabinet were secondary figures and he had accepted only on the premise that the de facto leaders would help him from behind the scenes. But the cabinet soon became known as the "catastrophe cabinet," when an attempt was made on the life of the visiting crown prince of Russia (later Tsar Nicholas II)—almost causing a grave international crisis—and a devastating earthquake hit Aichi and Gifu prefectures in the autumn of 1891. Matsukata's first term of office is best remembered for his dissolution of the lower house of the Diet when it refused to pass his budget and the infamous second general election of 15 February 1892, in which Home Minister SHINAGAWA YAJIRŌ, a Chōshū henchman of the Yamagata clique over whom Matsukata had little control, carried out a campaign of bribery and harassment of opposition politicians in an unsuccessful effort to win a majority of government supporters in the Diet. During Matsukata's second cabinet, he proved somewhat more flexible in dealing with the Diet. Following Itō's lead in taking the party leader ITAGAKI TAISUKE into the preceding cabinet as home minister, Matsukata took the other party leader, Ōkuma, into his cabinet as minister of foreign affairs and thereby obtained enough support in the Diet to avoid dissolving it again.

Matsukata retired from active government service in 1901, but he continued to be widely consulted and to exert considerable influence. In 1898 he had been named an elder statesman *(genrō),* and after Yamagata's death in 1922 he was briefly the only survivor of this group, playing the role of selector of the prime minister on the emperor's behalf. In 1883 he had been made a count, and in 1905 he was promoted to marquis in recognition of his financial services during the RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904–05). Finally in 1922, when he retired from the largely honorary post of lord keeper of the privy seal *(naidaijin),* which he had held since 1917, he was given the highest noble rank of prince. He served from 1903 to 1912 as president of the International Red Cross of Japan. Matsukata died on 2 July 1924, at the age of 89, after being injured in the great Tōkyō Earthquake of 1 September 1923.

Matsukata did not read English or any other Western language, but he was a great reader in translation of Western books, journals, and newspapers. He also invited many Westerners to his home in Mita in Tōkyō. From early in his career he was deeply concerned with foreign policy and, beginning in 1869, presented many memorials on diplomatic matters, treaty revision, and Japan's relations with China and the countries of the West. Matsukata was a man of few words and disliked competitive games, but he loved the outdoors, taking pleasure in horticulture, agricultural experiments, and raising sheep and horses. His wife Masako raised 19 children, 9 of them the offspring of concubines. Several of these children had important careers in industry, banking, and diplomacy.

——Matsukata Masayoshi, *Report of the Adoption of the Gold Standard in Japan* (1899). Matsukata Masayoshi, *Report of the Post Bellum Financial Administration in Japan* (1901). Fujimura Tōru, *Matsukata Masayoshi: Nihon zaisei no paioniya* (1929). Fukai Eigo, *Jimbutsu to shisō* (1939). Fukai Eigo, *Kaihō nanajūnen* (1941). George Marvin, "The Alexander Hamilton of Japan," *Asia* (January 1925). Tokutomi Iichirō, ed, *Kōshaku Matsukata Masayoshi den,* 2 vols (1935). Tsuchiya Takeo, *Nihon shihon shugi no shidōshatachi* (1940).

Haru REISCHAUER

Matsukawa Incident

A controversial criminal incident of the OCCUPATION period. On 17 August 1949, while Japan was still under military occupation by the United States following World War II, a mixed passenger and freight train of the Japanese National Railways was sabotaged and overturned near the village of Matsukawa in Fukushima Prefecture. Three crew members were killed. The Japanese government subsequently arrested and charged with the crime 20 Japanese citizens, 19 men and 1 woman, all of them leaders or members of either the National Railway Workers' Union (NRWU) or the Tōshiba Electric Company's Matsukawa factory union, and all but one of them members of the Japan Communist Party. These defendants were subsequently tried in the courts five times—once before the Fukushima District Court, twice before the Sendai High Court, and twice before the Supreme Court of Japan. On 8 August 1961 the Sendai High Court found all of them not guility, and on 12 September 1963 the Supreme Court upheld this verdict. On 1 August 1970 the Tōkyō High Court awarded damages to the Matsukawa defendants and their families and ordered the government to pay them ¥76,259,833 (US $212,927), the largest settlement against the state ever awarded in modern Japan. The Matsukawa Incident and subsequent trials is the most famous and one of the most controversial criminal law cases of postwar Japan.

The train sabotage incident was the most important outbreak of violence in opposition to the American Occupation's so-called reverse course. Until 1948 Occupation policy emphasized the "democratization" of the defeated country, but with the onset of the cold war and the revolutionary successes of the Chinese communists, the Americans altered their basic goals. In place of political reform, they gave first priority to rehabilitating the Japanese economy. The Americans did not reverse their democratic innovations, but they moved to curtail the communist domination of the trade unions. These unions had been created by the Occupation authorities themselves in the immediate postwar period, but they and many Japanese now felt that the communists had taken them over and were using them for revolutionary rather than economic purposes.

The largest union in the country was the NRWU. In 1949 the supreme commander of the Allied powers (SCAP) ordered some 97,000 national railway workers dismissed from their jobs in order to reduce featherbedding and to balance the national budget as part of a scheme to bring inflation under control. These measures were part of the DODGE LINE, named after Joseph M. Dodge, an American banker sent to Tōkyō in February 1949 to establish basic policies for the economic rehabilitation of Japan.

Communist-dominated sections of the NRWU as well as communist-dominated unions in private industry, such as that of the Tōshiba Electric Company, retaliated against the Dodge Line with strikes, demonstrations, petitions, and other legal measures. The government charged in court that communist unions had also resorted to terrorist acts, including the MITAKA INCIDENT, the SHIMOYAMA INCIDENT, and, most serious, the Matsukawa Incident. Charges of communist terrorism were never sustained by the courts.

The initial trial of the defendants indicted for the Matsukawa sabotage was the first important capital case brought under the new Occupation-inspired Code of Criminal Procedure. This law sought to introduce Anglo-American adversary procedures into Japan's essentially indigenous and continental European legal heritage. The trial and appeals turned into a muddle of challenged evidence, revolving above all around the use of confessions in Japanese criminal law. (Eight of the defendants had confessed to the crime.)

Advocates of judicial reform and of civil liberties like the prominent novelist HIROTSU KAZUO took up the cause of the Matsukawa defendants and argued in public that they were not receiving fair trials or, more serious, that they were victims of a police frame-up. The case became a major cause célèbre among Tōkyō's leftist intellectuals during the 1950s. Their extensive publishing activities gave to the Matsukawa case a significance for the democratization of Japan and for the postwar political education of the Japanese public that went beyond the fate of the defendants.

During the 1960s various writers sensationalized the case, suggesting that the sabotage was actually caused by the American Occupation authorities in order to discredit the communist trade union movement. The novelist MATSUMOTO SEICHŌ is the best-known advocate of the American conspiracy theory. Although the statute of limitations covering the Matsukawa case has precluded further prosecution, there are no untried suspects, and the case remains formally unsolved.

——Hirotsu Kazuo, *Matsukawa jiken to saiban* (1964). Chalmers Johnson, *Conspiracy at Matsukawa* (1972). Matsukawa Undō Shi Hensan Iinkai, ed, *Matsukawa undō zenshi* (1965). Matsumoto Seichō, *Nihon no kuroi kiri* (1962).

Chalmers JOHNSON

Matsukura Shigemasa (d 1630)

Daimyō of the early part of the Edo period (1600–1868). A hereditary vassal of the Tsutsui family (see TSUTSUI JUNKEI) of Yamato and Iga provinces (now Nara Prefecture and part of Mie Prefecture respectively), Shigemasa distinguished himself on the Tokugawa side at the Battle of SEKIGAHARA, and upon the disgrace of his master, Tsutsui Sadatsugu (1562–1615), in 1608 was accordingly made lord of a 10,000-*koku* (see KOKUDAKA) domain at Futami Gojō (now the city of Gojō) in Yamato. In 1616 he was promoted to a 40,000-*koku* domain at Shimabara in Hizen Province (now Nagasaki Prefecture), a region Christianized under its previous lords, the Arima (see ARIMA HARUNOBU). Initially lenient toward the Christian popula-

Tokugawa shogunate (1603–1867), which continued its major policies. In Japanese institutional history, the emergence of this regime marked the transition from the medieval period to the early modern age. The Shokuhō regime brought about the reconstruction of Japan's body politic after the collapse of its central organs in the Sengoku period (1467–1568). Under it, local barons were forced to submit to the national hegemon, the status of the *samurai* class and of the peasantry was redefined, and the country's economic base was reorganized through cadastral surveys (KENCHI). These effects are generally viewed as positive by Western historians, although Japanese scholars tend to emphasize the regime's brutal and authoritarian aspects. See also HISTORY OF JAPAN: Azuchi-Momoyama history. *George* ELISON

shokunin

(artisans). A general term for makers of traditional handicrafts. Around the 8th century the construction, metalwork, and weaving needs of the state were handled by offices called *shiki*. From the 9th to the 12th century, throughout the country, groups of skilled workmen (also called *shiki*) were attached to estates (SHŌEN) under the control of court nobles and powerful temples. When the word *shokunin* came into general use, it referred not only to handcraftsmen but to entertainers and peddlers as well. Although the meaning of the word *shokunin* narrowed with the expansion of commercial activities, the types and number of *shokunin* increased; the Edo period (1600–1868) was the golden age of handcraft production. In the ranking of classes at this time *shokunin* fell below *samurai* and peasants, but above merchants (see SHI-NŌ-KŌ-SHŌ). Following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, mechanized factory production became widespread, with the result that many handcraftsmen became factory laborers.

In the past, master craftsmen were organized into a type of guild. The usual procedure was to become apprenticed to a master at age 12 or 13, learn the skill until about age 20, and spend a year working for, or sometimes with, one's masfer in gratitude and as repayment (called *orei bōkō*), before becoming an independent, full-fledged *shokunin* (see also APPRENTICE SYSTEM).

Today there are virtually no guilds, and competition is open. Although *shokunin* still work in fields such as carpentry, joinery, metalworking, woodworking, pottery, and lacquer art, their number is now very small. The Japanese government has begun to designate and protect both traditional handicrafts and those who possess traditional technical skills, but the lack of young people who might succeed these *shokunin* threatens the survival of traditional crafts. See also LIVING NATIONAL TREASURES. MURAMATSU *Teijirō*

Shokuryō Mēdē

(Food May Day). Popular name for Shokuryō Kiki Toppa Jimmin Taikai (People's Meeting to Overcome the Food Crisis). Also known as Kome Yokose Mēdē ("Give Us Rice" May Day). A demonstration in front of the Imperial Palace in Tōkyō on 19 May 1946 that was organized by leaders of groups participating in May Day celebrations. Three hundred thousand people marched in what was the culmination of a series of nationwide demonstrations for food, the shortage of which had plagued Japan since the end of World War II. Resolutions were passed calling for the formation of a democratic popular front and the dissolution of the government. This demonstration, which occurred in the midst of a serious political crisis, was considered a threat to the democratic government and to law and order by the Occupation authorities (see SCAP) and on the following day General Douglas MacArthur issued a warning against future disorderly mob demonstrations.

Some of the demonstrators, members of the Communist Party, carried a placard saying "I, the Emperor, have eaten my fill, but you subjects can starve to death." As a result, one person was arrested and charged with LESE MAJESTY *(fukeizai)*, but Occupation authorities declared that the emperor was not entitled to special protection, and the charge was changed to simple libel. The person arrested was sentenced to prison for eight months but was pardoned and released three days later, and lese majesty became in effect null and void as a criminal offense in Japan. Lese majesty was not included as a crime when the Penal Code was revised in October 1947.

Shokusan Jūtaku Sōgo Co, Ltd

A construction company specializing in building houses, stores, and apartment houses to order by standard construction methods, Shokusan Jūtaku was established in 1950. It has grown rapidly, owing in large part to its method of taking payment for its construction work in monthly installments, and has come to boast the largest sales of individual homes in the country. In recent years the company has entered the real estate business through subsidiary firms. Sales for the fiscal year ending March 1982 totaled ¥146.6 billion (US $609 million), of which construction accounted for 71 percent, sales of goods 13 percent, and real estate 16 percent; capitalization stood at ¥7 billion (US $29.1 million) in the same year. Corporate headquarters are located in Tōkyō.

shokusan kōgyō

("Increase Production and Promote Industry"). Government policy of the early part of the Meiji period (1868–1912) to foster industries in order to realize the ideal of a "rich country and strong military" (FUKOKU KYŌHEI). The Ministry of Public Works (Kōbushō) was established in 1870, and the Home Ministry (Naimushō) in 1873, to organize industrialization. The two ministries were responsible for introducing modern technology from abroad, constructing railways, and supervising mining and other government enterprises. They also founded model factories for cotton-spinning and silk-reeling (see GOVERNMENT-OPERATED FACTORIES, MEIJI PERIOD), and emphasized the modernization of marine transport, agriculture, and other areas. Under the direction of ITŌ HIROBUMI, who became minister of public works in 1873, the policy produced positive results, but many of the government-operated enterprises encountered financial difficulties, and the government was forced to sell them to private entrepreneurs (see KAN'EI JIGYŌ HARAISAGE).

Shokushi, Princess → Shikishi, Princess

Shōmei Incident

(Shōmei Jiken; "Incident of the Bell Inscription"). The *casus belli* of the outbreak of hostilities between TOKUGAWA IEYASU and TOYOTOMI HIDEYORI in 1614. Hideyori had that year finished rebuilding the Hōkōji, a temple in Kyōto founded in 1588 by his father, the great national unifier TOYOTOMI HIDEYOSHI, and destroyed by an earthquake in 1596. The inscription on the bell commissioned for the rededication contained a phrase in which the two Chinese characters composing the name Ieyasu were split by a third; moreover, the characters of one couplet could, with some sophistry, be rearranged to read, "Make Toyotomi your lord and look forward to your progeny's prosperity." The authorities consulted by Ieyasu, notably the Neo-Confucian scholar HAYASHI RAZAN, interpreted these as imprecations to overthrow the Tokugawa, and Ieyasu seized this excuse to demand Hideyori's submission. When his ultimatum was rejected, Ieyasu mounted the massive campaign that resulted the next year in the destruction of Hideyori's Ōsaka Castle and the fall of the Toyotomi (see ŌSAKA CASTLE, SIEGES OF). That Ieyasu himself knew his justification for war to be specious is evident, for the bell was not destroyed and is still on view in Kyōto. *George* ELISON

Shōmonki

(Record of Masakado). Also known as *Masakadoki*. Considered the prototype of GUNKI MONOGATARI, or war tales, it was written by an unknown author after TAIRA NO MASAKADO's death in the mid-10th century. Written in the heavily Japanized form of Chinese known as HENTAI KAMBUN, the tale follows the life of Masakado through the Jōhei and Tengyō rebellions. The only extant manuscripts are the version dated 1099, found in the temple Shimpukuji in Nagoya, and that in the Katakura Takeo collection in Tōkyō (formerly in the Yang Shoujing [Yang Shou-ching] library).

——*Shōmonki*, tr Giuliana Stramigioli as *Masakadoki* in *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 53 1–2 (Università di Roma, 1979). Hayashi Rokurō, *Kōchū Masakadoki* (1975). Kajihara Masaaki, *Yakuchū Masakadoki*, 2 vols (1975–76). *Giuliana* STRAMIGIOLI

shōmono

A general term for Muromachi-period (1333–1568) commentaries on the classic texts of Buddhism, Confucianism, Chinese medicine, earlier Japanese literature, and so forth, by masters in these various fields. These commentaries typically consist of either notes made by

government by public discussion was used by advocates of the FREEDOM AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT to hasten its implementation.
M. William STEELE

kōgō

Nonreigning empress (a reigning empress being called *tennō*). The title *kōgō* was reserved for the principal consort of an emperor, that is, the one who gave birth to the heir apparent. According to the RITSURYŌ SYSTEM, only women of imperial blood were eligible for that honor; but in 729 FUJIWARA NO FUHITO's daughter became *kōgō* to Emperor SHŌMU (see KŌMYŌ, EMPRESS) and the first of many Fujiwara empresses. The codes had established an office called Chūgūshiki to serve the needs of the *kōgō*, but Shōmu set up the separate office Kōgōgūshiki for Empress Kōmyō, while the Chūgūshiki continued to serve his mother, the empress dowager. When Emperor ICHIJŌ in 1000 initiated the practice of having two empresses at once—one called *kōgō*, the other CHŪGŪ—these offices became permanent. In forms of address, honorific terms, and general deference, the *kōgō* was equal to the sovereign. The title *kōgō* was sometimes conferred as an honorary one, for example, on the wife of a deceased crown prince or on a woman (usually an imperial princess) who had given birth to an heir apparent. The title is still in use today; under the IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD LAW, the wife of the crown prince automatically assumes it on the death of the emperor.
G. Cameron HURST *III*

kōgoishi

Stone fortifications of the 6th century ringing the summits of mountains in northern Kyūshū and the extreme western coast of the Inland Sea; probably built in anticipation of invasions from Korea. Called *kōgoishi* ("divine protection stones") by the archaeologist TSUBOI SHŌGORŌ, who thought they were some sort of religious sanctuaries, they are distinguished from mountain fortifications like ITOJŌ, Ōnojō, and Kiijō (all defensive outposts of DAZAIFU) by walls of cut stone as much as 3 kilometers (1.9 mi) in length. Eight *kōgoishi* have been found, of which the best examples are at Zoyama, Kōrasan, Kagenoma, and Goshogatani, all in Fukuoka Prefecture.
——Onoyama Setsu, *Kofun to kokka no naritachi,* vol 6 of *Kodaishi hakkutsu* (1975).
J. Edward KIDDER, *Jr.*

Kōgon, Emperor (1313–1364)

The first sovereign *(tennō)* of the Northern Court; reigned 1331–33. Eldest son of the retired emperor Go-Fushimi (1288–1336; r 1298–1301). As a member of the Jimyōin line of the imperial family, Kōgon became crown prince under Emperor GO-DAIGO of the rival Daikakuji line in accordance with the Kamakura shogunate's policy of alternating members of the two lines on the throne. He became emperor in 1331, after the ambitious Go-Daigo, who had attempted a coup against the shogunate, was sent into exile (see GENKŌ INCIDENT). Two years later, however, Kōgon was forced to abdicate when Go-Daigo succeeded in overthrowing the shogunate and restoring direct imperial rule (see KEMMU RESTORATION). Go-Daigo's rule, in turn, quickly came to an end in 1336, when the military commander ASHIKAGA TAKAUJI revolted and established the Muromachi shogunate, placing Emperor Kōmyō (1322–80; r 1336–48), Kōgon's brother, on the throne. Go-Daigo took refuge in Yoshino (now in Nara Prefecture) and set up a separate court, referred to as the Southern Court in distinction to the Northern Court in Kyōto (see NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN COURTS). Kōgon, as retired emperor, headed the cloister government of the Northern Court for the next 15 years. He is known as a co-compiler of the poetry anthology *Fūga wakashū* (1346).

Kōgonen-jaku

(Register of the Kōgo Year). A set of household registers compiled in the year corresponding to 670, designated *kōgo* in the sexagenary cycle. Although it is no longer extant, several references to it appear in such historical sources as the *Shoku nihongi* (797) and the SHINSEN SHŌJIROKU (815). Although registers had been compiled every six years since the time of the TAIKA REFORM (645), the Kōgonen-jaku is believed to have represented the first such undertaking of nationwide scope. It listed the name and official rank-title of each household, as well as the status of each household member, including servants. While other registers were normally destroyed after 30 years, the Kōgonen-jaku remained in use until the middle of the Heian period (794–1185) as a basic reference for verifying the antiquity of a family's social pedigree.
Michiko Y. AOKI

Kogosho Kaigi

(Kogosho Conference). The first meeting of the leaders of the new Meiji government, held in the Kogosho, part of the Imperial Palace in Kyōto, on 3 January 1868, the day of the coup d'etat that restored imperial rule (ŌSEI FUKKO). A number of court nobles, major *daimyō*, and other political activists met in the presence of Emperor Meiji to decide the future political status of the Tokugawa shōgun. A compromise faction led by YAMANOUCHI TOYOSHIGE, GOTŌ SHŌJIRŌ, and MATSUDAIRA YOSHINAGA urged that the shōgun, TOKUGAWA YOSHINOBU, should be included in the new government and tried to arrange for him to participate in the meeting. However, IWAKURA TOMOMI, ŌKUBO TOSHIMICHI, and others who had long plotted the overthrow of the shogunate refused to allow Yoshinobu to attend. Moreover, they succeeded in persuading the compromise faction that Yoshinobu must be ordered to resign all offices (he had formally returned his mandate to the emperor the previous November [TAISEI HŌKAN] but still held the court title inner minister *[naidaijin]*), surrender his domains to the emperor, and apologize for his lack of leadership. The intransigence of Ōkubo and Iwakura resulted in the BOSHIN CIVIL WAR.

Kogo shūi

Historical work compiled in 807 by Imbe no Hironari. The book is a collection of myths and legends dating back to the time before the reign of Emperor Jimmu, and transmitted orally through the descendants of the IMBE FAMILY. It contains material not found in the KOJIKI and NIHON SHOKI, the oldest extant histories of Japan, as well as references to the achievements of the Imbe family.
ASAI *Kiyoshi*

Koguryŏ

(J: Kōkuri). One of Korea's three ancient kingdoms (see KOREAN THREE KINGDOMS PERIOD) that emerged with the demise of Han Chinese colonies in the peninsula (see LELANG [Lolang]). Formed by tribes in southern Manchuria between 37 BC and 19 BC, Koguryŏ dominated the northern two-thirds of Korea from AD 313 until overwhelmed by the southeastern Korean kingdom of SILLA and Tang (T'ang) Chinese forces in 668. As a result, Japan, which had earlier sent a naval force to help PAEKCHE against Silla and China (see HAKUSUKINOE, BATTLE OF), lost whatever influence it had on the Korean peninsula.
C. Kenneth QUINONES

Kōgyō iken

(Opinions on Promoting Industry). Record of industrial production of the first 17 years of the Meiji period (1868–1912). Commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, the editor, Maeda Masana (1850–1921), traveled throughout Japan to gather data. Of the total of 30 volumes completed in 1884, 14 outline policy for the promotion of industry and 16 consist of regional reports. Copies were distributed to prefectural governors. The *Kōgyō iken* is invaluable for its information on economic conditions of the early Meiji period.

Kōgyoku, Empress → Saimei, Empress

Koichijō In (994–1051)

Alternative name of Prince Atsuakira, eldest son of Emperor SANJŌ (r 1011–16) and Fujiwara no Ishi. In 1016 he was named heir apparent to Emperor GO-ICHIJŌ (r 1016–36). But Fujiwara no Shōshi (JŌTŌ MON'IN), consort of Go-Ichijō and daughter of the powerful regent *(sesshō)* FUJIWARA NO MICHINAGA, had given birth to a son, later Emperor Go-Suzaku (1009–45; r 1036–45), whom Michinaga wished to make heir apparent; and Atsuakira abdicated his position under great pressure in 1017. Michinaga treated Atsuakira generously thereafter: he was granted the palace Koichijō In, from which he took his name, and was treated like a retired emperor, enjoying great prestige and substantial wealth—notably tracts of land that

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

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序言

易ヲ去テ難ニ就クハ男子本来ノ真面目ニシテ死ニ臨ンテ心ニ悔ユル所ナク従容命ヲ終ル其快實ニ想フヘシ之ニ反シ難ヲ避ケ安ヲ偷ミ曾テ事ニ當テ全力ヲ盡スノ勇ナク苟且日月ヲ送過スルモノ其終ニ臨ンテ生平ヲ追思スレハ轉タ慚愧ニ堪ヘサルモノアラン其不快果シテ如何ソヤ

吾人カ日本國民トシテ向フヘキ針路ノ在ル所ニ著目シ相率ヒ相誘ヒ我國千歳ノ為ニ良習慣ノ紀元ヲ立ルト否トハ實ニ此ノ明治二十五年ニ在リ志士ハ非常ノ勇断ト果決ヲ要ス若シ躊躇ニシテ私情ノ羈絆ヲ絶ツコト能ハス或ハ騎虎ノ勢ヲ制スルコト能ハス一時ノ毀誉褒貶ニ區々タルカ如キアラハ國家将来ノ大計ヲ誤ラン

日本男子カ一身ヲ委ネテ國家ノ犠牲ニ供スヘキハ實ニ今日ニ在リ宜ク大ハ國家ノ為メ小ハ一家子孫ノ為メ各自其誠ヲ致シ其力ヲ尽シ彼岸ニ達スルノ勇ヲ鼓舞セサルヘカラス

近年愛國ノ士國ノ為メニ計レルコト尠カラス然レトモ今其結果ヲ察スルニ曾テ事ノ如何ヲ問ハス只人ノ如何ヲ問フテ之ニ抗抵シ之

ニ雷同セルノ跡アリ及目軋轢之カ為メニ假令一二得ル所アルモ復タ以テ其失ヲ償フニ足ラサルナリ夫レ兄弟牆ニ鬩ク就テ之ヲ問ヘハ各々其理由ナキニアラス然レトモ其本ヲ推セハ多クハ一時ノ感情ニ出ルニ外ナラス永ク此悪習ヲシテ吾人ノ子孫ニ遺傳セシメント欲スルカ何ソ其外侮ヲ顧ミサル何ソ其将来ヲ慮ラサルヤ

今ノ志士朝野何レノ地ニ在ルヲ問ハス若シ能ク人ヲ目的トセス己レノ良心ヲ目的トシ人ノ如何ヲ問ハス物ノ如何ヲ問ヒ僥倖ノ念ヲ断チ情實ノ弊ヲ去リ各自猛省スル所アラハ大ニ曉覺スル所アラン

現今ノ情勢ニ就キ詳細ニ之ヲ論シ来レハ言フヘキノ事固ヨリ一二ニシテ止ラス己名夙ニ殖産ヲ以テ生涯ノ事業トナシ身以テ之ニ

當リ曾テ其他ニ論及スルヲ期セサリシナリ而シテ今ヤ人心擾々業務ニ安ンセサルノ跡アリ我國民如此ニシテ其向フ所ヲ覺ラサレハ國家富強ノ事得テ望ムヘカラス今時勢ノ必要ニ迫ラレ終ニ殖産以外ニ論及シ世人ノ反省ヲ求メサルヲ得サルニ至レリ讀者幸ニ諒察スル所アレ

明治二十五年二月紀元節祝日　前田正名述

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Debts, burden, savings, clothing, food, housing

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明治廿五年三月廿二日印刷
同　年同月廿三日出版
同　年九月二　日再版

（正價金貳拾錢）

版權所有

編輯兼發行者　鹿兒島縣士族　前田正名
東京市麴町區下二番町三十八番地寄留

印刷者　東京府士族　川田幹一
東京市麴町區有樂町三丁目一番地

印刷所　忠愛社
東京市京橋區八官町十九番地

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本書製本ニ用ヒタル紙種ハ高知縣下長岡郡十市村弘光兼次郎ノ所製ニシテ其原料ハ三椏皮ナリ從來該縣下ハ最モ楮皮製ノ紙類ヲ產出シ來リシモ明治十六七年ノ頃ニ至リ仝人熱心改良シテ製出セル改良半紙ナリト云フ近來製紙ノ進歩稍ヤ見ルベキモノアリ爲メニ一言ヲ附記ス

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人物叢書

Maeda Masana

前田正名

まえだまさな

祖田 修

(~~MAEDA MASANA~~
~~TSUCHI NO IJIN SOSHO~~)
~~1943, 269p.~~
328+

Japan History Society.

日本歴史学会 編集
吉川弘文館 発行 (Publishers)

Japanese Historical Society
(Committee)

行脚姿の前田正名　（明治27年）

42442

『興業意見』を中心とする前田正名関係文書
（国会図書館所蔵）

前田が一時ひきこもった宮崎県庄内の家（現存）

はしがき

前田正名はこれまで明治一七年の『興業意見』編纂者として知られている。そして一般には『興業意見』はその後の殖産興業政策の基本となったとされ、あるいは前田自身はかなり保守的な思想家であった、と見られてきた。しかし『興業意見』の成立過程を見ると、単純に前田を保守的と片づけ、『興業意見』を殖産興業政策のバイブルとしてすますには、あまりにも重要な問題が内包されているのである。

前田在官中の『興業意見』、「農工商調査」の内容や主張を仔細に検討し、在野中の、いわゆる「前田行脚」による地方産業振興運動、農村計画運動などの実践活動を見るとき、前田は近代日本経済史上独特の光彩を放つ存在であることが、最近ようやく明確になってきた。幸いにして、これらに関するいくつかの貴重な論文が発表されたが、前田正名の生

涯と業績の全貌を学問的・体系的に明らかにすべき要請は、ますます高まっていたのである。

　これまで前田の事蹟を述べたものはいくつかあるが、いずれも小さなパンフレット程度のものである。今野賢三はかなりの資料に依拠して『前田正名』『開田の光』を著わしたが、いずれも小説形式を取り、単に前田礼讃の域を脱していない。右のような次第で、未熟には相違ないが、ともかく本書を世に送ることができたのは、私にとって大きな喜びである。

　ところで前田の生涯は、在官時代と在野時代に大きく二分して考えることができる。前田は明治二三年までの在官中に、『興業意見』や「農工商調査」など膨大な調査に基づく政策構想を提示した。『興業意見』は松方デフレ下に呻吟する人民と地方農工商業の没落の様を克明に描き出している。前田の基本的立場は、人民の悲惨の救済と、先進諸外国にせまる経済近代化の達成という、困難な二律背反的課題を同時的に実現しようと腐心した

点にある。こうして前田は、生糸・茶・織物など当時の輸出部門を中核とする地方産業の優先的近代化を主張し、漸次近代的大工業におよぶ漸進的・段階的発展の政策構想を詳細に示した。

　しかしこの構想は、特権政商資本を担い手とする移植大工業中心策を取る、松方正義ら政府主流によって否定された。野に下った前田は猛然として、地方諸産業を組織化し、その振興と改良、そのための近代的諸制度・法律・施設の実現に邁進し、彼が没する日まで地方産業近代化に献身した。

　後進の日本資本主義は、欧米先進資本主義国に比べ、どうしても政策主導型の展開を余儀なくされた。とくに明治一四年以降の松方デフレをはじめとする政策過程は、日本資本主義の構造を方向づける重要な意義をもった。それは大まかに言えば、近代的移植大工業と在来産業の対立・拮抗を軸とし、前者に優先的な道を拓くものであった。国家財政は在来産業から吸収した資本を移植大工業育成のために流すパイプとして作用し、在来産業の

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三善清行 所功（157）二七四頁
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IMANO, KENZŌ

MAEDA MASANA

TSUCHI NO IJIN
SOSHO (1943, 249p)

前田正名

Madeda Masana

今野賢三著

土の偉人叢書 Series

新潮社出版 Publisher

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時の涙

一

「どうやら小倉までは來たぞ。つかれたらうが宿屋はもうすこし……がまんさつしやい。」

「いや、つかれてはをりませぬ。」

「だいぶ足がおもいやうだ。」

「ちつとも。」

「がまんづよい。」

「まだ〱、五六里は大丈夫でござす。」

前を行く青年の元氣な言葉に、うしろの二人は聲をあげて笑つた。その二人といふのは、岸良彦七と平田平六であつた。前の青年は急に肩をゆすぶりながら歩調をはやめた。

「どこまで負けをしみがつよいか。」

岸良と平田は微笑の眼を見かはしてさゝやき合つた。

慶應二年、六月はじめの暑い一日であつた。

三人はこゝまで來る途中の混雜にだけでも疲れなければならなかつた。戰雲がみなぎつてゐるといふ言葉どほり、せまい道に馱馬がつゞき、兵士があふれてゐた。駈けぬける飛脚、町人、農民などがもみあひながらすれちがひ、砂塵を蹴あげてはゆきすぎた。青空も、太陽も、その砂塵のけむりにおほはれて黄色くにごつてゐた。

三人は夕暮の色がうすくたゞようたころ小倉の町にはいつた。どこもみな、小倉藩士や幕府の兵士でごつたかへしてゐた。籠手、臑當、小具足などをつけた軍裝も、また武器も、時代おくれの古いものであり、兵士たちがみな暑くるしさうに、またものうさゝうに、顔をしかめてうごいてゐるのが薩摩藩の三人には可笑しく眼に映つた。

この三人の見なれぬ旅行者に、すぐ警戒の視線がむけられ、槍を突いてヌッと立ちはだかつた者もあつた。けれども、青年の左の肩にかついでゐる兩掛を見ると、急に態度をかへて、ひ

つこんでしまつた。その兩掛といふのは、天秤棒の兩はしの行李に、島津家の紋を大きく染めぬいた布をかぶせたものであつた。この青年を前田正名といつた。正名を少年時代から知つてゐるひと〴〵は、「弘庵」と呼んでゐた。兩肩などガッシリとしてをり、とりたての魚のやうに潑剌とした感じが全身にみちてゐた。だが矮小といふほどでもないけれども、丈はひくゝて、髷の額がせまつてゐるので陽焼けのした額が圓く見えた。眉には一本氣な感情のつよさをあらはしてゐた。敏捷さうにまたゝく眼にふかい光をやどし、一文字にむすんだ口もとには、或る勇氣と意志をうかべ、笑ふと若々しい無邪氣さがあらはれた。けれども、ものをいふときなど、ひどく老成した表情を見せるのであつた。

三人は、薩摩藩士の定宿に旅裝を解くと、いそいで主人をよんだ。

「馬關ゆきの舟をたのめまいか。」

主人はもみ手をしながら困つたやうに考へこんだ。

「四五日前ならよろしかつたかと思はれますが、いやはやどうも、やかましくなりまして。」

「もうたのめぬかな。」

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―小說風に書いた―

「土の偉人」叢書

農民精神の中にこそ、新時代を指導す可き新精神がある。土に生き土に仕へた人々の中に眞の偉人がある事を知らねばならぬ。この意味に於て玆に我國近世の農村に於ける偉人、即ち農村を革新し、農民を指導せる先覺者七人を選び、それぞれの生涯と事蹟を農民文學者の手により小說風に敍述した。全篇盡く現下農村問題に示唆稗益するところ多き好著たるは疑ひなからう。

一冊・價壹圓拾錢

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・上杉鷹山――下村千秋著
・前田正名――今野賢三著
・船津傳次平（日本出版文化協會推薦）和田傳著
・佐藤信淵――古志太郎著
・石川理紀之助（文部省推薦）伊藤永之介著
・森川源三郎――大森〔illegible〕直著 近刊

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MAEDA MASANA
(1850-1921)
KÔGYÔ IKEN, HOKA
MAEDA MASANA
KANKEI SHIRYO
(361 p 22 cm)

Author
Pub:



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MAEDA, MASANA

興業意見 他前田正名関係資料

1

生活古典叢書

解説・安藤良雄・山本弘文

光生館発行

Publishers

2. commentators

Classical life series. I

Industrial Policy Proposal, etc.
Related Information and
Materials for Maeda Masana

JAN 7 1972
J.P.T. Co.

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安藤良雄
山本弘文

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解説

興業意見 他 前田正名関係資料

安藤良雄
山本弘文

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興業意見 他 前田正名関係資料

Proposal by Maeda Masana and Related Information.

1

この巻には、国立国会図書館のゆるしをえて、同館憲政資料室に収蔵される「前田正名関係文書」のなかの、

興業意見未定稿（文書番号一一九〜一三五）

岐阜県各郡長報告（同　一四六）

岐阜県管内士族生計総計総覧表（同　一六六）

を収録した。わが国資本主義黎明期の前田正名の事歴は、その編纂にかかる『興業意見』、『産業』などとともにあまねく知られている。とくに『興業意見』は、かつて大内兵衛、土屋喬雄教授によって『明治前期財政経済史料集成』（昭和六〜七年、改造社）に収録されていらい、日本資本主義の原始的蓄積期を代表する文献として注目をあつめ、多くの論者によって折にふれ言及されてきた。そして全国にわたる貴重な調査報告としての側面と、いわゆる「重要物産増進」計画に代表される勧業上の意義が、それぞれ指摘されてきたのであった。

しかしこうした関心とたかい文献的評価にもかかわらず、同書に対する従来の言及は、おおむね部分的引用ない

し概説的紹介にとどまり、調査報告および政策体系のいずれの側面についても、本格的な検討をみることがなかった。しかしこのような状況は、最近における政策史ないし思想史研究の進展と、尨大な「前田正名関係文書」の整理によって、あらたな展望を与えられることになったのである。

国立国会図書館参考書誌部編『前田正名関係文書目録』（昭和四四年）によれば、同文書は昭和二五年に前田家から同館に寄託され、四三年にあらためて寄贈された。点数は和装綴込三五七冊にのぼり、農商務大書記官（明治一七～一八年）、農商務省農・工務局長、次官（明治二二～二三年）在任中のものが大部分であるが、なかでも『興業意見』編纂関係の資料がもっとも大きな比重をしめている。これらの文書は右の目録のなかで、Ⅰ『興業意見』編纂関係、Ⅱ　農商務省改革、Ⅲ　済急・農区巡回関係、Ⅳ　財政金融など、一四項目に分類され、文書番号を付して閲覧の便に供されている。

右のような「前田正名関係文書」の整理と公開によって、『興業意見』と前田正名の事歴にかんする研究は、広い展望を与えられることになった。そして最近、その整理にあたった有泉貞夫氏によって、すぐれた成果が発表されるにいたっている。『史学雑誌』七八編一〇号（昭和四四年一〇月）に収載された「『興業意見』の成立」がそれである。同論文は、整理過程において発見された『興業意見未定稿』および『同草稿』と『定本』との綿密な照合をつうじて、この編纂計画にははじめ『定本』とまったく異なる『未定稿』構想があり、これにそって調査、編纂がすすんでいたが、構想の核心となった興業銀行の設立をめぐって大蔵省との間に対立がおこり、編纂方針の重大な変更を余儀なくされるにいたったことをくわしく論証したものであり、政府部内における殖産政策上の対立と前田構想の性格、政策史上の位置づけをあきらかにした、注目すべき論文ということができる。とくにそこにおいて政策体系としての『未定稿』構想が当初存在したこと、『定本』が「前田本来の構想の残骸でしかなかった」（『史学雑誌』七

八編一〇号、二九ページ）点が指摘されたことは、今後における『興業意見』と前田の研究が、『未定稿』と『未定稿草稿』を中心にすすめられねばならないことを示唆したものであり、今後の研究に重要な手がかりを与えたものということができよう。

ところでこの有泉氏の論文にさきだち、また氏の論文にも引用されることになったいくつかの論文が、数年前に発表されている。海野福寿、水沼知一両氏による直輸出にかんする研究と、[1] 拝司静夫氏による農商務省系不動産銀行構想にかんする研究[2]がそれである。右のうち海野・水沼両氏の論文は、前田正名が大蔵省に在勤中（明治一二年一月以降）、大隈大蔵卿のもとで推進した直輸出政策に焦点をあて、横浜正金銀行を中心とした荷為替信用の供与とその効果について吟味するとともに、松方財政の登場と「外国人為替取組手続」（明治一七年七月）の制定によって結局挫折に追い込まれることになった過程をあきらかにしたものであり、また拝司氏の論文は、明治一四年頃から農商務省系官員によって推進され、一七～一八年段階において大蔵省側の構想とするどく対立した不動産銀行（興業銀行）構想に焦点をあて、両者の対立点とその長短、および後の「勧業銀行法」（明治二九年四月公布）への影響を論じたものである。これらの研究をつうじて注目されるのは、前田をふくむこうした農商務省系官員の論策が、その二大支柱となった直輸出と興業銀行構想の双方において、いずれも政策としての合理性に欠け、結局、殖産政策ないし金融政策としてはより合理的、現実的な、松方のそれに道をゆずらなければならなかったという指摘であろう。いずれにしても『興業意見』を中心とした明治一〇年代の前田の論策については、こうしたネガティブな評価が最近目立っているといえるのである。

しかしこのことはもちろん、各種実業団体の育成や府県是、郡村是などの策定に奔走した二〇年代の活動や、その社会的・政治的・思想的意義を否定するものではない。伝田功「国民主義思想と農本主義思想」（坂田吉雄編『明

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治前半期のナショナリズム』所収、昭和三三年、未来社）、長幸男「ナショナリズムと『産業』運動—前田正名の思想と活動——」（長幸男、住谷一彦編『近代日本経済思想史Ⅰ』所収、昭和四四年、有斐閣）はこのような問題に光をあて、その思想史的意義をさぐろうとしたものといえよう。右のうち伝田功氏の論文は、静岡県小笠郡倉真村の地主岡田良一郎を例にとって、その農本主義思想と国民国家形成途上における生産主義的活動を浮彫りにするとともに、その組織者としての前田正名の役割をあきらかにしたものであり、また長幸男氏の論文は、『直接貿易意見一斑』から『興業意見』を経て、『産業』の刊行と実業団体組織化運動にいたる前田の思想と行動の軌跡を追跡し、国民経済形成過程における役割と思想史的位置づけをあきらかにしたものである。これらの論文はいずれも、前田のもつ思想上、政策上の限界を十分認識したうえで、なおかつかれが近代日本社会の形成途上において果した役割を、客観的にあとづけようとしたものということができる。いずれにしても、徹底した実学的、生産主義的発想と、反政党的、天皇主義的思想の緊密な結合にいろどられた前田の生涯は、このような内在的追跡をつうじて、今後よりゆたかな肉付けを与えられるものということができよう。以下こうした研究史上の成果を念頭におきながら、本巻に収録された資料の紹介をすすめてみたいとおもう。

（1） 海野福寿「直輸出論・直輸出政策」（静岡大学法経短期大学部『法経論集』一七号所収、昭和三九年） 水沼知一「明治前期横浜正金銀行の外国為替金融——貿易政策史的視点よりみた——」（『土地制度史学』一五号所収、昭和三七年）

（2） 拝司静夫「『土地抵当貸銀行案』について——明治政府部内における土地貨幣論的構想」（弘前大学『文経論叢』創刊号所収、昭和四〇年）、「不動産銀行の構想と農商務省——明治一八年の日本興業銀行条例案をめぐって——」（同上二巻二号所収、昭和四一年）、「興業資本局案について——農商務省系不動産金融機関構想の一事例」（同上四巻五号、昭和四四年）

2

収録した資料の第一は『興業意見未定稿』（活版）である。同『総目録』（「前田正名関係文書」番号一一九）によれば、右の『未定稿』は『総目録』をふくめて当初二六冊の予定であったが、結局印刷に付されたのはそのうち一八冊であった。しかしこの叢書に全一八冊を収録することは紙数の関係からとうてい不可能とおもわれたので、すでに『明治前期財政経済史料集成』のなかに収録されている『定本』と同一（ないしはほとんど同一）の部分をはぶき、九冊分を収録することにした。いまそのうちわけおよび『未定稿』と『定本』との内容的な異同、対応関係を表示すれば左のとおりである。

〔定本〕	〔未定稿〕	本叢書に収録の有無
203総目録	119総目録	○
巻一 204綱領	冊二 121綱領	○
〃二 205緒言	〃一 120緒言	○
〃三 206現況	〃三 122缺項適例	○
〃四 207原因	〃四 123時弊	○
〃五 208参考一	〃五 124参考甲ノ部上	
〃六 209参考二	〃六 125参考甲ノ部下	
〃七 210参考三	〃七 126参考乙ノ部	
〃八 211参考四	〃八 127参考丙ノ部	
〃九 212参考五	〃九 128参考丁ノ部	
〃十 213参考六	〃十 129参考戊ノ部	
〃十一 214精神	〃十一 130戒慎	○
〃十二 215国力一	〃十二 131統計甲ノ部	
〃十三 216国力二	〃二十二 133統計丙ノ部	
〃十四 217国力三	〃二十三 134統計丁ノ部	
〃十五 218地方一 〃十六 219地方二 〃十七 220地方三 〃十八 221地方四 〃十九 222地方五 〃二十 223地方六 〃二十一 224地方七 〃二十二 225地方八 〃二十三 226地方九 〃二十四 227地方十 〃二十五 228地方十一 〃二十六 229地方十二 〃二十七 230地方十三	〃十三 統計乙ノ部畿内 〃十四 132—イ統計乙ノ部東海道 〃十五 132—ロ統計乙ノ部東山道 〃十六 統計乙ノ部北陸道 〃十七 統計乙ノ部山陰道 〃十八 統計乙ノ部山陽道 〃十九 統計乙ノ部南海道 〃二十 統計乙ノ部西海道 〃二十一 統計乙ノ部北海道	 ○ ○
〃二十八 231方針一 〃二十九 232方針二 〃三十 方針三	〃二十四 方法甲ノ部 〃二十五 135方法乙ノ部	 ○

注一 『定本』と『未定稿』とをむすぶ記号═══は内容同一ないしはほとんど同一、───・───・───は内容おおむね共通、・・・は対応するがことなることをしめす。

二 点線でかこまれた巻、冊は「未成」として印刷されなかったものである。

三 『未定稿冊十四統計乙ノ部東海道』は埼玉県だけ、また同『冊十五統計乙ノ部東山道』は、群馬県、栃木県、秋田県を収録するのみである。

四 『未定稿冊二十五方法乙ノ部』は印刷されたが、興業銀行の設立をめぐる大蔵省との対立のため配布されなかった（有泉前掲論文参照）。

五 表中最下段の〇印は、本叢書への収録をしめすものである。

六 巻、冊の下のアラビア数字は、国立国会図書館憲政資料室に収蔵される「前田正名関係文書」の文書番号である。

右のように『興業意見定本』と『未定稿』の間には、編別構成のうえでかなり大きな相違がみられるが、内容的にも、すでに有泉氏によってくわしく検証されたように、興業貸付と独特な段階的殖産計画の脱落（『定本』）を中心に、重要な修正のあとがみとめられる。そして前田のもつつよい個性、とりわけその論策をいろどる保護と統制の思想は、『未定稿』においてより率直に表現され、政策として体系化されているといえるのである。

このような思想は『未定稿』全体にわたって随所にあらわれているが、なかでも殖産上の注意と心がまえを述べた『冊十一戒愼』は、「第一　是非ニ政府ノ立入ヲ要スル事」という項を設けてこの点をあらためて強調し、「政府ハ徹頭徹尾國民ノ誘導人タリ保護者タルノ責ヲ自任シ、以テ國歩ヲ進メサル可ラサルナリ」とその信条を吐露している。『冊二十五方法乙ノ部』（興業貸付計画）に集約される、政策体系としてのいわゆる『未定稿』構想は、こうした思想の率直かつ必然的な帰結であったということができよう。そしてそれは、貸付計画が大蔵省の反対によって挫折を余儀なくされたのちも、『定本巻十一精神』のなかに、「農工商ハ放任ス可ラサル事」、「農工商ハ撿束ヲ要スル事」として思想的斑文をとどめることになったのである。

もちろんこうした保護と統制ないし「撿束」の精神は、後進国の原始的蓄積期という条件と無関係ではなく、その意味では当時の為政者に多かれ少なかれ共通した属性であった。しかし『興業意見未定稿』が起草された明治一七年は、殖産政策のうえではすでに、新政府発足当初にみられたつよい官営主義と特定資本に対する保護助成策が背景にしりぞき、官業の払い下げや、共進会、農談会などに代表される民業の一般的奨励策が登場しはじめた時期であった。しかし『未定稿』にしめされた前田の構想は、むしろこうした風潮に対立し、生産と流通に対する保護と統制、立ちいった干渉を固持しようとするものであった。事実『方法乙ノ部』にしめされた興業貸付計画は、個別資本に対する助成策をつよく推進しようとした点で、松方を中心とする大蔵省主流の考えかたとかなりことなっていたばかりでなく、貸付規定においても貸付順序の規制と貸付業種の限定、「興業委員」の審査、点検など、総じて保護と統制を基調にした初期重商主義的色彩につよくいろどられたものであった。[4] そして『未定稿』構想をいろどるこのような特質は、のちに『所見』（明治二五年三月）のなかで赤裸々に吐露されることになった前田の政治思想、とりわけその純正絶対主義的国体論および反政党論と見事な整合ぶりをしめしているのである。かれが松方と対立し、大隈と袂をわかつことになったのは、こうした独自の経済論と政治論のためであった。

以上の点からすれば、政策体系としての『未定稿』構想の意義を過大に評価することはできないであろう。事実原蓄期のただなかで、分解にさらされた小業者に対する資金の貸付けは、その効果の点できわめてうたがわしいものだったであろうし、また同業組合への組織化も、そうした流動的な状況のもとではおそらく不可能だったであろう。そして鉄道・道路・運河・築港・堤防など社会的資本ないし施設の充実に対する否定的ないし消極的姿勢も、この構想の非現実性をしめすものといわなければならないのである。

いわゆる『未定稿』構想には、明治一〇年代後半の殖産政策としてみたばあい、こうした重大な欠陥が存在した。そしてそれは実施過程における破綻をまつまでもなく、大蔵省の反対と資金的裏付けの剥奪（『方法乙ノ部』の削除）によって、一括して棚上げにされることになったのである。『興業意見定本』は、このような意味において、「前田

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本来の構想の残骸」(有泉前掲論文)であった。

しかしこのような事実はけっして、わが国近代社会形成過程における「構想」の思想的意味や、その社会的・政治的役割を否定するものではない。とくにその根づよい在来産業と小生産者保護の思想は、一〇年代後半の資本主義確立期において、ともすれば為政者の視野からうしなわれがちな小業者を、各種実業団体にひろく組織し、また郡村是・府県是の策定に奔走するなど、めざましい活動の場を与えられることになった。原蓄期において日の目をみなかった前田の「構想」は、原蓄の完了と小業者の相対的安定の時期に、かれらを組織化し体制へ連繋する「布衣の宰相」としての地位と役割を与えられることになったのである。『興業意見未定稿』にもられた前田の思想と「構想」については、こうした側面からの吟味も必要といえよう。なお前田正名の伝記については、これまでにいくつかの小篇があらわされているが、まだこれといった『定本』がなく、その生い立ちや外遊中の事歴についても不明な点が多い。いずれも今後の研究にまたなければならないが、さしあたり左に関係資料、伝記およびこれまでのおもな研究論文を列挙し、参考に供したいとおもう。

(3) 松方正義はすでに明治一二年、内務省勧農局長在任の当時、太政官に提出した「勧農要旨」のなかで、個別企業に対する政府資金の貸付けに対して、つよい否定的見解をしめし、また十三年六月内務卿在任当時太政官に提出した「財政管窺概略」のなかでも「民業ニ関スル事業ハ断然民有ニ帰セシム可キ事」というあたらしい勧業方針を献策している(『明治前期財政経済史料集成』第一巻五二七ペおよび五三四ペ)。

(4) 拝司静夫教授の前掲論文「不動産銀行の構想と農商務省――明治一八年の日本興業銀行条例案をめぐって――」も、こうした農商務省系興業銀行構想の前期性をするどく指摘している。

―資料―

「前田正名関係文書」(和装綴込三五七冊、国立国会図書館憲政資料室蔵)

「直接貿易基礎確定ニ関スル三大要綱(明治一三年)」(「大隈文書」文書番号A三三三、早稲田大学社会科学研究所編

『大隈文書』第四巻所収、昭和三六年)

「直接貿易振興ノ為総領事ヘノ委任事務事項達書(明治一三年)」(同右文書番号A三三四、前掲書所収)

「地方物産調査報告書(明治一二年)」(同右文書番号A三八七九、前掲書第五巻所収、昭和三七年)

「上州出張記憶書(明治一三年)」(同右文書番号A三九六九、前掲書所収)

『直接貿易意見一斑』(明治一四年一〇月、博聞社)

「前田正名書翰」ほか(早稲田大学図書館蔵「大隈文書」、文書番号B二九三八、B二九三九、A九八三、A九八四)

「前田正名書翰(明治一一年一一月二九日、大隈重信宛)」(日本史籍協会『大隈重信関係文書三』所収、文書番号七二一、昭和四五年覆刻、東京大学出版会)

「前田正名への書翰」(日本史籍協会『大久保利通文書八』所収、文書番号一五五六、一五五八、昭和四四年覆刻、東京大学出版会)

「前田正名への命令書」(同右所収、文書番号一五六四)

「前田正名談話『三田育種場の創設と大久保公』」(同右四〇八〜四一〇ペ所収)

『所見』(明治二五年三月刊)

『産業』(一〜三八号、明治二六年一一月〜三〇年二月、産業社)

『興業意見』(大内兵衛、土屋喬雄編『明治前期財政経済史料集成』第一八巻ノ一・二、第一九巻、第二〇巻、昭和三九年覆刻、明治文献資料刊行会)

『日本勧業銀行法草案関係資料』(日本勧業銀行調査部勧銀史研究会編『日本勧業銀行史資料』第一集、昭和二六年)

『明治初年不動産銀行・農業銀行関係資料』(同右第二集、昭和二七年)

「興業銀行条例草按説明(明治一七年)」(日本銀行調査局編『日本金融史資料』第四巻一〇五六〜一〇七一ペ)

「興業銀行定款〔案〕(明治一七年)」(同右一〇七一〜一〇八二ペ)

「興業銀行条例草按意見書」(同右一〇五四〜一〇五六ペ)

「日本興業銀行条例発行ノ儀上申(明治一八年)」(同右一〇九九〜一一〇〇ペ)

「日本興業銀行設立主旨ノ説明(明治一八年)」(同右一一〇一〜一一一七ペ)

「日本興業銀行条例草按(明治一八年)」(同右一一一七〜一一二一ペ)

「日本興業銀行条例草按逐条説明(明治一八年)」(同右一一二一〜一一三五ペ)

「日本興業銀行定款草案(明治一八年)」(同右一一三五〜一一四六ペ)

「農商務省沿革略志」(土屋喬雄編『維新産業建設史資料』第一巻所収、昭和一八年、工業資料刊行会)

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『農務顛末』（第一～六巻、昭和二七～三二年、農林省）

――伝記および関係文献――

前田三介編「前田正名自叙伝上・下」（雑誌『社会及国家』二五一号、二五二号所収、昭和一二年、一匡社）
前田三介「前田正名『上海日記』」（同右二五三号所収）
金井捨三郎『前田正名君性行一斑』（明治二六年刊）
岡崎儀八郎『鉄鞋之響前田正名君』（明治三一年、団々社書店）
「前田正名履歴」（『明治前期財政経済史料集成』一八巻ノ一所収）
本間恒治編 愛甲兼達述『男爵前田正名君略伝』（大正一一年刊）
今野賢三『前田正名』（昭和一八年、新潮社）
楫西光速「前田正名」（『日本人物史大系』第五巻所収、昭和三五年、朝倉書店）
栗原百寿『人物農業団体史』（昭和三一年、新評論社）
高橋是清『高橋是清自伝』（昭和一一年、千倉書房）
黒正巌「松方正義公と明治初期の農政」（本庄栄治郎編『明治維新経済史研究』所収、昭和五年、改造社）
奥谷松治「前田正名の産業政策」（『近代日本農政史論』所収昭和一三年、育生社）
吉川秀造「明治産業の父前田正名」（日本経済史研究所編『政治経済先人を語る』所収、昭和一七年、竜吟社）
福沢諭吉「農商務省の大改革」（『福沢諭吉全集』第一五巻所収、昭和三六年、岩波書店）

――研究論文――

伝田功「国民主義思想と農本主義思想」（前掲）
水沼知一「明治前期横浜正金銀行の外国為替金融―貿易政策史的視点よりみた―」（同）
海野福寿「直輸出論・直輸出政策」（同）
同『明治の貿易』（昭和四二年、塙書房）
拝司静夫「『土地抵当貸銀行』案について」（前掲）
同「不動産銀行の構想と農商務省」（同）
同「興業資本局案について」（同）
有泉貞夫「『興業意見』の成立」（同）
長幸男「ナショナリズムと『産業』運動」（同）

3

収録資料の第二は、明治一八年当時の農村の景況をなまなましくつたえる「岐阜縣各郡長報告」である。周知のように一四年からはじまった松方財政下の農村は、通貨の急激な収縮と米価の崩落、地方税・消費税を中心とする増税と地租の重圧などによって、はなはだしい窮乏においやられていた。その一端はすでにペ・マイエットの古典的な著作『日本農民の疲弊及其救治策』（明治二六年）においていちはやく指摘されたところであり、いわゆる原始的蓄積の「全過程の基礎をなす」、農民からの土地収奪が猛威をふるっていた。明治一八年はいわばそのクライマックスともいうべき年であり、しかも前年来の気候不順の追いうちをうけて、名状しがたい惨状を呈したのであった。

一八年の農区巡回は、このような危機的状況のなかで急遽「済急」の措置を講じ、さし迫った破滅からのがれようという、緊迫した空気のもとでおこなわれた。このような省内の空気は前記「前田正名関係文書」のなかの「済急關係書類」（文書番号二四五、二四九）に随所にあらわれており、本省准奏任官以上の俸給一ヵ月分の義捐（肥料補助）、出張旅費の切り下げ（等外旅費の適用）、本省官員の節倹と貯蓄、巡回先での自粛など、各種の緊急措置が申しあわされている。また巡回先の地方官や住民に徹底するための「済急趣意書」も、推敲に推敲をかさねて作成され、危機脱出の方策が立てられた。しかしすでにふれたように、『未定稿』構想の挫折＝『方法乙ノ部』の削除によって、政策の財政的裏付けをうばわれた前田にとって、最後にたよることのできたのは「精神」だけであった。したがってできあがった「趣意書」の内容もまた、涙ぐましい苦心のあとにもかかわらず、「勤労」と「節倹」といういいふるされた「精神」しか盛り込むことができなかったのである。

収録された資料は、このようにしておこなわれた巡回にあたって、東海、北陸地区を担当した大書記官前田が[5]、岐阜県内各郡長から提出させたものである。その一見簡潔な報告のなかに、当時の農民のおかれた悲惨な状況をよみとることができよう。とくに草根木実を食し、路頭に物乞いする人びとの悲惨なありさまは、資本の発生史についての古典的な描写を彷彿させるものがある。なお同様の報告書は、ほかにも静岡、愛知、石川県の分が、前記

「前田正名関係文書」のなかに残されているが、いずれも紙数の関係で省略しなければならなかった。これらについては、憲政資料室に収蔵される原資料によって、その状況に接していただければさいわいである。

（5）各農区の巡回担当者は左のとおりであった。

東奥農区　大書記官　岩山敬義
南海農区　大書記官　品川忠道
中国農区　権大書記官　宮田冬三
東海北陸農区　大書記官　前田正名
関東農区　大書記官　宮島信吉
関東農区　権少書記官　樋田魯一
越羽農区　権少書記官　大槻吉直
西海農区　権少書記官　大山綱昌
（前掲『農商務省沿革略志』による）

4

最後に収録したのは「岐阜縣管内士族生計總計總覽表」である。その内容は一見してあきらかなように、旧藩ごとに各士族の職業、旧禄米、改正禄米、公債受領高、現在財産、現在歳入、自宅・借宅・同居の別、人口、家族構成、戸主の年齢を書き上げ、これを生計内容に応じて分類、集計したものであり、かなり丹念な生計調査ということができる。いまその全容をうかがうため、これを整理してみると別表のような結果をうることができるが、これによればその範囲は岐阜県管下の旧藩のみならず、他県管下の旧藩の士族（転籍者および全戸寄留者）にもおよび、総戸数三、〇八〇戸（総人員一三、五二一人）にわたっている。ところでこの資料はいつ頃作成され、またいかなる経緯によったものであろうか。この点については周知のようにすでに吉川秀造教授が、その著『明治維新社會經濟史研究』（昭和一八年、日本評論社）のなかで、広島県下の士族生計調査資料の紹介に関連して、明治一六年五月一日付の農商務省の通牒にふれ、その内容を紹介している。[6] 本資料の利用上欠くことができないので、左にこれを引用してみたいとおもう。

士族生計の現状は須らく熟知すべきの要用あるは御同感に可有之、故を以て頃日來各地方に於て往々其取調の擧あるを見聞せ

所属＼等級	上等		中等		下等		無等		計	
	戸数	人員	戸数	人員	戸数	人員	戸数	人員	戸数	人員
旧大垣藩	184	758	253	1,005	506	1,849	270	1,236	1,213	4,848
旧神官士族	—	—	1	6	2	12	—	—	3	18
旧岡田藩	1	9	—	—	2	12	—	—	3	21
旧野村藩	3	15	2	13	5	19	—	—	10	47
旧高須藩	25	107	81	239	182	845	25	117	313	1,398
旧今尾藩	8	34	32	117	52	236	16	86	108	473
旧加納藩	27	119	57	283	170	864	2	5	256	1,271
旧高富藩	6	24	7	23	24	92	2	7	39	146
旧郡上藩	38	189	100	464	181	850	10	43	329	1,546
旧岩村藩	7	31	46	220	170	791	27	112	250	1,154
旧苗木藩	28	162	31	143	104	513	27	107	190	925
旧旗下	6	36	3	21	2	5	1	4	12	66
旧旗下，石川伊賀守元家来	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	4	1	4
旧石河太八郎元家来	1	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	5
旧旗下，千村右衛門元家来	7	36	3	12	14	85	2	7	26	140
旧旗下，山村甚兵衛元家来	7	36	2	9	4	17	—	—	13	62
旧名古屋藩	35	186	36	158	134	627	15	57	220	1,028
旧犬山藩	1	3	8	35	6	15	3	5	18	58
旧西端藩	—	—	—	—	1	4	—	—	1	4
旧豊橋藩	—	—	1	4	—	—	—	—	1	4
旧岡崎藩	—	—	—	—	1	3	—	—	1	3
旧西尾藩	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	1	2
東京府下旧幕臣	7	49	8	35	18	69	2	8	35	161
東京府下旧一橋藩	2	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	8
旧亀山藩	1	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	7
旧桑名藩	—	—	—	—	1	10	1	5	2	15
旧丸岡藩	—	—	1	4	—	—	—	—	1	4
旧勝山藩	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1

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所属＼等級	上等		中等		下等		無等		計	
	戸数	人員	戸数	人員	戸数	人員	戸数	人員	戸数	人員
旧福井藩	—	—	1	5	1	7	—	—	2	12
旧大聖寺藩	1	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	4
旧田辺藩	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	1
旧和歌山藩	—	—	—	—	1	4	1	2	2	6
旧佐賀藩	1	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	5
旧田ノ口藩	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	1	2
旧高遠藩	—	—	1	8	—	—	—	—	1	8
旧松本藩	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3
旧荘内藩	—	—	1	4	—	—	—	—	1	4
旧米沢藩	1	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	6
旧三田藩	1	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	4
旧富山藩	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
旧磐城藩	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	1	2
旧人吉藩	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	1
旧宇和島藩	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	1	2
旧静岡藩	—	—	1	3	2	3	2	8	5	14
旧彦根藩	—	—	1	5	4	15	2	7	7	27
計	401	1,838	678	2,908	1,591	6,953	410	1,822	3,080	13,521
%	13.0	13.6	22.0	21.5	51.7	51.4	13.3	13.5	100	100

り。就ては自然御調整にも相成候はば、可成區々不相成様冀望候に付、爲御参考編輯例及表面五葉及御廻致候。猶御調整の際は當省へも一部御送致有之候様致度、此段得貴意候也。

士族生計表編輯例

一、本表は士族生計の現状を觀察の爲め、等級區別を立て編輯すべきものとす。

二、本表は舊藩毎に一表（冊子仕立）を製し、表中上中下等及無等の四級に分ち毎等類纂して小計をなし、表尾に總計をなすべきものとす。但他管内へ寄留のものは編入せざるものとす。

三、他管内より轉籍のもの及全戸寄留のものは、現在地に於て一管内を通じ第二の例により一表を製すべきものとす。

四、生計の度を左の三等及無等に類別す。其類別は當今生計の現状に依るべし。即ち其の例左の如し。

上等

資本より生ずる所の歳入は擧家の生計に供し饒なるもの。例へば一ヶ年得る所の歳入、一家六口以上にして金二百九十圓以上、四口乃至五口にして金二百四十圓以上、三口以下にして金百四十圓以上のもの。

中等

同上の歳入は擧家の生計に充て未だ饒ならざるものと雖も、目下の生計上差支なきもの。例へば一ヶ年得る所の歳入、一家六口以上にして金百五十圓以上、四口乃至五口にして金百二十圓以上、三口以下にして金七十圓以上のもの。

下等

同上の歳入に一定のものなしと雖も、辛くして擧家日常の生計をなし得るもの。

無等

目下日常の生計に苦しむもの。即ち下文の四類に類別すべきもの。(甲)鰥寡孤獨にして無資本なるもの、(乙)家族の多數にして資本に乏しきもの、(丙)勞力の資本はありと雖も之を使用すべきの緒に就かざるもの、(丁)勞力の資本はありと雖も之を使用するの念なく懶惰自ら貧窮に陷るもの。

五、生計の事たる、家族の多少其他の關係によりて、同一の資本にして甲家は生計の堵に安ずるを得、乙家は生計に之れ苦しむの場合あるものなれば、必ずしも資本の同等を以て生計の度を量るに足らず。故に該家現在生計の適否を以て類別をなすべきものとす。

六、凡そ資本とは資益を生ずべき動不動財産（田畑・山林・公債證書・商賈の仕入金・貸金・銀行株券の類）及勞力（仕官其他の職務・職業・傭役等の類、戸主家族に拘らず該家に有する所の勞力）を指稱す。歳入は之より得る所の金額を指すものとす。

七、歳入に甲乙の類を分つは、（甲）動不動産より生ずる歳入、（乙）勞力より生ずる歳入を識別し、及之に依りて生計するの景狀を察すべき爲めなり。

八、職業は戸主の職業を掲ぐべし。但し職業區別は戸籍法によるべし。

九、人口は戸主・家族の合計を掲ぐ。其一家内に他管へ寄留のものあるも之を算入すべし。

十、舊祿の正米、改正祿の正米、公債證書の受領高を掲表するは、沿革の參考に供するに外ならず。

十一、全管内の總覽表は舊各藩々及轉籍・全戸寄留の各表を合計すべきものとす。

十二、地價は地券面、公債證書及株券は其額面の金額を掲ぐべし。

十三、同居及附籍者一家別途に生計を有するものは之を一戸の例により掲げ、別生計をなさざるものは暫く其一家内と見做すべし。

以上の内容に照して、本巻に収録した「岐阜縣管内士族生計總計總覽表」が、一六年五月一日付の農商務省通牒にもとづくものであることは、ほぼ疑う余地がないものといえよう。吉川前掲書によれば、同書において要約、紹介されている広島県「士族生計調査一件」は、一六年六月一日現在の調査結果を集計したものであり、翌一七年一二月二七日付で農商務省に提出されたといわれているから、本書の「總覽表」もほぼこの時期に作成、提出されたものと考えて大過ないであろう。なお吉川教授によれば、右の広島県「士族生計調査一件」に集計された同県居住の士族は総数六、九二七戸（三一、一五五人）にのぼったが、そのうち上等は四・九％、中等は一三・七％にすぎず、下等と無等はそれぞれ七〇・八％および一〇・六％にのぼっていた。しかし岐阜県のばあいには、前記別表にみるようにかなりことなった状況をしめし、上等、中等をあわせて、全体の三五％をしめるにいたっている。こうした点からいっても秩禄処分後の士族の状態については、なお多くの研究の余地が残されているものといわなければならないのである。

（6）「第七章　士族の生計調査」（同書二三八―二五八ページ）

本巻の編集と解説の執筆を終るに当って、私たち編者は、まず、この解説にかかげた前田正名ならびにかれに関連する諸文献等についての研究を公にされた方がたの業績に対して深い敬意と謝意を表するものである。私たちの今回の仕事もこれらの研究の蓄積に負うところが大であった。

つぎに、この巻の刊行に当って、多大の便宜を与えられた国立国会図書館、とくに同館憲政資料室主査有泉貞夫氏に対して厚く感謝申し上げるものである。有泉氏は、この解説の冒頭において述べたように国立国会図書館にあって「前田正名関係文書」の整理に当られ、かつこれに関するきわめてすぐれた研究を発表しておられるが、本巻の編集・刊行にさいしても、非常なご配慮とかけがえのないご助言を惜しまれなかった。その意味では、同氏のご好意があってはじめてこの巻を公にすることができたといっても過言ではないのである。

なお、本巻の編集に当って種々お世話をいただき、とくに編集と解説執筆促進の労をとられた光生館社長中川豊三郎氏、同社丸山克彦氏にもお礼の言葉を呈したい。

最後に、本巻の公刊が前田正名ないし日本の近代史の研究にとっていささかなりともお役に立ちうれば、私たち編者にとっては望外の幸であるが、本巻に対するご意見、ご批判をお寄せいただければさらに幸であることを記し

たい。

前田正名年譜(1)

典拠

● 「前田正名自叙伝」(雑誌「社会及国家」二五一、二五二号所収、昭和一二年、一匡社) ①

● 前田三介「前田正名『上海日記』」(同右二五三号所収、昭和一二年、一匡社) ②

● 前田三介旧蔵「前田正名履歴」(『明治前期財政経済史料集成』一八巻ノ一所収、昭和三九年覆刻、明治文献資料刊行会) ③

● 『百官履歴』下巻(昭和三年、日本史籍協会) ④

● 国立国会図書館憲政資料室蔵「前田正名関係文書」 ⑤

● 前田正名編集、著作物(『直接貿易意見一斑』、『所見』、『産業』など) ⑥

● 「農務顚末第廿四三田育種場」(農林省編『農務顚末』第六巻所収、昭和三二年) ⑦

● 「大久保利通文書、前田正名への書翰および命令書」(日本史籍協会編『大久保利通文書』第八巻所収、昭和四四年覆刻、東京大学出版会) ⑧

● 「大隈文書」所収、前田正名関係資料(早稲田大学社会科学研究所編『大隈文書』第四、五巻所収、昭和三六、三七年) ⑨

● 農商務省編「農商務省沿革略志」(土屋喬雄編『維新産業建設史資料』第一巻所収、昭和一八年) ⑩

● 「農商務省第五回報告」(『明治前期産業発達史資料』別冊一七―一所収、昭和四一年、明治文献資料刊行会) ⑪

● 「顕要職務補任録」(昭和四二年覆刻、柏書房) ⑫

● 岡崎儀八郎『鉄鞋之響前田正名君』(明治三一年、団々社書店) ⑬

● 本間恒治編 愛甲兼達述『男爵前田正名君略伝』(大正一一年) ⑭

● 有泉貞夫「『興業意見』の成立」(『史学雑誌』七八編一〇号所収、昭和四四年) ⑮

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年月	事項	典拠
嘉永 三年 三月(2) (一八五〇)	薩摩藩士前田善安の三男(3)として鹿児島城下に生まれる	③④
安政 五年(4) (一八五八)	八木昌平（玄悦）の門に入り、洋学修業	①⑬
慶応元年(5) (一八六五)	長崎に留学	①⑬
明治元年四月二九日 (一八六八)	英和辞書編纂のため、上海へ向け大阪を出帆	②
〃 閏四月三日	上海に上陸	②
〃 五月六日	帰国のため上海出帆	②
〃 一〇月一四日	辞書改訂のため上海に再航	②
明治 二年二月一三日 (一八六九)	神戸に帰着	②
〃 三月	大学校より仏国留学生を命ぜられる	③④
〃 二月(6)	外務卿沢宣嘉より外遊の旅券下付	②
明治 八年六月一八日 (一八七五)	外務省二等書記生を命ぜらる	③④
〃 六月二三日	太政官正院より仏国公使館在勤を命ぜらる	③④
明治 九年一一月 (一八七六)	内務省勧業寮御用掛を命ぜられ、一ヶ月金七〇円を給与さる（准判任官）	③④
〃 三月一八日	外務省より所用のため帰国を命ぜらる	③④
明治一〇年一二月三一日 (一八七七)	外務省勤務を免じ、内務省御用掛、勧農局事務取扱を命ぜらる、月俸	

年月	事項	典拠
	七〇円（准判任官）	③④
〃 六月二五日	月俸八〇円、准奏任官となる、この頃三田育種場長に就任	③④⑦
〃 八月三〇日	仏国博覧会事務官を命ぜらる	③④
〃 〃	太政官より仏国博覧会へ先発を命ぜらる	③④
〃 九月三〇日	三田育種場開場式をおこなう	⑦
〃 一〇月一〇日	仏国博覧会準備のため横浜を出帆	⑧
明治一一年六月二六日 (一八七八)	太政官より仏国博覧会事務官長を命ぜらる	③④
〃 八月二〇日	内務省より勧商局兼勤を命ぜられ、博覧会終了後も別命あるまで仏国滞留を命ぜらる	③④
明治一二年一月一五日 (一八七九)	大蔵省御用掛兼務、商務局勤務を命ぜらる	③④
〃 五月九日	イタリー皇帝より下賜の勲章およびフランス文部卿より贈与の記章を受領し、佩用することを許可さる	③④
〃 五月一三日	内務省御用掛を免じ、大蔵省御用掛専務を命ぜらる、商務局勤務、月俸八〇円、ほどなく帰国	③④
〃 一〇月	『直接貿易意見一斑』起草	⑥
明治一三年一月六日 (一八八〇)	月俸七〇円増給	③④

年月	事項	典拠
〃 一月一三日	物産調査のため、東海・中国・九州筋へ出張を命ぜらる	③④⑨
〃 一月一四日	大蔵省商務局勤務を免じ、同書記局勤務を命ぜらる	③④
〃 九月一五日	月俸五〇円増給	③④
〃 一〇月 五日	太政官より総領事に任命され、仏国パリ在勤を命ぜらる	③④
〃 一〇月二九日	太政官より大蔵省御用掛兼勤を命ぜらる	③④
〃 一〇月三一日	物産調査のため埼玉・群馬県下へ出張を命ぜらる	③④⑨
〃 一二月一五日	大蔵省書記局勤務を命ぜらる	③④
〃 一二月三〇日	従五位に叙せらる	③④
〃 三月 四日	外務省より、所用のため当分赴任延期を命ぜらる	③④
〃 三月 六日	勲五等に叙せらる	③④
〃 三月	「直接貿易基礎確定ニ関スル三大要綱」を大蔵卿に提出	⑨
明治一四年二月五日 (一八八一)	フランス政府より贈賜の勲章の受領および佩用を許可さる	③
〃 二月一五日	太政官より内国勧業博覧会御用掛を命ぜらる	③
〃 二月二二日	省務に勉励のため手当金一五〇円を下賜さる	③
〃 四月二七日	京都・大阪・静岡ほか九県へ巡回を命ぜらる	③

年月	事項	典拠
〃 八月六日	太政官より大蔵大書記官に任命され、理事官として欧米両洲へ出張を命ぜらる	
〃 〃	大蔵省より福島県へ出張を命ぜらる	③
〃 八月三一日	第二回内国勧業博覧会事務勉励のため、太政官より銀牌一箇下賜さる	③
〃 一〇月	『直接貿易意見一斑』刊行	⑥
〃 一一月五日	太政官より農商務大書記官に任命され、兼大蔵大書記官、理事官として欧米両洲へ出張を命ぜらる	③⑩
〃 一二月八日	農商務省書記局事務取扱を命ぜらる	③⑩
明治一五年一月 (一八八二)	ヨーロッパに到着し、以後一一都府市港視察	⑤
明治一六年一月 (一八八三)	病気帰国、復命書を農商務卿に提出	⑤
明治一七年一月 (一八八四)	『興業意見・緒言(未定稿)』起草	⑤
〃 五月	『興業意見』地方調査、第一回照会	⑤⑮
〃 六月三日	農商務省より神奈川・埼玉県下巡回を命ぜらる	③
〃 八月	『興業意見(未定稿)』一五〇部印刷	⑤⑮
〃 九月一日	同右地方庁へ配布	⑤⑮
〃 九月二九日	勧業上の実況取調のため京都・大阪・兵庫・滋賀・愛知各府県の巡	

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富山縣下舊富山藩士族生計一覽表

等級	職業	舊祿米	改正祿米	公債受領高	現在財産 地價	現在財産 公債	現在財産 株券	現在歲入 甲	現在歲入 乙	現在歲入 計	自宅借宅同居ノ別	人口	十五以上六十以下人口 男	十五以上六十以下人口 女	十四以下六十一以上人口	戸主	戸主ノ年齡
上等	官員	三四〇	二六						一、八〇〇	一、八〇〇	借宅	五	一	一	三	白洲退藏	五三・一〇
上等	工	六	六						二〇〇	二〇〇	借宅	一	一			森本東吾	三八・一〇

福島縣下舊磐城藩士族生計一覽表

等級	職業	舊祿米	改正祿米	公債受領高	生計困苦ノ種類 甲	乙	丙	丁	自宅借宅同居ノ別	人口	十五以上六十以下人口 男	十五以上六十以下人口 女	十四以下六十一以上人口	戸主	戸主ノ年齡
無等	工	八・四〇	六・〇〇		甲				同居	二	一		一	田村德行	五二・〇〇

熊本縣下舊人吉藩士族生計一覽表

等級	職業	舊祿米	改正祿米	公債受領高	現在財産 地價	現在財産 公債	現在財産 株券	現在歲入 甲	現在歲入 乙	現在歲入 計	自宅借宅同居ノ別	人口	十五以上六十以下人口 男	十五以上六十以下人口 女	十四以下六十一以上人口	戸主	戸主ノ年齡
下等	無職	九	九	四六〇		四六〇		三・二		三・二	同居	一	一			内田亥子吉	一九・〇六

愛媛縣下舊宇和島藩士族生計一覽表

等級	職業	舊祿米	改正祿米	公債受領高	現在財産 地價	現在財産 公債	現在財産 株券	現在歲入 甲	現在歲入 乙	現在歲入 計	自宅借宅同居ノ別	人口	十五以上六十以下人口 男	十五以上六十以下人口 女	十四以下六十一以上人口	戸主	戸主ノ年齡
下等	農	六・八	一〇	三九〇	一五九・五三			三・九三	一八	三・九三	自宅	二	一	一		遠藤多吉	二〇・一〇

静岡縣下舊静岡藩士族生計一覽表

等級	職業	舊祿米	改正祿米	公債受領高	現在財産 地價	現在財産 公債	現在財産 株券	現在歲入 甲	現在歲入 乙	現在歲入 計	自宅借宅同居ノ別	人口	十五以上六十以下人口 男	十五以上六十以下人口 女	十四以下六十一以上人口	戸主	戸主ノ年齡
中等	雜業	一〇・〇一	一〇・五〇	一〇〇・〇〇				二〇・〇〇	一〇〇・〇〇	一二〇・〇〇	借宅	三	一	一	一	本多正直	三八・〇七
下等	工	四	七・二	五〇〇					二六	二六	同居	一	一			須崎忠行	二四・〇〇
下等	雜	七〇〇	三・六	八〇					二六	二六	借宅	二	一		一	神忠保	二六・〇六

計	
戸數	二
譯内 甲	
譯内 乙	二
譯内 甲乙相俟	
人員	三
譯内 甲	
譯内 乙	
譯内 甲乙相俟	三

等級	職業	舊祿米	改正祿米	公債受領高	生計困苦ノ種類 甲	乙	丙	丁	自宅借宅同居ノ別	人口	十五以上六十以下人口 男	十五以上六十以下人口 女	十四以下六十一以上人口	戸主	戸主ノ年齡
無等	雜	五〇〇	三・六	八〇					同居	六	三	二	一	金田正心	四八・〇七
無等	工	六・〇〇	七・一〇	五〇〇・〇〇		乙		丁	自宅	二	一	一		矢部光榮	四一・〇〇

總計	戸數	人員
上等		
中等	一	三
下等	二	三
無等	二	八

計	戸數	人員
計	二	八
内譯 甲		
内譯 乙	一	六
内譯 丙		
内譯 丁	一	二

滋賀縣下舊彥根藩士族生計一覽表

等級	職業	舊祿米	改正祿米	公債受領高	現在財產 地價	現在財產 公債	現在財產 株券	現在歳入 甲	現在歳入 乙	現在歳入 計	自宅借宅同居ノ別	人口	男 十五以上六十以下人口	女 十五以上六十以下人口	十四以下六十一以上人口	戸主	戸主ノ年齢
中等	官員	三人口二	八	四八五					一三〇	一三〇	借宅	五	一	一	三	池田勇夫	二七・〇八
下等	飲食店	三・八	六	四八五		四八五		五三・九五	二〇	七三・九五	借宅	五	一	三	一	金森音吉	五五・〇〇
下等	無職	九・六	六・一	三六〇		四八〇		三三・六	一六	四九・六	仝	三	一	二		西田德次郎	一七・〇八
下等	農	九〇	一三	四八五					二五	二五	自宅	二		一	一	高木乙吉	一三・〇〇
下等	雜	一四	七・五	三〇八					六〇	六〇	借宅	五	一		四	大橋喜九三	四八・〇九

計	戸數	人員
計	四	一五
内譯 甲	〇	〇
内譯 乙	二	七
内譯 甲乙相俟	二	八

等級	職業	舊祿米	改正祿米	公債受領高	生計困苦ノ種類 甲	生計困苦ノ種類 乙	生計困苦ノ種類 丙	生計困苦ノ種類 丁	自宅借宅同居ノ別	人口	男 十五以上六十以下人口	女 十五以上六十以下人口	十四以下六十一以上人口	戸主	戸主ノ年齢
無等	工	三・八	六	四八五		乙			借宅	六	一	一	四	中島銀太郎	一七・〇四
無等	農	九・〇〇	三・〇〇		甲				同居	一			一	小倉重吉	七一・〇〇

計	戸數	人員
計	二	七
内譯 甲	一	一
内譯 乙	一	六
内譯 丙	〇	〇
内譯 丁	〇	〇

總計	戸數	人員
上等		
中等	一	五
下等	四	一五
無等	二	七

岐阜縣管内士族生計總覽表

種別	上等 戸	上等 人員	中等 戸	中等 人員	下等 戸	下等 人員	計 戸	計 人員
戸數 人員	四〇二	一、八〇六	六七八	三、九〇八	一、五九〇	六、九四三	二、六七〇	一一、六九九
内譯 甲ノ歳入ヲ主トシテ生計スルノ戸口	四八	一九九	八六	三〇〇	三八四	一、二三四	五一八	一、七三三
内譯 乙ノ歳入ヲ主トシテ生計スルノ戸口	二七	一四四	一〇四	四〇〇	四一〇	一、九〇〇	五四一	二、六八四
内譯 甲乙ノ歳入相俟テ生計スルノ戸口	三二六	一、四八七	四八六	二、一八八	八〇八	三、九二九	一、六二〇	七、六〇二

無等	戸	人員
計	四一〇	一、八二三
甲	四三	一三三
乙	二七二	一、三九七
丙	八六	二六〇
丁	九	三三

總計	戸數	人員
總計	三、〇八〇	一三、五二二

生活古典叢書　第1巻

興業意見 他 前田正名関係資料

編集・解説　安藤良雄（あんどう よしお）　山本弘文（やまもと ひろぶみ）

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日本資本主義の展開過程
現代日本経済史講義
現代日本経済史入門
日本資本主義の歩み

日本経済史論（共著）1967年
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薩摩藩の洋式工業（論文）1960年
明治前期の馬車輸送（論文）1963年

1971年6月15日　初版発行　定価 4,000円

発行者　中川豊三郎
印刷者　春山宇平
株式会社　光生館
東京都文京区大塚2-1-17
振替　東京130621
郵便番号　112
電話（943）3335(代)—8

©1971 第8回配本

装幀　志賀紀子

本文整版印刷　株式会社共立社印刷所
本文用紙　王子製紙株式会社
表紙クロス　日本クロス工業株式会社
製本　有限会社佐抜製本所
製函　株式会社光陽紙器製作所

生活古典叢書（全八巻）

光生館発行

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余暇生活の研究

第五回配本・二三〇頁・定価三〇〇〇円

ICHIROU INUKAI: THE KÔGYÔ IKEN: JAPAN'S TEN YEAR PLAN? 1884

(K.S.U.:Economic and Business Review, No.6, May 1979, The Society of Economics and Business Administration, Kyoto Sangyo University, pp.100; CDS, Trivandrum :309.230952, B 4(64189)

p.38) (a)Which requirement should be considered as most important in the present efforts of the government in building Japanese industries? It can be neither capital nor laws and regulations because both are dead things in themselves and totally ineffective. The spirit/willingness sets both capital and regulations in motion. ...If we assign weights to these three factors with respect to their effectiveness, spirit/ willingness should be assigned five parts, laws and regulations four, and capital no more than one part.[7]/ MZZKSS Vol 18,p.433/; p.55/436/ KOGYO IKEN (30 Vols, approved by Cabinet 1884; chief planner: MAEDA MASANA MATSUKATA (1850-1921),in Paris 1869-78; ref page 98 to MAEDA MASANA: KOGYO IKEN? in MEIJI ZENKI ZAISEI KEIZAI SHIRYO SHUSEI MZZKSS? VOL 18; chief political person: MATSUKATA MASAYOSHI(1835-1912) in Eyrope 1878, Finance Minister 1881-1901, PM 1891-2,1896-8

I. Summary
II Introduction
III Present Condition
IV Causes
V-X References, both domestic and foreign
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/Ichirou Inukai: I have completed translation of six volumes of the original document. These are volumes I(Summary), Vol II(Introduction), Vol III(Present Condition), Vol IV(Causes), Vol XI(Spirit/Willingness), and Vol XIV (National Economic Capacity, Part 3). The translation will be published later./

KODANSHA INTERNATIONAL Ltd
2-2, OTOWA 1-CHOME, BUNKYO-KU, TOKYO

/in KODANSHA Encyclopaedia of JAPAN, Tokyo 1983, 10 volumes, Vol 4:387pp; Vol 4, p.249: KÔGYÔ IKEN (Opinions on Promoting Industry). Record of industrial production of the first 17 years of the Meiji period(1868-1912 Commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, the editor, Maeda Masana(1850-1921), travelled [illegible]16 consist of regional reports. Copies were distributed to prefectural governors. The Kogyo Iken is invaluable for its information on economic conditions of the early Meiji period/

p.59) Maeda:"Ask for facts before making any decisions!" at French defeat and chaos: "I felt confidence in our ability to achieve what the West achieved." p.4,14 "Enrich the nation to strengthen the army."

Pantheon Asia Lib: The Japan Reader 1: Imperial Japan 1800-1945, Ed. Jon Livingston, Joe Moore, & Felicia Oldfather, 1973

VOL. XXXIII, No. 3 JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES MAY 1974

Whig History, Japanese Style: The Min'yūsha Historians and the Meiji Restoration

PETER DUUS

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> "Chou is an old country, but its mandate is new." So too it is with Japan. Even though useless, empty-headed fellows prattle about the three thousand years of our history, it was the great revolution of the Restoration that brought about the establishment of Japan as a single people, unashamed. The glory of our creation is in the Restoration, and the achievements of our fathers' land are in the Restoration. The great revolution of the Restoration has determined the great way our people will follow for all time.[1]

WITH these stirring lines Takekoshi Yosaburō opened the preface to the 1893 edition of his *Shin Nihonshi* (*History of New Japan*). It is difficult to imagine a more enthusiastic celebration of the Meiji Restoration than one likening it to the epochal founding of the Chou dynasty. Yet those who read beyond the confident affirmation of the preface soon encountered a rising note of anxiety, concern, even alarm in the pages that followed. For it was clear that however highly Takekoshi regarded the ideals of the "great revolution of the Restoration," he also saw them in jeopardy. "Today," he wrote, "slightly more than twenty years since the Restoration, the general public has begun to tread the path of unrighteousness. Ministers in power err in their policies, and those in opposition err in their views, and together both make pronouncements that give comfort only to themselves. That is why the author has taken up his brush in indignation to narrate a general outline of the changing times since the Restoration."[2] The revolution, in short, was a revolution betrayed, or at least unfulfilled.

The theme is a familiar one. How hard it has been for most Japanese intellectuals since the 1880s to regard the Restoration with the unqualified pride that one might expect to surround such a decisive event. To be sure, one looks in vain for a Japanese Burke or Carlyle asking whether the Restoration was necessary and justified, or a Japanese de Maistre touting the glories of the *ancien régime*. Nor were there many intellectuals who doubted that Japan was better off for having been through the Restoration. But admiration for the Restoration was always grudging, qualified by the feeling that somehow it was "abortive," "incomplete," or "unfulfilled" as a historical event. It seemed a turning point that did not finally

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The author wishes to thank the National Foundation of Humanities for financial support during a stay in Japan in 1972–73 when this essay was written. He would also like to thank Professor John Pierson of the University of Illinois and Professor Harry Harootunian of the University of Chicago for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.

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[1] Matsushima Eiichi (ed.), *Meiji shiron shū, I: Meiji Bungaku zenshū*, Vol. 77 (Chikuma shobō, 1965) p. 3. Throughout this essay I have relied on the version of Takekoshi's *Shin Nihon shi* found in this volume.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 131.

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turn, or at least turn as far as it should have. Despite a willingness to concede that the Restoration made Japan stronger and more prosperous, most intellectuals since the 1880s have felt it should have done more.

The roots of this ambivalence toward the Restoration are not hard to surmise. Pride in the Restoration rested on its character as a "nationalist revolution," the decisive event which spared Japan the fate of other Asian peoples at the hands of Western imperialism. Reservations about it stemmed from the feeling that Japan, despite her independence from foreign control, her wealth and strength, or her modern civilization, still had not reached the state of perfection, felicity, or improvement found among the "most advanced civilizations" of the world. Judged as a "nationalist revolution," the Meiji Restoration was a success, but judged by other standards—as a social revolution, as an intellectual revolution, or even as a political revolution—it was a failure. Something "went wrong" with the Restoration that kept it from achieving its full promise. The deficiencies of present-day Japan could be understood only by looking at the failures of its immediate past.

It is not surprising that this ambivalent assessment of the Restoration should have begun in the late 1880s, nor that its first advocates were, like Takekoshi Yosaburō, members of the Min'yūsha group, writing for Tokutomi Sohō's *Kokumin no tomo*. As members of the "new generation" ("the young men of Meiji"), they were the first Japanese intellectuals able to view the Restoration from the outside, as a datum of the past rather than as a personal event in their own lives. Moreover, they had the advantage of perspective. It had not really been possible to assess the results of the Restoration before the constitutional and institutional reforms of the 1880s made clear the future direction of Japanese politics. Options for the future, still open in the 1870s and early 1880s, had narrowed considerably by the time the Meiji constitution was promulgated. Only then did it become possible to measure the promise of the Restoration against its results. It was clear to the Min'yūsha writers that despite the remarkable changes that had taken place since 1868 the future was by no means bright. A national assembly had been established but the oligarchs continued to dominate the government; the destruction of old class barriers had allowed the able and ambitious to rise in the world, but already the outlines of a new privileged class were visible; knowledge had been gathered widely from the outside world, but with alarming frequency voices were being raised in praise of the old ways; material progress had been remarkable, but its benefits were not equally shared by all; and so forth. On every side, there was evidence to conclude that the Restoration-revolution had failed to live up to its original ideals.

In part, this concern rested on a feeling that the policies of the Meiji government had strayed far from the brave declarations of the Charter Oath. But to arrive at such a conclusion also required certain assumptions about the nature of history. It necessarily required a teleological view of human history that saw mankind moving ever upward and onward until it was liberated from bondage to a dead and oppressive past. It necessarily rested on what Herbert Butterfield has called the "whig interpretation of history," which divides the world into the friends and enemies of progress. There is no question that the men of the Min'yūsha adhered to such a view of history, and that they shared it with later intellectuals, not the least consequential of whom have been the Marxists. Consequently, in order to understand why the Restoration has been such a loved, unloved event in the eyes

of modern Japanese intellectuals, there is perhaps no better place to begin than with the Min'yūsha historians. Their work opened a historical discourse that has yet to be concluded.

The background of Min'yūsha historiography

The pages of the *Kokumin no tomo* were filled with the writings of many historians, but the Min'yūsha view of the Restoration can perhaps best be studied through the works of three of them—Tokutomi Sohō, Takekoshi Yosaburō, and Yamaji Aizan. The choice is not entirely arbitrary since all three were perhaps among the most outstanding non-academic historians of their generation, and certainly they were among the most masterful historiographical stylists of the time. To call them a "school" might be stretching a point, particularly since their ranks were broken by Tokutomi's famous "change of heart" in the mid-1890s, but during the early Meiji 20s, when they were at the height of their popular influence, they shared a common view of the immediate past and a common conception of how history ought to be written. For one thing, they were not academic historians, devoted to a painstaking verification and ordering of the facts. Their goal was education, not science. They were, as the tone of Takekoshi's rhetoric indicates, interested in arousing both the concern and the interest of their readers, and their works brimmed over with political passion. They felt more kinship with Macauley and Carlyle, whom they had read, than with Ranke, whom they had not.

Paradoxically, however, for all their interest in "arousing emotions" (Yamaji's phrase) it seems likely that the Min'yūsha historians saw themselves as being rigorously scientific. At least, when they wrote about the writing of history, they all seemed to share the feeling that one of its goals was to discover in the past the "laws" or "principles" of human society. In this respect they were much indebted to the confident and optimist whig historiography (and whig sociology) introduced to Japan in the 1870s directly through translations of Buckle, Guizot, Macauley, and Spencer and indirectly through the literature of "civilization and enlightenment." To be sure, there were radical differences among these Western writers, but certain similarities clearly shone through when contrasted with traditional Japanese historiography. To a greater or lesser degree, the Western historiography read by the Min'yūsha historians reflected the view, perhaps best expressed by Herbert Spencer, that "the highest office which the historian can discharge, is that of narrating the lives of nations, so as to furnish material for a Comparative Sociology; and the subsequent determination of the ultimate laws to which social phenomena conform." Naturally such "laws" were usually regarded as developmental, not as structural, and the most appropriate evidence for them was historical data.[3] In their search for the basic "laws" of history, these Western writers managed to confirm their conviction that their own societies represented the highest stage of human civilization. The iron laws of progress that men like Spencer discovered in the cumulative experience of mankind was the movement of mankind toward freedom, equality, prosperity, and peace. The end state of human progress, in other words, was very much like the liberal, capitalist, middle-class Victorian world in which they lived.

This mode of historical thought had a great impact in the early Meiji intellectual

[3] Herbert Spencer, *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical* (Littlefield, 1963) pp. 69–70.

world. As Carmen Blacker and others have pointed out, Western whig historiography became the basis for a "new history," whose principles were perhaps first enunciated by Fukuzawa Yukichi, the intellectual godfather of the *Kokumin no tomo*. In his attacks on traditional Confucianized historiography, Fukuzawa had deplored the fact that traditional history had not been "the history of the Japanese nation, but merely the history of Japanese government." He had called for the separation of history from the science of virtue and the science of statecraft, and its attachment to the science of society. The function of the historian, he said, was not to judge the virtues and vices of kings and their ministers, but rather the broader enterprise of studying "civilization," that is, the whole culture of a people. Borrowing directly from Guizot's *General History of European Civilization,* Fukuzawa had introduced a stage theory of history, portraying the development of mankind as the long but inevitable march from "barbarism" to "civilization," and defining each stage not by its approximation to some ideal state of virtue (as in traditional historiography), but by the level man had reached in his mastery over nature and society. The "history of civilization," in short, told not of man's fall from a state of primal grace, but his ascent to wordly perfection.[4]

This optimistic, materialistic, and positivistic view of history, which later permeated Min'yūsha historiography, produced a rash of *bunmeishi* ("histories of civilization") attempting to put into practice what Fukuzawa preached. These *bunmeishi* broke out of the traditional mode of political history, dominated by emperors and shōguns, battles and dynastic change. They attempted to describe Japan's past in all spheres of culture—literature, society, economy. Many writers in this genre felt that the writing of history should not be a meaningless accumulation of fact, but should be informed by a search for general principles behind social development—or at least, should use the past to demonstrate what these principles were.[5]

The first and perhaps classic example of this style of history was Taguchi Ukichi's *Nihon kaika shōshi* (*A Short History of Japanese Civilization*), published in several volumes between 1877 and 1882.[6] Taguchi, who drank from the same spring as Fukuzawa, was familiar not only with Buckle and Guizot, but had also read the works of Spencer and Lubbock on social evolution. His *Kaika shōshi* was intended to demonstrate that Japanese society, like all societies, was governed by fixed laws or principles. Given his attachment to classical liberal economics, it is not surprising that Taguchi rested his argument on the principles of Benthamite psychology. The inherent character of man, he wrote, "is to protect life and avoid death; to protect his life and avoid death, he must clothe himself, feed himself, and shelter himself."[7] To satisfy these basic impulses, man used his rational faculties to accumulate worldly goods. This in turn led to material progress. The "fixed principle" (*ittei no ri*)

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[4] For a summary of Fukuzawa's views on historiography, see Carmen Blacker, *The Japanese Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1954) pp. 90–100; Shirayanagi Yūko, "Meiji no shikaron," in Matsushima, *op. cit.*, pp. 428–432.

[5] In addition to the essay by Shirayanagi cited in note 4, there are several other good introductory essays on Meiji historiography: Ōkubo Toshiaki, "Meiji shonen no shigakkai to kindai rekishigaku no seiritsu," in Matsushima, *op. cit.*, pp. 407–422; Ienaga Saburō, "Keimō shigaku," in Matsushima, *op. cit.*, pp. 422–427; Yamaji Aizan, "Nihon gendai no shigaku oyobi shika," in Sumiya Mikio (ed.), *Nihon no meicho: Tokutomi Sohō/Yamaji Aizan* (Chūō Kōronsha, 1971) pp. 489–498. Shirayanagi's essay was originally published in 1934, Ōkubo's in 1940, and Ienaga's in 1957.

[6] I have used the Iwanami bunko edition: Taguchi Ukichi, *Nihon kaika shōshi,* annotated by Kaji Ryūichi, Iwanami bunko 1019–1020 (Iwanami shoten, 1972.)

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

that Taguchi ultimately "discovered" in Japanese history was the inexorable advance of material culture, which in turn made possible the advance of "literature," that is, intellectual culture, as well. In the absence of statistical evidence, Taguchi did not find it easy to document the advance of material progress as Buckle did in Europe, but by an ingenious comparison of evidence from literary sources he was able to show that men enjoyed higher living standards during the Tokugawa period than they had earlier.[8]

Given Taguchi's premises, the general argument of the *Kaika shōshi* was not particularly surprising—indeed, it was basically tautological, as historical thinking often is. But the work constitutes a major intellectual breakthrough for it was probably the first time that a Japanese historian had systematically read the Japanese past as the triumphant march of progress. Moreover, by pointing out that this progress was not dependent on government protection or foreign influence, but generated by the Japanese people themselves, Taguchi adumbrated a theme that was to recur in Min'yūsha historiography.[9] In a concrete way, he had shown that the "people," i.e., private persons were not simply passive by-standers in the historical process, but active participants, perhaps even the motive force, and that the experience of the past confirmed the basic principles of laissez-faire economics.

Taguchi's attempt to discover in the Japanese past universal laws or principles shared with the development of other civilizations was by no means isolated. An even stronger demand that Japanese history be written in accord with the principles of "sociology" was to be found in Miyake Yonekichi's *Nihon shigaku teiyō (A Manual for the Study of Japanese History)* published in 1884. Like Fukuzawa and Taguchi, Miyake proclaimed the need to break down the boundaries which confined history to "politics and ethics" and to broaden its purview to "society as a whole." "Those who make a study of history today," he wrote, "must study it chiefly in accordance with the basic principles of sociology. Moreover, they must have as their goal the discovery of the fixed laws (*teihō*) of sociology. No matter how much they pile up the facts of history, their work will be useless, if they do not use them to discover the great laws of society and the principles of human relations."[10] To be sure, all this was easier said than done—then, as now—but the important thing to note is that Min'yūsha historiography came into being in an intellectual atmosphere of confidence in man's ability to read the present and the future from the past.

One must perhaps qualify all this by pointing out that the "sociological approach" to history was by no means the only one current in the late 1880s. On the contrary, side by side with "histories of civilization" and other broad attempts to define the historical laws of social development, there had also emerged a "textual criticism" school of historiography that was as long on historical facts as it was short on historical laws.[11] The main practitioners of "textual criticism" were to be found in the universities or official government historiographical offices. As Yamaji Aizan observed, they were usually civil servants with steady salaries, not professional literary men dependent for their livelihood on public taste and approbation.[12] These academic historians were as much in revolt against the praise-and-blame approach of traditional historiography as men like Fukuzawa and Taguchi, but they fought not by

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 147–172.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 189–194.
[10] Quoted in Ienaga, *op. cit.*, pp. 424–425.
[11] Ōkubo, *op. cit.*, pp. 414–418.
[12] Sumiya, *op. cit.*, pp. 486–487.

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seeking out general laws of civilization, but by careful verification of historical facts. Their eyes were on evidence not on generalization. They were the heirs of the *kōshōgaku* tradition of historiography that had enjoyed a vogue since the last decades of the eighteenth century. They devoted themselves to gathering facts, compiling chronologies, and subjecting classic works of historiography (such as Rai Sanyō's *Nihon gaishi*) to rigorous textual criticism. They were capable, critical, and dedicated scholars, but basically uninspiring, without an axe to grind or the passion of political commitment.

Rather consciously, the Min'yūsha historians contrasted their own work with these bookish and bloodless academic scholars. "Even if one gets the facts right, one ought not say he has thereby written history," wrote Yamaji Aizan. "History is the science of studying the laws (*hōsoku*) of national development on the basis of the facts. Consequently, textual criticism (*kōshōgaku*) is but the preparation, history is the conclusion."[13] As professional writers, the Min'yūsha historians also knew that they could hardly hope to excite the public by finding errors in the *Nihon gaishi* or the *Dai Nihon shi* or by debunking popular historical myths. What the public craved was not the destruction of old myths but the creation of new ones to make sense of the buzzing confusion of the immediate past. It was these new myths that the Min'yūsha historians set out to provide under the name of historical law.

Tokutomi Sohō

If one has to single out a founder for the Min'yūsha school, the prime candidate is doubtless Tokutomi Sohō, editor of the *Kokumin no tomo*. Tokutomi was one of the most prodigious historians of modern Japan, and certainly one of its most brilliant stylist. Many know Tokutomi as historian for his biographies of Katsura, Yamagata, and Matsukata, without which the writing of many English-language works on Meiji history would have been difficult indeed. He was also the author of a massive *Kinsei Nihon kokumin shi* (*History of the Early Modern Japanese Nation*), whose hundred volumes, begun in 1918 and completed after Tokutomi's death in 1957, gather dust in most of our libraries. But Tokutomi's interest as historian lies not in these products of his later years, which often consisted of excerpts from original documents woven into narrative by Tokutomi's terse and pungent prose. Rather it lies in his early efforts as founder of the Min'yūsha group to rally his generation for a "second Restoration" (intellectual, not political) to complete the work of the first.

Tokutomi's most important contribution to Min'yūsha historiography was not strictly speaking a work of history, in the sense of narrative, but rather his tract for the times, *Shōrai no Nihon (The Future Japan)* published in 1886.[14] It was nonetheless both important and influential for it set forth an interpretation of the Restoration, later elaborated, refined, and developed by Takekoshi, Yamaji, and others. An enormously tendentious work, *Shōrai no Nihon* set out to prove that

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[13] Yamaji Aizan, "Shigakuron," in Ōkubo Toshiaki (ed.), *Yamaji Aizan shū: Meiji bungaku zenshū*, Vol. 35 (Chikuma shobō, 1965) p. 325. The essay originally appeared in *Kokumin shimbun*, 7/20/1900.

[14] I have relied on the version of *Shōrai no Nihon* found in Sumiya, *op. cit.*, pp. 61–183. A convenient summary of the book may also be found in Irokawa Daikichi, "Tokutomi Sohō ron," *Rekishi hyōron*, Vol. 96, pp. 32–43; Vol. 97 (1958), pp. 2–18.

Meiji Japan, like modern Europe, was on its way to becoming what Tokutomi called a "popular society" (*heiminteki na shakai*). What Tokutomi meant by the concept of "popular society," a term he used interchangeably with "industrial society," defies easy summary. "Popular society" was defined in contrast to "aristocratic society" (*kizokuteki na shakai*).[15] It was defined as a society in which the interests of the "common man," rather than those of an entrenched privileged elite, were dominant. More to the point, it was basically an idealized version of liberal bourgeois society, gleaned from the self-congratulatory works of mid-Victorian Englishmen, including not only the whig historians and sociologists already mentioned, but also the free-trade pamphleteers, Cobden and Bright. As Tokutomi described it, "commoner society" was liberal democratic in politics, laissez-faire capitalist in economics, egalitarian in society, and peaceful in international relations. It was a society in which the many ruled rather than the few, in which the state existed for the people rather than vice versa, in which social cohesion rested on freedom not coercion, in which authority rested on voluntary contract not on command, in which brotherhood and fraternity triumphed over slavery and subservience, in which wealth accrued to those who produced, and whose independence was maintained not through war-like aggression but through peaceful means.[16]

This rosy assessment of where Japan's future lay—as it turned out, seen through a rather clouded crystal ball—rested heavily on a distinction that Tokutomi borrowed from Herbert Spencer—and distorted to his own purposes. In his *Principles of Sociology,* Spencer set forth an evolutionary model of social change according to which society moved through a series of stages from the lowest form, simple society, through compound and doubly-compound forms, until it reached its highest form, the treble-compound society, which more or less described mid-Victorian England. At the same time, however, Spencer said it was also possible to classify societies in another way:[17]

> Otherwise, though less definitely, societies may be grouped as militant and industrial; of which the one type in its developed form is organized on the principle of compulsory cooperation, while the other in its developed form is organized on the principles of voluntary cooperation. The one is characterized not only by a despotic central power, but also by unlimited political control of personal conduct; while the other is characterized not only by a democratic or representative central power, but also by limitation of political control over personal conduct.

Spencer therefore placed the distinction between "militant" and "industrial" outside the evolutionary stage theory, regarding them more as two polarities, both possible

[15] As others have noted, *heiminshugi* is a troublesome term to translate. Cf. Kōsaka Masaaki, *Japanese Thought in the Meiji Era,* tr. David Abosch (Pan-Pacific Press, 1958) p. 207. Tokutomi intended to use it as a translation for the word "democracy." Professor John Pierson kindly pointed out to me that the original draft of Tokutomi's manuscript used *minshūshugi* instead of *heiminshugi*. However, the whole thrust of Tokutomi's work suggests that he understood "democracy" less as a set of political institutions than as a social system characterized by status equality. Hence I have chosen to translate *heiminteki* as "popular" or "commoner" rather than as "democratic."

[16] Sumiya, *op. cit.,* pp. 77–78.

[17] Quoted in Talcott Parsons, et al (ed.), *Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociology,* Vol. 1 (Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1961) p. 143. Spencer was not a unilinear evolutionist. As he noted in his *Principles of Sociology,* "Like other kinds of progress, social progress is not linear but divergent and re-divergent. Each differentiated product gives origin to a new set of differentiated products." (Vol. 3, p. 331.)

within any one stage, but neither necessarily identified with more complex, and therefore, more advanced social forms.

It was the latter distinction that Tokutomi most took to heart. At the outset of *Shōrai no Nihon,* he followed Spencer's argument that society needed both "industrial" institutions to supply its material wants and "militant" institutions to protect itself from outside enemies.[18] But in the course of the book Tokutomi subtly transformed Spencer's distinction from a set of polarities into something nearly like a sequence of stages. By the book's conclusion it was obvious that he was desperately anxious to prove that Japan was to be transformed from a "militant-aristocratic society" into an "industrial-popular society." Obviously, this bending of Spencer's categories stemmed from his urgent desire that Japan follow in the footsteps of the Western countries, who alone had achieved the stage of "civilization." Like many other "men of Meiji," Tokutomi was a cultural absolutist, who identified the good society with the most advanced technically. He had difficulty in taking a position of cultural relativism, which admitted that all cultures were equal in the eyes of God—or sociologists. Wanting Japan to be advanced and "civilized," it is only natural that he argued it *had* to be. The "scientific laws of sociology," in this case Tokutomized Spencerian sociology, were a powerful intellectual weapon in arguing this to be the case. They implied that the direction in which a society moved was not a matter of choice or chance or even culture, but rather was determined by objective conditions.

Hence, *Shōrai no Nihon* was basically an attempt to specify the objective conditions that were to transform Japan into an "industrial society." A great deal of the book is devoted to a discussion of Japan's external circumstances and the "general trend of world history," both of which were likely to be influential in determining her future. The details of the argument need not detain us, except to note that while many of his contemporaries in the late 1880s were deeply pessimistic about the slow but steady advance of imperialism in the rest of the world, Tokutomi swept aside the constant warfare of nineteenth century Europe, the spread of colonialism, and other recalcitrant evidence of general international mayhem as mere surface phenomena, masking a deeper trend toward the advance of world peace. He did so by resort to the logic of Cobden, who argued that with the advance of industrialization, war and other military activity would be regarded as an unproductive and expensive enterprise. More persuasively, Tokutomi argued that the other "great trend" of the nineteenth century was the victory of *heiminshugi* ("popular democracy") over aristocratic society and the expansion of political liberty and liberty of belief. He cited the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the constitutional revolution in England, the abolition of the Corn Laws, and other landmarks of whig history as evidence. But his faith in the laws of unilinear progress necessarily led him to overlook the more recent development of Bismarck's Germany.[19]

The transformation of Japan into an "industrial society," however, was not simply to be the result of "general trends" in the outside world. Tokutomi argued that historical forces within Japan were also pushing in that direction. In discussing these historical forces he sketched the main outlines of the Min'yūsha view of the Restoration. Here Tokutomi followed several leads in Taguchi's *Kaika shōshi,* especially

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[18] Sumiya, *op. cit.,* pp. 72–74.

[19] *Ibid.,* pp. 95–138.

the chapters on the Tokugawa society, but he put them together in a slightly different way. Taguchi had noted the material progress of Tokugawa society but he had not tried to find in it the cause of the Restoration. Rather, as we have suggested, he was trying to make two other points: first, to establish that the "law" of material progress might be found in Japan's past as in the West's; and secondly, to argue that such material progress could come about under a "free" (laissez-faire) system which allowed this "law" to work itself out. When it came to analyzing the downfall of the Tokugawa, Taguchi singled out rather the rise of loyalist thought and the foreign threat as prime causes. The former laid the basis for an anti-bakufu movement after the latter had shattered the bakufu's authority.[20] But Tokutomi stood Taguchi on his head, or at least leaned him on one side, and looked for the origins of the Restoration in the material prosperity itself, relegating the foreign threat only secondary place, and the rise of loyalist thought practically no place at all.

Not too surprisingly, Tokutomi saw Tokugawa society riddled with flaws that led inexorably to its collapse. As a society that was at once "militant," "aristocratic," and "oppressive," Tokugawa Japan was in clear defiance of the evolutionary laws of history. The most basic problem, Tokutomi said, was that Tokugawa society rested on an "artificial" and "unnatural" economic system. The productive wealth of the country was extracted from the people to support the unproductive samurai; it was gathered from the countryside and collected in the castle towns, then gathered from the castle towns and collected in Edo, resulting in an unequal and therefore unnatural distribution of wealth. "Year after year, month after month, the country's wealth was thrown away on unproductive expenditure, and like money thrown down a well, it could never be recovered."[21] This exploitative system contained the seeds of its own destruction. The extraction of wealth from the commoners led the samurai into extravagance and effeminate gentility; it sapped "their original vital and simple sobriety," for they had more wealth than they needed. Under these circumstances it was clear that the ruling class was growing weaker and weaker, and eventually faced collapse. This was an argument he later restated in the opening sections of his biography of Yoshida Shōin in slightly altered form. "Peace was the envoy of wealth; wealth progressed; and it progressed extraordinarily. . . . The progress of wealth meant the impoverishment of the *bushi,* impoverishment meant debt, and debt meant the decline in influence in *bushi* society. . . . With social conditions as they were, a revolution could not have been avoided in the long run, even without the sudden emergence of the foreign problem."[22]

In Tokutomi's view the Restoration was the result of the inexorable working of the laws of social progress. He constantly refers to the inevitability of the forces of change, likening them now to a great floodtide, now to the pillar of fire that led the Hebrews through the wilderness. Pressures from within and without were tangible forces, which simply could not be stayed. Once the process of change started in the *bakumatsu* period, it became impossible to stop. One thing led to another, and the "great reform" rolled on, pushing aside all before it. The concessions to Perry led to internal upheaval; internal upheaval brought in its wake the return of sovereignty to the emperor; this led to the "restoration" (*chūkō*) of the

[20] Taguchi, *op. cit.,* pp. 195–208.
[21] Sumiya, *op. cit.,* p. 156.
[22] *Ibid.,* pp. 193–196.

Emperor, which led to the civil war, which led to the establishment of the Dajōkan, which led to the abolition of the domains, and so forth.[23] This reflected a highly determinist view of the Restoration, in which neither men nor ideas counted for much at all. Consequently, in Tokutomi's interpretation the leaders of the Restoration were merely instruments for the larger forces of historical change. They were neither "sages" nor "philosophers" but men rushed along by the "pressure of inevitable forces." "Their policies, taken *in response to changing circumstances, unknowingly and unconsciously* laid the great foundations for transforming our militant society [i.e. Tokugawa society] into an industrial society, and our aristocratic society into a popular society (Italics mine)."[24] It was not the Meiji leaders, but the "great trends" which moved them, that "created the solidarity of the new Japan." The leaders of all parties, whether *sabaku* or *kinnō, jōi* or *kaikoku*, were merely acting out of historical necessity.[25]

To some extent, Tokutomi retreated from this unrelieved determinism in his biography of Yoshida Shōin (published in 1893), which not only laid more stress on ideas but also gave greater credit to the lower samurai element in the Restoration movement. But the general outlines of his interpretation remained the same. Internal social breakdown, the rise of anti-bakufu forces from below, and the inevitable rush of society toward massive change set the background for Yoshida's actions.[26] Attributing the Restoration to "historical forces" rather than to the men who brought it about reflected the historicist assumptions implicit in the Spencerian model. But more important, it allowed Tokutomi to rob the oligarchs of their achievements. By making the Meiji leaders revolutionaries in spite of themselves, he could dissociate them from everything progressive—and therefore good—that had happened since the Restoration. If one could argue that the Meiji leaders were unaware of the import of their policies, then one could also question whether their continuing leadership was appropriate in the changed world of the 1880s. The implications of this argument were spelled out even more clearly in the work of Takekoshi Yosaburō.

Takekoshi Yosaburō

Takekoshi Yosaburō's reputation as a historian has not been enhanced among Western readers by the translation of a number of his works into English. Few who descend as neophytes into the English translation of his *Economic Aspects of the History of Japanese Civilization* can emerge from that chaotic work unscathed. Still, Takekoshi was the author of two of the most widely read historical works of the 1890s: *Shin Nihon shi (A History of the New Japan, 1891–1892)* and *2500 nen shi (Twenty-five Hundred Years of Japanese History,* 1896). According to

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 165–170.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 166.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

[26] I have relied on the version of *Yoshida Shōin* found in Sumiya, *op. cit.*, pp. 189–329. This is the original edition published in 1893. As is well known, Tokutomi later revised the work in 1908 out of deference to the wishes of Yoshida's former students, who had become leaders of the *hanbatsu* and patrons of Tokutomi himself. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 31. In the original version Tokutomi portrayed Yoshida as a "child of the times." As he wrote, the "atmosphere of ferment in Japan at length produced men like him and brought about actions like his." *Ibid.*, p. 192. Again, Tokutomi pointed out in the early edition, "With social conditions such as they were, a revolution could not have been avoided eventually, even without the sudden emergence of the foreign problem." *Ibid.*, p. 196.

Yamaji Aizan, the latter was more popular reading among some ladies than the latest novels, and it was printed in so many copies that it forced up the price of paper. Others were less complimentary. One critic, comparing Takekoshi to a more scholarly historian, said his history was more like a faddish patent medicine than like the prescription of a specialist, though Takekoshi may well have regarded this comment as a badge of merit.

In contrast to Tokutomi, who was really a pamphleteer with a theory of history, Takekoshi was a more conventional historian, interested in the flow of events. Nonetheless, he was not a man satisfied simply to accumulate facts and chase down every last source. He preferred to paint in broad strokes, much in the style of Taguchi. His *Shin Nihonshi,* one of the great seminal historical works of modern Japan, was basically a *bunmeishi,* dealing with the totality of Japanese society—politics, economics, society, ideas, foreign policy—from the late Tokugawa period down through the establishment of the constitution.[27] More important, it was a consciously revisionist work, attempting to demolish conventional wisdom about the causes and character of the Restoration. "Old style historians," said Takekoshi, attributed the Restoration to "loyalist ideas" (*kinnōron*). Others attributed it to the opening of relations with the outside world. Takekoshi was prepared to accept both views as partial explanations for the "great transformation" (*daihendō*), but neither were the whole truth, nor even "basic reasons" for the Restoration. Rather, following the same line of argument as Tokutomi, he suggested that the real causes of the Restoration lay in the emergence of basic discontent in Tokugawa society ending in the violent political explosion which brought its collapse.[28]

The Restoration, said Takekoshi, was a special kind of revolution, basically different from the classical models of the English, French, and American revolutions. The English case was a "restorationist revolution" (*fukkōteki kakumei*), in which the people, appealing to ancient liberties—a "political paradise" in the ancient past—overturned a monarchy that had violated them. By contrast, the American and French cases were "idealistic revolutions," brought about by thinkers and philosophers who looked not to the past, but to the future, to a "heaven of political freedom," and attempted to replace the existing regime with a "perfect country" based on these ideals. The Restoration was neither. It was an "anarchistic revolution" (*ranseiteki kakumei*—the translation is Takekoshi's), bursting forth from the misery of an oppressed people who found their "suffering was intolerable."[29]

Takekoshi took particular pains to deny that the Restoration was a "restorationist revolution." Indeed he emphatically denied a "golden age" in the Japanese past. The Japanese people could find no glorious political paradise in their past, only an age in which "emperors dabbled at poetry, nobles lived for love affairs and jealousies, the shogun and feudal lords worried more about the difficulty of controlling their women than controlling the realm, and the samurai feared the commoners rising behind them." To call the Restoration a "restorationist revolution" was "mere poppycock." No, said Takekoshi, the final cause behind the Restoration, as behind all

[27] The first volume of *Shin Nihon shi* appeared in July 1891 and went through seven printings by January 1893. The second volume appeared in August 1892. A third volume was projected and was evidently prepared, but was never published. The first two volumes were published by the Min'yūsha.

[28] Matsushima, *op. cit.,* pp. 133–134.

[29] *Ibid.,* p. 134.

"anarchistic revolutions," was "the gradual loosening of the cohesive power of society and its final dissolution."[30]

What then caused the breakdown of social cohesion in Tokugawa society? Here Takekoshi offered a number of explanations, some of which echoed Tokutomi's reworking of Taguchi. One was the inherent fragility of the feudal system, which could hang together only if it rested on acceptance of a central authority. In the case of the Tokugawa the system began to lose this authority from around the time of Yoshimune, whose sumptuary laws were widely ignored by the people.[31] But more important, and obviously related to this loss of central authority, was the long-run change in the relationship between the rulers, the *bushi,* and the ruled, the townsmen and peasants. The impoverishment of the *bushi* class, whose growing taste for luxury outran the growth of their incomes, was accompanied by the reciprocal growth in the prosperity of the "merchant, the peasant, the money-lender, the shopkeeper, and the great capitalist." The reason for this reciprocal relationship between samurai poverty and commoner wealth, said Takekoshi, was that the "political economy of the time did not center on how to increase the wealth of the [country]," but rather on "how to get as much of the [country's] limited wealth into the hands of the government." "The bakufu made demands on the feudal lords, and the feudal lords made demands on the four estates. If the four estates were unable to suffer the exactions of the feudal lords, neither could the feudal lords endure the exactions of the bakufu. To escape from these exactions, there was nothing to do but wait for an overturning of the dynasty (*daichō kakumei*)."[32]

While Tokutomi vaguely described the forces of change in abstractions and metaphors—floods, waves, pillars of fire, and the like—Takekoshi suggested that as the authority of the feudal system declined there developed a popular "force for popular rights," springing from the ranks of the common people and rooted firmly in their discontent over the "exactions of the samurai." The key element in this popular movement was the *shōya,* village head and landowner. The *shōya* class stood at the center of a "kind of system of local self-government," half-private, half-official, in which they functioned as "little Diet members or *gun* chiefs." Over the course of the Tokugawa period, they had come to possess "pedigree, moral influence, and ability," and they were in no sense inferior to the *bushi* "in spirit, in ideas, in learning, or in breeding." It was they to whom the people naturally gave their respect, and it was they who interposed themselves between the people and "the exactions of the samurai and the extortions of the magistrates." Indeed, Takekoshi went so far as to say that it was only among this class that existed "a spirit of willingness to sacrifice oneself for the public interest out of devotion to the people."[33] From this class, in village and town, in city and countryside, there "sprang any number of little Hampdens" ready to protest tyranny.

Still, Takekoshi leaped to no easy conclusion about these "little Hampdens" among the *shōya*-landlord class. He did not suggest it was they who eventually overthrew the bakufu. On the contrary, he pointed to the many failures in the struggles of "virtuous landlords against evil magistrates." But he read their struggle as harbinger of a growing possibility of clash between commoner and *bushi,* between

[30] *Loc. cit.*
[31] *Ibid.,* pp. 4–6.
[32] *Ibid.,* p. 135.
[33] *Ibid.,* pp. 135–136. Also see pp. 158–160.

"wealth and military power," between "reason and authority." "If [the popular movement of resistance] continued to push and advance as it had, a great clash between samurai and commoner would finally have been inescapable, even though [the movement] might not have taken up the slogan of *sonnō tōbaku*."[34]

In spinning out this theory of a rising rural gentry, Takekoshi was laying out proofs for his thesis that Tokugawa society was rapidly losing its cohesion. But at the same time he was also trying to scotch a current piece of conventional wisdom—namely that only the Anglo-Saxon peoples had a history of "democratic movements," and that historically no such movements existed in Japan. Such a position was taken not only by many foreigners, but also by those in the government who pointed out that Japan was not ready for liberal political institutions. For Takekoshi, however, there was "no error so great" as this attempt to expunge "democratic elements" (*minshū no bunshi*) from Japan's past. Not only had there been popular movements of resistance, there had also been a primitive democratic ideology—or at least a primitive notion of popular rights. The *shōya* may not have known of "the universal principle that all mankind possesses equal rights, but they did form political principles of their own, however crude, based either on the Chinese notion of democracy—that all-under-heaven was not the realm of one man but the realm of all—or out of the traditional notion that throughout history outstanding kings and benevolent ministers had identified the interests of the people with the interests of the state."[35] It was these ideas which inspired *aiminka* (lovers of the people) like Ōshio Heihachirō, Yamagata Daini, and Fujii Samon as well as peasant rebel leaders like Satō Sajibei.

Not surprisingly, Takekoshi is rather wistful about the failure of popular resistance to the Tokugawa system to achieve concrete results. Here, he seemed to say, was an indigenous popular base for a major transformation of the system. But the bakufu merely used peasant risings against the daimyo and their magistrates as an excuse to confiscate their domains and reduce their power. Instead of recruiting the talents of the "nameless lower samurai and the commoners" who appealed to the bakufu for aid against oppressive daimyo and tyrannical magistrates, the bakufu continued to rely on "elders of high pedigree." "Oh, how this shows how mistakenly the wisdom, bravery, eloquence, and power that gives society its driving force had been distributed."[36] These new and vital elements rising from the people became the enemies not the friends of the bakufu, and the loss was not only the bakufu's but Japan's as well.

The general conclusion Takekoshi reached, then, was that given the enormous socio-economic changes that had eroded it, Tokugawa society "*had* to turn in some new direction"—it "had to break down and create some new kind of cohesion." The *ancien régime* was like "an overripe fig, ready to burst at a touch" and all the reform efforts of bakufu leaders were but "preservatives" scattered on the ripe fruit, but unable to stay the rot. "The general trend was toward collapse and destruction and there was nothing that could be done about it."[37] If the foreign problem had not provided the occasion for its collapse, something else would have. In the face of the *crise de système*, loyalist thought was like a "dust flurry borne on the winds of a

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 136.
[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 137–138.
[36] *Loc. cit.*
[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 139–141.

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typhoon," and to see it as the cause of the Restoration was "to mistake a firefly for starlight." Loyalty to the emperor was merely an ideological tool—a device to unite the people against the foreigners and substitute a new kind of leadership for the defunct bakufu. "The great revolution made manifest the sublimity, the majesty, and the purity of the Imperial House; loyalty to the Throne was not a cause of the great revolution; rather it was the consequence of the great revolution made live by the people."[38] In sum, reversing the loyalist pieties of the oligarchic government, Takekoshi made the people the benefactor of the emperor, rather than vice versa.

Consequently, although Takekoshi described in great detail the political turmoil of the 1850s and 1860s, like Tokutomi, he attached little importance either to the slogans or the policies of the contending factions. *Sonnō, jōi, sabaku, tōbaku, kōbugattai*—all were nothing more than "flotsam and jetsam floating on the great wave of reform (*henkaku*)." While political struggle occurred at the top of society, irresistible forces were at work below, bringing down the old order and establishing a new one, before men realized it. Again, following Tokutomi, Takekoshi discounted the role of the men who came to power in 1868. They had no idea of what kind of society or what kind of political structure they wanted to create. They were merely a "party of opportunists riding the high tide of great change." The social revolution they engineered in the wake of Restoration—the emancipation of the commoners, the levelling of the *bushi* class, the revolution in land holding, and so forth—were all extrapolations of the great social changes that had occurred during Tokugawa times, and even these changes were superficial.[39] The Meiji government, which had come to power with "restorationist" slogans of *ōsei fukko*, went along with the social revolution, even though not especially committed to it, because to have opposed it would have brought a clash with progressive elements among the people. A more fundamental movement for change began outside the government in the realm of ideas, where men like Fukuzawa, relentlessly subjecting old orthodoxies to a searching and skeptical inquiry, paved the way for an "emancipation of men's minds" by a wholesale attack on the old society. Once again, it was a latter-day *aiminka*—or at least private individuals rather than government officials—who acted as the real agents for the forces of the change.[40] The revolution came about in spite of the oligarchic leaders, rather than because of them.

The society which Takekoshi saw beginning to emerge out of the destruction of the old order was the "popular society" Tokutomi had described in *Shōrai no Nihon*. It was basically an egalitarian society, where no one enjoyed special privileges, where all enjoyed the same rights, and where membership in society was open to all on an equal basis. The old Japan had been divided into "artificial classes," based on exclusiveness, heredity, and tradition, but all this had been overthrown by the Restoration and the post-Restoration reforms. The new Japan was becoming a pluralistic society made up of voluntary associations, in which leaders were chosen on the basis of talent and ability, in which all members enjoyed the same rights and obligations, and in which all members cooperated because they joined as a matter of free choice. (Takekoshi even went so far as to suggest that the basic social paradigm was a church congregation.) But perhaps most important, this "new society" had important implications for the solidarity, or perhaps the cohesion,

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 142.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 143.
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 145–146.

of the new Japan. A nation—a people, as Takekoshi put it—could not exist in a country where one class dominated another. But in a society whose members were equal and whose membership was a matter of free choice, social cohesion was "natural and firm," and by implication the state which rested on it was likewise more stable.[41] Consequently, the reason the "new Japan" was great and strong was not because its people were "loyal to the Throne," but because it rested on "voluntary cooperation" rather than on "compulsory cooperation"—although Takekoshi does not use these terms, as Spencer and Tokutomi did.

Yamaji Aizan

Yamaji Aizan is perhaps less well known to most Western readers than either Tokutomi or Takekoshi, but in Japan he is probably more respected than either as a historian. He never produced a monumental multi-volume work like Tokutomi's history of the Tokugawa period or Takekoshi's economic history. He had planned such a work, a massive "History of the Japanese People," but he managed to complete only one section before his death. Nevertheless he was a productive and perceptive historian, who won the admiration of a later generations of historians, among them men like Hattori Shisō. The breadth of his interests was wide, ranging from essays on Meiji literature to a classic history of Meiji Christianity. Yamaji never wrote specifically on the Meiji Restoration itself, being more inclined to intellectual, social, and economic history than political narrative.[42] It is clear that he shared the view of both Tokutomi and Takekoshi that the Restoration was not simply a political revolution, but a "total revolution," penetrating every aspect of material and spiritual life. However, he confined his own writings to the background of the Restoration and its effects, rather than dealing with the event itself.

Yamaji's interest for us lies in his assiduous explorations of the history of the common people. He followed Fukuzawa's precepts on the need to look at the life of the little man even more rigorously than Taguchi had. Indeed for him events in the lives of the common people were as important if not more important than high affairs of state. Discussing the diffusion of cotton in place of silk or linen following introduction of cotton seeds by the Portuguese, Yamaji noted that the "struggle between cotton and silk" was of more interest, and more consequence to most Japanese than the struggle between daimyo armies at Sekigahara. "Unfortunately since the history that exists in Japan is the history of warriors and aristocrats and not the history of the common people, this kind of event has been neglected. But if the role of the Japanese historian is to depict the condition of the Japanese people, then ought not we record their circumstances in great detail?"[43] Yamaji's own answer to this rhetorical question was obvious. Many of his contributions to the *Kokumin no tomo* treat the life of the common people in detail—essays on material progress during the Tokugawa period, on the institutions of local government, on the development of popular literary forms, and so forth.[44] He was dedicated to

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[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 160–161.

[42] Several of these may be found in the collections of Yamaji's works cited above. Yamaji's best known essays on Meiji history are *Meiji bungakushi* (1893), *Gendai Nihon kyōkai shi* (1905), and *Gendai kinken shi* (1908).

[43] Yamaji Aizan, "Kinsei busshitsuteki shimpo," in Ōkubo (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 269. This essay was originally published in *Kokumin no tomo*, 10–11/1892.

[44] *Loc. cit.;* Yamaji Aizan, "Tokugawa jidai no minsei," in *ibid.*, pp. 279–290; "Heiminteki tanka no hattatsu," *ibid.*, p. 290–296. The latter two essays appeared in *Kokumin no tomo*, 11–12/1892, and 9–10/1892, respectively.

showing that the commoners had a past, and that it was an important one. He argued, for example, that in the realm of law there had been a "little tradition" of local custom quite independent of the bakufu's decrees, and a system of local self-rule as well, which protected the peasants and lightened their burdens in the face of "military dictatorship."[45] He stayed close to the documents in these essays, always factual, drily so at times, but his pursuit of the evidence was always informed by the impulse to resurrect the "nameless men" of the past and give them significance if not a name. He never worked out a broad and sustained synthesis like Tokutomi or Takekoshi, but in a sense let the evidence speak for itself.

The one possible exception, especially interesting for our purposes, was an essay written in 1897 which took up a suggestion in the *Shin Nihon shi* that the Japanese had enjoyed a long and substantial history of human rights.[46] The essay was prompted by a remark of Shinagawa Yajirō, one of the most hated representatives of *hanbatsu* tyranny, that the cabinet was responsible only to the Emperor and that the political structure rested on Japan's own special *kokutai*. Angered by such a blanket assertion, Yamaji set out to demolish the notion that "loyalty to the Throne" had been the *leitmotiv* of Japanese politics, past and present, and that the Japanese people were naturally obedient and submissive to authority. Such a view, said Yamaji, would reduce the 2500 years of Japanese history to a "hellish chronicle of sacrifice of the blood and life of the people for the sake of the emperor." In reality, the facts showed that Japan's past was "clearly a history of the development of human rights."[47]

Yamaji's defense of this position was more ingenious than convincing, but none-theless brilliantly original. In part, he presented evidence such as that already put forth by Tokutomi and Takekoshi—the rise of the urban commoners in the Tokugawa period, the townsmen, merchants, and great capitalists who gradually encroached on the power of the samurai class. But the novelty of Yamaji's argument was that he pushed the "rise of the people" and the "struggle for liberty and human rights" much farther back into history, to its very beginnings. Basically Yamaji described the development of human rights as a kind of "trickling down process," with liberties and political control first won by those at the very pinnacle of society, and then gradually spreading to an ever widening circle of the people. His own metaphor, more elegant and more Japanese, likened the spread of liberty to the rays of the rising sun, which first struck the mountain peaks, then the lower slopes, and finally shone into the valleys.[48]

In Yamaji's interpretation, all the conventional climactic moments in Japanese history became victories for expanding liberty and the growing power of the people. The Taika reforms marked the uniting of the people behind the emperor to protect themselves from the tyrannies of the great clan aristocracy and to defend the land against the Koreans and the barbarians; the introduction of Buddhism led to the emancipation of the unfree or slave class; the struggle of the Heike and the Genji against the Fujiwara was like the struggle of the seventeenth century English gentry against the arbitrary rule of the Stuarts; the Kamakura regime was established, in effect, as a kind of council of the barons, in which lay the seeds of republicanism; the stability of the Hōjō regents rested on their protection of the land rights of the

[45] Ōkubo (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 290.

[46] Yamaji Aizan, "Nihon ni okeru jinken no hattatsu no konseki," in *ibid.*, pp. 314–324. The essay appeared in *Kokumin no tomo*, 1/1897.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 315.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 318.

great landholders against arbitrary incursions by the state; the Restoration of Go-Daigo occurred against the background of growing tyranny, centralization, and restriction of the people's liberties following the Mongol invasion attempts; and so forth. In sum, the "people," or at least the landed classes, fought against arbitrary impositions from above and defended their property rights as vigorously as the landed classes of England.[49] This interpretation places a rather broad construction on the meaning "liberty," "individual rights," or "popular rights." Basically it identified struggle against constituted but tyrannical authority as the "struggle for liberty" without suggesting that the "liberties" sought by men of one age might be vastly different from "liberties" sought by those of another. But Yamaji's view of medieval Japan placed no more strained a construction on the historical evidence than the notion, widely held in the nineteenth century, that the Magna Carta was not a feudal document, embodying the interests of the barons, but a liberal one defining the rights of all free men. (Perhaps that is where he got his idea.)

Rather interestingly, just as Takekoshi described the popular risings of the Tokugawa period as a "turning point that never turned," Yamaji regarded the *sengoku* period as the age in which the Japanese came closest to establishing the liberal institutions of representative government. The key class, potentially able to work this change, was not the *shōya*-landlord class, but the class of petty barons, perhaps 5,000 or 6,000, who were able to command 100–200 vassals. This class, which had "unconsciously" fought for their rights throughout the feudal period, was finally in the position, following the Ōnin War and the collapse of all central authority, to consolidate these rights by establishing a "representative system" (*daigisei*) of government. Unfortunately, however, they were absorbed instead by 200 or 300 larger barons, the sixteenth century daimyo, and this in turn paved the way for the Tokugawa, who unified the country and established a kind of absolutism, under which the petty barons and their knights lost their lands and became the much weakened samurai class of the eighteenth century. Yamaji, however, argued that this failure did not imply that the people had abandoned their struggle for liberty or lost a sense of their rights. Rather, it was purely fortuitous. It resulted from the introduction of Western firearms, which created the need for larger armies, and in turn for more centralization and the assembling of the knights in the castle towns. Consequently, despite the establishment of Tokugawa absolutism, the struggle for liberty continued, albeit with the urban commoners rather than the small barons as the main protagonists.[50]

Therefore, Yamaji concluded in his peroration, "Human rights progressed step by step from one age to the next. From ancient times the people of Japan have had the ability to make government bend to their will. Whoever today says that they do not have such power shows contempt for the history of Japan, does not understand the *kokutai* of Japan, betrays the sentiments of the Japanese people, and casts scorn on the ancestral Imperial Will which for 2500 years has graciously regarded the heart of the Japanese people as its own."[51] This put Shinagawa Yajirō in his place, but more important it summed up two of the basic implications of the Min'yūsha historians' view of their own past. First, it asserted that Japanese history was not

[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 315–318.
[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 320–323.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 324.

unique or radically different from the history of the West as then conceived, namely as the slow but inexorable march of mankind toward liberty and progress. It denied that there were "racial" or "spiritual" differences in the Japanese past—traditional devotion to the throne, *Bushidō,* the idea of the family state, or whatever—that set Japan off from the rest of the world, and perhaps made it superior. Secondly, as a corollary, by reading the Japanese past as a history of struggle and resistance to unjust authority, rather than as a struggle of the throne to recover its rightful place (or as "loyalist thought" teaching by example), it countered the argument that the Japanese people were not yet ready for self-government, representative institutions, or democracy.

The implications of Min'yūsha historiography

Today some of the themes of Min'yūsha historiography strike us as worn and commonplace. Few would probably dispute the assertion that "loyalist thought" per se was not the basic cause of the Restoration, and few would disagree that the Restoration resulted as much from certain long-run trends in Japanese society as from the "arrival of the foreigners." Yet other propositions advanced by the Min'yūsha historians may strike us as bizarre or at least unfamiliar. For example, few current assessments of the Restoration suggest that Japan, like the "liberal" West, had a long tradition of popular struggles for liberty or that the Meiji leaders were not revolutionary statesmen but the puppets of inevitable forces impelling Japan toward a liberal democratic society. Why the Min'yūsha historians suggested this to be so goes straight to the heart of their intellectual intentions.

It should be clear that the position of the Min'yūsha historians on the causes and character of the Restoration was intimately linked with their basic fear that the worst aspects of traditional Japan would not lie down and die gracefully. Takekoshi expressed anxiety that the "great purposes" of the Restoration were being betrayed, because he was convinced that the "new Japan" was still locked in the embrace of the "old Japan." This, of course, was a notion that Tokutomi had been pointing out with commendable regularity since the early 1880s. In 1883 he had written, "Today our people have departed from the old Japan, but have not yet arrived in the new Japan; they have left the world of autocracy, but have not yet entered the world of freedom."[52] This caution was echoed in *Shōrai no Nihon*. "Do not think that the old Japan is already gone," he said. "The most important elements dominating the society of today are all legacies of the old Japan."[53] In every sphere of life, the "spirit of feudal society soared loftily as a mountain range." The "new Japan," was basically a battleground between the "old Japan" and the "future Japan." Some "young men of Meiji," for example Okakura Tenshin, thought that the survival of the old Japan was not such a bad thing, for it showed that Japanese civilization could resist innundation by a flood of foreign ideas. But Tokutomi, as others have pointed out, did not think in terms of a dichotomy between "foreign" and "Japanese," but between "civilized" and "barbarian." What was "foreign" to men like Okakura was "civilized," "advanced," or "modern" to Tokutomi. The "industrial society" described in *Shōrai no Nihon* was superior not because it resembled the West, but because it was higher on the scale of social evolution.

[52] Quoted in Sumiya Mikio, "Meiji nashonarizumu no konseki," in Sumiya (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

Kenneth Pyle has pointed out that this kind of conviction posed problems for men like Tokutomi, who wanted to be both "modern" and "Japanese," since it seemed to imply an out-of-hand rejection of Japanese culture, a psychologically disturbing position. But this seems to me to be a slight misreading of the situation. The vigorous effects of Tokutomi, Takekoshi, and Yamaji to find the roots of *heiminshugi* in the feudal past implies to me something different. It reflects an effort to show that one could advocate radical spiritual and cultural change without showing contempt for the Japanese heritage. To put it another way, it was an attempt to locate elements of modernity, specifically democratic or liberal elements, in that heritage. Far from reflecting a kind of self-denial of self-abnegation in the face of a technologically superior foreign culture, the Min'yūsha view of Japan's past was highly affirmative, though admittedly in a rather different way from the neo-traditionalistic or culturally conservative defenders of the "national essence." The Min'yūsha historians believed in a "national essence" but found it in the pursuit of liberty or in the struggle against unjust authority rather than in some ineffable aesthetic or moral principle.

The discovery of "modern" elements in a "traditional" past is, of course, quite common among pro-modernizing intellectuals in a "transitional" society. Liberal Indian nationalists often touted the village *panchayat* as a kind of village "democracy" in attempting to establish claims that the Indian people were ready for self-government, and Chinese nationalists like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, as Joseph Levenson has shown, were willing to convert Confucius, the very linchpin of "traditional" culture, into a prophet of "modernity." The psychological significance of such arguments were (and are) manifold. Quite often, they were put forth in order to establish a moral or cultural parity between one's own native culture and the West, sometimes to sustain a flagging sense of national *amour propre,* sometimes to refute the arguments of certain kinds of Western observers who attributed culture to genetics by identifying those "without the law" as "lesser breeds" in the most literal sense. But the particular argument of the Min'yūsha historians that Japan had a "liberal" or "popular" tradition no less significant than that of the "Anglo-Saxons" was meant for domestic consumption more than for cultural warfare with Western critics. It was an attempt to marshall historical evidence against domestic political enemies.

Although it is useful to deal with the Min'yūsha historians in the context of a search for "national identity" or "cultural identity" so apparent in the intellectual history of the Meiji 20s, it may be truer to their intentions to fit them into a political context as well.[54] One has the impression that the problem of Japan's future for the Min'yūsha historians was less a cultural problem than a political one—though, to be sure, they saw the two as linked. The whole tone of the Min'yūsha writers was one of political advocacy rather than cultural anguish. They were not "agonized" or "tormented" youths, but very cocky and self-assured young men, confident in their faith in the gospel of progress and the laws of social evolution. Their despair, if so strong a word is justified, was less over the state of culture than over the state of politics.

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[54] This is the way in which most Japanese historians approach Tokutomi's thought. Kenneth Pyle's treatment of the Min'yūsha group (*The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity*, Stanford, 1969) presents a new and original way of looking at him from a vantage point not yet considered by Japanese historians themselves.

Significantly, all the Min'yūsha historians had early been influenced by the early *jiyūminken* movement, whose rhetorical style and passionately anti-government position spilled over into their writings. The collapse of the *jiyūminken* movement in the mid-1880s, particularly the disbanding of the Jiyūtō, had been a profound disappointment for all of them, but their "political fever" continued to burn on. As some Japanese historians have suggested, they belonged to a generation that turned from political activism to cultural propaganda largely because the collapse of the *jiyūminken* movement foreclosed the possibility of political action in an organized movement.[55] Tokutomi said as much himself in 1885: "The so-called era of political parties is over, and the era of education has arrived."[56] The goals of the *jiyūminken* movement still animated his imagination, however, and the founding of the Min'yūsha itself was a continuation of the *jiyūminken* movement by other means. (Significantly, both Tokutomi and Takekoshi eventually turned from journalism to political careers, albeit rather briefly for Tokutomi, in the mid-1890s.)

The basic political problem of their day, as the Min'yūsha historians saw it, was that the nation's political leadership were on a collision course with the laws of social progress. If left alone, culture would take care of itself, and the "new Japan" would eventually bury the "old Japan." But the problem was that no such policy of "cultural laissez-faire" was in sight. Although "objective conditions" were in every respect favorable to the transformation of Japan into an "industrial" or "popular society," and indeed had already produced elements of such a society, certain obstructive, obscurantist, and conservative political elements were staying the forces of history from their appointed course. Even though these historical forces perhaps could not be ultimately deflected from their goal, still it was clear that men could accelerate or inhibit the rate of historical change. It was in this context that the Min'yūsha came to write their interpretation of the Meiji Restoration and the past behind it. The Min'yūsha historians saw themselves on the side of acceleration, and those they opposed on the side of inhibiting change. They were writing history to help change history.

The chief target of the Min'yūsha historian's political critique was the Meiji oligarchs, who seemed to have turned their faces against the "inevitable forces of progress." Instead of "liberating the individual," dispersing political power, and encouraging active political participation by the "people," they had pursued a relentless policy of centralization, building up "state omnipotence." The forces of change, which had in the mid-1880s already begun to produce a new society, were brought to a halt by "opportunists and bureaucrats" like Iwakura, Ōkubo, and Itō. The critical year was 1884. Not only had the *jiyūminken* movement failed, but, as Takekoshi pointed out, "the leaders of the *dead revolution* . . . gradually began to confer peerage ranks on their trusted cronies, forgot their past, and turned *a society that was yearning for even great change* back to antiquity (Italics mine.)"[57] In other words, the *arriviste* autocrats were beginning to recreate, in defiance of "natural trends," precisely the kind of aristocratic, oppressive, and conservative social order the Restoration had destroyed.

The Min'yūsha historians did not blame the increasing conservatism of society

[55] For example, Irokawa Daikichi, "Meiji nijū-nendai no bunka," in *Iwanami kōza: Nihon no rekishi: Kindai 4, Vol. 17* (Iwanami shoten, 1962) pp. 271–314.

[56] Quoted in Sumiya, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[57] Matsushima (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 168.

solely on the oligarchs. They were also alarmed by the rise of a "popular conservatism," especially conspicuous in the late 1880s. Men like Fukuzawa Yukichi were retreating from their earlier advocacy of "progressive" views to a more state-centered or nation-centered position, and a new group of nativist conservatives had emerged under the leadership of men like Tani Kanjō. These were alarming trends for they signalled a return to the worship of all that was bad about the old Japan. The nativist conservatives, for example, regarded the *kokutai* as the most fundamental characteristic of Japan, to be protected and defended above all else; they held that "loyalty to the Emperor" was at the heart of the *kokusui;* and they regarded the notions of *heiminshugi* advanced by the *Kokumin no tomo* as inimical to both. All this represented a commitment to the "omnipotence of the state" no less intense than that of the oligarchs, and it marked a turning away from the principles embodied in the Restoration-revolution.[58]

This gloomy assessment of the ultimate fate of the Restoration was exquisitely balanced against a steady hope that Japan might still follow the path on which the "laws" of social progress and the "natural trends" of history had set her. This optimism rested on the feeling that there were elements in mid-Meiji society who could offer the kind of leadership that the oligarchs and their generation could not. Where were these to be found? For Tokutomi and Takekoshi, they were to be found among the "country gentlemen" (*inaka no shinshi*), provincial men of substance, secure in income, with an established social position and all the virtues of independence, initiative, and industry necessary to lead the new society. It was this class from which Takekoshi, Tokutomi, and other members of their circle had sprung, and it is not surprising that they felt Japan's future ought to lie in its hands.[59]

Although it would overstate the case to suggest that Min'yūsha historiography reflected the "class consciousness" of a nascent bourgeoisie, there is little doubt that their views were informed by a strong class bias. All the Min'yūsha historians tended to identify the former samurai class with the "old Japan" and all that was wrong with it. Despite his sympathy for the lot of many post-Restoration samurai, Tokutomi argued that former members of the class, even those who had adopted "liberal views" (*jiyūron*) in the *jiyūminken* movement, were unable to rid themselves of a basic conservatism. In Tokutomi's eyes, the "samurai spirit" (*shizoku konjō*), so much lauded by others, placed serious limitations on their political consciousness. Their sense of loyalty extended only to lord, domain, comrades, and ancestors, and it was not able to transcend these narrow limits. Because they could have no vision of what was ultimately in the interests of the whole society, they were hardly suited for the task of building the new Japan.

By contrast, the Min'yūsha writers identified the new Japan, and the future Japan, with the "country gentlemen." Indeed, Tokutomi called them the "new people (*shinjinmin*) of the new Japan." Even in Tokugawa times rural leaders had constituted a "vital center" (to borrow another whiggish phrase), embodying the virtues of both samurai and commoner. They were a class which did not "lapse into servility even though they tasted the bitter gall of the commoner . . . nor

[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 82–85, 161–168.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 159. For a discussion of Tokutomi's views on the role of the "country gentlemen," see Sumiya, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–26; Kanō Masanao, *Shihonshugi keiseiki no chitsujo ishiki* (Chikuma shobō, 1969) pp. 338–339.

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turned to arrogance even though they savored the sweetness of the samurai."[60] Of all the traditional classes, only the rural men of substance were able to perceive the interest of society as a whole and to see where true justice lay. Their emancipation after the Restoration freed them from the restraints of the old society and further enhanced their qualifications for leadership. Spurred by opportunities for "education" and "enterprise," the "country gentlemen," and those of their sons who flocked to the cities in pursuit of "knowledge from the West," were fast coming into their own as the natural leaders of society. Their private initiatives in business (contrasted with the pampered successes of government-supported "political merchants") and their central role in the prefectural assemblies were proof of their abilities, and their spirit of "independence and self-government" represented the kind of outlook most appropriate to the emerging liberal, laissez-faire "commoner society."[61]

It was in the context of this class bias that the constant Min'yūsha emphasis on the historical role of the *shōya,* the "little Hampdens," and the "commoner heroes" took on its significance. The past struggles of the Japanese people for liberty were an object lesson for the audience of provincial youth and rural men of substance that the *Kokumin no tomo* was trying to reach. By suggesting that the "country gentlemen" of mid-Meiji were the social heirs of those who had struggled against tyranny in the Tokugawa period, the Min'yūsha historians were rousing their readers to be confident in their ability to act. If they, rather than the oligarchs, the complaisant "political merchants," and the backsliding leaders of the *jiyūminken* movement, were the natural leaders of the new society, then they should seize the initiative in politics as their social ancestors had. The establishment of the Diet gave the rural well-to-do new access to power and new opportunities for political action. Min'yūsha historiography was *agitprop* urging them to take advantage of both.[62]

For this reason, the Min'yūsha historians lacked the smugness that so often characterized the Western whig historians on whom they modelled themselves. They were writing whig history in a tory society, and they could not afford to be complacent. Because of this, the Min'yūsha view of the Restoration was a prototype for later interpretations that likewise saw the Restoration as a "failed revolution." To the extent that the mainstream of Japanese society remained tory (defensive of the past), and Japanese intellectuals remained whigs (rushing into the future) the writing of modern Japanese history has tended to follow the mode that the Min'yūsha writers established. If later writers did not address themselves to the "country gentlemen" and their sons, they did address themselves to the "middle class," the "workers and peasants," or the "proletariat." And if they were less inclined to read the whole of the Japanese past as the struggle for liberty, still the notion of the Restoration as a revolutionary event betrayed by the statist oligarchs and conservatives continued to appeal to them. It meant that the future Japan need not be condemned to repeat the "hellish chronicle of sacrifice" that Yamaji deplored. What had started in 1868 remained to be finished.

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[60] *Kokumin no tomo,* Nr. 16, 2/17/1888, p. 89.

[61] The preceding views of the Min'yūsha on the role of the country gentlemen are most succinctly stated in "Inmitsu naru seijijō no henkan," a serial article that appeared in the *Kokumin no tomo,* Nr. 15–18 (2/3/1888–3/16/1888).

[62] It might be hypothesized that the failure of the "country gentlemen" to seize the opportunities so apparent to Tokutomi and his circle played a key role in Tokutomi's "change of heart." Cf., Sumiya, *op. cit.,* p. 26.

Modern Asian Studies, Vol 18-4, Oct- 1984, Cambridge

Edo Culture and its Modern Legacy (Tokugawa) (1600–1867)

W. G. Beasley

C R Boxer

|| Marius B. JANSEN (Princeton) Rangaku and Westerni[zation] pp. 541–554

(541) It is important to note with (Ronald P) Toby that the seclusion system was far from total. In fact, limiting the apertures from which the West could be observed probably had the effect of directing viewers to those apertures and sharpening their focus. The visits of the Dutch provided structured access to the import of books and information. Even Kaempfer (1690-92), writing at a time when interest in the West was minimal, could see 'scarce any other purpose' in the Dutch presence 'but that the Japanese might be by their means informed of what passes in other parts of the world.' The Dutch were obliged to submit regular reports about the outside world.
- In some respects Holland was an ideal bridge to the West for Tokugawa Japan.

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